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THESIS ABSTRACT
Following Colonel Younghusband's Mission to Lhasa in 1903-04, officers selected by 
the Indian Political Department were stationed in Tibet under the command o f the Political 
Officer Sikkim. This study examines aspects o f the character, role and influence o f these 
officers, whom I collectively term the T ibet cadre', and demonstrates that the cadre 
maintained a distinct collective identity and ethos, which was reflected in their approach to 
Anglo-Tibetan policies, and in the image o f Tibet which resulted from the Anglo-Tibetan 
encounter.
British India's northern frontier was the location for powerful imperial mythologies, such 
as the "Great Game", which were a part o f cadre identity. Conditions on the frontier were 
believed to suit a particular type o f individual, and officers o f  that type, capable o f 
upholding British prestige while gaining an empathy with Tibet and Tibetans, were 
favoured for cadre service. A similar type o f character was sought among the local 
intermediaries, the most successful of whom were given cadre postings.
As frontiersmen following the traditions o f Younghusband, their 'founding father', the 
cadre promoted 'forward' policies, designed to counter the perceived Russian threat to 
British India by extending British influence over the Himalayas. But Whitehall refused to 
support these policies to avoid damaging relations with China and other powers who 
regarded Tibet as part o f China. The increased control exerted by central government over 
the imperial periphery in this period meant that, although the Tibet cadre did succeed in 
their primary aim o f establishing British representation in Lhasa, they were unable to exert 
a dominant influence on policy-making either in Whitehall or in Lhasa.
The cadre largely controlled the flow o f information from Tibet, and they contributed a 
great deal to the construction o f an image of Tibet, particularly through the books they 
wrote. But although individual officers such as Sir Charles Bell developed a deep 
understanding of Tibet, this did not fully emerge in the final image, which had passed 
through layers of censorship designed to ensure that the image served British interests.
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GLOSSARY OF STYLE AND FOREIGN TERMS
INDIAN LANGUAGES
The following words are o f Sanskrit or Persian origin, butwere all used by the Tibet cadre 
in the form given below.
Babu
Chaukidar 
Dak bungalow 
Izzat
Kazi (Oazi) 
Lakh
Maharajah
Munshi
Pandit
Puranas
Purdah
Rai Bahadur
Rat Sahib
Saddhu
Sati
Shikar
Toshakhana
Clerk; particularly used to describe Bengalis, often a derogatory 
term.
Watchman.
Government rest-house (lit: post house).
Honour; charismatic authority.
Properly, a judge trained in Islamic law; used as a title by the 
Sikkimese ruling family.
100,000.
Important ruler (lit: 'great king').
Clerk; term used particularly in south and eastern India.
Usually 'Scholar' or learned person, applied to British-trained 
explorers o f Tibet in the 19th century.
Hindu texts; narratives of kings, gods, etc. Composed between 
300-1200AD., but containing m aterial reflecting an earlier 
period.
Veil; as worn by Muslim women. The practice o f seclusion o f 
women.
British Indian title; higher rank.
British Indian title; lower rank.
Hindu ascetic, or renunciate.
The practice of widow-burning.
Hunting, shooting.
Government store o f gifts received and to be given, treasury. 
(lit:'treasure-house').
TIBETAN
The following Tibetan words are given in the spelling form 
commonly used in British official documents. In the absence o f an accepted standardised 
form o f Tibetan transcription I have avoided the use o f academic forms o f Tibetan in the 
text, but they are given here in brackets, following Goldstein (1989), except where 
indicated otherwise. There are numerous variant spellings, including in names; Norbhu 
(Dhondup) for example, was also spelt Norbu.
Am ban
Bon 
De pon  
Dzasa 
Gelugpa
Jongpon
Kargyu
Kashag
Lonchen 
Monlam 
Nang pa  
Nyingma 
Ragyaba 
Phyid pa  
Shape 
Tashi lama
Trangka
Ula
(am ban) 
(bon)
(mda' dpon) 
(dza sag) 
(dge lugs pa)
(rdzong dpon) 
(bKa'brgyud*) 
(bka' shag)
Khenchung (mkhan chung)
(blon chen) 
(monlam) 
(nang pa*) 
(rnying ma) 
(rag rgyab pa) 
(phyid pa*) 
(zhabs pad) 
(bkra shis 
bla ma)
(tram ka)
('u lag)
Diplomatic representative in Lhasa of the 
Manchu Emperor 
Tibetan religious sect.
Senior military rank.
High rank or title; 'duke1.
Leading Tibetan Buddhist sect (to 
which the Dalai and Panchen Lamas 
both belong).
District administrator.
Sect o f Tibetan Buddhism.
Council. The senior government body 
o f four officials to whom all 
government business was referred. 
Monastic official, inc. Gyantse 
Tibetan Trade Agent.
Chief government minister.
New Year (Tibetan calendar)
Buddhist; 'insider'.
Sect of Tibetan Buddhism.
Disposers of the dead.
Non-Buddhist; 'outsider'.
Title of the members o f the Kashag.
The Panchen Lama, title used by 
early British officials.
Unit of coinage.
Free transport provided by villages
to those travelling on government 
business; part o f village tax 
requirement.
* Tucci(1980)
TERM INOLOGY AND ABBREVIATIONS
Tibetan and Chinese place and personal names are given in the form most common in 
British documents; i.e. Peking, not Beijing. Terms or titles in common usage in the west, 
such as Dalai Lama, are not italicised.
The term 'Political Officer' is used specifically in regard to the Political Officer Sikkim. 
When referring to officers o f the Political Department in general, the term 'Political officer' 
is used. An individual's m ilitary rank, or civilian title, is given on first mention; 
subsequently this is only given where necessary for clarity.
Where not otherwise specified, the term 'state' is used in the general sense. The term 
'Tibet' refers to the polity ruled by the Dalai Lamas, not that now designated as the Tibetan 
Autonomous Region o f China. Eastern Tibet refers to the Kharn, Derge and Amdo regions 
bordering China.
The following abbreviations are used:
ECO Escort Commanding Officer
fn Footnote.
ICS Indian Civil Service.
IMS Indian Medical Service.
IOLR India Office Library and Records.
MO Medical Officer
NAI National Archives o f India, New Delhi.
RGS Royal Geographical Society.
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INTRODUCTION
The popular image o f Tibet in the Western imagination is o f a remote land, seldom visited 
by Europeans. This ignores the fact that more than one hundred British Indian officials 
served in Tibet during the first half o f this century. Although their historical role has been 
almost forgotten, these officials had a significant influence on the British encounter with 
Tibet, and 011 contemporary Western perceptions of Tibetan history and culture.
An official British presence in Tibet began in 1903-04, with a mission to Lhasa under the 
command o f the Indian Political Officer, Colonel Francis Younghusband.[l] The mission 
forced the Tibetans to accept the establishment o f three British Trade Agencies' on their 
territory. The official British presence ended on 15 August 1947, when control o f the 
Agencies passed to the newly independent Indian Government. The last British official left 
Tibet in October 1950.
The Trade Agencies were situated at Yatung, in the Chumbi Valley close to the Indian 
border, at Gyantse, in central Tibet on the main road from the Chumbi Valley to Lhasa, and 
at Gartok, a remote town in Western Tibet (see Maps). Being closest to the Tibetan capital, 
the Gyantse Agency was the most important o f these posts until a British Mission was 
established at Lhasa in 1936-37.
With the exception o f the isolated and insignificant Gartok Agency, controlled by the 
neighbouring Indian provincial government until 1942, these positions all came under the 
control o f the Political Officer Sikkim, who was directly responsible for British relations 
with Sikkim, Bhutan, and Tibet. His status was equivalent to that o f a second class 
Resident in an Indian Princely State. The Trade Agents' were theoretically charged with 
overseeing Indo-Tibetan trade. In practice they were diplomatic representatives o f the 
Government of India, appointed by the Indian Political Department, which was responsible 
for India's relations with neighbouring states.[2]
The Gyantse Trade Agent had a military escort commanded by a British officer, and a 
British, or occasionally Anglo-Indian, Medical Officer from the Indian Medical Service. In 
addition, various British clerical, communications, and supply and transport personnel also 
served at Gyantse.[3] After 1936, a British Medical Officer and a Radio Officer also served 
at the Lhasa Mission. Although British officials (and one Anglo-Sikkimese) monopolised 
the senior positions in Tibet until 1936, they naturally placed a great deal of reliance on 
local employees, who acted as intermediaries between the British and the Tibetans.
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These intermediaries played a vital pail in translating the cultures and aspirations of two 
very different societies; one a modern European imperial power, the other a traditional 
Asian theocracy.[4] In 1904 neither society understood the other; this lack of understanding 
had been an implicit cause o f  the Younghusband Mission. By 1947, regular contact had 
given the two cultures a great deal more understanding o f  each other, and several 
individuals had come to be accepted as fully understanding, and even 'belonging to', both 
cultures.
This encounter had a significant and enduring effect on the history and culture o f the 
Indo-Tibetan frontier, including a legacy o f problems which remain important issues today 
in Sino-Indian relations, and in China's relations with the world community. Previous 
research into these issues has principally concerned government policies in regard to the 
major problem s and events o f the period, the Younghusband M ission, the Chinese 
Revolution, the Simla Convention and so on. In this concern with events and policies, the 
role o f the individual frontiersman has been largely overlooked. Yet the historical records 
o f the British presence in Tibet allow us access to the modes o f  thought and means o f 
action among the officers who served on the imperial frontier. There is a virtually complete 
record o f every individual who served in Tibet, and the key individuals, who formed a 
distinct group, are clearly apparent.
Using these records we may discover how and why these officers thought as they did, 
determine how their thoughts were expressed as action, and ascertain the extent to which 
these thoughts and actions affected policies, events and images on the Tibetan frontier. We 
can, therefore, construct a historical study within defined boundaries o f space and time, 
against which other historical models and findings may be compared. In the wider focus, 
analysis o f this encounter sheds light on current concerns with the creation o f national 
identities, and on the construction o f European images o f 'Other' cultures, and will 
contribute to the debate over whether understanding is possible in colonial encounter.
We may also reveal much o f the nature o f British imperial administration and policy on 
India's north-east frontier, and, in the context o f centre-periphery relations, help decide 
whether imperial policies were generated at the centre o f government, or by the men and 
events on the periphery; whether, as Malcolm Yapp concludes for the period 1798-1850. 
'the true motor o f imperial expansion was provided by the Political Agents'. [5]
This study will show that the officers who served in Tibet were a small, homogeneous 
group o f individuals with a distinct institutional identity, recognised by other government 
officials. As a result o f their background, character, education, training, and imperial 
service, these officers shared certain values and attitudes to Tibet and their duty there. This 
can be demonstrated by exam ining how these factors gave rise to an individual and
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collective identity, and mode o f thought which shaped their actions. For example, we may 
demonstrate how, and by whom, officers were taught a particular perspective on a frontier 
problem, show how and why they absorbed and adopted that mode o f thought, and how, 
and with what result, these officers promoted and applied the ideas they had been taught.
By examining how their collective character was formed and expressed, and to what 
effect, and by understanding the contemporary ethos in which it functioned, we may 
comprehend the perspective o f the 'man on the spot' and bring out the extent to which they 
influenced both British Tibetan policy and the image of Tibet.[6] Thus I examine their role 
from an 'insider's1 perspective to produce a picture o f the thought process which gave 
unity, and consequently political force, to this group o f elite imperial officials. [7]
In order to gain insight into the 'insider's' perspective, my approach to this study is a 
cross-disciplinary one. I draw on aspects o f historical methodology including collective 
biography, Tibetology, and administrative, imperial, and frontier history, in addition to 
borrowing, where necessary, from the social sciences. This is designed to provide a 
history which is what Collingwood called 'a picture which is partly a narrative o f events, 
partly a description o f  situations, exhibitions o f m otives, [and an] analysis o f 
characters'. [8]
My concern, therefore, is to examine the character, role, and influence on policy and the 
image o f Tibet, o f the most influential officers who served on the Tibetan frontier. In the 
absence o f  an established inclusive title, I refer to this group collectively as the 'Tibet 
cadre'. [9] I have classified as Tibet cadre those officers who served in one or more o f the 
three positions which significantly influenced the encounter between Tibet and the imperial 
power: the British Trade Agent Gyantse, the Head of British Mission Lhasa, and the senior 
post o f Political Officer Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet. Those who served for less than nine 
months in these posts are excluded, as they had little impact. We are left with a group o f 22 
officers - 19 British, one Anglo-Sikkim ese. and two Indian-born Tibetans - whose 
influence will be examined. Appendix One gives details of these officers.
This classification has the weakness o f excluding several local employees who had a 
great deal o f influence on Anglo-Tibetan affairs, but we may more usefully examine their 
role separately, for their influence was filtered through the officers included as members of 
the Tibet cadre. While the records relating to the military, medical and technical support 
personnel, many o f whom served for long periods in Tibet, are a valuable source for this 
study, their role wfas a supporting one, and my treatment o f their history reflects this.
This is, ultimately, a study of men, ideas and events on the periphery o f empire, 'betwixt 
and between' cultures European and Asian. Tibet. British India. Sikkim, and indeed the 
Tibet cadre, may all have been 'imagined communities', constructed according to the
demands o f competing power structures, but the subjects o f my study existed in a specific 
time and place. They thought and acted in a cultural context, which is important because of 
its effects today on real people, places, and events. My work does not concern a single 
underlying process; rather it analyses complex human actions, and the causes o f these 
actions amidst changing ideas and circumstances. Form, structure, perspective and 
methodology in this work are therefore aimed at understanding how and why the Tibet 
cadre officers thought and acted as they did, and the effects o f their thoughts and actions.
SECTTON 1: - SOURCES
This study is based upon the English-language primary source material o f the India Office 
Library and Records (London) and the National A rchives o f India (New Delhi), 
supplemented by material from other public and private archives. [10] This source material 
consists principally o f private and official correspondence to and from the Tibet cadre. In 
addition, I carried out a series o f interviews with British, Tibetan, and Indian officials who 
served in Tibet, or with the families o f those who did so. These interviews were intended 
to provide more insight into the personalities o f the individuals involved and the ethos of 
their time. In the interviews I relied primarily on the methodology suggested by Seldon and 
Pappworth,[l 1] although, due to the widely-differing perspectives o f those interviewed, I 
did not use a standard questionnaire, but varied my questioning according to the subject's 
role in Tibet. A list o f both the persons interviewed, and the archives consulted, is 
contained in the attached bibliography. [12]
Other than my own previous works, there are no secondary sources specifically 
examining the history o f  the Tibet cadre. There are, however, a number o f accounts 
concerning, or by. individual officers o f the cadre, and there are numerous books and 
articles by other individuals who visited Tibet. There are also a number o f secondary 
sources which concern Anglo-Tibetan relations and the history o f Tibet during the period of 
the British presence. The most reliable of these accounts are the works by Alastair Lamb, 
whose focus has been on events relating to the making o f India's borders. I have come to 
rely a great deal on the outstanding scholarship of Lamb in this area.[13]
The critical scholarship o f Lamb excepted, it is characteristic o f most o f these secondary 
sources, particularly the accounts o f  travellers, that their approach reflects the 'imperial 
school' o f British history, whose view o f the British presence in South Asia is largely 
uncritical. The memoirs o f cadre officers, and even primary sources, have therefore been 
taken at face-value by most writers on Tibet. They have not been analysed as texts of
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imperial history representing the views o f a particular power structure, and promoting its 
'voice' at the expense o f other 'voices', which they m arginalise in their prevailing 
discourse. Modem historical methodology has only recently influenced Tibetology, most 
notably in Peter Bishop's analysis o f the role of travel literature in the formation o f the 
'mystical' image o f Tibet. [14]
While taking into account these modern historical trends, my concern here is not to 
deconstruct the constitution o f  a particular cultural order, but rather to reconstruct the 
mentality o f the Tibet cadre and to demonstrate the results o f this mentality. As the works 
o f Alastair Lamb illustrate, familiarity with the primary sources enables the reader to 
perceive the intentions behind stated meanings and to 'hear' marginalised 'voices’ in 
official discourse. British Tibetan policy and administration was never monolithic. Policy 
was determined through compromise. Discussion often ranged throughout the chain o f 
command from Whitehall to the frontier, and along this chain can be found many dissenting 
views, British and Asian, and many representations o f marginalised power structures. 
There were alternative perspectives on the frontier, and they are represented in the official 
archives. W hile most o f the published work by imperial officials was subjected to 
censorship, there are records o f what was censored, and which 'voices' were suppressed. 
We may, therefore, analyse the construction o f an image o f Tibet by this narrow, class- 
based cadre o f officials, and contrast it with the available alternative images to ascertain 
where it is lacking.
As contemporary politics and language difficulties have restricted this study to English- 
language sources, my perspective naturally reflects this. The questions which I raise could 
be considered from Chinese, Tibetan, and Russian points o f view through the use o f their 
sources. But my intention is to examine the British encounter w ith Tibet through the 
perspective o f the British officials who served there, and this is best represented through 
the British sources which I have used.
SECTION 2: - EVENTS LEADING TO THE BRITISH POSTS IN TIBET
The Younghusband Mission was the culmination of a long process o f British Indian 
expansion towards Tibet which began in the time of the East India Company. Following 
victory at the battle o f Plassey in 1757, the East India Company had become the leading 
power in Bengal. In 1772, when Bhutanese forces invaded Bengal's northern neighbour 
Cooch Bihar, and captured its ruler, the Regent o f Cooch Bihar appealed to the East India 
Company for assistance. The following year, the Governor-General o f Bengal, Warren
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Hastings, dispatched a force which drove the Bhutanese back into their own territory. 
Seeking m ediation to end the conflict, the Bhutanese then turned to their northern 
neighbour, Tibet, for assistance.[15]
In the seventh century AD,, Tibet had emerged as a united tribal federation under a series 
o f sacral kings who ruled at Lhasa. After a brief period as an expansionist power, when 
Tibetan troops ranged from Samarkand in the west to the Chinese capital of Chang'an (now 
Xian) in the east, the Tibetan kingdom collapsed after the assassination o f the last o f the 
sacral kings in c842. In the 13th century Tibet em erged again as a united, now 
predominantly Buddhist, state, which submitted to Mongol overlordship. In return it was 
allowed to retain a large measure o f  internal autonomy, and was able to convert the 
Mongols to Tibetan Buddhism. [16]
In 1578, the Mongol ruler, Altan Khan, gave the title o f Dalai Lama ('Ocean o f Wisdom') 
to the hierarch o f the Tibetan Buddhist Gelugpa sect, who was recognised as the second 
incarnation o f the sect's founder. [17] The title was later applied retrospectively to his 
predecessors, and was inherited by his successive incarnations. In 1642, Mongol forces 
intervened in Tibetan internal struggles on behalf o f the Gelugpa sect, and made the 5th 
Dalai Lama the effective ruler o f Tibet. It was the 5th Dalai Lama who appointed his senior 
teacher as Abbot o f  Tashilumpo, Shigatse's leading Gelugpa  monastery, with the title 
Panchen ('Great Scholar'), an action which was to have far-reaching consequences. [18]
In 1720, the Mongols' overlordship o f  Tibet was replaced by that o f China's Ch'ing 
dynasty, whose emperors sought to use the Panchen Lama's power to counter that o f the 
Dalai Lama. In 1773, when Bhutanese and British-commanded forces clashed over Cooch 
Bihar, the 8th Dalai Lama was still in his minority, and, although Tibet was ruled by a 
Regent, the long-serving 3rd Panchen Lama had acquired a considerable degree o f power 
and autonomy. Thus it was the Panchen Lama who came to the aid o f his Bhutanese co­
religionists.
On 29 March 1774, the Panchen Lama wrote to Warren Hastings blaming the Bhutanese 
for the fighting, but asking Hastings to put an end to hostilities before they 'irritate both the 
[Dalai] Lama and his subjects against you'.[19] Hastings ignored the implied threat, and 
accepted mediation. A treaty was concluded with Bhutan, and Hastings took advantage o f 
the establishment o f communications with Tashilumpo by dispatching an envoy, George 
Bogle o f the Bengal Civil Service, who reached Shigatse in 1775, where he established 
good relations with the Panchen Lama. After the Panchen Lama died in 1780 (and Bogle a 
year later), Hastings continued to seek ties with Tibet, sending Captain Samuel Turner to 
Shigatse in 1782 after the Panchen Lama's incarnation had been discovered.
Despite the goodwill they established at Tashilumpo, Bogle and Turner achieved little of
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lasting value. The Lhasa authorities refused to permit them to visit the Tibetan capital, and, 
with Hasting's departure from India, British contacts with Tibet ceased. While the British 
increased their power over India, culminating in 1858 when India was brought under the 
ultimate control o f  the British Government, Tibet became increasingly isolated from 
changes in the outside world. An eccentric English private scholar, Thomas Manning 
(1772-1840), visited Lhasa in 1811, and two Lazarist priests, Hue and Gabet, followed in 
1846, but the Tibetans, encouraged by the Chinese to regard foreigners as a threat to their 
religion, and fearing the expansion of British power in India and Nepal, increasingly 
resisted any attempt to open Tibet to foreigners. [20] The result was that Tibetan society 
became more conservative and insular.
During the 19th century, China's control over Tibet diminished to the point of mere 
ceremonial overlordship, represented by an official, resident in Lhasa, known as the 
A m  ban.  T ibet's rem oteness made it a hardship posting for the Chinese, whose 
representatives were o f  poor quality, and China's own internal weaknesses prevented her 
from imposing stronger rule. Real political power in Lhasa was held by a succession o f 
Regents, as the 9th-12th Dalai Lamas all died before, or shortly after, taking power.
Throughout the 19th century the advance o f British rule in India continued, until they 
became Tibet’s principal southern neighbour. By 1846, the British had gained control o f 
most of the area bordering south-western Tibet, and in the second half o f the 19th century 
they gradually drew most o f the area to the east under their influence. Nepal, a traditional 
enemy o f Tibet, had become a British ally, and in 1855 they invaded and defeated Tibet, a 
move the Tibetans assumed must have had British support.
Tibetan mistrust o f British intentions was also fueled by incursions into Tibetan territory 
by parties o f British officers on 'hunting expeditions'. While the Government o f India 
officially sought to discourage such cross-border expeditions, unofficially they were used 
to gather intelligence concerning Tibet. The British also trained local surveyors, known as 
pandits . to travel in disguise through Tibet, and they produced the first accurate maps o f 
the country.[21]
Tibet's desire for isolation presented problems to British India. Although there was a 
long history o f Indo-Tibetan trade ,[22] it was principally in the hands o f frontier 
intermediaries, and there were no formal ties between India and Tibet, no diplomatic 
representatives or established mode o f inter-governmental communication. When the 
British sought to raise issues with Lhasa, they had no means of communicating with the 
Tibetan Government.
In the late 19th century, Whitehall and the Government o f India came under pressure 
from powerful trading lobbies seeking to open Tibet to trade. The Darjeeling tea industry
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was particularly concerned to force the Tibetans to end a ban on the import o f Indian 
tea.[23] More importantly, there was an increasing concern with the security o f India's 
northern frontier, as the British came to fear that Russia's rapid expansion into Central Asia 
would lead to their gaining influence in Tibet.
There was also a less quantifiable concern: a contemporary spirit o f enquiry demanded 
that the 'unknown' should be 'known', and Tibet's policy o f  isolation was increasingly 
producing, in the European construct, an alluring image o f a mystical 'sacred realm'. 
Tibet's determination to preserve its isolation only succeeded in making it more attractive to 
many European minds. [24]
As China was theoretically the supreme power in Tibet, the British sought to deal with 
the Tibetans through discussion with the Chinese. In 1885, China agreed to a mission from 
the Government o f Bengal to Lhasa, but this was abandoned at the last minute when it 
became clear that Tibet would not accept it. The Tibetans apparently regarded the mission 
as an invasion force, and stationed troops to oppose it in what the British regarded as 
Sikkimese territory. [25] After unsuccessful attempts to negotiate a solution with China, the 
British dispatched an expeditionary force in 1888-89, which expelled the Tibetans. John 
Claude White, a Public Works Department engineer 'on loan to the Political Department' 
for the duration o f the expedition, was then appointed to the newly-created post o f Political 
Officer Sikkim.
China feared that she would lose any vestige o f her influence in Tibet if  the Tibetans 
negotiated directly with the British, and therefore agreed to talks with Britain, with no 
Tibetan representatives involved. These talks produced the 1890 A nglo-Chinese 
Convention and its attached 1893 Trade Regulations, which allowed for the opening o f a 
British Trade Agency in Tibet. However the British were manouevered into accepting 
Yatung, located in an isolated valley o ff the main trade route, as the site for the Trade 
Agency, instead of Phari, where Tibet's trade taxation office was located.
The Tibetans ignored the Anglo-Chinese agreement, and when White visited Yatung in 
May 1894 to open the mart, he found the Tibetans had built a wall around Yatung to isolate 
it. The Government o f India were, by the 1893 Regulations, entitled to 'send officers to 
reside at Yatung to watch the conditions o f  British trade at that mart', but none were 
appointed. Thus in 1895. when the 13th Dalai Lama took power in Tibet, the Tibetans 
remained relatively secure in their isolation.[26]
In 1899 a new Viceroy arrived in India, George Nathaniel Curzon (in office 1899-1905). 
Curzon had travelled widely in Central Asia, and had seen at first-hand the expansion of the 
Tsarist Russian State into the tribal confederacies and khanates o f Central Asia. Curzon did 
not deny that Russia had the right to imperial expansion, but he considered that British
interests demanded that India, 'the Jewel in the Crown1 o f the British empire, be secured 
from Russian influence.[27]
Curzon received reports from a number o f sources which indicated that Russia was 
gaining influence in Tibet. [28] He twice sent letters to the Dalai Lam a through 
intermediaries in an attempt to open communications with the Tibetan leader; neither was 
accepted. While Warren Hastings had ignored the implicit challenge to British strength in 
his letter from the Panchen Lama, Curzon saw the Tibetan's refusal to accept a letter from 
the Viceroy of India as a deliberate blow to British prestige. [29]
The British were particularly suspicious of Agvan Dorzhiev, a Russian Buryat monk who 
had become an attendant o f the Dalai Lama. When it became known that Dorzhiev had 
travelled to St Petersburg to contact the Russian Government at the Dalai Lama's behest, 
Curzon began planning a mission to Lhasa which would remove Russian influence from 
Tibet and establish British influence there.[30]
By late 1902, Curzon had chosen Francis Younghusband, a dynamic and widely 
travelled Political officer, to lead the mission. Younghusband was a loyal supporter o f 
Curzon, and considered he had a personal responsibility to him to succeed in implementing 
the policies Curzon promoted.[31] Younghusband was given a military escort, and, as the 
mission advanced into Tibet, it met increasing resistance from Tibetan forces. The far more 
technically advanced British Indian troops inflicted a series o f heavy defeats on the local 
forces and, on 30 July 1904, the 13th Dalai Lama fled into exile in Mongolia, four days 
before Younghusband’s forces entered Lhasa.
Younghusband negotiated an agreement with the Tibetan Government resulting in the 
Convention between Great Britain and Tibet, signed in the Potala Palace on 7 September 
1904. This Convention gave the British the right to establish Trade Agencies at the Yatung, 
Gyantse and Gartok 'trade marts', and to station British officers there to 'watch over 
British trade at the marts'. It also allowed the British to occupy the Chumbi Valley until the 
Tibetans had paid an indemnity, in seventy-five annual installments.
Whitehall refused to allow the Government of India to establish a representative in the 
Tibetan capital, which had been one o f Curzon's main policy aims. Younghusband. hoping 
to salvage Curzon's policy', negotiated a separate agreement with the Tibetans, not included 
in the Convention.[32] This gave the Gyantse Trade Agent the right to visit Lhasa. 
Whitehall, however, anxious to avoid continuing involvement in Tibet, rejected the separate 
agreement, and also reduced the period o f the indemnity payments to three years. [33]
The Trade Agencies were established in late 1904, as the Younghusband Mission 
withdrew. Yatung. in the Chumbi Valley, was already under British administration. 
Younghusband's 'right-hand man', the Tibetan-speaking Captain O'Connor, was left in
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Gyantse as Trade Agent, and a small party o f officers (including Lieutenant F.M.Bailey) 
returned to India via western Tibet, to prepare for the establishment o f the Gartok Agency. 
The British now had a permanent foothold in Tibet.
The Tibet which Younghusband's forces encountered was not a modern nation state as 
Europeans understood it; as will be seen in Chapter Six. Tibet had no formal mechanism 
for the conduct o f relations with its neighbours, nor did it have a bureaucratic class. It was 
not tied into any economic systems, and the economy functioned largely by barter. There 
was no industrial or mechanical development; even the wheel was used only in a religious 
context, and was unknown as a means of transport.
While Tibet was not a modem nation-state, Tibetans had a definite identity, which, as 
will be seen, was based on racial, cultural and linguistic separateness from their 
neighbours, and on the collective understanding o f a shared history, mythology and 
traditions. Although there were non-Buddhist elements in Tibetan society, the outstanding 
feature o f Tibetan culture was its Buddhist religion, and the Tibetans defined their identity 
primarily in religious terms. Tibet was thus a Buddhist traditional state, defining itself by 
its centre and sacred spaces rather than following European definitions according to borders 
and political and economic systems. As they entered the twentieth century, the Tibetans 
were forced to confront the differing perceptions o f national and state identity held by 
traditional and modern societies.
SECTION 3: 1904-47: EVENTS IN TIBET
The withdrawal o f Younghusband's forces left a power vacuum in Lhasa. The Dalai 
Lama wras exiled to Mongolia, and the Regent appointed in his absence was an elderly 
religious figure with no experience o f secular power. China, whose prestige in Tibet had 
suffered greatly from their inability either to control the Tibetans or to prevent the 
Younghusband Mission, began to assert their power.
China's position was greatly strengthened by Whitehall's willingness to concede their 
right to rule Tibet. Britain negotiated agreements with China in 1906 and 1908. and with 
Russia in 1907, which effectively recognised Chinese 'suzerainty' over Tibet, and 
committed the British not to negotiate with the Tibetans without Chinese participation. In 
addition, Britain and Russia agreed not to send any representatives to Lhasa, and it was 
agreed that the Trade Agent's escort would be withdrawn once China had established 
'effective police measures at the marts and along the routes to the marts’.[34]
By late 1906. when they blockaded the Gyantse Trade Agency in a show of strength, the
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Chinese had become the dominant power in central Tibet. A Chinese army in Eastern Tibet, 
commanded by General Chao Erh-feng, brought the eastern borderlands under Chinese 
control and China paid the indemnity imposed on the Tibetans for which the Chumbi Valley 
had been held as security. While the cadre believed that 'we have many excuses for keeping 
it [Chumbi]', Whitehall insisted on withdrawal.[35]
The exiled Dalai Lama, having unsuccessfully sought Russian assistance, was forced to 
turn to China. He travelled slowly to Peking, where he was received by the Chinese 
Emperor in September 1908. The Emperor died soon after, and the Dalai Lama was 
allowed to return to Lhasa. Although the Chinese had attempted to depose him, they 
recognised, as the British had yet to do, that the Dalai Lama was the only leader able to 
command the support o f the majority of Tibetans.
The Dalai Lama reached Lhasa in December 1909, but fled south to India in February 
1910, as two thousand troops from Chao Erh-feng's army entered Lhasa. The Chinese 
troops were, according to the Chinese, sent to police the trade marts under the terms of the 
1908 Anglo-Chinese Agreement. As such the British could not object to them, but both the 
Tibet cadre and the Tibetans regarded the troops as an invading army, sent to enforce 
Chinese control in Tibet. [3 6]
The Government o f India gave the Dalai Lama refuge, and supported the cost o f his 
establishment. In his absence, the Chinese attempted to make the Panchen Lama the ruler of 
Tibet. Although the Panchen eventually refused, the perception that he had hesitated sowed 
the seeds for a dispute between the supporters o f the two leading Tibetan incarnations, 
which eventually led to the Panchen Lama fleeing into exile in China.[37]
In October 1911, the Chinese revolution overthrew the ruling dynasty. Supporters o f the 
revolution among the Chinese troops in Tibet mutinied. The Tibetans revolted against the 
Chinese, whose position in Tibet collapsed. The Dalai Lama returned from exile in June 
1912, and on reaching Lhasa in January 1913. issued what the Tibetans regard as a 
declaration of independence.[38] In the same month, a Mongol-Tibetan treaty was signed. 
While its legal status was uncertain, the treaty was indicative o f Tibet's desire to fully 
separate from China.[39]
Tibet then entered tri-partite negotiations with China and Britain, resulting in the Simla 
Convention of 1914. China refused to sign this Convention, which was eventually agreed 
between Britain and Tibet. Tibet gained recognition of her autonomy from Britain, but the 
Chinese refusal to sign the Convention made its legal implications difficult to assess. While 
using it as the basis for their relations, Britain and Tibet continued to seek Chinese 
recognition o f the Convention. By 1920, it had become apparent that this would not be 
forthcoming. Sir Charles Bell, the Political Officer in Sikkim, who had become a close
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associate o f the Dalai Lama during his exile in India, was then permitted by his government 
to visit Lhasa.[40]
Bell was the principal advisor to the Dalai Lama in the period 1910-21, when Tibet 
gained its practical independence and began a policy o f modernising its institutions. This 
policy was opposed by the conservative monastic and aristocratic leadership o f Tibet, and 
taxes imposed in an attempt to finance the modernisation programme were a factor in the 
Panchen Lama's decision to flee into exile in 1923.[41] Conservative opposition was too 
powerful for the Dalai Lama to ignore, and with the Tibet cadre unable to provide the 
financial, or military, support necessary for Tibet to modernise, the policy was abandoned. 
After Bell's departure, the Dalai Lama was less committed to policies promoted by the 
British, at least until clashes with China on the eastern frontier in the early 1930s led him to 
turn again to British India for support. [42]
The death o f the Dalai Lama in 1933 saw the installation o f a young and inexperienced 
Regent, from Reting Monastery. Tibet became preoccupied with the search for the Dalai 
Lama's new incarnation, while China made two significant moves to reestablish influence 
in Tibet. Although their officials had been expelled from Tibet in 1913, the Chinese sent a 
'condolence mission' to Lhasa following the Dalai Lama's death. Once established in the 
Tibetan capital, the mission became a de facto  Chinese embassy. In addition, the Panchen 
Lama, who had been supported by the Chinese during his exile, threatened to return to 
Tibet with a significant force o f Chinese troops as a 'bodyguard'.
In response to China's moves, the British established a Lhasa Mission, although the 
Panchen Lama's death in 1937 ended the threat o f his return. China was increasingly 
preoccupied by her war with Japan, and Tibet remained neutral throughout World War 
Two. Its preparations for the post-Indian independence period were distracted by an 
attempted coup d'etat in 1947, when the Reting Regent, who had resigned in 1941, 
attempted to regain his power. The affair drew one o f the three main Lhasa monasteries into 
fighting with the government before the convenient death o f the Reting Lama brought the 
affair to an end.[43]
The Tibetan perspective on the 1904-47 period was very different from the British 
perspective. Tibet was an isolated and insular society, largely oblivious to the outside 
world. The country was absorbed with religious matters, the central feature o f its social 
system. Tibet's determination to preserve that system meant that its foreign policy was 
largely aimed at ensuring its isolation. Historically, Tibet was prepared to surrender aspects 
o f sovereignty which in the European understanding were the proper province o f 
government, in particular foreign relations, to a stronger power if that power would leave it 
with internal autonomy, particularly in regard to religion. Historically it had made that
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compromise with the Mongols, and with the Manchu Dynasty, but, once the Chinese came 
to be seen as a threat to Tibet's autonomous position, Tibet distanced itself from China, and 
looked for another patron who would guarantee its internal autonomy.
With the Russians unwilling to provide any practical assistance, the Tibetans were forced 
to turn to the British. They received indications o f support, for example the protection 
extended to the Dalai Lama in Indian exile, which briefly led them to rely on the British. 
When it became apparent the British could not provide sufficient support, and that the 
imposition o f British policies o f modernisation threatened their socio-religious system, they 
sought to balance their powerful neighbours, playing one off against the other, a common 
strategy for states located between two empires.[44] A delicate balance was established 
during the period 1936-1947, but the advent o f a Communist government in China after the 
withdrawal o f the British meant the end o f any self-government by the Tibetans.
SECTION 4: APPLYING FORW ARD POT IC Y  IN TIBET
The security o f India's northern frontier was the primary concern o f the Government of 
India in their dealings with Tibet. In the 19th century the Himalayan mountain chain 
appeared to provide a 'natural frontier' between India and China. [45] China was not then 
seen as a threat to India, and the predominant British Indian opinion was that there was no 
need for a 'Tibetan policy '.[46] The implicit assumption was that if  Tibet was part o f 
China, the Government o f India could solve the Tibetan question by agreement with China.
When it became apparent that Chinese rule over Tibet was purely nominal, and that for 
practical purposes the Tibetans were independent, this still did not demand a T ibetan 
policy'. Tibet did not pose a threat to India, and there was no apparent reason why the 
Government o f India could not establish what they considered normal relations between 
neighbouring states.
When it became apparent that the Tibetans were not prepared to establish 'normal 
relations', the need for a Tibetan policy grew, but there remained a strong body o f opinion 
within policy-making circles which held that India could still safely leave the Tibetans in 
their desired isolation. Only when it became known that Russia had developed links with 
Tibet was it agreed that a Tibetan policy was needed, for Russian involvement in Tibet was 
seen as liable to threaten the security o f India by paving the way for the infiltration o f 
Russian influence into Nepal and the British Indian Himalayas.
The Government o f India therefore created a Tibetan policy which was aimed at 
preventing Russia from gaining influence in Tibet, while incidentally satisfying the trade
lobby and those forces arising out o f the contemporary spirit o f enquiry. Curzon resolved 
to force the Tibetans to negotiate with the British by dispatching Younghusband to Tibet 
with full authority to negotiate with the Tibetan Government. Curzon hoped that this would 
lead to a British representative at Lhasa, who, in the manner o f  a Political Officer in an 
Indian Princely State, would be able to influence the local government to act in accordance 
with British aims. This policy was largely Curzon's creation, although the influence o f 
other Indian officials (such as the then Foreign Secretary, Sir Louis Dane), was also 
apparent.
The policy which Curzon initiated was recognised in British India as one of two possible 
frontier policies. Either the frontier could be defended by garrisons o f troops, or it could be 
defended by 'buffer states' beyond the frontier. 'Buffer states' were those separating two 
empires. They were also potential zones o f expansion for the imperial power, influence 
tending to lead to their being absorbed. Therefore while frontier garrisons were an 
essentially defensive policy, 'buffer states' implied a 'forward' policy.[47]
'Forward' policies were those which involved an expansion o f imperial responsibilities 
beyond existing limits. The classic exposition o f the consequences o f this policy was by 
General John Jacob, on the Sind frontier in the 1850s, who stated, 'to enable this red line 
to retain its present position...it is absolutely necessary to occupy posts in advance o f 
it.'[48] 'Forward' policies were generally favoured by the imperial frontiersmen because an 
extension o f British administration offered an obvious solution to problems raised by 
peoples outside British control. There were also benefits to the career o f  individual 
frontiersman who were responsible for bringing territory under British control.[49]
If'forw ard' policies were the most popular on the periphery o f  empire, they were much 
less so at the centre. While the security of India was their primary concern, the Government 
of India operated on a tightly controlled budget which greatly restricted its frontier policies. 
An expansion o f British control over the Himalayas would have been an extremely 
expensive undertaking, and Tibet, with a primitive economy and no infrastructure, was 
unlikely to provide any economic benefits if it was drawn into the Indian economy. The 
government was therefore extremely reluctant on financial grounds to extend its 
responsibilities to the north, and sought the most economical solutions.
’Forward1 policies were even less attractive to Whitehall, whose global perspective gave 
it an aversion to expanding the frontiers o f its empire. Both Russia and China always 
opposed any extension o f British influence in Tibet, while after World War One this 
opposition widened to include Japan, America and later Nazi Germany, all o f whom 
employed varying degrees o f anti-colonialist rhetoric in regard to the British presence in 
Tibet. Whitehall wras particularly concerned to avoid alienating the Chinese, with whom
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British trade ties were o f  great economic importance, and therefore sought to solve the 
Tibetan question through negotiations with China and Russia, leading to wider regional 
agreements.
There was an obvious tendency for the interests o f Whitehall and the Government o f 
India to clash in areas o f foreign policy. Measures which India considered essential to 
safeguard its security interests could be strongly opposed by Whitehall because o f their 
effect on British foreign relations. Whitehall therefore sought to increase its control over 
India's foreign policy and to limit India's expansionist tendencies. They were deeply 
distrustful o f the frontiersmen and their plans for expanding British authority, and by the 
turn of this century, improved communications had enabled Whitehall to bring India more 
firmly under their control. The age o f expansion o f the British South Asian empire was 
practically over.
Curzon's period as Viceroy was o f seminal importance to Anglo-Tibetan relations, but it 
marked the high tide o f empire on India's north-east frontier. W hen Curzon ordered 
Younghusband to Tibet, this seemed likely to end in a British Tibetan protectorate. 
Whitehall's refusal to allow a British presence to be established at Lhasa was a fatal blow to 
Curzon's plans, but Younghusband appeared to salvage part o f Curzon's aims by obtaining 
the right to occupy the Chumbi Valley (which was o f great strategic importance in that it 
offered a possible invasion route to and from India) for 75 years; that should have brought 
the Chumbi Valley into the British Indian empire. But while Younghusband considered that 
'I do not see the slightest prospect of our ever being able to give Chumbi up whatever His 
Majesty's Government may say about not occupying any part o f Tibet', Whitehall again 
refused to approve such a 'forward' m ove.[50]
When Curzon left India the imperial tide had turned. There was a new Liberal 
Government in Britain and the Boer War had swung public opinion against overseas 
adventures. In a reversal o f the situation in the Curzon period, there was a weak Viceroy 
and a strong Secretary o f State, and the Government o f India were now given clear 
instructions that they were to follow Whitehall's orders. Younghusband was given a copy 
o f Secretary o f State St. John Broderick's despatch to the Viceroy, dated 2 December 
1904. by Broderick himself.
Questions [wrote Broderick] o f Indian Frontier policy could no longer be 
regarded from an exclusively Indian point o f view, and the course to be 
pursued in such cases must be laid down by His M ajesty's Government 
alone. [51]
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SECTION 5: POLICY: THE TTBET CADRE’S PERSPECTIVE
While the Tibet cadre were o f the 'forward school', implementation of'forw ard' policies 
was blocked by Whitehall. India had to accept that
The large commercial interests o f His Majesty's Government in China make 
it necessary to subordinate policy in Tibet to the general policy o f the British 
Government in China and to avoid incurring the hostility...of the [Chinese] 
Government. [52]
This was not the view o f the Tibet cadre. They were naturally frustrated by the 
restrictions imposed on them by the Government o f India, usually, though by no means 
exclusively, at Whitehall's behest. But while they often railed at the 'Old maids who weave 
our destiny in Simla',[53] it was the British Foreign Office which represented the antithesis 
o f their position. The Tibet cadre considered that their view o f the China-Tibet problem was 
pro-Chinese. When one Tibet cadre officer visited the Foreign Office in 1949 he found 'an 
icy Chinese expert, Paul Grey, in charge o f the Far East...and he simply smiled bleakly 
when I tried to tell him o f Tibet's position.' Another complained that 'I don't think the 
young pup who was dealing with Tibet...knew where it is on the m ap.'[54]
While British policy in Tibet was not monolithic, there were prevailing trends which we 
may summarise, and the policies favoured by the Tibet cadre represent a consistent line o f 
policy. The ultimate aim o f the British in Tibet was the protection o f India from what was 
seen as the subversive influence o f its neighbouring northern empires. There were three 
possible solutions to that threat. China could be allowed to control Tibet, Tibet could be 
made a British protectorate, or Tibet could be strengthened to the point where it was 
capable o f acting as an effective 'buffer state'.
Although China’s inability to control Tibet and exclude Russian influence there had led to 
the Younghusband Mission, Whitehall, and elements of the Government o f India, saw the 
establishment o f Chinese power in Tibet as the solution to the Tibetan problem. But. 
following the Chinese efforts to weaken the British position in Tibet, the Tibet cadre 
opposed any return to Chinese control. This was particularly the case during the isolation 
o f the Gyantse Trade Agency between 21 November 1906 and 16 July 1907, when the 
Chinese prevented the Trade Agent from having any direct dealings with the Tibetans. The 
cadre argued that reassertion o f Chinese control would lead to a revival o f Chinese claims 
to areas o f British India, including Sikkim, and also to Bhutan, and, most importantly. 
Nepal. They also thought that China might be too weak to prevent Russian, and later
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Japanese, influence from penetrating through Tibet, and argued that allowing China to rule 
Tibet would not provide a stable and secure northern border for India as China's control 
would be contested by the Tibetans.[55]
The cadre initially favoured establishing a British protectorate in Tibet, although this was 
never openly articulated. Younghusband1 s attempt to annex the Chumbi Valley, and the 
later annexation o f Tawang under the 1914 Simla Convention, were both aimed towards 
that end.[56] But after Curzon's viceroyalty it became increasingly obvious that Tibet 
would not be taken into the British empire, even at its own request.[57] The Government 
o f India's econom ic restrictions, and W hitehall's concern for the international 
complications, meant that they would veto any such move. The Tibet cadre continued to 
promote policies which might have led to the establishm ent o f  a British Tibetan 
protectorate, but this became an increasingly unrealistic aim, and was largely forgotten by 
the 1930s.[58]
Creating a Tibetan 'buffer state' was a compromise between abandonm ent and 
annexation. It required the creation o f a strong, unified Tibet, capable o f resisting external 
influence, which, if  it was to be an effective 'buffer state' for British India, had to be 
brought under British influence; thus the cadre promoted policies aimed at establishing 
influence over Tibet. Most importantly, they sought to station a British representative in 
Lhasa. Only there could they create the close ties with the ruling class which were needed if 
the British were to influence Tibet.
Once it became apparent that the Dalai Lama was the only leader capable o f uniting the 
Tibetans, a Tibetan 'buffer state' policy implied support for his leadership, which became 
the basis o f the cadre's policies after 1910. This was consistent with Political Department 
methods in India, where the friendship of local rulers was deliberately cultivated in order to 
establish influence. By 1923, it was clear that the conservative elements in Tibet who 
opposed modernisation were succeeding in convincing the Dalai Lama to side with them 
against the weaker modernising faction. But, as we shall see in Chapter Four, after what 
was apparently a failed, and largely concealed attempt to create an alternative leadership 
which would institute modernisation policies, the British had no alternative but to continue 
to deal with Tibet's traditional leadership.
The extension o f British influence in Tibet was naturally opposed by China, who 
consistently sought to bring Tibet into her empire. There was no dispute between the two 
powers over the model o f modernisation which Tibet should follow, for China was herself 
modernising on the Western model. What they disputed was who would control the 
process. [59]
The history o f Tibet during the 1904-47 period can be seen as a struggle between the
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British and the Chinese over this question o f control. Both countries sent representatives 
who sought to influence the Tibetans and control the process o f  modernisation in their 
country's favour. They used similar methods, copied the other's initiatives, and constantly 
measured their opponent's successes and failures against their ow n.[60] The slightest 
indication o f Tibetan preference for one country's ideas, actions and even sports and 
pastimes, was seen as evidence that the Tibetans favoured that country and hence its 
policies.[61] With both sides claiming their involvement was in the Tibetans' best interests, 
the Tibetans' desire for isolation and autonomy was ignored.
SECTION 6: BRITTSH INDIAN ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE
In order to place the Tibet cadre in its administrative context, it is necessary to outline the 
structure o f the Government o f India and the administrative chain o f command in which the 
Tibet cadre were located.
The Government o f  India inherited its basic structure from the East India Company. In 
1833, government in India had been placed under the control o f a Governor-General (also 
known, after 1858, as the Viceroy, the term I have used in this study). In 1843, 
government was reorganised into four departments, Home, Financial, M ilitary and 
Foreign. All matters relating to India's foreign relations cam e under the Foreign 
Department.
The East India Company used the term 'Civil Service' to describe its non-military 
employees responsible for civil administration. They became the Indian Civil Service when 
the Government o f India Act o f 1858 brought British Indian administration under direct 
Crown authority. Under this Act, the ultimate control o f British India was vested in the 
Crown, and, in practice, in the British Parliament, while the Viceroy, on behalf o f the 
British monarch, was responsible for relations with the Indian 'Princely States'. A new 
British Government department, the India Office, was created to administer India. It was 
headed by the Secretary o f State for India, who was a member o f the British Cabinet. This 
separated responsibility for relations between Britain and India from relations with foreign 
states such as Russia and China, the responsibility of the Foreign Office, and relations with 
the British colonies, which came under the Colonial Office. This division obviously created 
the potential for conflicts o f interest between the different departments, which was to be 
reflected in the Tibet cadre's struggle with the views o f the Foreign Office.
The Secretary o f State for India (hereafter, the Secretary o f State), was responsible for 
the principal appointments in the Indian administration, and controlled recruitment to the
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Indian Civil Service (hereafter, the ICS). As a member o f Cabinet, he was subject to 
political appointment, but there was a Permanent Under-Secretary o f State, a civil servant 
who had the right to correspond directly with members o f the Government o f India.
The Government o f India was largely self-financing, and, although theoretically subject 
to the India Office, it maintained a great deal o f autonomy, the extent o f which depended 
largely on the personality and ability o f the Viceroy. His relationship with the Secretary o f 
State was thus a delicate one, the nature o f which has attracted some academic 
controversy.[62] For our purposes it is sufficient to note that the relationship varied with 
time and circumstance, but again it was a situation which may be seen as potentially 
creating conflicts of interest, or alternatively as part o f a series of'checks and balances' on 
the power o f the Viceroy.
The branch o f government with which we are concerned, the Indian Political Department, 
was originally part o f the Foreign Department under the East India Company. It had been 
concerned with politics in the Indian sense o f the word at that time, meaning relations with 
other territories.[63] After 1858 these fell into two categories. Firstly there were the self- 
governing Indian states within the borders o f British India, and secondly, those external 
states whose affairs were o f direct consequence to India, such as Nepal, Afghanistan, and 
Tibet.
The Political Department came under the personal control o f  the Viceroy, who was 
ultimately responsible for appointments to the Department. The cost o f its positions was 
borne by India. The service underwent several name changes which reflected its twin fields 
o f operation. At the beginning o f our period (1904), it was known as the Political and 
Secret Department; the Political branch dealt with relations with Indian states, and the 
Secret Department with external territories. In 1914 it was renamed the Foreign and 
Political Department, and in 1937 it was divided into the External Affairs Department and 
the Political Department. (Control o f the Political Department was then passed to the 
'Crown Representative’; this position was always occupied by the Viceroy.).
Throughout this period, however, the Political Department's agents were chosen from a 
single body o f men. The agents were commonly known as 'Politicals', the term they used 
to describe themselves, and, in the interests o f continuity, I have used the terms 'Political' 
and 'Political Department' throughout this work, irrespective of date.
The Political cadre was made up o f officers who had served either in the Indian Army, or 
in the ICS. They were theoretically 'on deputation' to the Political Department from their 
original service, but in practice they normally remained members o f the Political 
Department until retirement. An approximate balance o f two-thirds Indian Army and one- 
third ICS members was maintained by a complicated intake formula. After the 1920s.
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officers from the Indian Police, and occasionally the Provincial Civil Services, were also 
admitted. [64]
ICS recruits arriving in India were given a gazetted posting to a province. After provincial 
service they could apply for entiy to the Political Department if  they were unmarried, had 
less than five years' service, and had passed the necessary departmental examinations. If  
successful, they were allocated a posting by the Political Department Secretariat. A similar 
path was followed by Indian Army officers who, after service with an Indian regiment, 
could apply for a Political Department posting if  they were unmarried, under 26, and had 
passed their promotion examination. Persons particularly suited could be advised to apply 
for a post, or appointed to one on a temporary basis (which could last many years), prior to 
permanent appointment. This was a common occurrence in the Tibet cadre.
The established strength o f the Political Department consisted o f a fixed number o f 
positions, which remained largely in European hands. The exact number varied in response 
to government interests. By 1947 there were 170 cadre posts, although as recruitment had 
ceased after the outbreak o f war only 124 o f these were filled. Whereas in the ICS there 
was then a slight majority o f Indian personnel, there were only 17 Indians in the Political 
Department. [65]
Officers were posted to both ’foreign' and 'political' posts, no distinction was drawn 
between areas o f service, and, while some officers specialised in a particular area, others 
remained 'generalists' throughout their careers. Officers also served in the administrative 
headquarters o f the Department, at (after 1911) Delhi, or, in summer, at Simla. This 
Secretariat, which was under the direct control o f the Viceroy, maintained a small staff who 
controlled the activities and postings within the sendee.[66]
The decision-making process within the Political Department depended on a hierarchal 
passage o f paper. Trade Agents' reports were forwarded to the Department by the Political 
Officer in Sikkim, who added his own comments. These reports were considered and 
commented upon by the Secretariat, and might be shown, officially or unofficially, to other 
relevant departments. If  important, they were passed to the Viceroy, and thence to the India 
Office in London, who in turn reported to the British Government. The process might also 
work in reverse. A request for information about a Tibetan matter directed to a British M.P. 
could be passed down the chain to an Agent in Tibet, whose report would pass up the chain 
again. Each officer in the chain could add comments and each Department would consider 
these comments in their report or recommendation.
Policy-making thus involved each link in the chain from Trade Agent to British 
Parliament and sovereign. The result o f  this hierarchal process was that, although the 
opinion o f the 'man on the spot' was theoretically highly valued, in practice it was liable to
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be overruled at any or every higher level. Again, we might see this as a recipe for conflicts 
o f opinion, or as a series o f checks and balances on the power o f individuals.
SECTION 7: IMAGES OF TIBET
Two prevailing images of Tibet co-exist in the West. The first is the empirically-based 
historical image. The second is what I have called the 'mystical' image; Tibet as a spiritual 
realm beyond precise empirical understanding. This mystical image predates the Tibetan 
encounter with modern European culture and is not, therefore, an entirely Western 
construct, but it has been significantly affected by this encounter. While the creation o f the 
mystical image o f Tibet is beyond the scope o f this study, the existence o f this 'other 
worldly' image both affected, and was affected by, the historical image. The Tibet cadre 
did not place themselves in opposition to the mystical image, with significant results, as 
will be seen.
References in early Indian religious texts, such as the M ahabharata, suggest that the 
Indian view o f the Himalayas (rather than Tibet specifically), as sacred space, dates to the 
pre-Christian era.[67] The earliest European references to Tibet repeat what was clearly an 
already established image o f Tibet as a land of'necromancers'. [68]
In the 19th century this image was brought into the European spiritual imagination by the 
reports of early travellers; Tibet became a sacred place for the West. European esoterics, in 
particular the Theosophist movement, began to adopt their own versions o f Tibetan beliefs. 
Writers such as Madame Blavatsky, who claimed to be receiving telepathic messages from 
spiritual 'masters’ residing in the Himalayas, had a great deal of influence in the creation of 
this image. Others with a more scholarly approach, such as Alexandra David-Neel, made 
serious efforts to investigate reports o f psychic phenomena in Tibet, which again enhanced 
the mystical image. Tibet, in the Western imagination, became firmly located as a spiritual 
place, outside o f time and space, possessing a knowledge unavailable in the West. 
Probably the supreme expression of that image emerged in 1933, with the publication of 
James Hilton's novel. Lost Horizon, which gathered many strands o f images into a single 
imagining: 'Shangri-La'.[69]
Peter Bishop, in a recent seminal study, has examined the process by which European 
travellers to Tibet constructed an image o f it as a sacred place within the European 
imagination. He demonstrates how Europeans projected their own imaginings onto Tibet, 
until it became drawn into European spiritual identity. This imagery, ordered by succeeding 
layers o f images produced by generations o f travellers, led not towards an ultimate
21
empirical truth, but to a core image which enabled the continuing projection o f  western 
fantasies onto Tibet. [70]
Tibet became a paradoxical place in the European mind. While drawn within European 
imagining, it 'always sustained an independent Otherness',[71] and this image o f the 
unknown was a significant part o f its attraction. Yet, as a result o f  the British encounter 
with Tibet, a body o f knowledge was built up which was used to create the historical image 
o f Tibet. While the projection o f  this knowledge was affected by the requirements o f both 
British and Tibetan power structures, it did produce empirical evidence o f a historically 
real, geographically located, Tibet. Two images o f Tibet thus came to co-exist in the 
European imagination.
Tibet retained its image as an isolated place, beyond the reach o f Europeans, despite more 
than 500 Britons visiting Lhasa with the Younghusband M ission, and the subsequent 
posting o f British officials to Tibet during the period 1904-47. The mystical image survived 
despite the production of an empirically-based historical image. Previous mystical images 
o f unknown lands, such as Australia, or the source o f the Nile, had faded as they became 
known to European science, and other constructions replaced the mystical. We need 
therefore to ask why Tibet's mystical image persisted and co-existed with the historical 
image rather than being superseded by it.
Tsering Shakya may provide part o f the answer when he states that Europeans lost 
interest in a place when it had been colonised. Thus 'Tibet was mythologised precisely 
because it was never colonised.'[72] But there was also a deliberate use o f this mystical 
image by both the British and the Tibetans. As we shall see in Chapter Six, Tibet's mystical 
image survived because it served the interests o f the British and their allies in the ruling 
class o f Tibetan society. It reinforced a Tibetan identity separate from that o f China, and it 
provided a positive image which helped to justify support for Tibet's continued existence. 
The Tibet cadre did not, therefore, apply themselves to refuting Tibet's mystical image; 
indeed much o f their writing implicitly supports it. [73]
The continual popularity o f the mystical image is not, however, solely attributable to the 
projections o f the imperial power. It is, to a large extent, 'consum er generated', the 
strength was, and is, in the demand, not the supply. This meant that writers who had never 
visited Tibet, such as James Hilton, made contributions to the image through works o f 
fiction.
The process by which the cadre created the historical image o f  Tibet can be clearly 
demonstrated through an examination o f the gathering o f information and its subsequent 
use, and by showing how the Government o f India shaped this image by censorship. 
Whereas the construction of images by the imperial power-structure in India is usually seen
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as producing negative images, the political need for an independent Tibetan identity as a 
friendly neighbouring state to India meant that Tibetan society and aspirations were 
portrayed sympathetically and positively. We need to ask why the particular image o f Tibet 
was created. What were the British perceptions o f Tibet and the Tibetans, and to what 
extent did these coalesce with the Tibetans' own identity and self-image? The creation o f an 
image o f Tibet involved making definitions, o f what was Tibet and Tibetan. Defining Tibet 
required judging what was their territory, language, custom, and so on, raising the 
questions o f whom the message was aimed at, on whom do codes o f  meaning act to 
establish the idea o f a nation and a state?
Tibet was not a modern nation-state in the European understanding. The 'creation' o f 
Tibet, and the attempt to transform it into a modern nation-state both required a model. We 
are, therefore, addressing the relationship between power and knowledge in the Tibetan 
context, and seeking to respond to wider questions o f identity, in demonstrating how the 
mentality and perceptions o f the Tibet cadre shaped the historical image o f Tibet today.
SECTION 8: THESIS OUTLINE
This study begins with a collective biographical examination o f the Tibet cadre, in order 
to demonstrate the type o f individual favoured by the Government o f India for service on 
the imperial frontier. I am concerned to examine the cadre officers' background and training 
in order to isolate their common characteristics, and show how their character was shaped 
for imperial service generally, and for Tibet specifically.
It will be seen that, while an initial period o f  service in Tibet was often the result o f a 
chance posting, extended and recurrent service there was a matter o f choice, by both the 
individual, and his superiors in the Tibet cadre, which to a large extent controlled its own 
intake. This meant that they were able to select officers whose character and mentality 
conformed to that o f their predecessors. In identifying the means by which the cadre 
identity and traditions were passed on to newcomers, use is made of David Potter’s work 
on the administrative traditions of British India, and findings related to such earlier studies. 
The analysis o f the transmission o f in-service traditions is located within the framework 
established by Potter's study.[74]
The image o f the ideal ’type' of officer favoured for frontier service was part o f British 
prestige, the maintenance o f which was considered of crucial importance to the continuance 
o f British rule in India. The British sought to present themselves to the Tibetans in a 
particular way, and Europeans who would not uphold accepted ideals o f behaviour and
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presentation were excluded from Tibet whenever possible. Considerations o f British 
prestige were apparent in all spheres o f imperial activity and there was an ongoing debate 
between two tendencies, those who thought prestige was best maintained by distancing 
themselves from the local people, and those who held that British prestige was enhanced by 
their mastery o f local social forms. There was a similar debate in Tibet over whether Indian 
officers could be expected to maintain British prestige. In Chapter Two, we examine these 
considerations, and ask whether the Tibetans understood the projection o f British forms of 
prestige.
The British encounter with Tibet required the services o f intermediaries between the two 
cultures. In addition to clerical and domestic staff, there was a body o f men, mostly 
Sikkimese or British Indians of Tibetan origin, whose selection and training were modeled 
on that of their British superiors. The intermediaries acted as translators in the widest 
sense, o f language, customs and aspirations. They became a powerful class, although their 
'voice' is often hidden behind that o f the British officers they served. In Chapter Three we 
examine how these intermediaries were selected and trained, and how the most successful 
o f them came to embody an understanding of both British and Tibetan cultures.
We then examine, in Chapter Four, how the character and identity o f the Tibet cadre and 
the intermediaries affected their role in Tibet. Although it became obvious, the Tibet cadre's 
diplomatic function was not normally openly articulated, to avoid complications with 
China, Russia and other powers. Nor did the cadre officers receive specific or detailed 
instructions as to their duties. They were, therefore, left, to a large extent, to define their 
own role.
We examine how the character, training and institutional traditions o f the Tibet cadre 
ensured that their role reflected the 'forward' policies o f their founders, and demonstrate 
that the issues with which they were most concerned were those related to their primary 
purpose - ensuring the security o f India's northern border. The gathering o f intelligence 
concerning Tibetan affairs, and the cultivation o f good relations with leading Tibetans, 
were two of the primary functions which they took on to achieve this.
Exactly where political power was located in the Tibetan system was not immediately 
apparent to the British, and the early officers investigated the possibility o f building on the 
ties established by Bogle and Turner, to ally themselves with the Panchen Lama. But, as 
noted, after 1910, the predominant policy o f the Tibet cadre was to support the Dalai Lama. 
After his death they resorted to making payments to key Tibetan individuals and institutions 
in the hope o f obtaining their support, with a consequent affect on the moral climate o f 
Tibet during the minority o f the 14th Dalai Lama.
In Chapter Five we examine in more detail how the Tibet cadre developed and promoted a
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particular policy over a period o f time. The cadre considered that they could achieve little 
without access to Lhasa, and kept this issue at the forefront of internal government debate. 
After 1920, they were able to obtain approval for occasional visits to Lhasa by the Political 
Officer in Sikkim, and no objection was raised to their use o f regular visits to Lhasa by 
local employees. This paved the way for the eventual establishment o f a British Lhasa 
Mission. However, the cadre were only able to achieve this after China had reestablished a 
representative in Lhasa. This was an example o f how British policy in Tibet after 
Younghusband was essentially reactive, 'forward' moves only being allowed in response 
to Chinese or Russian moves.
Having considered the Tibet cadre's influence on British policy, we turn to an 
examination of their role in the creation of an image of Tibet. Their principal concern in this 
context was to project Tibet as a separate entity from China, in order to establish it as a 
'buffer state' between British India and the Chinese, or Russian, empires. This required 
Tibet to be defined in the European understanding, in terms o f aspects o f identity such as 
language, race, culture, history and so on. In an attempt to construct a modem Tibetan 
identity, building on the pre-existing proto-nationalism o f historical identity, the Tibet cadre 
translated traditional Tibetan concepts into modern forms o f  expression. Political 
requirements, and personal understanding, made the images they constructed positive or 
’pastoral' ones. These definitions may therefore be located in the wider context o f 
questions o f  European understanding, and we may compare the actuality o f the cadre's 
projection o f images o f 'Tibet' and 'Tibetan' with what we know o f the Tibetan's own 
perspective on their identity.
While the Tibet cadre sought to promote an image of Tibet as a separate state, this was 
restricted by Whitehall's refusal to recognise Tibet as fully-independent. In Chapter Seven, 
we examine the mechanisms by which the Tibet cadre’s projected image was censored by 
their governments, and to what effect. We then ask whether the Tibet cadre understood the 
Tibetans, whether the encounter was a dialogue or a lecture to the uncomprehending.
In Chapter Eight, I argue that several members of the Tibet cadre did come to understand 
the 'Other' culture, but demonstrate that a deep understanding was not required by their 
government for the satisfactory performance o f their duties; it came only from an officer's 
personal search for understanding. Those officers who obtained such understanding o f the 
'Other' society that they became accepted as 'belonging' to it, naturally became members of 
a class within the 'Other' society, and identified with that class. The result was that the 
policies they favoured, and the image o f Tibet which they promoted, represented the 
interests o f their class within the 'Other' society, as it did the interests o f their own native 
class.
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It becomes apparent that a predominant feature o f the British involvement in Tibet was a 
lack o f definition. The Tibet cadre's role, the status o f Tibet, the authenticity o f the Tibet- 
Mongolia Treaty o f 1913; these, and many other important questions remained deliberately 
undefined as the British discovered 'the advantage o f falling in with the Central Asian 
tendency to avoid precise definition '.[75] This is both an example o f how location 
influenced British policy, and characteristic o f the frontier; the zone o f interaction and 
transformation, encounter, and myth. I adopt the term 'Iiminal' from the field o f religious 
studies to describe a zone beyond precise definition, and use this as a means o f treating the 
legendary and mythological aspects of the British presence in Tibet. Previous studies of the 
frontier show these aspects to be characteristic of such zones, and enable us to locate the 
Tibet cadre within frontier history.
After a summary o f the conclusions reached in this study, and an examination o f the 
consequences o f the Anglo-Tibetan encounter, Appendix One gives biographical details of 
the 22 officers I have classified as belonging to the Tibet cadre. Appendix Two lists the 
individuals who occupied the major British posts on the Tibetan frontier. This provides a 
clear exposition o f the system whereby officers were promoted from the Gyantse and 
Yatung Trade Agencies to the Lhasa Mission, and to the senior post o f Political Officer in 
Sikkim, as well providing a reference tool for future studies o f this subject.
My two major fields o f enquiry are therefore, the realms o f empire and expansion, and 
the question o f knowledge. I am concerned with the questions o f how and why the Tibet 
cadre thought and acted as they did, and what effect this had on (a) British policy in Tibet, 
and, (b) the historical image o f Tibet.
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FOOTNOTES
[1] Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Francis Edward Younghusband (1863-1942) KCSI. KCIE., was born in 
Muree on the north-west frontier of India, the son of an Inspector-General of Police in the Punjab. 
He was educated at Clifton College and Sandhurst. For a recent biography, superseding previous 
attempts, see French (1994). There are a number of works on the 1903-04 Mission, including 
Younghusband's own account; see Younghusband (1985, with an introduction by Alastair Lamb). 
The primary imperial account is Fleming (1986). A more balanced account of the Mission is 
contained in French (1994).
[2] For details of the establishment of the Trade Agencies, see McKay (1992a).
[3] Eleven dak bungalows were built between Gangtok and Gyantse to accommodate British 
officials on this route.
[4] The use of the term 'theocratic' in regard to Tibet's ruling structure is problematical; it may be 
qualified by describing it as the Tibetan form of theocracy.
[5] Yapp (1980, p.588).
[6] As Georges Duby notes, it is the 'prevailing mood' within an organisation 'which influences 
behaviour'; Duby (1985, p.230).
[7] Here I follow Lawrence Stone, who defines the purpose of collective biography as 'to 
demonstrate the cohesive strength of the group in question, bound together by common blood, 
background, education, and economic interests...prejudices, ideals and ideology...it is this web 
of purely social and economic ties which gave the group its unity and therefore its political force1; 
Stone (1981, p.46).
[8] Coilingwood (1989, p.245).
[9] The terms ’Trade Agent1 or 'Agent' apply specifically to the officers in the three Trade 
Agencies, while the term 'Political Officer’ applies specifically to the Sikkim post. The latter is an 
unsuitable collective term as nearly half of the Tibet cadre officers were not actually members of 
the Political Department. Despite its communist implications, and lack of aesthetic appeal, the term 
Tibet cadre’ does serve to emphasise the group's collective identity.
[10J Since the completion of my research the India Office Library has been renamed the Oriental 
and India Collection. I have retained the form current during my research.
[11] Seldon & Pappworth (1983).
[12] I have retained either tape-recordings, or signed transcripts, of the interviews conducted.
[13] See Addy (1984); Goldstein (1989); Mehra (1974); Singh (1988a); Richardson (1984); and, 
in particular, Lamb (1960, 1966, and 1989).
[14] See Bishop (1989); also see Cocker (1992).
[15] Collister (1987, pp.7-11); Richardson (1984, pp.63-64); I have also relied primarily in this 
section on Richardson's account of Tibetan history in the pre-1900 period, in addition to the 
accounts of Lamb (1960), Shakabpa (1984) and Tucci (1980).
[16] Regarding the early history of Tibet, see Beckwith (1987); Tucci (1980); Yeshe De project 
(1986).
[17] The Dalai Lamas (along with a considerable number of other important lamas, including the
27
Panchen Lama), are considered successive rebirths of an individual. The system of incarnate 
('sprul skif) lamas, which began in the twelfth century, involves a search for a new incarnation a 
few years after the death of the previous incarnation. In the intervals between the death of one 
one incarnation and the majority of the next, a Regent serves in their stead. See Tucci (1980, 
pp.41, 134-35).
[18] Tucci ibid (pp.41 -42), Regarding Tibet-Mongol relations see; Petech, L., China and Tibet in 
the Early Eighteenth Century. Leiden 1950.
[19] Collister (1987, p.12).
[20] ibid (pp. 11 -21); Richardson (1984, pp.64-67).
[21] Re the Pandits, see Waller (1987).
[22] For details of traditional Indo-Tibetan trade see, Chandola (1987); also see Lamb (1960, 
pp.342-355).
[23] China monopolised the Tibetan tea trade and Indian tea was excluded from Tibet. Both 
China, and Tibetan monasteries, which traded in tea, profited from this arrangement. To Indian tea 
merchant's frustration, the Tibetans also appear to have genuinely preferred Chinese tea, not 
least because it came in compressed bricks which suited Tibet's large semi-nomadic population. 
For the contemporary British prospective, see Cooper (1869); Louis (1894). As late as 1935 the 
Indian tea growers had still been unable to make brick tea, and the Tibetans continued to prefer 
Chinese tea; IOLR L/P&S/12/4175-1175, Report on a Mission to Lhasa, by Captain 
R.K.M.Battye, 29 December 1935.
[24] See French (1994, pp.202-03).
[25] Sikkim, which stood on the easiest route from Calcutta to Lhasa, had come under British 
influence following the Treaty of Tumlong in 1861. It became a British Protectorate under the 
Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890.
[26] Lamb (1960, pp.174-229); McKay (1992a, pp.400-01).
[27] Lamb ibid (pp.239-241); Richardson (1984, pp.78-82).
[28] The Japanese monk, Kawaguchi Ekai, who visited Lhasa in 1901, was one apparently 
neutral source who reported that Russian arms supplies were reaching Lhasa; Berry (1991, 
pp.304-05); Kawaguchi (1979, pp.505-06).
[29] Lamb (1960, pp.240-252); Fleming (1986, pp.32-36).
[30] Dorzhiev's role in Tibet has attracted a great deal of comment, much of it inaccurate. A recent 
work, which uses a number of hithertoo unavailable Russian sources, provides the first reliable 
account of his life; see Snelling (1993).
[31] See French (1994, pp.154-55, 192, 254).
[32] The full text of this separate agreement is found in Younghusband (1910, p.300). The text 
of the Anglo-Tibetan Convention of 1904 (which Younghusband signed in the Potala), is given in 
Richardson (1984, pp.268-271).
[33] The issue of British representation in Lhasa is discussed in Fleming (1986, pp.211-15); also 
see, Mckay (1992a, p.416), & (1992b).
[34] The text of these treaties is given in Richardson (1984, pp.271-74). The term 'suzerainty' 
has no precise, agreed definition in the Tibetan context, although its meaning has been subject 
to much discussion.
[35] IOLR MSS Eur F157-166, Bailey to his parents, 20 October 1907.
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[36] The Dalai Lama described as a 'pretext' the Chinese explanation for these troops; Shakabpa 
(1984, p.246). The Tibet cadre’s view was that it was an 'invasion'; Richardson (1984, pp.97-100). 
Lamb, relying on Eric Teichman's account, describes the Tibetans as being prepared to accept a 
small Chinese force entering Lhasa, only to be tricked by the arrival of a much larger than 
expected force; Lamb (1966, pp.192-94), following Teichman (1921, p.28).
[37] Tibetan sources emphasise that the dispute involving the Dalai and Panchen Lamas was 
due to differences between their supporters, not between the two incarnate lamas themselves; 
see Shakabpa (1984, p.263); Taring (1983, pp.66-67); Dhondup (1986, pp.123-26); also see, 
Lamb (1989, esp., chapters V1 & V111).
[38] For the text of this declaration, see Shakabpa (1984, pp.246-248).
[39] Mehra discusses aspects of the Tibet-Mongol treaty in Mehra (1969).
[40] There is an extensive literature concerning the Simla Convention; in particular see the works 
of Lamb (1966), & (1989); Mehra (1974); and Richardson (1984).
[41] Tibet's modernisation programme required finance, which the Tibetan Government 
attempted to raise by means of new taxes. As these were based on the size of estates, the 
Panchen Lama’s taxes were greatly increased. There were a number of factors behind the 
Panchen Lama's flight, the precise causes of which remain unclear. For contrasting views on the 
matter see Dhondup (1985, pp.123-140); Richardson (1984, pp.125-28).
[42] For an examination of the role of conservative elements in Tibet, see Goldstein (1989). 
Goldstein's controversial thesis, that the failure of the conservative Tibetan monastic and 
aristocratic rulers to accept modernisation was ultimately responsible for Tibet losing its 
independence, has not been successfully disputed.
[43] Richardson (1979); personal correspondence with H.Richardson, May 1989.
[44] Ford (1990, p. 170); Williamson (1987, p.98).
[45] 'Natural frontiers' are those imposed by geography; rivers, lakes, coastline and so on. In
British India, mountains were considered, as Royal Geographical Society President, and 
Superintendent of Frontier Surveys, Sir Thomas Holditch, stated, 'the most lasting, the most 
unmistakable and the most efficient as a barrier'; Holditch (1916, p. 147).
[46] As late as March 1905 Curzon was still proclaiming that there was no need for a north-east 
frontier policy; Mehra (1974, p. 11).
[47] Curzon (1907), Lyall (1973, pp.334-49); Prasad (1979, pp.577-78); Verrier (1992, p.36).
[48] General John Jacob, quoted in Edwardes (1975, p.93).
[49] Yapp (1980, p.588).
[50] NAI FD, 1905 Secret E February 1398-1445, Younghusband to L.Dane (Indian Foreign 
Secretary), 30 May 1904.
[51] Fleming (1984, p.285); also see Younghusband (1985, p.340); Lamb (1966, pp.13-14), 
quoting FO 535/5, No.83, encs. 2 and 3, Broderick to India, 2 February 1904.
[52] IOLR L/P&S/12/187-4682, Foreign Secretary, India, to the Under Secretary of State, India 
Office, 28 June 1935.
[53] RGS. Bailey correspondence, 1921-30; Mrs Irma Bailey to Arthur Hinks (RGS Secretary), 9 
October 1924.
[54] IOLR MSS Eur F157-259, Richardson to Bailey, 25 February 1949; MSS Eur F157-258,
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Hopkinson to Bailey, 26 November 1949.
[55] IOLR L/P&S/12/4177, file note by J.C. Walton, 12 February 1934.
[56] Lamb (1989, fn.10, p.22, fn.21, p.24).
[57] The Tibetans asked the Government of India to take-over their foreign relations on at least 
two occasions, in 1910 and again in 1932; see IOLR L/P&S/10/147-995, Bell to India, 17 July 
1910; L/P&S/12/4174, Viceroy to the Secretary of State, 10 August 1932, enclosing Weir to 
India, 9 September 1932. But as Lamb (1966, p.587), notes, in 1910 'the British Empire in India 
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CHAPTER ONE
T H E Y ’VE ALL GOT SOMETHING SPECIAL ABOUT THEM ’: 
THE MAKING OF A TIBET CADRE OFFICER.
INTRO DUCTIO N
Selection for the Political Department was governed by the belief that there was an ideal 
type o f officer best qualified to represent British India. It was commonly held that the 
necessary qualities were, as Curzon pronounced, 'an instinct rather than an acquisition'.[1] 
But Political officers in the 20th century were almost invariably products o f British public 
schools, and universities or military colleges, who had served in the ICS or Indian Army, 
and these institutions therefore, acted as a training process, which was believed to bring out 
the innate qualities o f the ideal character for service in the Politicals.
Although Tibet was a regular Departmental posting, to which officers could, through 
choice or chance, be sent, extended service there was a m atter o f choice, not chance. 
Although it was never stated as policy, individuals found unsuitable for service in Tibet, or 
who found it uncongenial, were not posted there again. Thus just as a particular type o f 
individual was thought suitable for the Politicals in general, particular types o f Political 
officer were considered suited to particular regional posts. One type might be best suited to 
the Persian Gulf, another might respond most positively to the Tibetan environment. There 
fore, while the Tibet cadre had many characteristics which were common to other Political 
officers, there were distinguishing aspects o f their character, which made them a distinct 
group.
As noted, only 22 officers were permanently appointed to. or remained long enough to 
exert any real influence in, the three most significant posts in Tibet during the 1904-47 
period; those at Gangtok, Gyantse, and Lhasa. There are sufficient sources concerning 
these 22 officers, whom I term the Tibet cadre, to conduct a collective biographical 
examination of them, enabling the isolation of common factors which indicate the type of 
character favoured for service in the Politicals generally, and. more specifically, in the Tibet 
cadre.
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The prevailing character and mentality o f the cadre is important because it proves to be the 
basis o f their perception and definition o f both Tibet, and their own role there. Through 
understanding the type o f characters they were, and the way they thought, we can gain a 
greater understanding o f  their consequent actions. In this conclusion, I follow scholars 
such as Clive Dewey and David Fieldhouse in arguing that 'vested ideas, rather than vested 
interests, are the great determinants of human behaviour'. [2]
In this chapter I will, in the course o f reconstructing the prevailing character and mentality 
o f these officers; [a] examine the background o f the Tibet cadre; [b] describe how their 
training and selection took place, and; [c] demonstrate how the cadre traditions were 
established and passed on to newcomers. This will show that a particular ethos and 
characteristic attitudes prevailed among those who served there, and that their distinct 
collective identity was produced by a planned process. As will be seen in later chapters, 
this had a significant effect on British policy in Tibet and upon the historical image o f Tibet.
SFCTTON 1.1: - THE OFFICERS' BACKGROUND
O f the 35 officers who served at Gangtok, Lhasa, and Gyantse, nine were Escort 
Commanders or Medical Officers appointed to act temporarily as Gyantse Trade Agent 
during the absence o f a permanent appointee, and are therefore excluded from this study. 
Four Gyantse Agents may also be excluded on the grounds that they served there for less 
than nine months, and therefore had little impact. Their careers, can, however, be useful in 
illustrating certain aspects o f Tibetan service, as will be seen. The careers of the 22 most 
significant officers - the Tibet cadre - will be the subject o f this examination of their 
background and training.[3]
The first obvious common characteristic of these 22 men is their close family connection 
with India; nine were born there. A tenth was born in Persia, while his father was on a 
Government o f India posting to the British Consulate at Mashad. Three of those born 
outside India had a father or grandfather who had served in the ICS or Indian Army, and at 
least one other had close relatives who had served in India.
O f those not born in India, six were born in England, four in Scotland and two in 
Ireland. All o f these British-born officers came from a professional or land-owning 
background, with the exception o f Frederick Williamson, whose father's employment was 
'technical'. Four had fathers in the military, while the church, law and academia were 
among other professions represented.
With the exception o f John Claude White, who was educated privately in Germany, all o f
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the British officers (including those born in India), attended public schools in England or 
Scotland. Their education then continued either at university, or at military college for those 
who went on to join the Indian Army. O f the civilians, four studied at Oxford and two at 
Cambridge, while White attended Cooper's Hill College o f Engineering. Among the 
military, six attended the Royal Military Academy Woolwich, four attended Sandhurst and 
two attended Quetta Cadet College.
O f the 22 cadre officers, 17 followed the usual routes into Political Department postings, 
either via the Indian Army (12 officers), or the ICS (five officers). These figures are 
consistent with the Political Department's usual intake ratio o f two-thirds from the Indian 
Army and one- third from the ICS. Five officers came from other Indian services; White 
from the Public Works Department, Frank Ludlow from the Indian Education Department, 
and David Macdonald, Rai Bahadur Norbhu Dhondup and Rai Bahadur Pemba Tsering 
from local government services.
An additional military influence on the Tibet cadre was that two o f those selected from the 
ICS, Williamson and Arthur Hopkinson, had seen active service in World War O ne.[4] 
Tills military influence meant that proven physical courage was a common characteristic. At 
least seven of the officers saw active service - in Tibet, Persia or the W orld Wars. 
Hopkinson, Lieutenant-Colonel F.M .'Eric' Bailey, and Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Frank 
O'Connor were all wounded in action during military service. W illiamson, Lieutenant- 
Colonel Edward Fletcher and Major George Sherriff were mentioned in despatches, while 
Major Alex Russell won a Military Cross in anti-Bolshevik operations in Northern Persia in 
1924. [5]
The Tibet cadre were thus characterised firstly by a similar middle, or upper-middle, class 
background, and close family connections with India, and secondly by a public school 
education, followed by entry into Indian military or civil service. These findings are 
consistent with those o f previous studies o f the Indian services; the ICS. Indian Medical 
Service (hereafter, the IMS) and the Politicals, and are not therefore, indicative o f the 
particular character o f the Tibet cadre, which must be sought elsewhere. [6]
Three officers were from a very different background; David Macdonald w as the son o f a 
Scottish tea planter and a Sikkimese mother. Norbhu Dhondup wfas born into a Sherpa 
family at Darjeeling, and Pemba Tsering was from an Eastern Tibetan family who had 
settled at Ghoom. near Darjeeling. Although these officers encountered some prejudice, the 
Tibet cadre were essentially a meritocracy, and one which relied heavily on the knowledge 
o f local employees. But these officers were promoted to Political Department posts only 
after a long period of service, and most importantly for our case, after they had thoroughly 
absorbed the ethos o f the British officers and their way o f life. This aspect will be
examined in Chapter Three.
SECTION 1.2: - THE EFFECT OF THEIR EDUCATION
What then was the effect of this common background, and what type o f person did it 
produce? Studies o f the relationship between imperialism and the British public school and 
university systems have demonstrated how the system produced individuals whose 
particular qualities were considered desirable for service in the empire.[7] The result was a 
system o f which it could be said, 'Every school building is a citadel o f Empire and every 
teacher its sentinel.'[8]
This was a deliberate process. Physical, intellectual, and moral codes were designed to 
prepare pupils for imperial service. As one o f the founders o f  the Colonial Service stated, 
'the Public Schools...are vital. We could not run the show without them. In England 
universities train the mind; the Public Schools train character and teach leadership'.[9] That 
the schools were successful in inculcating imperial values is indicated by Lord Curzon, 
who credited a lecture at Eton with being the source o f his views on imperialism. [10]
The cadre were, in common with officers from other Indian services, from a variety o f 
public schools, with 'no significant networks' from any particular institution, although two 
Wykemists, Bell and Gould, occupied the senior Gangtok post for almost half the period 
under consideration. [11] But they shared a common standard o f taught behaviour, for the 
various schools they attended all sought to shape the character o f  their pupils to produce 
'gentlemen' with a sense o f duty and service who would take on responsibility in the 
empire. The desired character included qualities of self-confidence, leadership, and respect 
for tradition, along with a certain 'amateur spirit', an ideal o f generalised, rather than 
specialised or lucrative knowledge.[12] These were precisely the qualities o f character 
sought by the Political Department. Thus a probationary report on Basil Gould states 
approvingly that, 'His manners are perfect, as might be expected from a Winchester and 
Oxford education.'[13]
An important part o f this character training by the public schools centred on sporting 
endeavour, in the tradition of'm uscular Christianity'. Team sports were believed to foster 
both the physical virtues o f strength and endurance, and the moral virtues of self-discipline 
and duty, thus producing 'the confidence to lead and the compulsion to follow'.[14] The 
public schools' emphasis on sports produced a particular code o f ethics, which used 
symbols and metaphors derived from the Victorian amateur sporting ethos. This 'games 
ethic' became the ethical basis of the 'frontierman's code', which was 'an important part of
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the collective identity of frontier officers'. Thus, in the imperial setting, an officer was 
expected to have 'a sense o f fair play', and expected his fellow-officers to 'play the 
game'.[15]
The Tibet cadre held to this 'games ethic', and valued the institutions which had instilled 
it in them. One o f the foremost exponents o f imperial literature was the poet, Henry 
Newbolt, a friend and contemporary o f Younghusband's at Clifton College. Newbolt's 
best known poem, Vitai Latnpada, equates school sport and empire battle, culminating in 
the repeated refrain 'Play up! and play the game.' When Younghusband reached Lhasa, 
Newbolt sent him an 'Epistle' containing the following lines:
The victories o f our youth we count for gain 
Only because they steeled our hearts to pain,
And hold no longer even Clifton great
Save as she schooled our wills to serve the State. [16]
The extent to which the public schools emphasised spoils and games can be exaggerated. 
Clive Dewey has recently shown the importance o f the opposing trend towards Socratic 
virtues, w hich existed at public schools in parallel to the cult o f 'M uscular 
Christianity'.[17] This preference for intellectual virtues was not, however, specifically 
oppositional to the ideals o f empire. While the cadre contained a number of men of obvious 
intellect (as will be seen in Section 1:8), they were 'outdoor types', shaped by, and 
adhering to, the 'games ethic'. Although intellect was valuable, a high standard o f fitness 
was essential; several Politicals failed to satisfy the fitness requirement for service in the 
harsh Tibetan enviroment. Intellect, as demonstrated by cadre officers such as Bell and 
Richardson, was in addition to 'outdoor' qualities, and the cadre valued both elements.
The public schools' system o f training for imperial adm inistrators continued at the 
universities, particularly at Oxford and Cambridge.[18] Curzon remarked that 'he could not 
understand how anyone educated at Oxford in his time could fail to be an imperialist'.[19] 
The pro-imperial ethos was also promoted at the military colleges, which reproduced 
many o f the processes used by the public schools to develop the desired qualities o f 
character in its trainees. For example, at Sandhurst, Bailey's English Composition 
examination paper asked such questions as, ’Are Polar Exhibitions[sic] worth the hardship 
and sacrifice involved?' - the desired answer is obvious.[20]
The military colleges deliberately developed loyalty to a military fellowship. Loyalty to a 
public school house was replaced by loyalty to a military company, loyalty to a school was 
replaced by loyalty to a regiment. Individuals were (ideally) bound together with a shared
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sense o f purpose into a single unit, centred on the mess, where the nuances o f appropriate 
behaviour* were learned.[21]
The military colleges also emphasised equestrian skills, and "manly sports" as an aid to 
building both character and team spirit, and skill in these areas was considered to enhance 
work performance. That these ideals were implanted in the Tibet cadre is indicated by 
Bailey's comment in his later career that, 'I would not keep Rai Bahadur [Norbhu 
Dhondup],..if he was not good at polo, football etc, as I knew[sic] his work would not be 
so good.'[22]
The Tibet cadre officers were thus educated in an imperial milieu. This ensured that, as 
one Political wrote, 'I grew up with a profound belief in the British...Empire... We were 
completely satisfied about the superiority o f everything British, and never doubted that the 
British Empire would endure for ever.'[23] The Tibet cadre applied the moral standards 
inculcated by their education to their own imperial role. Trained to believe in their right to 
rule, they were self-confident administrators, who viewed themselves as loyal servants o f a 
righteous empire.
The educational system did not, o f course, produce only imperial administrators. 
Products o f  the military colleges were not always 'gentlemen' who upheld the honour o f 
their regiment, and the universities did not, despite Curzon's statement, only produce 
unquestioning imperialists. But the system did produce, at least in the pre-World War One 
period, sufficient men who believed in the imperial ideal; and those who did not subscribe 
were not favoured for government service in India.
Although not directly affecting the Tibet cadre, there was a decline in interest in Indian 
service after World War One. This was due to both the declining financial rewards o f 
Indian service, and to changing perceptions o f empire, as the prevailing attitudes o f the 
Curzon era gradually became the minority view.[24] The Indian services did adapt to the 
changing conditions; for example, later officers did not expect the British empire to last 
forever. But the educational and selection process o f the Political Department did not 
change in tune with the times. In the 1930s and '40s the ideal o f the desired type o f 
Political officer was largely unchanged from that of the Younghusband era. Thus Charles 
Bell and Hugh Richardson represented very similar 'types', despite the changes that had 
taken place between their periods o f service.
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SECTION 1.3: - EARLY TRAINING IN INDIA
The training process begun at their public schools and universities or military colleges, 
continued when recruits arrived in India. The Indian services expected that recruits with 
this educational background would have the capacity to become good imperial officers once 
they had been given the necessary training in both their specialised duties, and the values 
and traditions o f their service. These duties and values could, it was believed, only be 
learned by experience 'on the job'. Thus one ICS officer stated that
If  the recruitment is properly done, he [the recruit] should have the capacity 
to become a good bureaucrat. But what constitutes being a good bureaucrat 
is som ething he still has to learn, and it can only be learned by 
experience. [25]
In the Indian Army, the newcomer was attached to a regiment, which became the focus of 
his loyalties. There he learned the practice o f his profession in the Indian context. In the 
ICS, a trainee was placed in a district under the supervision of an experienced ICS officer. 
There he was expected to leam the appropriate local language(s), and the practical methods 
by which British rule was administered. In addition to mastering legal, cultural and 
economic aspects o f  his duties, the ICS newcomer learned 'to locate and work with his 
political support'[26]; those local powers who could be persuaded that their best interests 
lay in co-operating with the British, and those elements within British government who 
favoured the policies the officers promoted. This skill would be particularly valuable to 
those who joined the Political Department.
Arguably the most important aspect of this initial training was that newcomers, both civil 
and military, had to learn their social place, and social behaviour appropriate to that status. 
While their family background (particularly if it was British-Indian). and public school 
education had taught them much o f the required behaviour pattern, the singular culture of 
British-Indian society, with its codes and nuances of behaviour which were by no means 
always clearly articulated, imposed its own demands. For example, an ambitious Indian 
Army officer learned that 'you had to push to get there, but it would not be good form to 
push too hard’; the 'swot' was frowned upon. He had to drink, but not too much, he had 
to have pride in him self and his regiment, but not boast about either. The ideal officer 
mastered these subtle distinctions between good, and bad, 'form '.[27]
Just as the regiment became the focus for the loyalties o f an Indian Army officer, so the 
institution of the ICS became the focus o f the civilians' loyalty. While newcomers to the
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service may have found what Potter calls an 'instant freemasonary1 among fellow-officers, 
the ICS trainee often had little in common with the officer under whom he served his 
apprenticeship. Potter has recorded the contrasting relationships newcomers to the ICS had 
with their initial supervisors, and friendship was by no means typical. This meant that the 
newcomers’ primary identification was with the service itself rather than with individuals, 
although a respected superior could be a great influence on his trainee.[28]
There is contrasting evidence as to the importance o f particular factors as formative 
influences on the imperial officers in India. Dewey has emphasised the paramountcy of'the 
values they absorbed in their youth'. Potter, balancing social and service training 
influences, argues that an emphasis on social factors has disguised the importance o f ICS 
training. But as Potter him self states, while social background was generally constant, the 
extent to which recruits were shaped by their initial training varied.[29]
In the case o f the Tibet cadre, there is little evidence that their initial ICS or Army service 
was as important a formative influence on their character and mentality as was their public 
school. It appears that once an officer entered the Politicals, he ceased to identify with his 
former service, although to a large extent the Politicals' traditions and even duties, built on, 
or replicated, those o f  the ICS and Indian Army.
These services naturally had no wish to lose their best officers. Individuals who entered 
the Politicals could be resented, for implicitly they were rejecting the ties o f loyalty to their 
former service. Younghusband him self noted that 'the regiment always looks side ways at 
men going into the Politicals and make it difficult to get leave.[sic]'[30]
New ties o f loyalty were developed, and these were to an institution which was 
considered by those belonging to it as having superior status to that o f their former service. 
None o f the Tibet cadre ever returned to their former service after they had served in the 
Politicals. It appears therefore, that the officers themselves gave less credit to their initial in­
country training as they had ceased to identify with their former institutions.
While successful cadre officers, ex-ICS or ex-Indian Army, may or may not have been 
strongly influenced by their initial Indian training, all were strongly influenced by their 
public school and it remained their commonest reference point. Arthur Hopkinson for 
example, had been very happy at M arlborough, for him 'there was no school but 
Marlborough', and although he was also at Oxford, he did not talk o f  it as he did his 
school. [31]
School inculcated the character and set o f values desired for the empire. [32] These were 
given specific application by training in India, and, while as Potter has shown, new 
institutional loyalties were developed, and ideas were modified by local circumstances, the 
training process in India was considered to develop and shape character and mentality
which had been, as noted, established by the formative influence o f British public 
schools.[33] While initial training might influence later performance, an officer’s school 
was part o f his identity. For example, Bell's obituaries refer to his school, but not to the 
obscure district in eastern India where he began his ICS career.[34]
This process o f training officers for service in Tibet was, in the wider perspective, an 
established means of uniting individuals for a common purpose. As organisational studies 
have established, individuals, whose allocated role in an establishm ent in some way 
enhances their personal goals, may be trained to internalise the values o f that organisation. 
When this training process has been successful, the individual may then be relied upon to 
react in a manner consistent with, or advantageous to, the aims o f  the organisation. The 
individual acquires a loyalty to that body, and individual and organisational goals coincide. 
As a result o f this process, individuals expect their fellow group-members to behave in the 
same manner as themselves, and individuals acquire an 'organisation personality' in some 
ways distinct from their own.[35]
Such a process occurred with the Tibet cadre. The point o f their training was to ensure 
that the government could rely on them to act independently and on their own initiative, 
within the limits o f overall British aims and policies. Their training was therefore designed 
to produce officers with 'the maximum degree o f uniformity o f  intellect, education and 
general outlook'.[36] Having shown they could internalise the values o f the ICS or the 
Indian Army, the cadre officers could be relied upon to act in accord with the interests of 
that section o f the Government o f India o f which they were now members: the Politicals.
SECTION 1.4: - READING AND OTHER INFLUENCES
While the public school system could produce the type of individual wanted for imperial 
service, the desire to serve in India and on its frontiers usually had roots elsewhere, as we 
have seen from the number o f officers with family connections to service in India. The 
family tradition of an Indian career certainly influenced Bailey at an early age. Preserved 
among his papers are a school 'Essay on Choice o f a Career in Life [sic]', and another on 
'Outdoor Games', written when he was aged 11. Bailey then favoured a naval career 
'Because I like travelling'. His chosen games topic was polo, a sport we may surmise that 
his father, also a Lieutenant-Colonel in the Indian Army, must have played.[37]
Another primary formative factor on the desire to serve in India was a literary influence, 
particularly from the works o f Kipling. While he was by no means an unequivocal 
supporter o f imperialism, Kipling (who was a close friend o f O'Connor), certainly inspired
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many Politicals. As one wrote, 'W ith the literary backdrop o f the Jungle Books and 
Kim...I longed to see India.'[38]
An early taste for Kipling was common, and lasting, among the cadre. Bell would relax 
by reciting Kipling's poetry, while Hopkinson gave his new bride a collection o f Kipling's 
works, along with riding lessons; both were o f equal importance if  a Political officer's wife 
was to fit into her new role.[39] Travellers' tales were another inspiration to officers such 
as Richardson, who was inspired by reading o f George Bogle's 18th century travels in 
Tibet. [40]
Naturally the image of India that would-be colonial officials received from these texts was 
incomplete. Imperial literature was primarily concerned with the British in India, or with 
those aspects o f India and its society which were, in the European perspective, unusual, 
spectacular, and 'Other'. Thus it commonly dealt with events involving the British, such as 
the 'Indian M utiny’, or imperial life in Simla and other hill-stations, or with the diverse 
extremes o f  Indian culture: Maharajahs, saddhus, sati and so on.
An implicit, and occasionally explicit, political agenda existed behind much o f this 
literature in that it reinforced imperial concepts o f a racially diverse and ahistorical India, 
united only by British rule. The administrative classification o f various religio-social 
groups as 'martial' and 'non-martial' races, or as 'criminal tribes', arising from the view of 
Indians as members o f communities, was reflected in literary stereotypes o f 'the wily 
Brahm in', 'the w arlike Sikh', and so on. Those peoples whose opposition to a 
transformation o f their traditional societies led them into conflict with the imperial power 
were naturally portrayed in particularly negative terms. While writers such as Kipling were 
certainly not uncritical o f the Raj, the general tendency o f colonial literature was to portray 
B ritish rule as a 'civilising m ission', bringing the many benefits o f 'progress' to 
’uncivilised' India.
It is simplistic to view this British construction of an image o f India purely in terms o f the 
imperial process, and to ignore the fact that the reading public 'is not interested in the 
mechanics o f government, only in melodrama’[41]. But the effect o f this process was that 
the British understanding of India was distorted by Eurocentric perspectives, and policies 
were evolved and imposed, which were based on knowledge constructed by and for 
British, rather than local, interests.
The importance o f imperial texts as an influence on new officers was recognised in the 
Political Department. What were considered suitable texts for trainee officers were selected 
and used as training manuals. After six months in the Politicals, new entrants were 
examined (at least into the 1920s) on four books; Lyall's The Rise and Expansion o f  the 
British Dominion in India , Thornton's biography. Sir Robert Sandeman , Edwardes's A
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Year on the Punjab Frontier, and another text pertaining to the M iddle East. Given that 
most o f the Tibet cadre read these works, it is instructive to analyse the policies and role 
models they present, because they clearly demonstrate aims and activities approved by the 
Political Department in terms which were not otherwise officially articulated.
Sir Alfred Lyall was a former Indian Foreign Secretary, whose 1891 work was a history 
o f British Indian government. It reflects the confidence o f the imperial age, taking a 
positive view o f progress, with British rule in India portrayed as paternal. Lyall 
emphasised the importance o f frontier protectorates as a convenient method o f extending 
British power without responsibility for government. The importance o f this view will 
become apparent later. [42]
Edwardes's work stressed the need for non-interference in local custom. It proclaimed 
that 'benevolent despotism is the best o f all governments', and reinforced the public school 
ideal o f Political officers as sent 'forth beyond our boundaries to be a pioneer o f Christian 
civilisation'. Both were views the Tibet cadre were to have little argument with at least until 
the 1940s. [43]
While Lyall and Edwardes provide a theoretical framework to British rule, the ideal o f a 
Political officer emerges most strongly in Thornton’s book. This is a hagiography o f 
Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Robert Sandeman, Chief Commissioner o f Baluchistan from 1877 
to 1892. According to Thornton, Sandeman displayed just the qualities desired by school 
and empire, 'energy, perseverance...and a strong sense o f duty'; free of debt, but 
hospitable and generous, he was keen on sports and 'no self-seeker'. Other qualities o f 
Sandeman were described which trainee officers could recognise as a practical guide to 
success on the frontier. Sandeman was 'no favourite with officials....In important matters, 
he rarely accepted an official negative as final'. He apparently delayed a telegram 
postponing an assault, an action described in approving tones, and crossed the frontier 
without permission, but, as the trip was a success, the 'irregularity was condoned'.
Both Lyall and Lord Curzon contributed to Thornton's book. Lyall approvingly observes 
that Sandeman. 'continually discovered excellent reasons for advancing...and annexing 
fresh territory'. The ultimate seal o f approval was Curzon's support for Sandeman's 'spirit 
o f somewhat greater independence o f central Government than a rigid officialism either 
encourages, or readily condones'. Trainee Political officers reading this book could be left 
in little doubt that bold action advancing British interests or frontiers was what the Politicals 
required, whatever their duty might be defined as for public consumption. Such action, 
even if  irregular, would advance an individual officer's career far more than would 
devotion to rules and routine.[44]
There are numerous examples of the Tibet cadre following Sandeman's examples in the
41
early years o f the British presence in Tibet; O'Connor made his name by an unauthorised 
border crossing, Younghusband almost certainly delayed a telegram long enough to allow 
the Swedish explorer, Sven Hedin, to cross into Tibet, and W hite and Bailey were 
notoriously tardy in their paperwork. The early Trade A gents, given the unsettled 
conditions on the frontier which made for potential expansion, all 'continually discovered 
excellent reasons for advancing' into the Tibetan hinterland.[45] We can, therefore, 
conclude that the books read in their youth, or during their training, exerted a direct, 
powerful influence on the cadre, an influence not emphasised in previous studies of the 
imperial services.
In addition to reading those texts required to pass departmental examinations, officers 
naturally read other specialist works on the empire in general and on their specific area of 
service. One particularly influential book was The Defence o f  India, a confidential report 
by Sir Charles Macgregor, Quartermaster-General of the Indian Army, which emphasised 
the Russian threat to India. This work was a great influence on the 'forward school'. 
Younghusband for example, studied it closely and it confirmed his own views on the need 
to combat Russian expansion. [46]
Ambitious cadre officers read as much as they could on Tibet. Williamson's wife recalled 
his study 'lined with books in which...travellers described their abortive attempts to enter 
the forbidden city'. Bell listed 76 books on Tibet and its neighbours among his 
collection. [47] Libraries were started in the Gangtok and Gyantse posts to encourage this 
reading. Here specialised works on Tibet were kept, along with Blackv\’oods magazine (in 
which most articles were by colonial officers), the Statesman , and The Times (which co­
operated closely with the Government o f India). Many of the books were written by former 
cadre officers (in particular Sir Charles Bell), and they were closely studied by serving 
officers.[48] Hopkinson, for example, had all o f Bell's books with him when he visited 
Lhasa in 1945, and had thoroughly absorbed their contents.[49]
Officers thus studied Tibet both by personal choice and as a part o f  their duty. Many of 
the texts the)’ read were by other members of the cadre, or their predecessors, the 
Government of India officers who had crossed into Tibet in the 1890s. It is significant that 
the succession o f officers read many o f the same books as their predecessors, for these 
books reinforced a particular, imperial, view of Tibet. But these books were all products of 
the Victorian age o f imperial expansion. The ideals promoted by these writings were the 
products o f an earlier age, and their message became an increasingly outdated one. 
Improved communication, increasing centralisation of government, and a changing climate 
o f opinion all acted against the fulfillment o f the ideals promoted by these works, yet 
through these texts the ideals remained with the frontiersmen into a later age.
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SECTION 1.5: - ENTRY TNTO THE TIBET CADRE
The commonest reason for an ICS or Indian Army officer's seeking to join the Politicals 
was the desire for a more varied and interesting career. Finance was another factor, 
particularly for Indian Army officers, who were paid less than the ICS. It also appealed to 
the ambitious; Bailey 'realised that in these days nothing important happened in India itself. 
To get on one must learn about the neighbouring countries.'[50]
Entry into the Political Department was theoretically governed by certain rules. However, 
as Bailey noted, 'All the rules for entering [the] Political Department are made simply to 
keep out people they don't want.' In practice, the Politicals controlled their own intake of 
personnel, with selection governed by factors not covered in the written rules o f admission. 
Thus while the specified age limit (under 26 for military entrants), was regularly used to 
exclude unwanted candidates, Fletcher was accepted when a year over age, and Macdonald 
was to have been admitted when he was over 50, (although in the event other factors 
prevented his admission),[51]
What then were the real criteria for admission into the Politicals? In correspondence with 
Arthur Hopkinson, an official in the Secretariat admitted that, 'we do attach considerable 
importance to a favourable report from an officer o f the Political Department.'[52] Thus 
O'Connor and Bailey were chosen with backing from Younghusband, Hopkinson had the 
backing o f O'Connor, and so on. Officers with other influential backing, such as Major 
P.C.Hailey, with a reference from his uncle, the Governor o f the Punjab, Sir William 
Hailey, also stood a good chance o f selection. [53]
Lieutenant-Colonel J.L.R.Weir's father, a Colonel in the IMS, solicited the backing o f 
the Indian Foreign Secretary, Sir Louis Dane, for his son's candidature. Dane had once 
promised Weir that a pay cut 'would be counted unto me for righteousness'. Dane was 
asked by Colonel Weir IMS. if 'th e  counting might take the form o f the admission o f my 
boy into Political employ?’[54]
Russell (who was the fifth-generation o f his family to serve in India), was perhaps 
idealistic when he wrote in a follow-up letter to his original unanswered application that 'I 
could perhaps get some influential backing but I would infinitely prefer to get in on my 
own merits and I believe the latter course would be appreciated.'[55] Entry into the 
Politicals was largely by patronage, and great weight was given to the claims o f officers 
related to serving or former members o f the Department. Those whose families had served 
in India, and who were born there, were considered better able to adjust to the local 
environment. The ideal officer sought was thus Indian born, and British educated.[56]
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The selection o f those raised in the Indian milieu and schooled in the empire's training- 
grounds in Britain acted as a means o f ensuring that selected officers were o f a similar 
mentality to their predecessors. The effects o f this nepotism on the efficiency o f  the 
Politicals have been favourably judged by scholars.[57] But although the sample group is a 
small one, there was in the case o f the Tibet cadre, little evidence that birth in India was an 
advantage. Six o f the ten cadre officers who were born in India (or Persia), were appointed 
to the senior post in Sikkim, while six o f the remaining 12 officers who were born outside 
India reached that position.
A distinctive feature o f the senior officers in Tibet was the high proportion o f them who 
were not actually members o f the Political Department. Seven officers (White, MacDonald, 
Bell, Ludlow, Sherriff, Norbhu Dhondup, and Pemba Tsering) were not in the Politicals, 
(although Sherriff had been, but had resigned) while three others (Bailey, O'Connor and 
Major W .L.Campbell) were admitted retrospectively. This was because the Politicals 
recruited Tibetan specialists from outside the Department to serve in Tibet.
As a provincial government employee, Macdonald was not eligible for admission to the 
Department until a change o f rules in 1921. Ironically, as the change was designed to 
encourage Indians into the Politicals, his application was opposed by one Secretariat 
official on the technicality that he was Anglo-Indian, not Indian. [58] Bell, despite the 
immense prestige he acquired, was not taken into the Political Department as his 
specialisation in Tibet would have made it difficult to promote him to positions elsewhere. 
However, officers with 'attached' status received all the benefits o f Political employ, such 
as language allowance and pension, and identified fully with the aims and ethos o f the 
Department. No difference is apparent between them and officers actually in the 
Politicals. [59]
In 1906. Secretary o f State John Morley objected to the Politicals 'introducing officers 
from outside the department to fill particular posts', and the practice did decline thereafter, 
only to become common again in World War Two due to manpower shortages.[60] But the 
Viceroy always retained the power to choose any  officer he wished, and every officer 
selected for the Politicals was personally approved by him. A vital part of the admission 
process was lunch at the Viceregal residence, where social abilities were closely monitored. 
These meetings were not necessarily always formal. Sherriff was posted to Lhasa after a 
interview with Lord Linlithgow which culminated in a catapult competition out o f the 
Viceregal window.[61]
The 'attached status' officers were also usually interviewed by, or personally known to 
the Viceroy when they were appointed. This may suggest the Tibetan cadre felt an added 
sense o f involvement and identity from this personal link with the head o f the Government
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of India.
Although a Political officer's selection was ultimately sanctioned by the Viceroy, 
selection was not immune from interference by W hitehall. The proposed choice o f 
O'Connor as Political Officer Sikkim in 1908 was vetoed by Morley, who was totally 
opposed to O'Connor's aggressively 'forward' views and his unrestrained expression of 
them in reports. O'Connor had to wait another 12 years for a second chance at the post. 
There was a personal factor in this which may reflect Lord Morley's character as much as it 
illustrates the extent to which policy differences affected personal relations within the 
service. Vetoing O 'Connor had been, Morley wrote later, 'a moment o f  pure wicked 
jo y '.[62]
The personal involvement o f serving officers and the Viceroy in the selection o f the Tibet 
cadre was a deliberate policy aimed at ensuring a continuity o f attitude and hence o f policy. 
The Government o f India considered that the success of the Political Department 'depended 
to a great extent on the training and wise disposal of a cadre o f officers'. [63]
The Tibet cadre themselves emphasised the need to select suitable officers for specialised 
training in Tibetan affairs. As early as 1905, O'Connor recommended that Bailey relieve 
him while he was on leave, pointing out the 'extreme importance o f training one or more 
young officers as experts in Tibetan affairs'.[64] The point continued to be made by 
successive officers. As late as 1948 Hopkinson reported that
For the maintenance and cultivation o f friendly relations the first necessity is 
the careful selection o f the agents..[and]..Along with this the training o f a 
succession o f officer-Cadets[sic] to form a future supply.[65]
In 1912, government agreed that
If we keep Gyantse as a training ground, we should generally have an 
officer who has sufficient experience of the Border and knowledge o f the 
language to be appointed Political Agent[sic] Sikkim and Bhutan.[66]
This policy was adopted, and all o f the officers who were appointed to the Sikkim post 
after White had previously served as Trade Agent Gyantse.
Because the selection and training o f officers for service in Tibet was influenced by those 
already serving there, the influence o f  the Tibet cadre's founders, Curzon and 
Younghusband, remained strong throughout the period o f  British presence in Tibet. 
Curzon personally chose Younghusband to lead the Tibet Mission in 1903-04, knowing
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that he would represent the interests o f  his patron. Younghusband in turn selected 
O'Connor and Bailey for service in Tibet. Thus even after Curzon's departure from India,
officers who had supported, and benefited by, his policies, remained in Tibet. They in turn
*
selected officers who would continue the policies they supported.[67]
Sir Charles Bell represented a slightly different, but none the less 'forward', line o f 
succession. O'Connor was the choice o f the 'forward school' to succeed White as Political 
Officer Sikkim in 1908, and Younghusband seems to have had doubts as to Bell's 
suitability for the post. H ow ever Bell soon gained the support o f  Curzon and 
Younghusband, for their initial differences were over means, not aims. (This can be most 
clearly seen in their combined efforts to attain a British representative at Lhasa, detailed in 
Chapter Five). Bell became the model officer for the Tibet cadre, inspiring future officers 
who followed his aims and methods, as will be seen.
SECTION 1.6: - 'LEAN AND KEEN* ADMINISTRATORS
Once an officer was accepted into the Political Department the Secretariat decided his 
postings. But the officers had a chance to express their preferences during their selection 
interview and, after their initial apprenticeship, their preferences were solicited by the 
Secretariat, who tried to fit them into posts they favoured. Officers tended to concentrate 
their careers either in the Indian Princely States, or in frontier and consulate work, although 
there was no formal barrier to movement between the two sections. 'Lean and keen for the 
frontier, fat and good natured men for the states' was the popular maxim. [68]
But suitability for the frontier was not enough to ensure that an officer would be suitable 
for the Tibet cadre. Although m anpower shortages elsewhere meant that Frederick 
Mainprice’s career in Tibet was a brief one, he was the perfect example o f the 'lean and 
keen' frontier officer, efficient and hard-working, who nonetheless failed to fit the specific 
requirements o f the Tibet cadre. M ainprice was o f a new generation, he had driven 
overland to India in 1939 to join the ICS, but his sense o f duty and moral standards 
reflected the ideal of an earlier age. Taking over at Gyantse after an unsettled period, he 
reorganised the local staff, several o f  whom were dism issed for corruption and 
inefficiency, and had the Agency cleaned and painted. Finding the system whereby 
presents received in the Toshakhcma were priced 'at less than half their actual market value 
and are usually sold to the officers o f the Agency', 'very immoral', he raised the valuation 
to 75 per cent.[69]
But while his performance was certainly up to the Political Department's ideal, Mainprice
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was less than impressed by the Tibetans and their government (as will be seen in Chapter 
Six). An empathy with the Tibetans was a required characteristic o f  successful officers o f 
the Tibet cadre, and, as he apparently lacked this, M ainprice's services were used 
elsewhere.
Many Political officers served a term in the Secretariat during their training. There they 
could arrange their own postings, and two officers, Gould and M ajor Ken Saker, 
volunteered to serve in Tibet when a vacancy arose there during their term  at 
headquarters.[70] In the Secretariat, the officers learnt how to write reports in the concise, 
detached style favoured by government. More importantly they learned 'how to fight 
official battles'.[71]
Early cadre officers lacked this political skill, a weakness which had significant effects on 
O'Connor's career, and hence the policies he favoured. O 'Connor regularly upset the 
Secretariat with his intemperate writings. His more important reports were forwarded to 
Secretary o f State Morley, as he was reminded after describing one decision as 'an abject 
lesson to all observers on the feebleness o f our policy'. Although he was allowed to rewrite 
that particular report, O'Connor's outspokenness was, as noted, a major factor in Morley's 
vetoing his promotion to Political Officer Sikkim. [72]
Ian Copland has argued, in the Indian context, that Political officers were weak in 
administrative skills, and this was true, at least o f the early cadre officers. White, for 
example, took four months to pass one report from Gyantse to his government. [73] But the 
Tibet cadre placed more emphasis on the importance of political skills, after early failures in 
this area. Younghusband considered that lack o f such skills had prevented the 'forward 
school1 plan to annex the Chumbi Valley from coming to fruition. 'Perhaps we might still 
have been in the Chumbi Valley if I had known better how to handle Government', he 
wrote, and he urged Bailey to learn to present a case to government 'in such a way as to 
ruffle as few as possible o f their prejudices and enlist as many as possible o f their 
sympathies'. [74]
Bell, as will be shown in Chapters Four and Five, was a master of political infighting, 
and his successors followed his lead. Time in the Secretariat taught Gould that 'there wras 
usually somebody...whose opinion was liable to be decisive in a particular matter'. 
Successful officers learnt how to influence these decision makers, knowing that, if their 
recommendations were 'reasonable, and fought for until they were granted...each point 
gained made it easier to win the next one'.[75] This understanding o f the importance o f 
political skills was to be an important weapon in the Tibet cadre's struggles to influence 
policy.
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SECTION 1.7: - THE QUESTION OF LENGTH OF SERVICE
Copland has also argued that the Government o f India, fearing its officers would become 
too partial to their host states, posted its officers to new positions too frequently. This 
'usually had a deleterious effect on the influence exerted by government in the states 
concerned'. Similarly M argaret Ewing has concluded that, in the ICS, postings were too 
frequent, and this resulted  in too much power resting in the hands o f  local 
subordinates. [76]
As will be seen in Chapter Six, some British 'other ranks' spent most o f their careers in 
Tibet, but the longest tenures in Political Department posts in Tibet were terms served by 
the local-born officers M acdonald and Norbhu Dhondup, and officers attached to the 
Political Department, such as White and Bell. This was because the career structure o f the 
Political Department required that its officers were regularly relocated to new postings. The 
longest term served by a member o f the Politicals was Gould's term at Sikkim from 1935- 
45, which was due to wartime shortages o f manpower. [77]
There were advantages to long postings in one state. Expertise, particularly in language, 
naturally increased, and an officer's personal relations with local peoples generally 
improved with time. The Tibetans disliked frequent changes o f British personnel as they 
attached a great deal o f significance to their relations with individual British officers, 
continuing to seek their advice after they retired. An example o f this came in 1910, when 
the Panchen Lama sought to contact O'Connor, then serving in Mashad. The Lama sent a 
small group of men to Persia, bearing bags o f gold dust and a letter requesting O'Connor's 
assistance in obtaining British aid. Despite speaking only Tibetan, they managed to reach 
Southern Persia before being repatriated by the British consul, with assurances that their 
message would be forwarded to O'Connor.[78]
There were four main arguments against lengthy terms o f service in Tibet. A general 
staleness could reduce an officer's effectiveness, while frequent postings 'removed the 
temptation o f corruption'. [79] There was also a danger that the long-serving officer would 
form too close an attachment to the state to function with the necessary detachment. Most 
important, however, was the officer's own concern with career opportunities; they sought 
transfers to gain promotion.[80]
Ultimately the policy adopted was one o f compromise. Politicals were able to specialise, 
without fear o f being pigeonholed into a single posting. There were always local experts to 
advise an officer and to provide continuity at a post, and the officers made their successors 
aware o f the reliability, or otherwise, o f these local experts, with their advice being
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perceived accordingly.[81] Copland is correct in perceiving a loss o f  influence due to 
frequent postings - this was inevitable - but he ignores the human factor, that individuals 
sought career advancement through a variety o f postings, and only those individuals with a 
particular attachment to a place sought to remain there for long periods. Thus the lengthy 
periods served in Tibet by Bell, M acdonald, Gould and Richardson are themselves 
indicators o f these officers' attachment to sendee there.
SECTION 1.8: - 'GENERALISTS'. ’SPECIALISTS1 AND RECLUSES
A 'generalist' tradition, developed from the 'amateur ideal' inculcated in the public 
schools, has been seen as an important part o f the imperial ethos, but o f the 22 Tibet cadre 
officers, 14 or 15 might be described as Tibetan specialists. (The exceptions are those post- 
1927 Gyantse Trade Agents who served single terms in Tibet, with the possible exception 
o f Major Ken Saker). While O'Connor, Campbell, Saker and Weir all acquired expertise in 
other areas in addition to Tibet, and White is now more associated with Sikkim, this still 
means that at least half of the Tibetan cadre were specialists.
This supports previous findings that by the late 19th century an expert knowledge o f local 
cultures and conditions was seen as essential for decision-making by government.[82] 
'Generalists', such as Weir, were still valued in the 20th century, but the increasing 
realisation that policies had differing effects in different regions meant that the Government 
o f India needed its 'men on the spot' to become experts in the particular culture in which 
they operated.
This need for expertise led to another distinguishing characteristic of the Tibet cadre. 
Those officers who studied the Tibetan language, culture and customs, progressed beyond 
the usual working knowledge acquired by Politicals in any state, to produce genuine 
scholarship. Most of those who reached the position of Political Officer Sikkim, or Head of 
Mission Lhasa, may be seen as distinguished by this quality. While later research has 
naturally reduced the value o f some o f their earlier works, their writings remain essential 
references today. In particular. R ichardson and Bell established them selves as 
Tibetologists. This scholarly character manifested in various other ways - with Bell a taste 
for classical Greek writings (Gould and Hopkinson also read the New Testament in 
Greek.) Only W illiamson and Hopkinson, who died before they could record their 
knowledge, and Weir, 'a scholar’ but perhaps too modest to publish, failed to leave a 
record for the future.[83]
This finding provides a contrast with that o f Copland, who criticised the Politicals as 'a
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byword for intellectual mediocrity'. However, other studies o f the ICS, whose officers 
made up one third o f  the Political's intake, have concluded that its officers were 
intellectuals.[84] The Indian Army Politicals may have had a less well-developed intellect, 
but, while intellectual ability is not recorded as being high on the list o f the Political 
Department's requirements, Copland's judgment cannot be applied to the Tibet cadre.
Along with scholarship, another quality emerges. O'Connor was described as 'having a 
touch o f the recluse', [85] and it appears that this quality can be ascribed to a number o f the 
cadre, particularly in their early, bachelor years. Service in the Politicals naturally appealed 
to those attracted to the more remote locations. While by education and background well- 
trained in contemporary social skills, many officers were happiest with the simplicity o f life 
in the wide-open spaces o f Central Asia. This is most obvious in the case o f Ludlow, who 
clearly favoured 'the stony bridle path in preference to the tarred road'. After his first 
posting as a schoolteacher in Gyantse in 1923-26, he dreaded 'the hurry and hustle o f the 
west after the hinterlands o f Tibet'. His second posting there was in 1942 as Head of 
M ission Lhasa, but that involved too much socialising for his taste, and he was not 
unhappy to leave. [86]
Williamson and Sherriff, who both served in the Kashgar Consulate, the most remote 
posting o f the Government o f India, were others who clearly had 'a touch o f the recluse', 
and this quality emerges, clearly or implicitly, in most o f the cadre officers. A fondness for 
separation from western society, and in some cases any society, was a significant element 
o f their mentality, and one which predisposed them to the isolation o f Tibet. [87]
SECTION 1.9: - POSTINGS PREFERENCES
We have noted that the Political Department solicited officer's posting preferences. While 
there can be no doubt that the officers chosen from outside the Politicals wanted to serve in 
Tibet,[88] a regular Political officer’s preferences might lie elsewhere. Macdonald recalled 
that
I have known men posted to the Agencies who did nothing but bemoan their 
luck in being stationed in such an out-of-the-way place, and who passed 
most o f their time devising some scheme which would obtain them a 
transfer. Others did all they could to get an extension o f their term o f 
duty.[89]
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As MacDonald's Political contemporaries had all sought service in Tibet, his comments 
must relate to escort and technical personnel, rather than Politicals. Even then the number 
o f those who did not appreciate the posting was probably small. Several technical staff in 
MacDonald's time remained in Tibet for long periods, and later Escort Commanders such 
as Lieutenant-Colonel D.A.W alters and Captain Allen Robins greatly enjoyed Tibetan 
service. Captain Robert Grist was so keen to stay that he had Gyantse monks perform 
(unsuccessful) ceremonies aimed at ensuring that his term would be extended. While a 
sense o f adventure may have initially attracted many o f  the technical staff to Tibet, it 
appears that the Tibet cadre, or the Tibetan environment, instilled an enthusiasm for Tibet in 
most o f the men who served there. [90]
Several letters indicating Political officers' postings preferences are on file in the National 
Archives o f India. Captain D.R.Smith, whose Tibetan career was to be ruined by his 
failure to adapt to the altitude, had specifically asked for Gyantse. Williamson, who was 
'keenly interested in Central Asia and Tibet', Bailey, and Gould (in 1912), all sought a post 
in Tibet. Gould asked for 'any frontier' if  no Tibet post was available, but by 1931 he 
showed more concern with career advancement (although at that time Weir and Williamson 
appeared to have a monopoly on the Gangtok post), wanting a post which would 'tend to 
qualify me for...a senior post either in Baluchistan or the Indian States'.[91]
Career prospects were an important factor in a Political officer's preferences. For 
example Weir accepted the post o f Political Officer Sikkim, only 'on the understanding that 
by doing so I would not forfeit my chances of getting a Residency*.[92] Another example 
is the case o f Hopkinson who, in 1928, was getting married, and sought a post such as 
Mysore or Kashmir, suitable for a couple. But he recalled how happy he had been in his 
postings in Chitral and Gyantse, and noted how he hoped with seniority to aspire to 
Gangtok or Kabul.[93]
Two officers whose careers in Tibet were less than successful, Lieutenant-Colonels 
H.G.Rivett-Carnac and M.C. Sinclair, favoured service in the Indian states, while two 
who were to find continued service in Tibet not to their liking. Russell and Major Keith 
Battye. favoured the Persian Gulf and Baluchistan respectively. This suggests that officers 
in Tibet were more successful if they wanted to serve there, and that officers who favoured 
service in the Indian States were less likely to succeed on the frontier.
The Tibet cadre themselves certainly believed that officers suited to service in the Indian 
Princely States would not necessarily succeed in Tibet. Bailey's original opinion o f Bell 
was that 'he would possibly be alright in an Indian district but is not a man for the frontier'. 
Bell himself wrote that 'A man, efficient in administrative work in India...is not always the 
best for Tibet', and Hopkinson repeated this 'truism uttered by Bell' in his final report on
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Tibet. [94]
The cadre therefore drew a distinction between service in India and service in Tibet, 
which was consistent with their understanding both o f the frontier as a zone requiring 
particular personal qualities from those who served there, and o f Tibet as a unit separate 
from its surrounding states. Administration in India was associated with bureaucracy, 
service on the frontier meant freedom of action, and could not, they believed, be bound by 
'rules and regulations framed to meet...Indian conditions'. If  the cadre were to influence 
the Tibetans they needed officers capable o f 'getting on well' with them; officers with 
'sympathy' for the Tibetans.[95]
There was, however, a significant element o f expediency in postings to Tibet, While this 
was particularly the case with Agency supporting staff, the Politicals also faced problems 
with wartime shortages o f men, officers going on leave, getting married, falling ill, or 
being deputed on special missions, such as Bailey's survey mission in Assam in 1913, 
which precluded his return to Gyantse. [96] Last- minute changes o f posting were 
commonplace. Richardson was sent to Lhasa instead o f Kashgar in 1945, while Mainprice 
was diverted from Gangtok to Lohit (Assam) ten days after his first appointment as Trade 
Agent Gyantse in 1943.[97]
Vacancies were often filled in the early years by doubling up control o f the Gyantse and 
Yatung Agencies, and between 1918 and 1936 they were under joint command. Due to the 
distance between them, this inevitably led to one or other position being neglected, 
although it was popular with the Agents concerned as, in addition to increased prestige with 
the Tibetans and Chinese, they received 300 rupees a month extra pay.[98] A more 
successful alternative seems to have been appointing either the Medical Officer (as was 
done in 1909 and 1926), or the Escort Commander (in 1929 and on 6 occasions in the 
1940s), as Acting Trade Agent Gyantse.
Vacancies were usually filled by officers recommended by the Political Officer Sikkim, 
whose final approval was sought for every officer posted to Tibet. [99] Thus just as a 
recommendation from a Political was virtually a requirement to enter the Department, so too 
did service in Tibet usually require a 'patron'. There are indications that several officers 
sought a posting in Tibet without success due to lack of support from within the Tibetan 
cadre, [100]
While the lower postings were, to an extent, dependent on availability and chance, careful 
consideration was given to the appointment o f the Political Officer Sikkim, with officers 
earmarked for that position some time in advance. For career-minded officers with an 
interest in Tibet, but an eye on their pension, the Sikkim post offered a stepping stone to a 
higher position, and candidates such as Williamson actively sought the appointment.fi 01]
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On occasion, cadre officers actively co-operated to ensure that a vacancy was filled by an 
officer o f their choice. For example in 1921, O 'Connor took over briefly as Political 
Officer Sikkim while awaiting a posting as British Envoy to the Court o f  Nepal. O'Connor 
advised Bailey o f his plans, suggesting he apply for the Sikkim post. Bailey who was on 
leave, then advised the Government o f India that he wanted to be posted to Sikkim on his 
return, failing which he wanted to extend his leave until the position was vacant. O'Connor 
was then forced to cut short his stay in Gangtok to return to England due to his mother's 
illness, and Macdonald relieved for three months as Political Officer Sikkim, (in addition to 
his holding the posts o f Trade Agent at both Yatung and Gyantse). Although Foreign 
Secretary J.B.W ood considered he was 'somewhat junior for the post', Bailey was the 
candidate m ost experienced in Tibetan affairs, and he was appointed. W hen the 
Kathmandhu incumbent retired, O'Connor's complicated plan succeeded and he returned 
to take over there in October 1921 .[102]
SECTIO N 1.10: - F ATT TIRES
Among the 35 officers who served at Gangtok, Lhasa and Gyantse, there were a number 
who failed to suit the requirements of the Tibet cadre. It is instructive to examine the 
reasons why some officers failed to make a success o f their careers there, in order to show 
qualities which were possessed by the successful. Firstly they had to be physically fit. 
After Smith was found medically unfit for service at altitude, medical examinations were 
introduced before an officer was posted to Tibet. Despite this a Major Laughton fell ill at 
Gangtok en route to Tibet in 1940, and his replacement, Sinclair, also suffered badly from 
altitude and returned early to India.[103]
Only one of the Sikkim Political Officers can be definitely adjudged a failure. Even in 
recent publications White's services in Sikkim are lauded, but this reputation was largely 
created by his own 'extremely self-laudatory' account o f his time there.[104] White had 
been originally appointed to Sikkim when it was o f only minor importance, and Curzon 
was initially attracted by White's 'forward' views on Tibet. But when the region gained 
prominence during the Curzon Viceroyalty, White's faults soon became apparent, and, 
although he was the obvious candidate to lead a mission to Lhasa, Curzon preferred 
Younghusband.
White was plainly out o f his depth in Tibetan affairs, and unable to relate to the Tibetans. 
(He was also responsible for the policy o f importing Nepalese labour into Sikkim and 
Bhutan, with serious consequences apparent today.) By the time of the Younghusband
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expedition, W hite's opinions w ere largely disregarded by his governm ent, who 
corresponded directly with the highly-rated O'Connor in Gyantse. White managed to avoid 
being dismissed despite being censured five times between 1904 and 1908. The most 
serious o f  these matters concerned White's overpaying him self 500 rupees a month in 
1904-06, but despite his government's doubts as to his 'bona fides' they were careful to 
word their refusal to extend his term 'so his not to hurt his feelings', apparently in 
consideration o f his long service in an isolated post,[105]
There were several failures among the Gyantse Trade Agents. Captain D.G.Thornburgh 
was one officer found 'quite unsuited to the job', apparently due to his failure to relate to 
the Tibetans, while Rivett-Carnac was more concerned to be with his wife and young 
children in India than with service in Tibet. He was described privately by Weir as 'utterly 
useless' and 'more o f an uxorious horticulturalist than a working political officer'. After 
Rivett-Carnac was transferred, the collapse o f a private bank established in Gyantse with 
Government o f India assistance revealed that he had borrowed 3,000 rupees from the bank 
and made no attempt to repay it. To make matters worse, he had previously filed a report 
clearing the bank o f allegations o f  cheating the government. W hen it collapsed, the 
allegations were shown to be true. Rivett-Carnac's failures in Tibet were followed by very 
unfavourable reports from his subsequent postings, and, when further unpaid debts were 
revealed, he was forced to retire.[106]
Fletcher, though certainly the 'lean and keen' type favoured for the frontier, fell out with 
local Tibetan officials over hunting and fishing trips on which he demanded ula, the free 
transport to which Tibetan officials and guests on official duties were entitled. [107] Others, 
such as Russell, simply found life in Tibet was not to their taste, or regarded it as just 
another, albeit interesting, posting in a long career. They had no enthusiasm for studying 
Tibet, and hence for them it could be 'excessively tedious'.[108]
Mainprice reported that Gould was pleased to have an ICS trained officer at Gyantse after 
the three previous ex-Army Politicals had failed to make a success o f the post. While a 
tension between ex-ICS Politicals and those taken from the Indian Army has been noted by 
many previous studies, this is the only reference I have seen to it in the Tibetan context. As 
Gould got on well with Escort Commander Robins, the subsequent Acting Trade Agent in 
1945-46, it appears any such prejudice was based more on personal relations than wider 
bias. However it is apparent that the failures were all, with the exception of White, ex- 
Indian Army Politicals, and we may provisionally suggest that some types o f character 
suited for military employ were unsuited to Tibet.[109]
Thus from those officers who failed to satisfy the requirements o f the Tibet cadre, we can 
see several factors which were required o f successful members. An officer such as Rivett-
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Carnac falling by the wayside is not, in itself, significant, other than in showing that the 
system quietly removed its failures. More important was his desire to be with his family; 
successful officers, and their wives, always put duty first. The extreme example of this 
being Williamson, who, as will be seen in Chapter Five, knew that his last journey to 
Lhasa posed a serious risk to his health, but chose to go, a decision his wife accepted. [110] 
Ability to live at high altitude was essential, and so too was the ability to get on well with 
Tibetans o f  all classes. Obviously an interest in the country assisted in gaining this 
empathy, and those without that interest, or who found Tibetan society restricting, did not 
succeed.
SECTION 1.11: - RETIRED OFFICERS
An indicator o f the successful cadre officers' deep involvement in their role was their 
inability to detach themselves from Tibetan affairs after their departure. Most o f the Sikkim 
Political Officers either sought to return to the frontier in some capacity, or devoted a 
significant part o f their retirement to the Tibetan cause.
Bell and MacDonald both remained closely involved in Tibetan affairs. MacDonald made 
several attempts in the 1930s and '40s to return to Tibet in an official capacity, and 
attempted to persuade Bell to return and lead another mission to Lhasa. MacDonald was 
involved in a number of business enterprises on the frontier, and his Kalimpong hotel was 
a centre o f Tibetan affairs there. [111]
O'Connor frequently gave advice on Tibetan matters to both the Tibetan and British 
Governments, and, after attempting a new career in business, worked as tour guide on the 
frontier. Bailey, posted to a Central Indian Princely State after leaving Sikkim, attempted 
unsuccessfully to persuade the Political Department to return him to the frontier. Gould 
extended his term of service on the frontier until he was forced to retire on medical 
grounds, and he and Richardson both supported the Tibetan cause in retirement. The lure 
o f Tibet also affected a number o f those who served there in lesser capacities, Escort 
Officers, Captain Perry and Captain Parker, and Telegraph Sergeants Lee and Martin were 
among those who applied to live in Tibet.[l 12]
These officers' continuing involvement in Tibetan affairs created problems for their 
successors. Most handovers in the Gangtok Residency were accompanied by personal 
difficulties between the officers concerned (or their wives), although with time the 
successors came to realise 'how it nearly broke your heart to leave Sikkim', and how there 
were 'foolish misunderstandings on both sides'.[113]
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Bell posed a big problem for his successors. As will be seen in Chapter Seven, in 
retirement he pursued an independent line, refusing to submit his last three books for 
censorship or to allow the government to read his correspondence with the Dalai Lama. He 
continued to advise the Tibetans, and his successors naturally feared that with Bell's high 
status in Lhasa his advice was more valued than their own. Such was the prestige Bell 
acquired that the Tibetans continued to view him as having great influence at the highest 
levels o f British policy making. This view was consistent with their own political system, 
in which retirement from government service did not necessarily mean the end o f  an 
individual's influence. [114]
Weir was especially worried when Bell planned a visit to Tibet in 1932, fearing that if  
Bell was in Lhasa he, or any any other Political Officer, would be 'considered [a] 
nonentity'. When Williamson was preparing to visit Lhasa in 1935, Foreign Secretary O laf 
Caroe advised him to make it clear to the Tibetans that Bell no longer had any official 
status. Williamson requested a statement to this effect in writing from the Government o f 
India, fearing that otherwise the Tibetans would not believe him .[115]
SECTION 1.12: - TN THE MOULD'
Robert Ford, who served as a Radio Officer in Lhasa and Eastern Tibet before being 
captured by the invading Chinese in 1950, agreed that by selecting and training suitable 
successors in their own likeness, the Tibet cadre was creating a 'mould', a distinctive type 
o f officer who served in Tibet. The distinction was recognised at the time. Some thought 
'they've all got something odd about them', while Ford's 'insider' view was that 'they've 
all got something special about them'.[l 16]
Ford saw a subdivision into 'm ilitary animals' and 'political animals', with the 
implication that the latter were more involved with Tibet, and hence more successful there. 
As he noted, however, the distinction cannot be applied strictly in military versus civil 
terms. Sherriff, Bailey, and to an extent O'Connor, although from military backgrounds, 
were, like Gould and Hopkinson, 'in the m ould'.[117]
Certainly many o f the military Politicals, Escort Commanders, and particularly the 
Medical Officers, were keenly interested in Tibet. Officers like Saker, Robins, Kenned}’ 
and Major J.Guthrie were sympathetic to the Tibetans' cause, and enjoyed their time in 
Tibet. They too felt, like Mrs Saker, who spent more time in Gyantse than any other 
European woman, that 'it was special, a great experience...a privilege to be there'. But they 
had careers which had to develop elsewhere, and so their involvement was more limited.
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whereas those 'in the mould' devoted much o f their life to Tibet. [118]
This is not to suggest that the officers themselves necessarily got on personally. While 
O'Connor and Bailey, or Ludlow and Sherriff, were obviously close friends, there were 
actually few opportunities for officers to meet, and relations were often 'fairly 
superficial'. [119] They appear to have been judged by their fellow officers mainly on the 
basis o f their reputation, and the views they expressed in their reports.
There was certainly ill-feeling between some individuals on occasions. Altitude 
contributed to shortness o f temper, and those stationed together in isolated posts such as 
Lhasa and G yantse could find 'pressures built up and nerves became frayed'.[120] 
Obvious problems could arise when an officer played host to his superior, the Political 
Officer Sikkim, for long periods. [121 ] But evidence o f such ill-feeling does not appear in 
the published works o f the Politicals, for it was an unwritten part o f their code, deriving 
from the public school code o f 'n o  snitching', that such disputes were not aired in public. 
This is consistent with the finding that these types o f memoirs
are quintessential!)' about community solidarity. The 
authors ignore or pass over issues o f dissension and 
conflict while emphasising individual attributes such 
as strength, hard work, self-reliance, humour and 
communal attribute s. [122]
Thus the only specific published remarks over personal differences are those by a female 
observer, W illiam son’s widow, although there are frequent references to ill-feeling in 
diaries or personal correspondence. [123]
For those 'in the mould', however, such differences were o f little consequence in the 
long term, and service in Tibet had special attractions apart from the unique culture and 
environment. There were none o f the communal troubles increasingly common in India, no 
caste barriers to contact with the local people, and great independence for the officers.[124] 
Those 'in the mould' whether posted to Tibet by choice or circumstance, found it 
congenial, immersed themselves in various aspects o f its culture, and acquired an expertise 
which they communicated through their later publications.[125]
SECTION f .13: - THE LEGEND OF THE FRONTIER
The encounter between Britain and Tibet tended to be expressed in mythological terms.
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due to its location outside o f normal British imperial codes o f meaning. Just as the frontiers 
o f  India were the setting for much o f India's indigenous mythology, so they were the 
setting for a powerful mythology o f empire expressed in novels such as Kipling's Kim  and 
Political Department textbooks such as Thornton's Sir Robert Sandeman . Myth and legend 
generally require a placement outside normal constraints o f time and space. Therefore, it 
was no coincidence that the frontier, the zone with the weakest area o f definition and 
administration, was the strongest realm o f Indian indigenous and imperial myth.
Within British imperial society, the men who served on the frontiers became part o f a 
mythology o f empire which was brought out in newspapers and imperial memoirs, and in 
popular books and magazines ('Boys Own Paper', for example). These imperial frontier 
legends can be used as a historical source, because they provide a valuable perspective on 
the understanding o f the frontiersman's experience by his society, and tell us much about 
the character o f these officers, their sense o f place, identity, and the ethos in which they 
functioned. [126]
The frontiersman o f legend was portrayed as strong and self-reliant, courageous, upright 
and noble; a pioneer o f  European civilisation. He gained the trust and respect o f the 
'unruly' indigenous peoples, and, through individual initiative and friendship with 
individuals or elements o f  the local society, imposed (w hether through military or 
diplomatic action) the British concept o f good order and civilisation, to the greater benefit 
o f all. His efforts almost invariably resulted in the expansion o f British imperial authority. 
These qualities o f the frontiersman o f legend thus mirror the qualities sought in recruits to 
the Political Department. The ideal was the legend.
The heroes in this discourse, officers such as Lugard, Rhodes and Sandeman, took on 
legendary status, and there were also martyrs, such as General Gordon and Captain 
Cavignari. As Peter Bishop states, 'Tales o f explorers’ hardships and deaths were utterly 
essential for the Victorian British...imaginative associations with the region.'[127]
In India, this imperial mythology developed most strongly on the North-West Frontier in 
the 19th century, but it included other mythical and legendary elements o f regional 
traditions, and service traditions such as those concerning the Indian Politicals. There was a 
broad similarity among the various Indian regional and service traditions, with each 
tradition based on the service's fundamental purpose, upon which variations were 
developed. The Tibet cadre sought to exclude Russian and Chinese influence from India, 
whereas the Punjab tradition, as L.D.Wurgaft has shown, was based on a desire 'to create 
and preserve a stable rural base',[128]
W urgaff s evocation o f the 'Punjab style' is very similar to the ethos of the Tibet cadre, in 
that it was characterised by an idealised concept of
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heroic action, the exercise o f unlimited power... far from the red tape o f 
settled areas...an ideology o f action and independence as the primary 
instruments o f imperial control'. [129]
Cadre officers had absorbed imperial frontier legends in their youth, through magazines 
such as Boys Own Paper, M agnet or G em , in which 'it is always taken for granted that 
adventures only happen at the ends o f  the earth'.[130] As we have seen in the case o f 
Bailey, those officers with family connections to India also absorbed the imperial ethos, 
with its inherent heroic mythology, at home. The cadre were thus predisposed to service in 
the frontier zone that was the setting for the heroes of empire.
In the 20th century, when the mythology o f empire spread to embrace the new Tibetan 
frontier, the element o f competition with Russia meant that the Tibet cadre were drawn into 
the mythology o f  the "Great Game", the struggle between Russian and British agents for 
control o f Central Asia and the passes into India. The cadre legends were most clearly 
located in that context, and were given enhanced mystique by association with the Tibet of 
mystical renown.
The Tibet cadre's 'founding fathers', Curzon and Younghusband, were role models for 
would-be 'Great Gamers'. They were both legendary figures in the empire following their 
19th century exploits in Russian and Chinese Central Asia, and Younghusband was already 
a famous 'Great Gamer' when he led the mission to Lhasa. His proteges, O 'Connor and 
Bailey (as will be seen in Chapter Four), saw their role as continuing the traditions which 
Younghusband established,[131]
The cadre officer's placement in legend may also be seen to derive from their career's 
resemblance to a primary archetypal myth; 'the myth o f the return'. In this myth, the hero's 
quest takes him out o f his own society, and, with the assistance o f an intermediary, into 
another culture. This hero then returns to his own society, having gained an object, which 
may be seen as a symbol of the knowledge gained through 'crossing over' and 'returning' 
(a concept examined in more detail in Chapter Eight).[132] Those officers who 'crossed 
over' to Tibetan society and who 'returned' to their own could be perceived in those 
mythological terms.
The Tibet cadre were imperial administrators, schooled in the ideals o f positivist enquiry-, 
and they took a pragmatic approach to their duty, as will be seen. Ultimately they placed 
their duty to protect the security o f India's northern border, and serve the interests o f the 
Government o f India, above any consideration for the Tibetans. To describe them as 
mystics would be an obvious misconception. But Younghusband established an ethos in
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which a place in imperial mythology was a part o f the cadre's tradition and prestige, and an 
interest in the metaphysical was regarded as being an acceptable indication o f intellect and 
vision.
In the concluding pages o f his book India and Tibet, Younghusband attributes the source 
o f the British 'forward' policy in Tibet, not to individual, geo-political, or economic 
causes, but to a 'great world-force, energizing through Nature'. Younghusband explains 
this "ubiquitous spirituality" at some length, as being the force which guides the affairs o f 
men, and which had guided the British to Tibet. Characteristically, he concluded that this 
force in the Tibetan sphere would be best served by a British Agent in Lhasa. But 
Younghusband provided a precedent for his successors to exist in collusion with, not 
opposition to, Tibet's mystical image.[133]
The extent to which the cadre were drawn into the Tibetan spiritual milieu in which they 
were located, provides another example o f the extent to which the imperial nations' 'men 
on the spot' were influenced by the host society. Long periods living in a spiritually- 
orientated society had its effect. Just as imperial legends became a pail o f the cadre officer's 
self-image, so too did an inclination to spiritual speculation become acceptable.
SECTION 1.14: - TRADITION. IMAGE AND HISTORY
David Potter has defined an administrative tradition as having two features; (1) content, 
consisting o f values, norms and structure, and (2) a process o f  reproduction. If  the 
features continue over three generations it may be defined as a continuing tradition, and 
Potter has isolated three factors as being necessary for the reproduction o f a tradition; (a) 
obtaining similar successors, (b) shaping them to the tradition, and, (c) support from the 
political leadership.[134]
The traditions o f the Tibet cadre, and the process o f their reproduction among succeeding 
generations o f  officers, are consistent with Potter's definition. Although the British Tibet 
cadre lasted for less than fifty years, there were at least four generations o f officers within 
that period; (1) the 'Curzon-Younghusband-O'Connor' era in which British control o f 
Tibet was a realistic possibility; (2) the Bell and Macdonald period culminating in their visit 
to Lhasa; (3) the Bailey-W eir-W illiamson era o f Lhasa visits; and (4) the era after the 
establishment o f a position at Lhasa, dominated by Gould, Richardson and Hopkinson.
A fifth generation may also be identified, that o f their Indian successors. There was 'no 
substantial change in the ambience' o f the Tibet cadre after the departure o f the British, 
although the 'Imperial style’ and the concern with 'preserving their imperial distinctness'
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were dropped.[135] Certainly key elements of the tradition, such as location, method, 
readings, and the ideal o f their predecessors, were all passed on to the new generation of 
Indian officers. We may, therefore, define the cadre as maintaining the key elements o f an 
administrative tradition.
Previous studies o f administrative traditions within British India have described a 'Punjab 
style’ (Wurgaft) or a ’service code’ (Ewing), a collective ethos maintained through 
selection and training, which bear many similarities with the distinctive group identity 
passed on in the traditions of the Tibet cadre. But these studies have adopted a more critical 
perspective on their subject groups than I have found necessaiy. Wurgaft has described the 
’Punjab style’ as a briefly successful one which became part o f an imperial mythology that 
isolated the British from the complex realities o f their environment. Ewing found ICS 
officers were ’hard headed realists who looked upon their time in India as a job and not a 
mission’, a finding consistent with Bradford Spangenberg’s criticism o f ICS officers as 
’aspiring to succeed in India primarily in order to provide for a comfortable retirement in 
England’.[136]
But the cadre seem to have had a far more complex motivation, including disinterested 
elements. The Tibet cadre does not seem to have been dominated by careerists. Certainly 
there was ambition, but there was also a strong sense o f ’mission’ (which Ewing found 
lacking in the ICS officers whom she interviewed), that emerges clearly throughout the 
period under consideration. Thus even ambitious officers promoted to other positions, such 
as O’Connor, continued to work for what they saw as the benefit o f  the Tibetans. This 
continued even after the departure o f the British from India and Tibet.
Copland's study o f the Political Department is most critical. It describes an 'intellectually 
second-rate' service, poorly trained in administrative skills, 'dominated by upright but 
slow-thinking and extremely unimaginative officers', their claimed efficiency 'a mere 
facade’.[137] As noted, Copland’s criticisms of lack of intellect and administrative skills do 
not, from my analysis, apply to the Tibet cadre.
These critical studies do provide a balance to what Potter has called 'an active myth- 
m aking ',[138] those works, many by former imperial servants, which prom ote a 
romantically positive view o f the imperial services and their officers. This may be 
compared with the promotion of a similar myth in recent times: that American Government 
policy and will failed in Vietnam, but the men who served there did not. There is however, 
a strong element o f truth in this type o f myth as it applies to the cadre. As will be seen, 
most cadre officers did their best to strengthen Tibet, albeit under British supervision, but 
the Tibetan cause was o f little concern to Whitehall after World War One. and o f  no 
concern at all after World War Two. Thus the Tibetans were abandoned to their fate.
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despite the efforts o f the 'men on the spot'.
My concern here is to analyse the cadre through understanding their mentality, taking the 
perspective from the 'inside', rather than attempting to deconstruct their image from the 
'outside'. This 'insider view', enhanced by the use o f participant oral sources, does not 
produce an uncritical image, but one which represents a history recognisable as 'true' by 
the two main participants closest to events, the Tibetans and the Tibet cadre. Naturally it 
reflects the Anglo-Tibetan perspective o f  the sources, but as Edward Shils observes, 
traditions are defined by the insiders, not the observers.[139]
Judged by their own standards, rather than by the outcome o f their policies, (a matter 
which was in the hands o f higher government), the Tibet cadre were a success. While 
Copland's conclusions o f course apply to a different field than my own, his 'outsider' 
approach may in itself tend to produce more critical findings, which do not necessarily 
represent history as seen by the participants, and thus do not enable us to understand the 
mentality o f the period.
Therefore, analysing the accuracy o f the cadre's image, and the extent to which the 
officers themselves lived up to this image, does little to assist understanding. The image 
was one created by the officers themselves; therefore it was largely self-descriptive. 
Officers who failed to live up to the image were not considered 'in the mould', and were 
not re-employed in Tibet. Those who remained there were naturally those who lived up to 
the image. Thus my concern is to describe the qualities o f those 'in the mould' in order to 
understand their actions, rather than to deconstruct the image itself.
SECTION 1.16: - PASSING ON TRADTTTONS
We have seen that the cadre's traditions were originally developed within existing 
imperial, and more specifically, Political Department traditions o f frontier service, and the 
mythology and reality of the "Great Game". The character and exploits o f Younghusband. 
and the support and ideology o f Curzon and other 'forward school' figures such as 
MacGregor and Dane, provided the direction and much o f its character. The traditions 
established by the early agents, direct disciples o f Younghusband, were passed on 
throughout the 1904-47 period. Just as 'the first generation o f frontiersmen in the Punjab 
had become legendary by the end o f the 19th century1,[140] so too had Younghusband and 
the founding officers o f the Tibet cadre 30 years later, when they were seen as ideal types 
to emulate.
The cadre officers were aware of their legendary image; it was part o f their identity. They
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played a large part in creating it, and attempted to live up to it. One consequence o f this was 
that their identification with 'forward1 policies was an integral part o f their sense o f cadre 
identity as much as it was a reasoned analysis o f potential means o f protecting the security 
o f India.
Although the romantic image o f the Politicals has been criticised by scholars such as 
Copland and W urgaft,[141] it was an important part o f Political officers' own sense o f 
identity and purpose. A certain amount of pride and self-confidence was usually an integral 
part o f the ambition to attain the higher ranks o f the Politicals. While the self-effacing 
Ludlow deplored the ego o f some o f his Political Department contemporaries,[142] Gould 
expressed this pride when he recalled that T o  a jealous outside world "a Political" might be 
a term o f abuse. To us it was a term o f glory.'[143]
The early officers such as Bell and Bailey, modest though they were by nature, learned 
the need for judicious self-promotion, and for obscuring their failures; this was a part o f 
gaining both career advancement, and the advancement o f the policies they favoured. Yet a 
fine line was drawn in the 'gentlemanly codes' they had learned in school, between quiet 
self-promotion and immodesty. This was defined by Bailey when he wrote of Sven Hedin, 
'I think he did a great deal but it is a pity he did not let other people praise it instead o f 
praising it himself.'[144]
To the Tibet cadre, the most important aspect o f promoting their image was the 
maintenance o f traditions within the cadre itself. Service traditions were deliberately passed 
on to newcomers by serving officers. While Younghusband and his proteges, O'Connor 
and Bailey, were more colourful figures, and hence featured more in the romantic 
mythology, the greatest influence on succeeding officers in Tibet was Sir Charles Bell. He 
was 'd isposed to let a new com er see things for h im se lf and form his own 
conclusions'^  145] but W eir. M acDonald, W illiam son, Gould and Hopkinson all 
acknowledged a great debt to him, and their written work contains constant echoes o f 
Bell's influence, both acknowledged and unconscious. These officers followed Bell in 
deliberately instilling their 'enthusiasm' and 'sense o f mission' in their successors.[146]
Traditions were handed on within the cadre through the system whereby serving cadre 
officers selected promising individuals with an interest in Tibet, supervised their training, 
and instilled in them the history and traditions o f the British presence there. For example, 
Ludlow describes how Bailey had taken he and another young officer and 'pointed out the 
old haunts o f the mission in 1904-05[sic]'.[147] This was a deliberate policy, and the 
British sought to hand down these traditions to their Indian successors after 1947. 
Hopkinson wrote that he wanted
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to get some Indians genuinely interested and sympathetic, who would help 
to continue the ideas on which British officers, in succession, had tried to 
work...and try to bring the Indians up to the right idea.[148]
Richardson too, hoped that he might encourage his successor to work 'along the right 
lines’. [149]
Officers naturally took an interest in the careers o f those they had promoted; their own 
judgm ent would be considered at fault if  their proteges failed. As Younghusband told 
Bailey's father, 'tell him [Bailey] to be sure and do me credit for I am responsible for him 
and I want any man I recommend to be a credit to me'.[l 50]
Most officers also solicited their predecessors' advice. For example, Bailey profited from 
O'Connor and Younghusband's counsel throughout much o f  his career, and Gould wrote 
to Bell in 1936, noting he had tried to meet Bailey and ’pick his brains', and now sought 
his old superior's advice,[151]
The cadre traditions were jealously guarded. In 1934, when the Italian Professor, 
Giuseppe Tucci, claimed to have been the first European to visit Rabgyeling monastery in 
western Tibet, H.Calvert ICS, who had been there en route to inspect the Gartok Trade 
Agency in 1906, was quick to write to The Times and correct the report. Since 1947 
officers such as Richardson and Caroe have also been quick to defend their achievements 
against any criticism or misinterpretation. [152]
C O NCLUSIO NS
What then were the defining characteristics o f the successful members of the Tibet cadre? 
In common with officials o f other Government of India services, they had close family 
connections with India and shared a middle, or upper-middle class origin. They were 
educated at British public schools, universities or military colleges, which gave them an 
almost unquestioning belief in the righteousness of the British Empire.
While made up o f officers with very different types o f personality, these differences 
were, at least for public consum ption, submerged in a collective identity which 
incorporated the ideals inculcated in their upbringing and training, ideals which were 
largely synonymous with those o f both 'gentleman' and 'muscular Christian'. Thus while 
self-confident, and not above subtle self-promotion, they were not immodest, or 
unsophisticated, and they generally maintained a high standard o f ethical conduct. When 
individuals failed to maintain such standards, this failing was concealed from wider
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knowledge, in order to maintain the prestige of the cadre.
They were strongly influenced by their reading, in youth, education and service training. 
The texts they read tended to reinforce their ideals, and their perception o f frontier service. 
Role models such as Sandeman provided precedents for their actions, and an image to 
emulate. Later officers read books by their predecessors, which further reinforced the cadre 
image and their identification with it.
There were characteristics which they shared with other frontiersmen. They were 'lean 
and keen1, and they preferred the frontier life to the more comfortable existence o f an 
Indian State; implying that in their character was a 'touch o f the recluse*. There was a 
strong military influence and they were courageous in the military sense, but did not view 
things exclusively in military tenns. An intellect more broad than that often associated with 
army officers was required.
Like many other frontier officers, the Tibet cadre gained a strong empathy with the local 
people among whom they served, and the lengthy terms which several officers chose to 
serve, and their reluctance to retire completely from Tibetan affairs, are indications o f this 
attachment. The pre-existing image o f the frontiersman was definitely an aspect o f their 
identity and, as on the North-W est Frontier, there was a strong sense o f regional cadre 
tradition.
In common with all Politicals, their selection had been personally approved by the 
Viceroy, which enhanced their own self-confidence and identification with the ’system’. 
But nearly half o f them were not members of the Politicals when they were first appointed 
to Tibet. However closely they identified themselves with the Department, this implied a 
specialisation which contrasts with the ’generalist' ideal o f the ICS and the Politicals. This 
ideal however, had became an increasingly outdated image in the 20th century, as Ewing 
has noted.[153]
This degree of specialisation within the Tibet cadre is one of their defining characteristics, 
and emerges most clearly in another integral feature o f these men; their scholarship. In the 
early years officers were not 'a network o f scholars',[154] but they developed their 
increasingly deep knowledge of the country into an expertise which later provided much o f 
the European understanding o f Tibet. Along with scholarship, the officers learned the 
importance o f  political skills, how to manipulate government opinion to achieve their 
desired policy aims, as will be examined in more detail in ensuing chapters.
We can see from those who failed to return to service in Tibet, that, given the fitness to 
live at altitude, the most important aspect o f the job was a close identification with the 
Tibetans. Gaining this was a deliberate policy, and officers who failed in this aspect failed 
in their duty. Thus officers distracted by family concerns, or unable to endure the mores o f
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Tibetan society, did not succeed.
Despite some circumstantial evidence that the Tibetans were more at ease with married 
officers (they certainly wondered why officers remained alone), celibacy, a state then 
considered less unnatural than it is now, was required. It has been argued that sexuality in 
the British empire was sublimated in duty; this appears to apply to the Tibet cadre. While 
some of the ’lower ranks’ o f supporting staff in Tibet married into the community, or took 
mistresses there, I have found neither evidence nor rumour that any Political Officer did 
so.[155] Whether, as Ronald Hyam suggests we should consider, sexual factors played a 
part in their original decision to serve in the empire, is not revealed in the sources.[156] 
Crucial to the Tibet cadre's maintenance o f their collective identity and policy was their 
control o f personnel intake. This created a chain o f succession in which the influence o f an 
early officer can be seen to emerge in a later period. The Yatung and Gyantse positions 
were used as training grounds; if  the trainees proved suitable they were later returned to the 
higher ranking positions in Lhasa or Gangtok.
The cadre was, to an extent, a meritocracy. While the Political Department generally was 
the slowest government service to incorporate local peoples, three o f the Tibet cadre were 
local or Eurasian officers. Acceptance o f locals however, came only after long periods in 
which they had proved their loyalty, and ability to fit in with the ideals and ethos o f  the 
cadre, as will be seen in Chapter Three.
There was one other characteristic of the Tibet cadre which was not unique, but which is 
so often and clearly expressed in the sources that it must be examined in depth. This was 
the concern with prestige, personal, cadre and national, which we will examine in the next 
chapter.
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CHAPTER TWO
’TOP OF THE HEAP’: 
ASPECTS OF BRITISH PRESTIGE IN TIBET.
• k ' k ' i f k - k - i f k r k - k ' k ' k - k ' k ' k ' k - f !
IN TR O D U CTIO N
In 1903, Secretary o f State Lord George Hamilton, in a letter to Viceroy Curzon, 
expressed the view commonly-held by British-Indian ruling circles that 'our power in India 
was largely based on prestige'.[l] Prestige, in the British understanding, involved creating 
an impression o f personal and national superiority over the local peoples and local power 
structures. Superior status was dem onstrated through both individual and national 
behaviour, and through outward forms and symbols. In assuming this superior status, the 
British in India could claim to be following local custom; the precedent o f  izza t, the 
charism atic authority o f the Mughal rulers. To this they added aspects which were 
quintessentially British; Gould dined at eight every evening, and always donned formal 
dress for dinner, even in camp. [2]
In the wider context, British prestige was a part o f the prestige o f European civilisation; 
there was a solidarity o f purpose among Europeans generally to demonstrate and uphold 
the superiority o f their society. Thus Madame Alexandra David-Neel, the French traveller, 
wrote to Bell when he had her deported from Sikkim, that 'It is not good that Europeans 
appears[sic] to be quarreling before natives who do not like them.'[3]
The belief that 'natives' were essentially hostile contributed to the social segregation 
which became a feature o f the British Indian social system. Imperial distinctness was 
preserved by both physical separation, expressed in architecture and living space, and 
social separation, which was enforced by rules and customs. Again, the Raj claimed local 
precedence for this. The Hindu caste system and Muslim segregation o f women made 
intercommunal social intercourse difficult, and these local social divisions provided the 
precedent for the British to remain a distinct 'caste'. This concern for social distinctness 
predominated in British India despite the existence o f a counter trend towards lessening the 
distance between the races.
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Although the British in India believed that maintaining status was crucial to their rule, 
prestige was, Younghusband claimed, 'little understood in England, but....of immense 
practical value in the Easf.[4] Prestige was considered of'practical value' because it was 
believed that if  British power was seen as invincible, resistance to it would be considered 
futile. Prestige was thus an alternative force, a symbol o f power which became increasingly 
important as the British sought to avoid the political and economical cost of using military 
force as an instrument o f policy in India. [5]
There was considerably less social separation from the local people in Tibet than in 
British India, but the concepts o f correct behaviour and appropriate action associated with 
the maintenance o f prestige were equally assiduously followed. After the Younghusband 
Mission had demonstrated British military power to the Tibetans, the Tibet cadre followed 
the strategy used in India. They sought to create an impression o f power which would 
instill in the Tibetans a respect for the British, and influence them to support imperial 
interests. As Curzon stated,
What I want is that our present intolerable and humiliating relationship with 
the Tibetans shall not continue, and that they shall be sufficiently impressed 
with our power as to realise that they cannot look to any other quarter for 
protection. [6]
This was a common strategy in contemporary European imperial expansion; Russian 
frontiersmen stressed the need to support Russia's prestige in Central Asia, just as the Tibet 
cadre promoted British prestige in Tibet. [7]
We have seen that a particular type of officer was considered ideal for service in Tibet. In 
this chapter we shall examine how this ideal type was considered to embody the 
characteristics necessary to uphold British prestige (in contrast to local employees, whose 
failure to do so was regarded as being due to their race). We shall examine how the cadre 
attempted to restrict the Tibetans' contact with any but this ideal British type, as revealed by 
their efforts to control European travellers to Tibet, and how the cadre used prestige as a 
weapon to advance their personal and cadre status within government, and to advance 
policies they favoured.
This study demonstrates the importance o f different forms o f prestige to the British in 
Tibet, and illustrates how concepts o f prestige influenced the cadre's image o f both Tibet 
and themselves, and their actions consequent upon this understanding.
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SECTION 2.1: - PRESTIGE AS POT,ICY
Prestige, in British Indian usage, was not an incidental quality, but a potent weapon o f 
British power which was deliberately cultivated. Considerations o f  prestige were manifest 
in most British actions, from personal dress and bearing to government policy, and the 
British concept o f prestige was constantly re-evaluated and refined, just as weapons o f 
military power were. In Tibet the maintenance o f  British prestige was an important factor, 
both in the field o f policy and because its symbols were an important part of an individual 
officer's self-esteem. Thus M acdonald proudly recalled how, in 1911, when he was 
inadvertently caught between opposing Chinese and Tibetan forces, they recognised him by 
his white topee, and both sides stopped firing to allow him to leave the battlefield.[8]
The Escort and Medical Officers played an important part in this process. The Medical 
Officers' concern with personal status matched that o f the Politicals. While the advantages 
o f modern medicine, and its free application to all classes o f Tibetans naturally enhanced 
the British reputation, the 'right type' o f doctor was also considered to do 'a tremendous lot 
for British prestige'. [9]
The Trade Agent's escort symbolised British military power. Attempts to withdraw the 
escort fo r political or financial reasons were successfully resisted by the cadre on the 
grounds that 'it would leave the Trade Agents divested o f  the needed symbols o f 
authority'.[10] A Gyantse Escort Commander recalled how, when the Trade Agent paid 
official calls, they 'showed the flag’.
We rode out in great pomp and style. Liveried scouts riding on ahead, then 
the Mounted Infantry with the bugler, and the men carrying a huge Union 
Jack, and finally the B.T.A. and Officers. I feel sure the locals found this an 
imposing sight. [ 11]
Concern with prestige wras manifest in an almost surreal attention to detail. When Bailey 
mentioned in a report that he had presented the Panchen Lama with a white silk scarf (the 
usual Tibetan practice on greeting a religious figure), his government promptly asked the 
Political Officer Sikkim, 'whether he considers that it is in any way derogatory to the 
dignity o f British officers to do so.'[12]
When the British concern with prestige was combined with the Tibetans' own concern 
for details o f etiquette, it could result in great importance being attached to the smallest 
detail o f diplomatic ritual. While arranging the Panchen Lama's visit to India in 1906,
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O'Connor sought to ascertain how far the Viceroy would advance to meet the Lama, and 
vice versa. This was an important consideration in Tibetan etiquette, but it led even Foreign 
Secretary Dane, a strong supporter o f O’Connor, to comment, 'Really these Tibetan 
officers are very unreasonable', and to pronounce that 'We are not Buddhists and cannot 
pay this extravagant spiritual homage.' But O'Connor insisted, and eventually an official in 
Calcutta was deputed to count the number o f  steps at the entrance to the Viceregal 
residence, although he concluded ironically that, 'number o f paces to be taken in each case 
[is] unascertainable.'[13]
This correspondence illustrates the two schools o f thought regarding the appropriate 
British response to local cultures. In the Indian context, Clive Dewey has described how 
the British 'veered between two clusters o f  axioms', which he calls the 'Gospel o f Uplift' 
and the 'Cult o f Friendship', as they faced the problem o f whether to impose W estern 
solutions to Indian problems, or whether to take the local cultural context as the primary 
reference point in policy formation. [14]
In Tibet, the 'Gospel o f Uplift' was represented by Bailey, who considered that it was 
'inconsistent with the maintenance o f dignity to pander too much to native ideas'. Thus 
White, who followed this tendency, believed that O'Connor should have 'simply have told 
the Tashi Lama what he is expected to do'.[l 5]
O'Connor represented the other school o f thought, the 'Cult of Friendship'. He believed 
that respect for Tibetan traditions enhanced the dignity o f the British. The 'Cult o f 
Friendship' which O'Connor followed, and of which Bell was to be the primary exponent, 
was the path followed by the more successful officers o f the Tibet cadre.
SECTION 2.2: - QUESTIONS OF STATUS
We have seen that there was a type o f officer considered ideal for service in Tibet; the 
qualities inherent in this type were those regarded as necessary to the creation o f an image 
o f the British which the Tibetans would respect. Hence the definitions o f an officer with the 
necessary prestige match those definitions o f the ideal type defined in the previous chapter.
As a part o f their self-creation o f a role in Tibet - an aspect which will be considered in 
Chapter Four - the Tibet cadre sought to establish their status vis-a-vis the Tibetan and 
Chinese officials with whom they dealt. During the 1904-13 period the Chinese attempted 
to use the uncertain status of the British officials to their advantage, and the issue was never 
fully resolved. Campbell had served in Peking, and his expertise in Chinese etiquette was 
then o f great value; on one occasion he returned a letter as he understood that it was
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'addressed to me only by name in a manner only possible [when] addressing an 
inferior'. [16]
After 1936, when both British and Chinese Missions were present in Lhasa, the two 
countries were in constant competition to enhance their status with the Tibetans. Thus 
British and Chinese accounts o f  the installation o f  the 14th Dalai Lama differ greatly, as 
each attempts to claim a higher status for their reception. The British even reported that 
when they rode into Lhasa with their dogs carried in a dandy, the Tibetans were favourably 
impressed by this, as Chinese officials were usually earned in dandies. [17]
Establishing the cadre officer's status vis-a-vis Tibetan officials was easier. Bell sought 
the highest possible status for the Political Officer Sikkim, and arranged that he rank with 
the Tibetan Chief Minister. This meant that, although within British India the Sikkim post 
was never more than a second-class Residency, in Tibet the Political Officer could justly 
claim, 'You couldn't get any higher.... We were the top o f the heap'. [18]
This status was much higher than that to which cadre officers might have aspired had 
they remained in Britain. But while officers from British middle and upper-middle class 
backgrounds became the ruling class in India, they reverted to their previous status when 
they returned to Britain (which must have been a factor in the Political Officer's reluctance 
to retire from Sikkim), and the British aristocracy were inclined to view the status these 
men held in India as being unwarranted. This paradox was reflected in British concern that 
minor Indian princes were treated with great ceremony on European visits, despite their 
relatively low stature in India. [19]
Individual British officers were keenly concerned to maintain and increase their own 
personal status, and even when the Tibetans were not directly involved no detail of protocol 
was ignored. For example, when Campbell was Trade Agent in Yatung, he objected to 
receiving letters from the Political Officer Sikkim signed by the Gangtok clerk, while when 
Gould visited Gyantse he insisted on being received at the precise distance (several miles) 
dictated by Tibetan etiquette. If  he reached this spot before his reception party. Gould 
would sit and wait until they arrived to escort him into the Agency.[20]
In these m atters, however 'tiresome' they seemed to witnesses, the officers were 
supported by their government. Bell reported that Campbell, then in charge of the Chumbi 
Valley, 'insists and perhaps rightly so on the local people dismounting from their ponies 
and removing their hats whenever they see him'. Bell was not personally given to 
demanding such public deference, but he clearly supported the all-important principle of 
maintaining the highest possible prestige. If the British 'were to represent a superior race, 
they had to act the part'.[21]
Spangenberg, in reference to the ICS. described their concern with prestige as
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'obsessive', but he viewed prestige as an individual concern with career advancement. In 
Tibet, the cultivation o f prestige was an integral part o f  an officer's duties. The 
development o f both national and personal prestige were aspects o f a deliberate policy to 
strengthen what the British saw as a primary weapon of imperial influence.[22]
SECTION 2.3: - WAS PRESTIGE A BRITISH QUALITY?
British officers were considered inherently able to represent British status, but in 1906, 
the IMS proposed posting an Indian officer, one Captain D.P.Goil, to Gyantse to replace 
the first Medical Officer there. Lieutenant Robert Steen. The Political Department objected, 
stating that, 'On political grounds it is important that the Medical Officer in a pioneer post 
like Gyantse should be a European.'[23]
The question o f whether the necessary British prestige could be maintained by local 
officers was also raised by the posting o f Indian provincial officers to the Gaitok Trade 
Agency. Relations with western Tibetan officials were always problem atical, for the 
Agent's efforts to protect the interests o f British Indian traders were at odds with the 
interests o f the Tibetan officials, whose income came from trading and tax gathering, 
official or unofficial.[24]
It was suggested that a British officer should make an annual visit to Gartok, 'as such a 
visit would improve, in the eyes o f  the Tibetans,the status o f Thakur Jai Chand' (the first 
Gaitok Trade Agent).[25] But financial and logistical problems meant that visits by British 
officers to western Tibet became increasingly rare. In their absence, the actions o f the 
Gaitok Trade Agents seriously threatened British prestige in this remote region.[26]
As the Indian officers posted to Gartok were from the Punjab Hill States bordering 
western Tibet, they were invariably open to accusations o f bias in favour o f traders from 
their own clan. In addition, the neglected and poorly paid Agents had numerous 
opportunities to take financial advantage o f their post. Jai Chand, although approved 
personally by Younghusband. proved to be 'a thoroughly hopeless person and quite 
unsuited for his appointment' and he was eventually dismissed for misusing government 
funds. His successor, Lala Devi Das, while marginally more efficient, also made the fullest 
possible use of his travelling and personal allowances. [27]
Das’s successor. Pala Ram. unnecessarily antagonised the local officials, and was found 
to have 'little tact and less discrimination...an exaggerated sense o f his own importance 
and...a petulance and lack o f  dignity which were unworthy o f one in his position.' His 
replacement, Thakur Hyatt Singh, gained such a bad reputation for profiteering that he was
79
banned from entering Tibet after his dismissal, which followed a drunken brawl over a 
women with a local official. The Tibetan official was killed soon after by lightning, but he 
had felt strongly enough about Hyatt Singh to write to the Government o f India pointing 
out the threat to bilateral relations posed by the poor choice o f Agents. [28]
While the performance o f these Agents was damned in a series o f reports by inspecting 
officer E.W. W akefield in 1928, he had some sympathy for them on account o f their poor 
pay and conditions, which were held to have contributed to their failures. W akefield's 
reports ultimately led the Government o f India to conclude that the Agents had not failed 
through any fault o f  their own, but because they were not 'o f the right class'. In order to 
increase their prestige, it was decided to select Agents o f a higher caste than previously and 
increase their pay and rank. W akefield's reforms were apparently successful. His visit, 
had, the new Trade Agent, Dr Kanshi Ram, reported, enabled the Tibetan officials 'to 
understand the status o f the Trade A gent'.[29] But any improvements were not long- 
lasting; Captain Saker, following his visit in 1942, reported that 'the position o f the British 
Trade Agent has gradually deteriorated', and it must be concluded that the Gartok post was 
never particularly successful.[30]
The question o f  whether only a British officer could embody British prestige was never 
entirely resolved. In 1909 Bell had set out the respective advantages o f British and Indian 
officers for the Yatung Trade Agency. He concluded that if  no British officer were 
available, an intelligent Indian of'good family1 already in local government service, would 
be cheaper, more capable in administrative work, and 'liable to live on terms o f closer 
friendship with the Chinese and Tibetan officials than a European could do'.[31]
Bell's definition of a suitable Indian officer implied that an Indian could uphold sufficient 
prestige if he were o f 'good family’. A distinction was drawn here between those local 
social groups who were accustomed to authority, and those outside traditional power 
structures, with the former group being the target o f the Politicals' attempts to 'cultivate the 
friendship o f the local Ruling Chiefs'. [32]
One o f the rewards offered to British supporters from the local power structures was 
government employment in posts o f authority which reflected their traditional status. The 
British considered that their prestige could be represented by the traditional personal 
authority o f their supporters from local ruling elites, who were accustomed to command 
and to the external symbols and trappings o f authority. However, while they might 
maintain the prestige o f British rule, as members o f the subject race these local leaders 
could not equal the personal status o f a British officer.
The Government o f  India wanted a local officer at Yatung for financial reasons. While 
this meant that the Trade Agent there would have less status than a British officer, this
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factor would, if  Bell was correct, be balanced by his greater ability to cultivate the 
friendship o f local officials, which was o f paramount importance to his role (an issue that is 
discussed in Chapter Four). In the event, the officer chosen signified a compromise. He 
was an Anglo-Sikkimese, David Macdonald, a local government employee who had served 
on the Younghusband Mission. While not from an aristocratic family, he was intelligent 
and got on extremely well with Tibetans, and even the Chinese.
Macdonald was uniquely well qualified, and thoroughly conversant with British concepts 
o f prestige. As he later recalled T here was the prestige and pomp o f the empire to be 
maintained and this meant one reflected the glory.' In contrast, when the Lhasa Mission 
was headed by a local officer o f Tibetan origin in the 1940s, it was felt that 'the want o f a 
Political Officer [i.e. a British officer] in charge o f the Mission was felt by our friends'.
[33]
Questions o f manpower and economy, allied to the need to reward local supporters, 
meant that local employees had to be given positions o f authority, but they were generally 
kept away from the key positions in which policy decisions were made. MacDonald was 
the only local officer given a Political post in Tibet until the late 1930s, and he was 
originally appointed to Yatung, which had little or no influence on policy formation.
Ultimately, although the British had to use local employees, they felt that, with the 
exception o f an exceptional individual such as Macdonald, their prestige could only be fully 
represented by British officers. Local officers had not been trained to command at British 
public schools, and thus could not be expected to understand and maintain public school 
codes o f behaviour. In consequence, if  a local officer failed to maintain the required status 
and standards o f behaviour, his failure was blamed on his race or class, whereas if  a 
British officer failed, it was the individual who was blamed: 'A man who does not play the 
game at the outposts is a traitor to our order.'[34]
SECTION 2.4: - QUESTIONS OF RELIGION AND LANGUAGE
The various locations and cultures in which the British operated prevented a single all- 
embracing definition o f what upheld a British officer’s status, and what adversely affected 
it. Prestige was localised in application and the boundaries o f appropriate behaviour were 
redrawn in the light o f local circumstances and cultures. In Tibet, this process occurred in 
two areas, religion and language, which provide further insight into the collective mentality 
o f the Tibet cadre.
In British India, following Neitzche's dictum that 'political supremacy always gives rise
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to notions o f spiritual suprem acy',[35] the prevailing tendency was that too close an 
association with Hinduism was apt to be regarded with suspicion. While sympathy and 
interest in Indian religions was not unknown, Hinduism and Islam were themselves 
commonly denigrated, Christianity was an important part o f  British distinctness, and 
provided a moral justification for British rule. The character o f  the ideal official was 
described in term s o f w hat were considered Christian virtues; courage, honesty, 
truthfulness and so on. But a distinct religion was not made an aspect o f British prestige in 
Tibet. None o f the Tibet cadre became practising Buddhists (indeed, most were practising 
Christians), but the successful officers were all deeply respectful towards Tibetan religion.
Aware that the Tibetans regarded missionaries as a threat to their religion, the cadre totally 
opposed any attempts to influence them towards Christianity. In this they enjoyed the full 
support o f their government, which steadfastly refused to allow any missionaries to work 
in Tibet, or even to contact the Tibetan leadership. A sympathetic approach to the local 
religion was thus another defining characteristic o f the Tibet cadre,[36] in contrast to the 
prevailing trends in India.
In contrast to colonial systems which required the indigenous peoples to learn the 
language o f the dominant power, British Indian officials regarded their ability to learn the 
local languages as an important part of their personal and national status. While an Indian 
'gentlemen' was expected to converse in English, and indeed his ability to do so was a 
defining mark o f his status, British officers were expected to be able to converse with all 
levels o f Indian society, which required a mastery o f local language and dialects. As 
Bernard Cohn has shown, this also enabled the British to use, and to ensure they received, 
the forms o f the local language appropriate to their social status, and thereby maintain 
prestige. [3 7]
In pre-1947 Tibet there were only a handful of English-speaking individuals, and these 
were middle-level government officials who had been educated or trained by the British. 
Tibetan 'gentlemen', such as Tsarong Shape,[38] were not defined by their command of 
English. The cadre, therefore, had to learn to com municate in Tibetan, or rely on 
translators. The choice o f O'Connor as the first Gyantse Trade Agent, and o f Bailey as his 
successor, owed much to their being the only candidates capable o f speaking Tibetan. In 
Gartok the first Trade Agent apparently spoke Tibetan but not English; he reported in Urdu.
The association o f language and prestige had a wider significance that was not restricted 
to Tibetan. Cohn has shown that there are codes o f meaning within official colonial 
language;[39] a finding which we may apply to Tibet. Throughout the Tibet cadre's 
reports, certain words and phrases recur. There were those aimed at enhancing the cadre 
officers' personal reputation, and those which were to reinforce British policy.
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Annual reports from the Agencies always contained a positive statement o f good relations 
with local officials. The same phrase, 'Relations with all officials continue to be friendly', 
occurs in every Yatung report from 1930 onwards. When the Yatung Agent omitted this 
phrase from the 1939-40 report it was added by the Political Officer Sikkim before the 
report was submitted to the government. Through the use o f this phrase the cadre sought to 
demonstrate to their government that they were successfully cultivating the friendship of the 
Tibetans and that their presence there was welcome. This contrasted with alternative 
evidence which suggested that, particularly in the early period o f the British presence, 
significant elements o f the Tibetan power structure opposed their presence. O'Connor, for 
example, reported that, 'Although the country people and some o f the traders are well 
enough disposed towards us...the monks and officials regard us w ith ineradicable 
suspicion and dislike.1 [40]
Similarly we may examine descriptions o f the Tibetan Government as 'naive', or 
’unwilling to make decisions' (as will be seen in Chapter 7.1), and see these statements as 
justifications for British actions which the Tibetans opposed. Seen through British eyes, 
the Tibetan Government were often naive, (and many Tibetans today would accept that 
statement), but by emphasising this, the cadre sought to justify their own actions through 
the medium of the dominant language.
SECTION 2.5: - PRESTIGE AS A MEANS OF CONTROL
The cadre used prestige as both an instrument o f policy towards Tibet, and as a weapon 
o f personal or cadre empowerment within government. The latter aspect is clearly apparent 
in their efforts to ensure that the cadre had sole control over direct Anglo-Tibetan contacts.
I f  the Tibet cadre were to succeed in promoting the policies they favoured, and 
consequently promote their own careers, they had to establish themselves as the sole 
channel o f communication between Whitehall and Lhasa, and ensure that they were 
Whitehall's only official source o f information on Tibet. Other voices, which might present 
policies opposed by the cadre, had to be silenced.
The clearest example o f this is in the cadre’s struggle against the Chinese imperial 
services, which reflects the wider struggle for influence at W hitehall between the 
Government o f India, and the Foreign Office, responsible for imperial affairs in China. As 
noted in the introductory chapter, the interests o f the Government o f India were often in 
conflict with those o f other British interests, such as trade with China. In these 
circumstances, the Tibet cadre naturally represented India's interests, protecting both their
own, and their government's, prestige.
One threat to the cadre's position emerged soon after the Younghusband Mission. 
Following the 1893 Agreement between Britain and China, British officers o f the China 
Maritime Customs Service were posted to Yatung. [41] These officers had little or no 
contact with the Government o f India prior to 1903, when the fifth officer to serve there, 
Captain W.R.M. Parr, was attached to the Younghusband Mission. Contact with Parr 
alerted India to the possibility that their presence could be taken as indicating that the trade 
marts were Chinese Treaty Ports; in which case they would be open to all foreigners and 
the Government o f India would lose much o f its influence in Tibet. 'This', Louis Dane 
ruled, 'we cannot allow'. But when Parr was replaced by Mr V.C.Henderson in September 
1904, the threat became a real danger. [42]
Henderson officially refused to recognise the right of the Government of India, in the 
person o f  Trade Agent O'Connor, to be advised o f his movements and motives within 
Tibet, on the grounds that he was an officer o f Tibet's suzerain power, China. Unofficially 
however, he got on well with O'Connor, and revealed Chinese intentions to get rid o f the 
Trade Agencies, as well as his own ambitions - a posting in Lhasa as 'advisor' to the 
Ambcrn, which he hoped would mean 'practically running the country'. O'Connor warned 
his government that 'Henderson, nice fellow that he is, is a very dangerous and skillful 
opponent to us and the sooner he leaves...the better.'[43]
The issue with which O'Connor was concerned here was not only that Henderson 
represented the Chinese Government and its plans to establish their authority over Tibet, 
but that he was not under Government o f India authority. It was part o f the Government of 
India's prestige that it represented the highest, and undivided, authority in the region. If  its 
authority was seen to be successfully challenged, even by other British elements, that 
prestige would, it was held, be damaged throughout the 'East'. Any weakening, or 
division, o f the cadre's authority would also reflect badly on the prestige o f individual 
officers.
The cadre set out to remove the China Customs officers from Tibet, using the need to 
maintain prestige as their principal argument within government. Maintaining the Tibetan's 
respect, the cadre argued, required the presentation o f the correct type o f European to the 
Tibetans, and the China Customs men were, according to Younghusband, 'not o f a 
particularly refined type and add little to our prestige'. Younghusband warned that the 
Tibetans 'believed that the Chinese must be superior to us from employing Englishmen in 
their service.' O 'Connor charged that the China Customs m en ill-treated the Tibetans, 
which reflected badly on all British officers, and pointed out that their advice to the 
Tibetans might be very different to that of the Government o f India. [44]
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Armed with these allegations, India sought Whitehall's assistance in removing European 
officials in Chinese employ from Tibet. This was apparently done informally, to avoid 
creating an issue in which Sir Robert Hart, the powerful Head o f Chinese Customs, would 
intervene to safeguard the prestige and interests o f his own force, and, in April 1907, 
Henderson was replaced by a Chinese officer. The Chinese service, apparently forgetting 
the previous difficulties, attempted to send another British officer on an inspection visit to 
the redundant Chinese Customs post at Yatung in 1913. They abandoned the attempt in the 
face o f strong opposition from the Government of India, which instructed frontier officials 
to prevent the officer from crossing the border. The principle o f Delhi's control over 
European officials in Tibet was now firmly established.[45]
Prestige was also a weapon in the struggle to remove from Anglo-Tibetan relations the 
influence o f the China Consular Service (the equivalent in China o f the Indian Political 
Department). There were two China Consulates in a position to become involved in Tibetan 
affairs, but one o f these, the Kashgar Consulate, was m aintained and staffed by the 
Government o f India, as it was more easily reached from India than from Peking. The 
Kashgar Consuls were preoccupied with Russian influence in Sinkiang, and the Consulate 
had only peripheral involvement in Tibetan affairs. [46]
In 1913 however, the China Consular Service opened a post at Tachienlu, on Tibet's 
eastern border, in order to gather intelligence concerning events on that frontier. The cadre 
regarded this post as having a pro-Chinese perspective, and it posed a definite threat to their 
monopoly on the supply o f regular intelligence from Tibet, and thus to their authority. 
Matters improved in 1917 with the posting to Tachienlu o f Eric Teichman, whose views on 
Tibetan policy were in agreement with those o f the Tibet cadre, but when Teichman 
departed in 1919, his replacement was W.H.King, whose pro-Chinese views were seen by 
Bell as a threat to his efforts to cultivate Anglo-Tibetan ties. [47]
Alastair Lamb has shown how Bell orchestrated a rather unseemly campaign to ensure 
King’s removal from Tachienlu. Bell showed his mastery 'in the great game of bureaucratic 
survival and self-promotion', and by forcing King's removal, restored the Government of 
India's full control over British relations with Tibet.[48]
King's despatches to Peking were sent via Sikkim, where they were seen by Bell and his 
government. After a long report by King in April 1921, which argued that the Eastern 
Tibetans would be better off under Chinese rule, Bell, who was then in Lhasa, became 
sharply critical of King's ability. In the Secretariat they watched with interest as 'Mr Bell 
and Mr King...are warming to the fray, and vigorously criticizing each other's despatches.' 
Bell homed in on King's weakness in Tibetan. On one occasion Bell pointed out 'forty 
lines in Mr King's Tibetan text with eighty-nine mistakes...The style o f writing is not that
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used in letters, and the handwriting is that o f an uneducated man' which might 'result in 
disastrous errors'.[49]
Bell enlisted the aid o f the Tibetans, who requested that India withdraw King as he was 
'hostile to the Tibetans'. These requests continued after Bell's retirement, and, after a 
decent interval to avoid the appearance o f bowing to Tibetan protests (which, it was 
believed, would have threatened British prestige), King was withdrawn and the Tachienlu 
post combined with that o f C.hengdhu.[50]
The removal o f European China Customs officers from central Tibet, and China Consular 
officers from Tibet's eastern border, enhanced the status o f the Tibet cadre, reflecting their 
increased influence on Anglo-Tibetan relations. Yet their removal also meant that an 
opportunity o f understanding China's perspective on Tibet was lost. But most cadre 
officers disliked the Chinese as a race, and made little effort to understand them, as evinced 
by Ludlow's comment to Bailey that 'W illiamson hates Kashgar and the Chinks. I agree 
with him as regards the chinks[sic].'[51]
SECTION 2.6: - CONTROL OF TRAVELLERS
Prestige was an important factor in British policy towards European travellers' access to 
Tibet. The Tibet cadre were, to an extent, caught between the conflicting desires of Tibet's 
conservative ruling class to maintain its isolation, and the outside world, which sought to 
end it. The cadre generally favoured opening Tibet to foreign visitors, but sought to control 
both the numbers and the types o f visitors allowed, in order to avoid antagonising the 
Tibetans and to ensure that those visitors allowed into Tibet represented the type o f 
European who would maintain or enhance British prestige.
In the 19th century Tibet had, with Chinese assistance, generally excluded foreigners 
from its territory, their primary motive being the protection o f their religion. In 1873, in 
order to prohibit unauthorised visits which would upset the Tibetans, India introduced the 
Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulations, which, while permitting the continuance o f traditional 
local cross-border relations, barred persons who were neither officials, nor (non-European) 
local inhabitants, from entering Tibet. Travellers required government permission to cross 
designated 'Inner Lines' set back from the Tibetan border. One unwanted effect o f  this was 
to increase Tibet's allure for Western travellers.
Individuals and institutions such as the Royal Geographical Society had hoped that the 
Younghusband M ission signalled the opening o f Tibet to foreign travellers. But the 
strength of Tibetan opposition to this, allied to fears that Russians and Chinese could then
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travel freely there, meant that the British continued to discourage most individuals who 
sought to enter Tibet. Following Bell's visit to Lhasa, access to Tibet was eased at his 
suggestion, and individuals were permitted to travel on the trade route via Yatung to 
Gyantse. The Tibetans continued to voice objections to these visitors, but the Government 
o f India was always sensitive to criticism that it was the instigator o f Tibet's isolation, and 
generally allowed travellers on the trade route.[52]
Access to Lhasa, or places away from the trade route, such as Shigatse, remained tightly 
controlled. The Tibetan Government's approval was required for these visits, and the 
Governments o f India and Tibet regularly played out an elaborate charade, in which each 
claimed the other was refusing access. In practice, apart from a handful o f visitors who 
obtained a invitation direct from the Tibetans, permission to visit Lhasa was obtained 
through unofficial representations by the British to the Tibetan Government. Those whose 
visit was strongly supported by the British were generally approved by the Tibetans, and 
permission was always forthcoming for British officials. The cadre were thus able to 
ensure that the British who came in contact with the Tibetan leadership represented the ideal 
they sought to present.[53]
The Government o f India had legitimate reasons for wanting some control over European 
entry to Tibet. They sought to exclude known criminals, and those seeking to exploit 
Tibetan ignorance o f the outside world. Unauthorised individuals could create incidents 
such as that involving an American 'adventurer' in 1907, who shot a tribesman in Eastern 
Tibet in a dispute over ula.[54]
In addition to the criminal element, however, there was another class o f visitor the cadre 
opposed. The usually perceptive Teichman, in supporting the opening o f Tibet to visitors, 
had concluded that 'once the novelty of the thing had worn off none would want to go there 
but Indian traders and wool buyers'; but Teichman greatly underestim ated Tibet's 
appeal. [55]
Tibet attracted large numbers o f Europeans who were outside the mainstream of their 
own culture, the culture which the Tibet cadre was attempting to present in the most 
positive light to the Tibetans. Large num bers o f relig ious seekers (particularly 
Theosophists). eccentrics, adventurers, and even the mentally disturbed, sought to enter 
Tibet. Such persons were unlikely to present the image of Europeans which the cadre 
sought to project, and were thus seen as a threat. This 'threat' grew with the increasing 
number o f visitors in the 1920s and '30s.
The cadre were particularly concerned with travellers' dress and mode o f travel. Thus 
they objected to a Swiss traveller with 'only' two coolies who borrowed bedding from the 
dak bungalow chaukidars as, 'Such conduct...lowers the prestige o f foreigners'. Even in
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the 1930s they considered that, 'while nowadays no one expects to see a Curzonian frock 
coat in the middle o f a desert, it is a pity that occasionally even Englishmen should 
travel...looking like sweeps'. To the cadre, the desired ideal visitor represented a particular 
type whose bearing and behaviour emulated that o f the officers themselves. Travellers of 
that kind were considered to be 'a type which many other tourists would do well to 
emulate'. [56]
From the perspective o f officers whose contact with women was restricted throughout 
school, university and colonial posting, female travellers were a particular threat to British 
prestige. Ludlow, noting the visit o f one 'weird lady', wrote that 'we do get some funny 
people as visitors. All the women seem to be only too glad o f an excuse to wear puttees and 
breeches all day long.' Richardson considered it 'particularly undesirable that European 
ladies should live in the servants quarters o f dak bungalows'. To counter this problem, 
Gould decreed that female travellers were not permitted to travel in Tibet without a male 
escort. This was even applied to cadre officer's wives, although, in the case o f the 
Politicals, they had usually been socially assessed by the Viceroy, along with their 
husbands. [57]
The cadres' attitude to religious seekers in Tibet was ambivalent. Travellers who were 
sympathetic and respectful to Buddhism were less liable to upset Tibetan sentiments. Many 
o f the cadre officers themselves were also personally, as well as professionally, interested 
in Tibetan religion, and were not untouched by the attractions o f  the wider shores of 
Tibetan mysticism. But they were brought up with a belief in scientific lines o f enquiry. 
When a traveller such as the American, Theos Bernard, visited Lhasa as a student o f 
Buddhism, his exotic dress and manner were not unacceptable, but when he claimed to be 
the incarnation o f an important Tibetan religious figure, and to have participated in 'secret 
ceremonies', British (and Tibetan) support for him vanished.[58]
However, the crucial issue was political. The dress and bearing of religious seekers could 
be distinct from that o f other Europeans without threatening British prestige, for such 
distinctness was characteristic within Tibetan society. Seekers whose actions did not 
alienate the Tibetans, and whose later writings and speeches avoided Himalayan politics, 
and particularly British policy there, were considered acceptable; indeed it appears to have 
been regretted that there were no British seekers of their type.[59] But if these seekers 
became at all involved in political issues, they became persona non grata with the British, 
and generally with the Tibetans also.
The cadre reserved the greatest disapproval for William McGovern, an American lecturer 
from the School o f  Oriental Studies in London. McGovern was a member o f a self-titled 
'British Buddhist M ission' which visited Gyantse in 1922, but which was refused
permission to visit Lhasa. The India Office had warned Bailey that the Mission, although 
otherwise composed o f Oxford University graduates, 'are a queer crowd..(who)..clearly 
show the cloven hoof .[60]
M cGovern returned with his fellows to India, but then secretly made his way back 
through Tibet in disguise, reaching Lhasa on 15 February 1923. He revealed his presence 
to the Tibetan authorities, who expelled him from Lhasa six weeks later. His subsequent 
book, and newspaper articles, widely publicised in Britain, made a number o f comments 
on British policy in Tibet. [61]
McGovern's worst 'crime' in the Tibet cadre's eyes was his statement that there was a 
pro-Chinese party in Lhasa. Any evidence suggesting the Tibetans, particularly in Lhasa, in 
any way favoured the Chinese rather than the British was always denigrated. In this 
instance, Bailey obtained the assistance o f  A rthur Hinks, the Secretary o f  the Royal 
Geographical Society, with the result that the journal of the society published as strong an 
attack on M cGovern's reliability and reputation as was legally possible to make. The 
journal claimed that 'whatever little value the story [of McGovern's journey] might have 
possessed is discounted by Dr. M cG overn's obvious predilection for sensational 
journalism'. His conduct, they claimed, had done 'great disservice to good relations with 
Tibet', while his 'boast' that Indian frontier police were punished for failing to prevent his 
visit meant M cGovern 'stands self-condemned'. Future references to him by cadre 
officers were inevitably derogatory; two decades later Bell described McGovern's book as 
'a thriller' and incorrectly alleged that his disguise had been penetrated. [62]
The Government of India's embarrassment over the McGovern affair was compounded 
by Tibetan protests that M cGovern had not been punished. Delhi had decided that the 
available penalty was so small as to be not worth enforcing, as it would only give 
McGovern more publicity. This led the Tibetans to suspect McGovern's journey was not 
an illicit one, and provided ammunition for conservative elements in Tibet to oppose 
Europeans' right to travel in Tibet.[63]
In retrospect it is difficult to see that McGovern’s visit had any great effect on Anglo- 
Tibetan relations, and it is perhaps surprising that none of the cadre officers, no strangers 
to illicit journeys themselves, revealed any admiration for McGovern. It may be that the 
cadre felt their failure to intercept McGovern reflected badly on the controls exercised by 
their government, and hence harmed their own prestige within the system.[64]
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SECTION 2.7: - FOREIGN TRAVELLERS
For the cadre, the ideal traveller was one whose character and behaviour were o f the type 
thought necessary to uphold European prestige, and whose visit would further British 
interests in Tibet in some way. Although non-British travellers were generally discouraged, 
the epitome o f the traveller considered ideal was the Italian, Professor Guiseppe Tucci, 
who made a number o f visits to Tibet.
Tucci, already an eminent scholar when he first applied to visit Tibet in the 1920s, 
cultivated good relations with important British officials such as Basil Gould and the Indian 
Foreign Secretary E.B.Howell, and he gave the British detailed reports o f his travels, 
including maps and copies o f his books. Tucci took care not to transgress the Tibetan travel 
regulations, and he had considerable personal funds, which, together with his professed 
Buddhism, ensured that he established good relations with the Tibetans. The Government 
of India continued to support Tucci's travels throughout the 1930s, even after another 
Tibetologist, M arco Pallis, had written to Delhi criticising Tucci's removal o f  large 
numbers o f artifacts from Tibet. [65]
In 1946, with Britain and Italy still technically at war, and with the British Council 
informing the India Office that Tucci had lost his chair at Rome University for supporting 
Mussolini, support for Tucci was more circumspect. But Richardson in Lhasa, while not 
prepared to support the Italian officially, suggested to Tucci that he send the Lhasa Mission 
eight copies o f his latest book, 'for distribution as ground bait' to Tibetan officials: Tucci 
did so and duly got approval for another trip to Tibet. Continued support for Tucci came 
because his researches were 'a valuable contribution towards...our main aim o f policy viz. 
that Tibet always has had, and continues to have, a separate national existence'.[66] 
Although Tucci was the ideal traveller, there was a general reluctance to allow non-British 
travellers into Tibet. Most foreign travellers were seen as representatives o f their native 
government. As the interests of Japan, France, Germany, America, Russia and China (who 
provided the bulk o f non-British travellers to Tibet), were not normally synonymous with 
those o f the British in Tibet, foreign visitors were viewed with great suspicion. Non- 
British travellers with sufficient backing from official circles, or a few wealthy individuals 
who obtained an invitation directly from the Tibetans, were able to visit Tibet, but those 
who entered from India were closely monitored by British contacts among the guides, 
syces and other caravan personnel that travellers needed.[67]
Alastair Lamb sees this attitude as a 'deliberate policy o f limiting Tibetan opportunities for 
acquiring knowledge about, and contacts in. the outside world'.[68] Certainly the available 
evidence suggests that progressive elements o f Tibetan society (such as Tsarong Shape, the
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outstanding secular personality in 20th century Tibet), were keen to contact any foreign 
travellers. But there were obvious cases where foreign visitors potentially posed a great 
threat to British Indian interests. One example was the 1939 German Mission to Lhasa.
The German expedition, led by Dr D.E.Schafer, had Himmler's personal support; several 
o f its members were SS. officers. India was placed under considerable pressure by 
Whitehall, then following Chamberlain's ’appeasement policy', to allow them to enter 
Tibet. India bowed to this pressure, and Richardson was instructed to assist the Germans 
to obtain Tibetan permission to visit Lhasa. Richardson was very reluctant to do so, and 
most unusually received a 'private and personal' telegram from the Viceroy which stated, 'I 
have to ask you to do what you are asked'.[69]
The Germans, however, achieved little. Before he left Germany, Schafer had accidently 
shot his wife and, if  British reports are to be believed, was mentally unstable. Schafer also 
formed an indiscreet relationship with his young caravan leader, and tried to arrange to take 
him to Germany. The unexpected outcome o f the German's visit, Richardson was happy to 
report, was 'results o f  lasting value to us...they created an unfavourable impression in 
Lhasa...and by contrast heightened our prestige'. Richardson thus implied that the Tibetans 
distinguished between British and Germans, and would henceforth favour the British.[70]
In general, the Tibet cadre were successful in restricting access to Lhasa to British 
officials o f the desired 'type'. Those Europeans who were able to reach Lhasa without 
British support were either individuals o f no political importance, or on missions which 
failed to achieve their political objects. Neither impaired British prestige in Tibet.
CONCLUSION: - THE TIBF.TAN VIEW
As the British used prestige as a weapon o f policy, the question arises as to how 
successful a weapon it wras. English language sources represent the view of the dominant 
culture, and references to Tibetan view's are usually filtered through British perceptions, but 
what evidence is available suggests the Tibetans were less impressed by the symbols o f 
British prestige than the British hoped. The Tibetans were concerned with their own 
ceremonial forms, and British adherence to these was undoubtedly contrasted favourably 
with the approach o f the Chinese. But the waxing and waning o f Tibetan fondness for the 
British does not appear to relate to British prestige.[71]
Certainly outer forms such as dress appear to have gained the British nothing. After 
seeing a picture o f the 'Trooping o f the Colour', a Tibetan official commented. "You are 
just like us when you are at home. Why don't you wear bright colours like this when you
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come to Tibet."[72] Nor were the Tibetans likely to think less o f the British when women 
travelled cheaply or alone. Both were common within Tibetan society. The Tibetans were 
far more concerned that European women, like men, would affect Tibetan culture; as may 
be seen by the ban on 'bobbed hair and foreign style shoes’ which the Tibetan Government 
sought to impose on women in 1946.[73] Similarly the local officials in western Tibet were 
unlikely to hold the Gartok Trade Agent in any less regard because he indulged in personal 
trade, as this was the accepted practice among Tibetan officials there.
Several studies have shown how, in the context o f British India, architecture was an 
important weapon in establishing British prestige, with Residencies acting as symbols o f 
British power. [74] Although Richardson stated that ’it never occurred to me that the 
buildings at Yatung and Gyantse had any importance in terms o f prestige’, other cadre 
officers described the British buildings there as 'incompatible with dignity' or 'a disgrace to 
the name and prestige o f the British Government'. The Tibetan view was expressed by 
their officials in discussions with Bailey over the building o f an English school in Gyantse 
in the 1920s. Bailey reported that 'They said our houses were always badly made and 
required repairs so they wanted to build the school themselves.'[75]
Nor do the British appear to have created such a deep impression on the Tibetans as 
British sources indicate. Many Tibetans, even monks in Lhasa, were actually unaware of 
the existence o f British representatives in Tibet, while to Tibetan officials outside central 
Tibet, the Government o f India was 'a shadowy and far-off power, agreements with which 
can be safely ignored’.[76]
While the Younghusband Mission had brought home to the Tibetan Government the 
extent o f British power, the Tibetans were well aware o f subsequent events in India as it 
moved towards independence. British leniency in dealing with Indian nationalists was seen 
as a weakness.[77] Success in two World Wars had little effect on British prestige, for the 
Tibetans were, much to the frustration o f the British, almost entirely indifferent to these 
events. They may, however, as Lamb suggests for the period after 1942, have made it 
obvious to the Tibetans that the British were no threat to Tibet, a perspective which was 
probably to British advantage.[78]
Despite the evidence suggesting that Tibetans inteipreted British status in a very different 
form from that intended, there does not appear to have been any real questioning by the 
British as to the effectiveness o f prestige as a weapon. This was taken for granted, for 
reasons which reflect the imperial confidence. During the 1940s however, while there was 
no decline in the British use o f symbols o f prestige, there was an increasing emphasis on 
another, apparently more successful, means o f impressing the Tibetans. There was an 
increasing use of financial support for key elements o f the Tibetan power structure; a move
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perhaps, from over-reliance on outdated modes o f cultural expression to a more cynical 
realpolitik. The cadre were again at the heart o f this change o f policy, which will be 
examined in Chapter Four, after we have, in the next chapter, examined the role o f the 
intermediaries.
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CHAPTER THREE
’THE RIGHT HAND OF EVERY POLITICAL OFFICER': 
THE ROLE OF THE INTERM EDIARIES
INTRODUCTION
The process o f European expansion in South Asia created a need for intermediaries 
between the imperial and indigenous societies. Government officials, and other groups 
involved in the im perial process such as explorers and m issionaries, needed local 
employees who could translate the language, culture and aspirations of one society to the 
other. This demand led to the creation o f a distinct, and ultimately powerful class o f local 
government officials who served as intermediaries for the British.[l]
These intermediaries played an important part in Anglo-Tibetan relations; and the most 
trusted of them were appointed to Political Department posts. As individuals and as a class, 
they were strongly influenced by the character and mentality o f  the Tibet cadre officers. In 
this chapter we will examine the careers o f the most important o f  them in order to illustrate 
how local employees were chosen, trained, and used by the British, and the effects that this 
process had upon their character, culture and mentality. This study forms part o f a wider 
debate over the role o f local intermediaries in the imperial process, and explores the issue 
which the British in India never fully resolved; what was the ideal character of a local 
employee? Was he British in all but race, or should he retain certain aspects o f his own 
culture, and if so. which aspects?
SECTION 3.1: - THE EARLY INTERMEDIARIES
During the 19th century the Government of India employed various types o f local people 
to obtain information about Tibet. The most important o f these were the pandits (trained 
surveyors, native to the Indian Himalayas, who travelled in various disguises to
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clandestinely map Tibet), and the school teacher Rai Bahadur Sarat Chandra Das CIE. 
(1849-1917).[2]
The pandits' main duty was to gather geographical data, and they were extremely 
successful in this task. But whereas they travelled among the lower social classes in Tibet, 
Chandra Das's mission was to contact powerful figures in Tibetan society in order to 
collect political inform ation. Just as Political officers were directed to 'cultivate the 
friendship o f  the local Ruling Chiefs', Das was under instructions to 'cultivate the 
friendship of influential persons'.[3]
Chandra Das, a Tibetan speaking Bengali, was the first headm aster o f the Bhotia 
Boarding School in Darjeeling, which was opened in 1874 specifically to train Bhotia and 
Sikkimese intermediaries in preparation for the opening o f  Tibet to the British. In 1891 the 
Bhotia school merged with the Darjeeling school to become Darjeeling High School.[4]
Das became the first o f many intermediaries from the school when he was given a 
nominal government post as a school inspector, freeing him to travel to Tibet. He was 
accompanied by Rai Bahadur Urgyen Gyatso, a Sikkimese lama from an aristocratic 
family, who had been employed as a teacher at the Bhotia School after serving on the staff 
o f the Rajah o f Sikkim. Urgyen Gyatso made a number o f journeys to Tibet under British 
auspices, alone, or accompanying Chandra Das. Unlike the p a n d its , the two school­
teachers continued to be employed as Tibetan specialists after their return to India. [5]
When the Tibetan Government later discovered that Chandra Das had visited Lhasa, and 
correctly assumed that he had been spying for the British, the strength o f  their reaction 
underlined the Lhasa Government's determination to preserve Tibet's isolation. The 
Panchen Lama's Prime M inister, Kyabying Sengchen Tulku, an incarnate lama from 
Dongtse Monastery who had been Das's principal sponsor, was executed, and the Dongtse 
ruling family, the Palhes, close associates o f Sengchen Tulku, were severely punished.[6] 
The decision to force the Tibetans to open diplomatic relations with British India meant 
that a new type of intermediary7 was required, one who was accustomed to dealing with the 
Lhasa aristocracy. Such people were particularly difficult to locate in such an isolationist 
society as Tibet, where the ruling class appeared to present a united front against high-level 
foreign contact. Increasing Western contact with Tibet in the late 19th century had produced 
a small body o f men with experience in guiding European travellers there, but these guides, 
such as caravan leader Mahmood Isa, were mostly members o f the Central Asian trading 
class, and they had little social status. [7]
Individuals o f low social status had neither the contacts, nor the prestige and social 
skills, necessary to approach and influence the Tibetan ruling class. However the 
punishment inflicted on the aristocratic Palhe family had alienated them from the Lhasa
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ruling classes, creating an opportunity for the British to exploit their estrangement, as well 
as to reward the assistance they had given the British agents.
Kusho Palhese, (later Dewan Bahadur Palhese) exiled scion o f the Palhe family, came to 
Kalimpong when Bell was seeking a suitable Tibetan instructor, and he became Bell's 
personal assistant. Bell's notebooks reveal the enormous contribution Palhese made to his 
understanding o f Tibet, and Bell was, by the standards o f the time, generous in his praise 
o f  the Tibetan's contribution to his work. The two men became close friends, and Bell 
brought Palhese to Britain in the 1920s to assist his research. Palhese's association with the 
British enabled him to restore the family estates, although Bell's account attributes his 
primary motivation to more personal factors.[8]
The punishment o f the Palhe family also provided O'Connor with his principal assistant, 
a Buriat monk, Sherab Gyatso (later Rai Sahib Sherab Gyatso; d.1909), known as 
Shabdrung Lama. He had been a personal attendant o f Sengchen Tulku when the lama was 
executed for assisting Chandra Das. Imprisoned and tortured along with his master, 
Shabdrung Lama escaped to Darjeeling. There he was given employment as a teacher at the 
Bhotia school, and as a British agent gathering information from Tibetans in Darjeeling 
bazaar, before being em ployed by O 'C onnor as his personal secretary on the 
Younghusband Mission. [9]
According to David MacDonald, Shabdrung Lama saw his service with the British as an 
opportunity for revenge on the Tibetan Government; during the Younghusband Mission he 
told Tibetans the expedition was to punish them for their treatment o f  Sengchen Tulku. [10] 
O'Connor's action in securing the release o f two o f Shabdrung Lama's colleagues who had 
been imprisoned in Lhasa since Das's 1882 v is it,[ ll]  must have tended to confirm that 
impression. Certainly it carried an implicit message, that the British supported those who 
supported them, an essential message to convey if they were to receive loyalty in return.
Palhese and Shabdrung Lama differed from later important intermediaries in that their 
primary loyalty was to a particular officer, rather than to the British in general. Thus 
Palhese's first loyalty was to Bell; he served on the understanding that if  Bell left 
’government service today, I leave tom orrow'.[12] Later cadre officers continued to have 
assistants loyal to them personally, but these assistants were not politically influential.[13] 
M ichael Fisher has shown that two patterns o f  service were common among 
intermediaries in the Indian Princely States. One group o f m unshis  were linked to a 
particular British patron throughout their careers. In the second group there was a pattern of 
family service, in which after one family member was recruited, he would endevour to 
secure employment in British service for other family m em bers.[14] Both patterns are 
apparent in Tibet at different times.
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In later years the dominant pattern was one o f cadre service, largely because the rewards 
o f service with a single officer ceased when that officer departed. The shorter terms served 
by later Tibet cadre officers also made the individual patron pattern o f service less common, 
and there may be an evolutionary progress from the personal type o f loyal assistant to the 
second pattern Fisher isolated, as British terms o f service were reduced. But this move to 
cadre service was also a symbol o f local employees' attempts to strengthen their positions 
in the imperial hierarchy as British officers appropriated the authority for collection and 
definition o f local knowledge and for communication with the Tibetan ruling class.
Previous studies have shown how in the early stages o f  the imperial process, local 
employees were used both to translate, and to gather information concerning the traditional 
society. Nicholas Dirks has shown how Colin MacKenzie, later the first Surveyor-General 
o f India, relied upon his principal assistant, Kavelli Boria, to gather, collate and interpret 
the wide variety o f  information which MacKenzie sought. Boria trained other assistants, 
including two o f his brothers, but after MacKenzie's death they were refused permission to 
continue the work on the grounds that supervision o f such a project was beyond the 
capability o f  any 'native'.[15]
MacKenzie, like Bell, fully acknowledged the debt he owed to his local assistant, but, as 
Dirks demonstrates, when the information which the local assistants had gathered was 
collated in colonial archives, it became a part o f the imperial body o f knowledge, rather 
than local knowledge. The credit for collection went to M acKenzie, not to his local 
informants, just as Bell was credited with Palhese's knowledge. Similarly, while they were 
the Political's Tibetan-language examiners until 1909, neither Urgyen Gyatso or Chandra 
Das played any further significant part in Anglo-Tibetan relations after Curzon's arrival. 
Their journeys had been part o f the process by which British India extended its influence 
over the periphery. Firstly new territory was mapped, and thus located within the European 
imagination, then its power sources were identified, and intermediaries despatched to 
establish communication with them. When contacts were established - or refused - British 
officers took over.
As the imperial power strengthened its control over the periphery, as it did during the 
Curzon viceroyalty, the authority for supplying inform ation about, and establishing 
political ties w ith, Tibet, was appropriated by British officers. W hen Europeans 
appropriated this authority for knowledge gathering and dissemination, 'native' informants 
came to be seen as unreliable. Where the early intermediaries had been given responsibility 
for the collection o f knowledge, the translation o f cultures, and initial contact with the 
traditional rulers beyond India's frontiers, the authority for these duties passed to British 
officers. This process, which reduced the importance o f intermediaries, was typical of
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British Indian frontier policies, and may also be observed in the establishment o f ties with 
Bhutan or north-eastern India.[16] In response, the intermediary class sought to strengthen 
its position within the imperial bureaucracy by transferring its loyalty and service from 
individuals to government.[17]
SECTION 3.2: - THE IDEAL INTERM EDIARY
While Palhese and Shabdrung Lama were o f great personal assistance to Bell and 
O'Connor, they were, like Chandra Das, unpopular at Lhasa. It proved to be impossible to 
offer Tibetan employees full legal protection from Lhasa's authority by naturalising them, 
and Palhese remained the only important Tibetan-born intermediary used by the cadre. [18]
Ideally, what the British wanted was an individual who could match the status and talents 
o f Agvan Dorzhiev, the Buriat monk who acted as an intermediary between Russia and 
Tibet. A Russian citizen, Dorzhiev took his degree in Buddhism at Lhasa's Drepung 
monastery and rose to be an assistant tutor to the 13th Dalai Lama; he was thus a member 
o f  Lhasa's religious elite. At the same time, he represented Russian interests in Lhasa, and 
sent valuable information back to Russia. Dorzhiev was a formidable opponent for the 
British, but they recognised that he was the ideal type o f  intermediary, a loyal citizen o f the 
imperial power, but highly placed in the local society.[19]
Lacking any existing British Indian equivalent o f Dorzhiev, the Government o f India 
began to develop suitable candidates from among the Tibetan-speaking peoples within 
India. Pupils o f  the form er Bhotia school, set-up for ju st such purpose, and its 
replacement, Darjeeling High School, were obvious candidates. These Darjeeling pupils 
were not necessarily advantaged individuals in local society; many came from marginalised 
communities on the periphery o f traditional society. But the school offered an opportunity 
for disadvantaged children to progress to imperial employment, where their lack o f ties to 
local power elites could be seen as an advantage by the British.
The Younghusband Mission recruited a number of clerks and translators from the frontier 
region, and although there are few records o f these early employees, it appears that the 
favoured candidates were Tibetan-speakers who been taught English language and cultural 
values at Darjeeling High School.[20] After the Younghusband Mission, many o f these 
local staff were given further employment at the Trade Agencies or with the Political Officer 
in Sikkim. This group formed the basis o f  an emerging class o f intermediaries on the 
Tibetan frontier, and most o f the early influential local employees o f  the Tibet cadre were 
from that group.
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SECTION 3.3: - EXCLUDING INDIANS FROM TTBET
Prior to the appointment o f Pemba Tsering in 1941, the Gartok Agent and his staff were 
always Hindus, with the occasional Muslim peon. Gartok was considered too isolated and 
strategically unimportant to require the presence o f a British officer, and Hindus from the 
Garwhal hill-region, who had traditional ties with western Tibet, served there. However, 
no Hindus or M uslims were chosen by the Political Departm ent for the senior cadre 
posts.[21]
W hen they selected local officials for Tibetan service, the cadre favoured the 
predominantly Buddhist, British Indian frontier peoples. W ith their close historical, 
cultural, racial and linguistic ties with Tibet they could be expected to adapt most easily to 
the Tibetan social system. [22] W hen it became obvious that India would becom e 
independent, Richardson tried to locate suitable Indians to serve in the Gyantse Agency in 
preparation for more senior cadre posts, but it was not until after Indian independence that 
any Hindu or Muslim was given a senior cadre post in Tibet.[23]
The British prejudice against using Hindus or Muslims in Tibet can be traced back to the 
first British visitor there, George Bogel. He noted that it was 'inconvenient carrying Hindu 
servants into foreign parts'.[24] Later frontier officials distinguished between 'Indians', 
meaning Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, and so on, and the predominantly Buddhist frontier 
peoples, and m aintained a barely-concealed personal preference for the latter. The 
predilection for hill-peoples over the peoples o f the plains went beyond the usual colonial 
officer's favouring o f the peoples among whom he worked. In British India, mountain 
people were commonly seen as morally and physically superior to those o f the plains. [25] 
By such actions as rejecting Captain God's posting to Gyantse, early cadre officers 
established a precedent for the exclusion o f Hindus and M uslims from any but menial 
positions in Tibet, and no further consideration was given to employing them there until 
Indian independence was imminent. An Indian officer, Lieutenant Chatterjee, did serve at 
Gyantse as Escort Commander, but died at the end of his term there.[26]
When Bell discussed appointing an 'Indian' as Yatung Trade Agent, he claimed that 
'Indians are handicapped by their inability to speak Tibetan, by the difference of their 
religion and by their ignorance of the habits of the people.'[27] Bell’s judgment reflected 
the ethos of the time; the British obviously had a similar handicap, but were assumed to be 
able to overcome it. 'Indians' were perceived as a subordinate race, lacking the necessary 
qualities to overcome these handicaps. Kenneth Ballhatchet describes these stereotypical 
views of Indians as fitting
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the classical models o f dominance and subordination. M embers o f  the 
dominant group ascribe to themselves the qualities needed for the tasks 
which they wish to monopolize. They are unable to perceive such qualities 
in persons o f subordinate groups, who are excluded from positions in 
which they can demonstrate these qualities.[28]
There was however, another aspect to the preference for frontier peoples over 'Indians'. 
It implied that the Tibet cadre recognised that India was a British construction, a state made 
up o f different peoples, some o f whom had their strongest ties (socio-cultural, political and 
economic), with peoples classified as being non-Indian, and existing outside India's 
borders. While it was necessary for British strategic and administrative purposes to define 
certain areas as 'Indian', the frontier was perceived as a separate zone, inhabited by peoples 
whose status was ambiguous, and the artificial nature o f the administrative boundary was 
implicitly recognised.[29]
The exclusion o f Indians was also a symbol o f the Tibet cadre's sense o f identity and 
purpose. While being an Indian sendee, and orientated towards their central authority in 
Delhi, the cadre saw themselves as diplomats, serving on the frontier, and among frontier 
peoples. They had no wish to be drawn back into the Indian administration, with its image 
o f babus and bureaucracy.
SECTION 3.4: - MACDONALD: DOR.II OR DAVID?
Within British India, Anglo-Indians, those o f mixed British and Indian parentage, were 
often subject to greater prejudice than Indians, and they were excluded from several areas 
o f government em ployment.[30] But in Tibet, Anglo-Indians were preferred to Indians. 
The difference is difficult to account for, but certainly some aspects o f British Indian social 
attitudes were relaxed on the frontier,[31] and there was the precedent o f a number o f  
legendary Anglo-Indian frontiersmen, such as the Hearsey family, and General James 
Skinner, founder o f Skinner's Horse, an irregular cavalry division. Several Anglo-Indian 
Medical Officers were used, including Dr Dyer, who accompanied Bell to Lhasa in 1920. 
In the 1940s, two Christian Medical Officers, the Anglo-Indian Dr Humphreys, and 
Captain M.V.Kurian, paved the way for the subsequent posting o f Hindu Medical Officers 
at Gyantse. [32]
One Anglo-Indian was chosen for a Political post in Tibet, David MacDonald, the son of 
a Scottish tea planter, who became an important figure on the frontier. Although his father
105
had left India when MacDonald was five years old, the boy was well provided for, 
receiving the then generous sum of twenty rupees a month in trust. His Sikkimese mother, 
Aphu Drolma, entered him in the Bhotia Boarding School, from where he entered local 
government service, before joining the Younghusband Mission.[33] While M acDonald 
began regular Tibetan service as a Trade Agent, not an intermediary, unlike the other two 
local officers classified here as Tibet cadre (Norbhu Dhondup and Pemba Tsering) he 
shared a similar background to the intermediaries, and his career may be more appropriately 
considered in this section.
MacDonald had a truly multi-cultural background. Raised as a Buddhist with the name of 
Dorji MacDonald, he converted to Christianity and adopted the name David under the 
influence o f his wife, the Anglo-Nepalese, Alice Curtis. These various influences gave him 
command o f all o f  the principal languages o f the region, Tibetan, Nepali, Hindi, Lepcha 
and English, and insight into both Buddhist and Christian religious cultures. MacDonald 
had the character and skills needed to attract the patronage o f British officers, a necessary 
quality for an ambitious individual o f his background. He assisted both Charles Bell and 
Colonel Waddell, Chief Medical Officer on the Younghusband Mission and early scholar of 
Tibetan Buddhism, to learn Tibetan, and their support gained him Political employ.[34]
Bell's patronage was crucial; MacDonald was held in high regard by Bell, and owed his 
position to Bell's support. When his patron left, MacDonald lost influence. His efforts to 
support his son John, and his son-in-law Frank Perry, in various employment schemes on 
the frontier brought him into conflict with Bailey, the new Political Officer Sikkim, and his 
final years in Tibet were difficult ones. In retirement however, he ensured the family 
security by turning his Kalimpong home into a successful hotel, which still exists 
today. [35]
SECTION 3.5: - THE PRINCIPAL INTERM EDIARIES
Tracing the intermediaries' career paths is complicated by both a lack o f source material, 
and the fact that local staff were not normally given fixed-term appointments to a particular 
post, but were used throughout the British posts on an 'as-needed' basis. [36] However 
there are sufficient sources to examine the careers o f several o f the most im portant 
individuals, and this produces a number o f significant findings.
Norbhu Dhondup, was born in Kalimpong with no aristocratic connections, and is 
described variously as being Sherpa or Tibetan. Taken from Darjeeling High School by 
O'Connor to serve as a translator on the Younghusband Mission, he was then given a
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clerical post at Gyantse. Norbhu gradually worked his way up to become the most trusted 
intermediary, and in the late '30s was taken into Political employ, the first intermediary to 
be so honoured. Although originally recruited by O'Connor, Norbhu was not associated 
with any particular British officer, but became 'the absolute right-hand o f every Political 
Officer. He knew the ways o f everybody, how to speak to them, what to say, what not to 
say, [and] how to be diplomatic.1 [37]
Norbhu was personally popular with the British; his character fitted the British ideal of 
the frontiersman. Gould described him as having 'lots o f common sense, a ready laugh and 
infinite guts'. General Neame, who accompanied Gould to Lhasa in 1936, observed 
approvingly that Norbhu was 'one o f the few Oriental officials...who will tell one his real 
opinion, palatable or not, and strong and decisive opinions too1.[38]
As Norbhu was a Buddhist, there was some doubt that he could 'put things bluntly' to 
the Dalai Lama. But Norbhu satisfied his superiors that he could take a firm line where 
necessary. In the late 1920s he argued that the weakness of the British position required the 
posting of'som e strong officer, I mean not so polite as we all do now[sic]...[to] deal with 
the Tibetans more strongly'. Like O'Connor, his original mentor, the strength o f Norbhu's 
written opinions caused the Secretariat to question his tact, but they were assured that 
despite his 'brusque' telegram s, 'Norbhu Dhondup can be trusted to employ most 
diplomatic language in his actual dealings with the Tibetan Government'.[39]
Norbhu visited Lhasa on 15 occasions prior to the establishment o f  a permanent British 
M ission there in 1936, and developed excellent ties with the Tibetan leadership. They 
rewarded him with Tibetan aristocratic rank, making him a Dzasa o f  the fourth grade, and 
he appears to have had automatic access to the Dalai Lama. His popularity with Lhasa's 
aristocratic ladies also provided him with a valuable source o f information, generally 
neglected by the British until Mrs Sherriff and later Mrs Guthrie took up residence in Lhasa 
with their husbands.[40]
By the 1930s, Norbhu had become a trusted 'insider', and was given appropriate 
honours. Awarded the title o f Rai Bahadur in 1923, he was appointed Trade Agent at 
Yatung in 1936 and subsequently headed the Lhasa Mission, where he was treated with all 
the ceremony considered necessary to uphold the prestige o f a British officer; for example 
on his arrival at Gyantse from Lhasa in 1941 he was met by Trade Agent Captain Saker 
with 25 troops, who rode out to escort him into the Agency.[41]
Norbhu headed the Lhasa Mission for around four years in total, and was therefore, by 
our classification, very much a member o f the Tibet cadre. His acceptance by the cadre as 
an 'insider1 was not only due to the manner in which he performed his duty; it owed much 
to his adoption o f British forms o f behaviour. He played football, rode well, and acted with
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'tact and common-sense'. Yet he also wore particularly colourful Tibetan clothing, was 
proud o f his Tibetan rank and heritage, and, off-duty, aspired to the lifestyle o f a Tibetan 
aristocrat, rather than a British officer. [42]
Norbhu's acceptance by the Tibet cadre suggests that he represented the ideal type of 
Tibetan the British hoped would emerge from a modern Tibet; one who had retained what 
the British considered were the best features of his own culture, while adopting the 
necessary British officers' modes o f  thought and behaviour. Norbhu was also liked and 
respected in Lhasa, and his career represents evidence that an individual could understand, 
and be accepted by, both imperial and local societies, an issue we return to in Chapter 
Eight.
Norbhu's contemporary, Rai Bahadur Sonam Wangfel Laden La (1876-1937), was a 
very different type o f individual. A Sikkimese, he was a nephew of Urgyen Gyatso, and 
worked his way up in the Bengal Police. Displaying a great aptitude for intelligence work, 
he escorted both the Panchen and Dalai Lamas during their visits to India, in return for 
which he was given the Tibetan rank o f  D e p o n . Laden La also visited Europe, 
accompanying four Tibetan schoolboys who were sent to Rugby school in 1913. Like 
N orbhu, he made numerous visits to Lhasa in the 1920s and '30s on behalf o f the 
British. [43]
Laden La became an extremely powerful figure on the frontier, and was active in frontier 
politics in opposition to the growing power o f the Nepali community. [44] Unlike Norbhu, 
he made many enemies in India and Tibet. The independent observer, William McGovern, 
accused him o f using his position for personal profit, and there is considerable doubt that 
his own claim to personal popularity in Lhasa bore any close relation to fact. As will be 
seen in Chapter Four, the Dalai Lama personally intervened to prevent his appointment as 
Trade Agent Yatung. Despite that. Laden La remained o f great value to the Tibet cadre, 
which, in the light o f  his failures in other areas, suggests this was because o f  his 
intelligence skills. As one officer commented 'Laden La is very full of himself, but is very 
interesting regarding events and personalities in Lhasa.'[45]
Laden La also differed from Norbhu in that he adopted British dress and social customs, 
and aspired to a British lifestyle.[46] While he retained the support o f the Tibet cadre, he 
was less successful than Norbhu in cultivating the friendship o f the Tibetan leadership, and 
was not appointed to a Political post. He remained, therefore, by our classification, an 
intermediary, rather than a member o f the Tibet cadre. Thus succeeding local officers of 
ambition followed the Norbhu model. Ultimately Laden La failed to achieve the desired 
balance o f British and Tibetan understanding and forms o f behaviour, and he was not 
trusted by the Tibetans after his involvement in the events of 1923-24, described in the next
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chapter.
There was an obvious tension between Norbhu Dhondup and Laden La in addition to that 
arising from their different life-styles; they represented different local interests and 
communities. Laden La had connections with Sikkimese aristocracy through his uncle, 
while Norbhu, though o f undistinguished background, was favoured by the Tibetan 
community with which he identified. These diverging interests have affected subsequent 
history, with traces o f  their rivalry remaining among the available oral sources in the 
Himalayas.
The Rudolphs have shown that competing lineages were common within a particular 
body o f intermediaries in Rajastan.[47] Similarly, British service offered both Norbhu and 
Laden La the chance to ensure future prosperity for their families, and, ideally, to establish 
a family administrative lineage. Thus they competed to establish themselves as the most 
reliable intermediary between British India and Tibet; a contest won by Norbhu, as his 
promotion to the Tibet cadre indicates. While his son died young, Norbhu's value to the 
Tibetans may be reflected in the fact that his daughter now works for the Tibetan 
Government in Dharamsala. Laden La failed to establish a family administrative tradition, 
but he acquired considerable wealth, and while he died early, his family, like the 
MacDonalds, established a successful hotel business.
As a nephew o f  Urgyen Gyatso, Laden La did represent one o f the two patterns o f 
service Michael Fisher described.[48] Whereas Palhese and Shabdrung Lama's careers 
were linked to a British patron, the family tradition o f service became the predominant 
mode among local employees in Tibet: Thus A-chuk Tsering, a Darjeeling Tibetan, and his 
son Lha Tsering, both served as intelligence agents for the Government o f India. Tonyot 
Tsering. a Sikkimese educated in Kalimpong and Patna Medical College, served as a Sub- 
Assistant Surgeon in Gyantse, and his son. Tonyot Tsering jnr., served at Gyantse under 
the British, and from 1949 to 1960 at Lhasa under the Indian Government. Bo Tsering, a 
Sikkimese Sub-Assistant surgeon at Gyantse and Lhasa from 1914 until c l 950, was 
closely related to Sonam Tobden Kazi, who succeeded Norbhu Dhondup as Trade Agent 
Yatung. [49]
Family patterns o f loyalty could represent great changes in allegiance, symbolising the 
process by which the British allied with existing local ruling classes after establishing their 
place at the top o f the political hierarchy. Sonam Tobden Kazi was a great-grandson o f the 
Sikkim ese Prim e M inister Dewan N am gyal, whose treatm ent o f  the D arjeeling 
Superintendent Dr A.Campbell and botanist J.D.Hooker in 1849 precipitated the eventual 
British take-over o f Sikkim. Whilst Dewan Namgyal had been exiled by the British, Sonam 
Tobden was to be one o f their most valuable employees. [50]
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SECTION 3.6: - FOLLOW ING THE BRITISH M ODE!,
Just as the British officers o f the Tibet cadre were educated and trained to meet the 
particular requirements o f  the service, so too were the intermediaries. Their schooling was 
on the British model, giving them an understanding o f British language and culture, and 
teaching them the correct behaviour patterns as defined by the dominant culture. When the 
intermediaries' training began, the British frontiersmen provided the behavioural model to 
emulate. Those accepted for British service were those who potentially matched that 
model.[51]
The local officials educated and trained by the British formed a distinct group in 
Himalayan society, readily identifiable by their social behaviour. They passed on these 
behavioural patterns to their children, who were educated in the same way, thereby creating 
an bureaucratic 'caste' which still persists today, with many contemporary Sikkimese 
bureaucrats being descended from former British employees.
Successful intermediaries learned that advancement came from the adoption of both work 
and certain social patterns o f the British model. We have seen that many o f the early 
lessons the cadre learned were unwritten guidelines, such as those implicit in Sandeman's 
biography, and it appears that successful intermediaries learned such unwritten codes, and 
echoed cadre rhetoric while following more practical models implicit in the cadre's actions.
Like the successful cadre officers, the intermediaries studied privately to improve their 
language skills and local knowledge. For example, Pemba Tsering, the other intermediary 
who, by virtue o f heading the Lhasa Mission for more than a year, can be classified as 
having become a Tibet cadre officer, was fluent in five languages and worked hard to 
improve himself. He read English literature and underlined unfamiliar words to look up 
later. His character matched the British ideal; he was 'straightforward', a man of integrity, 
with a good sense o f humour, punctual, meticulous and disciplined. In the British fashion 
he relaxed with theatricals, tennis, music, and billiards.[52]
Just as the British officers o f the Tibet cadre formed a distinct, and largely self- 
perpetuating group, so too did the interm ediaries. Norbhu D hondup, like David 
MacDonald, showed that merit (as judged by the British) was the main factor in promotion, 
although as recruitment was largely controlled from within the Tibet cadre, selection also 
depended upon their being approved by the cadre. Intermediaries had little or no contact 
with the Government o f India unless they received a Political posting; their careers were 
judged by their immediate (British) superiors.
The successful local employees o f the Tibet cadre were those who learned British frontier 
codes o f behaviour and patterns o f thinking; those who 'understood' the British. But while
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these men 'behaved just like sahibs', in carrying out their duties, they also maintained their 
own cultural identity. A long-serving local such as Bo Tsering might speak o f "we 
British", but he remained a Buddhist, and wore local dress off-duty. Just as the British 
officers did not adhere to Tibetan forms o f behaviour in their private life, they did not 
require, or want, the local officials to abandon their own traditions. In presenting Urgyen 
Gyatso with his Rai Bahadurship in 1893, the Lieutenant-Governor o f  Bengal noted 
approvingly that, while rendering valuable service to the British, 'he has not forgotten the 
traditions o f his ancestors, nor failed in his reverence for, and duty towards, his 
religion'.[53]
Dress was a significant issue. Adopting European dress was an indication that the 
wearers identified themselves with modern society. In the late 1940s, while European dress 
was already common among local peoples in the frontier region, the leading intermediaries 
o f the time such as Sonam Tobgye and Pemba Tsering, wore traditional dress. Their 
employers considered that they should not be 'dressing like third-rate Europeans...they 
must adhere to their own customs and wear their national dress'.[54]
The Government o f  India did not need its local employees in the Tibetan sector to 
'become British'. They needed employees able to understand, and express themselves in 
British forms, in order to translate their understanding o f Tibet to the British. But just as 
the British in India deeply mistrusted any European who 'went native', so the reverse 
applied. The result was that successful local employees were those able to function as 
'insiders' in both British and Tibetan cultures, while retaining their own cultural identity.
SECTION 3.7: - THE INTERM EDIARIES' MOTIVES
Why did the intermediaries work for the British imperial government? Their motives were 
quite simple. Even without the various allowances paid, salaries were two or three times 
higher than in any comparable position, conditions were good, and government employees, 
even in menial positions, gained great prestige in the local com munity. Although 
relationship to a serving government employee was an advantage in recruitment, promotion 
was on merit, and there was a clear ladder of opportunity in serving the British.
The intermediaries, particularly those from Sikkim, did not then have a sense o f loyalty to 
an independent India. There was little or no independence movement in Sikkim, which, at 
least in theory, controlled its own internal affairs. Sikkim was isolated between India and 
Tibet, and veiy few Sikkimese travelled widely in India or beyond. Even today there is no 
exile or emigrant community o f Sikkimese elsewhere. The result was that the Sikkimese
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were the ideal imperial bureaucrats, with no geo-political overtones to their service.
While Sikkimese were not confronted by crises o f  loyalty, problem s did arise for 
Palhese, a Tibetan, and for Norbhu, who identified him self as a Tibetan. Bell recorded that 
Palhese 'was known in Tibet as "two-headed" because he had to serve two masters'. But, 
again according to Bell, Palhese was able to reconcile any divided loyalties because 'on 
most o f the main issues the interests o f the two countries lay very close together'. [55] The 
Tibetan perspective is not recorded, but it is noticeable that Palhese was not given any rank 
by the Tibetan Government, in contrast to Indian-born officers such as Norbhu.
Norbhu was close to retirement age when he was confronted by an issue where British 
and Tibetan interests were very far apart, Gould recalled how Norbhu, 'brought up in the 
straight-minded school o f Bell, had never...attempted to persuade the Tibetans to believe 
anything o f which he was not him self convinced', until he was required in 1942 to press 
the Tibetans to accept the 'Trans-Tibet Transport' scheme to open war-time supply routes 
to China. Norbhu shared the Tibetans' fear that this scheme would increase access to Tibet, 
and his failure to persuade the Tibetans to accept the plan led to his being replaced in Lhasa 
by Frank Ludlow.[56] Norbhu reverted to being Trade Agent Yatung for six months before 
he retired, and he died o f tuberculosis just over a year later.
Previous studies have shown how local employees could arrange administrative details to 
their own advantage. The records upon which revenue collection depended could be 
tampered with, whether with the connivance o f local rulers, or, in the case o f intermediaries 
with no fixed ties to the local community, solely for their own benefit.[57]
There is plentiful evidence o f corruption at the lower levels o f the British presence in 
Tibet, by both British and local staff, particularly in regard to building work at Gyantse. 
Early in his career Norbhu Dhondup was implicated in a case where a building contractor 
bribed Gyantse Trade Agency staff to win a contract. Norbhu (who denied the accusations) 
was not charged on the curious grounds that he was absent at the time charges were 
preferred, and the matter does not appear to have been raised again.[58]
A cadre officer was aware o f'w hat masses o f money...I could make if  we wanted to be 
corrupt'[59]; and two officers, White and Rivett-Carnac, were, as we have seen, involved 
in cases which cast serious doubts as to their personal honesty. Although incorruptibility 
was generally part o f the image o f the cadre officers, the need to maintain that image meant 
that such cases were not publicised. But in the case o f corruption among local staff, 
evidence for the cadre's attitude is generally lacking. In 1944, however, Frederick 
Mainprice clearly found corruption among local staff, and noted that 'sacking anyone from 
the [Gyantse] Agency had been almost unheard o f .[60]
Thus there must be a suspicion that some cadre officers, however honest themselves.
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applied a different standard to their local employees, and were prepared to turn a blind eye 
to a certain level o f corruption if  the persons concerned were sufficiently valuable to them. 
Thus the expectation o f extra reward must be considered as a motivating factor for some of 
those who sought imperial employment.
SECTION 3.8: - THE INTERMEDIARIES' ROTE AND DUTIES
The British acknowledged that the success o f  their posts in Tibet relied 'largely on the 
personality and contacts’ o f local employees. [61] Unlike British officers, intermediaries 
were permanently employed on the Tibetan frontier. This lead to a gradual build-up o f 
experienced local staff, who provided a valuable continuity as the British officers came and 
went.
While there were originally advantages to the imperial government in recruiting persons 
with 110 ties to the local power elites, those recruited tended to form their own power elite, 
whose support became important to the imperial power. As a loyal body, this elite was then 
a natural imperial recruiting ground, although the loyalty and ability o f each generation had 
be proven anew. It was clearly in the interests o f the intermediaries to promote their family 
loyalty and service to the British, and to construct this tradition. As the Rudolphs have 
shown in regard to Jaipur in the same period, 'family traditions' o f service were not 
necessarily long-established. [62]
The recruitment o f persons related to those already employed by government was a 
common pattern in British India, for example in Army recruitment.[63] In Tibet, while 
there were numerous family connections in service, positions were by no means hereditary; 
Norbhu, M acDonald, and Laden La all failed to obtain imperial employment for their 
sons.[64] But there was a very small body o f educated personnel suitable for service in 
Tibet available in the frontier districts, and most o f these were related in some way. or 
became related through marriage. As the preference for recruits who were related to serving 
personnel was characteristic o f the Political Department's recruitment of British officers, it 
is no surprise that the policy was repeated in the recruitment o f subordinates.
The intermediaries' experience meant that part o f their duty was to 'guide' newly arrived 
British officers. This naturally required a great deal o f tact; their position might be 
compared to a battle-hardened sergeant 'assisting' a new officer in wartime. While the 
intermediaries might wonder ’who have they sent us now?1, such tactful instruction was an 
important part o f their function, and was an integral part o f the system which allowed the 
Political Department regularly to rotate its officers' postings.[65]
The process o f selecting and training local subordinates was part o f the process by which 
the Tibet cadre ensured the continuity o f their traditions. By the 1940s, the process had 
produced a few individuals who could carry them on. During the last 11 years o f the 
British presence in Tibet, three local employees were promoted to Political Department 
postings (although they were not, as far as I can ascertain, taken into the Department). 
Norbhu Dhondup and Pemba Tsering both served as Trade Agent Yatung and Head of 
British Mission Lhasa, while Sonam Tobden Kazi, 'a worthy successor to Laden La and 
Rai Bahadhur Norbhu' was being groomed for a senior position with postings as Trade 
Agent in Gartok and Yatung. [66]
It is difficult to judge the extent to which the Lhasa M ission was ever effectively 
controlled by a local officer. Their terms overlapped with visits by the Political Officer 
Sikkim, and M ajor Guthrie, the Tibetan-speaking doctor attached to the Lhasa Mission 
from 1945 onwards, was an important figure there in the absence o f other British officials. 
Doubts were expressed in the Secretariat as to the efficiency o f the Mission when headed 
by a local official, and, while the Tibet cadre officers followed their usual tradition of 
publicly defending their own, it appears they did have some reservations as to whether 
local cadre officers were o f the required standards. [67]
But personal relations between the British officers and local employees were good, with 
Norbhu being particularly popular. The isolation of the posts, and the easier social relations 
with Buddhists, as opposed to Hindus, made for a relaxation o f the social codes o f British 
India, as did the reliance placed by the cadre on the local employees' experience. While the 
Tibet cadre officers' regard for those in their charge, particularly in the case o f lower 
ranking servants, fits into the 'paternal' mould described by Lionel Caplan in his study of 
British relations with the Gurkhas, the Sikkimese today remember the individual officers of 
the Tibet cadre (as distinct from the policies which they represented) with fondness.[68]
C O N CLUSIO N S
The British presence in Tibet led to the creation of a small 'caste' o f peoples on the north­
eastern frontier o f India who identified with British aspirations and culture. The British 
educated and trained these Tibetan-speaking frontiersmen to act as intermediaries between 
British India and Tibet because they presumed they could understand Tibet and its people 
and pass on their understanding to the British. There was, therefore, a reciprocal process o f 
power reinforcement and inculcation o f understanding. The British also relied upon their 
local employees to maintain the continuity and institutional identity o f the Trade Agencies.
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and to carry out much of the day-to-day work there.
The role o f  the intermediaries in the imperial process has been largely submerged in 
historical discourse. Most memoirs o f colonial officials pay a brief tribute to their great 
contribution, but their significance has been largely forgotten. M ost have remained 
obscure, and, in common with other marginalised groups, or social classes in the imperial 
process (including British subordinates, an issue examined in Chapter Seven), their 'voice' 
has been historically submerged beneath the 'voices' o f both imperial and indigenous 
empowered social classes.
This process has partly been due to the needs o f Indian nationalist historians, who have 
preferred to emphasise those who engaged in indigenous resistance to the Raj and to 
highlight the oppositional nature o f the imperial process. Those who had given great 
service to the im perial pow er, such as Norbhu Dhondup, were viewed with less 
enthusiasm in independent India. However indigenous resistance to colonial rule was 
arguably less common than support or acquiescence. Just as the subordinate class position 
o f the intermediaries meant that their historical voice was submerged under imperial voices, 
so the creation o f an Indian nation-state obscured the voices o f those who had supported 
the British.
The intermediaries needed to understand both British and Tibetan cultures, but there was 
considerable mistrust o f an individual such as Laden La, who clearly identified him self 
with the modern imperial society, and who was perceived by many in both camps as 
having left his own culture behind. The British came to favour, and to promote, those, like 
Norbhu Dhondup and Pemba Tsering, who were able to function in British society without 
adopting external British forms o f behaviour. The British mistrust of locals who abandoned 
their own culture consequently created sophisticated and cosmopolitan individuals, at home 
in both imperial and indigenous societies.
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CHAPTER FOUR
’FREEDOM  TO ACT AS THEY THOUGHT BEST’: 
CREATING A ROLE; ASPECTS OF POLICY
INTRO DUCTIO N
We have seen that the distinct collective identity o f the Tibet cadre was maintained 
through its selection process. Those who appeared suitable for the specialised requirements 
of Tibetan service were usually assessed during a junior posting to Gyantse or Yatung, 
and, if they proved able to maintain the prestige and further the aims o f their predecessors, 
they were later promoted to the senior cadre posts at Gangtok or Lhasa. This selection 
process meant that the senior cadre officers shared a similar mentality, which produced a 
broad continuity o f  approach to Tibetan policy. The common theme o f the policies the 
cadre promoted was that they were designed, or served, to deepen British involvement in 
Tibet, and increase Tibetan dependence on British structures and 'advice'. The cadre thus 
resisted the dominant trend o f British Indian policy in this period, which was ’a retreat to 
the centre'.[1]
While the Governm ent o f India's policies emerged as a result o f discussion and 
consensus between opposing, or different, schools o f thought, and the cadre's influence is 
not always apparent in the policies finally adopted after this process, their predominant 
influence on policy was 'forward'. This meant that their role was considerably more 
significant than Whitehall had intended and the title Trade Agent' might suggest.
The cadre's aims and methods become more apparent, and the results significant, when 
we examine the nature o f their role in Tibet. It suited the British to avoid precise definition 
o f the cadre's role, as the formal posting o f British diplomatic representatives in Tibet 
would have raised the question o f Tibet's status at the expense o f  relations with China and 
other powers. In this chapter we will examine how, in the absence o f specific instructions 
as to their function, the Tibet cadre created a particular role for themselves.
The effects o f  the cadre's definition o f their role can be seen in two, sometimes
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overlapping, areas. In this chapter we will examine the effect that they had on policy by 
their promotion and support o f particular programmes, and this will be developed in the 
next chapter where we will examine in depth the issue which the cadre saw as most crucial 
- British representation in Lhasa. The second area is that o f  their effect on the image of 
Tibet held in Western academic and political circles today, which we examine in Chapter 
Six.
SECTION 4.1: - DEFINING THE CADRE'S ROLE
When J.C.White was posted to Sikkim in 1889, his government 'depended upon him to 
define the limits o f his job without recourse to precedent..[to]..bring it more into line with 
British policy.'[2] Similarly the Trade Agencies were established without an accepted 
definition o f their intended function. What then was tire intended role o f the Tibet cadre?[3]
In that they represented British government and culture, and gathered information about 
those o f their hosts, the cadre can be best defined as diplom ats.[4] But the inherently 
'forward' nature o f  their view o f the purpose of a British presence in Tibet often blurred the 
distinctions between diplomat, foreign advisor and 'empire builder'.
Publicly, government maintained that the Trade Agents' duties were ’to further Indian 
trade in Tibet and generally to protect the interests of British subjects'. Yet it is obvious that 
they were not qualified to be Trade Agents. None o f the officers chosen to serve in Tibet 
had any experience o f customs work or trade, indeed the word 'trade' carried pejorative 
connotations in official British Indian circles.[5]
Within governm ent, the Agencies' purpose was disputed. In 1904, the Political 
Department claimed that a civil dispensary at Gyantse would be 'politically advantageous'. 
However, the acting Viceroy, Lord Ampthill, cautioned that
We must be very careful that anything we do does not even wear the
appearance o f establishing a political centre at Gyantse and I hope that
the Department will refrain from suggesting political intrigue.[6]
It was a vain hope. Although India tried to maintain a non-political definition o f the 
Agents' role when it advised Secretary o f State Morley in 1906 that their function 'was 
without doubt primarily commercial', it was admitted that 'it has been necessary to entrust 
him [O'Connor] also with im portant political work, as he is the main channel o f 
communication between the Government o f India and the Lhasa Government.'[7]
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The term 'Trade' Agent was a convenient fiction, which owed its usage to political 
circumstances. Whitehall had prevented Curzon from stationing British officials in Tibet for 
political purposes, but pressure from British and Indian trading interests meant that it had 
accepted the need for British officers to oversee trade in Tibet. By placing them under the 
Political Department's command, the Government o f India ensured that the Agents' role 
would be political and diplomatic, as Lord Curzon intended.[8]
W hitehall was thus outm anoeuvered by the 'forward school' and, while the name 
remained, the pretence that the Agents' primary role concerned trade was largely abandoned 
after M orley's departure from the India Office. By 1932, government censors did not 
object to Macdonald describing his duties as including 'watching and forwarding reports on 
the political situation to the Government o f India'.[9] In later years internal government 
correspondence clearly stated that even the Agency Medical and Escort Officers had a 
primarily political role, although a trade role remained a convenient fiction for public 
consumption.
The Gartok post came closest to Whitehall's ideal o f a Trade Agency, although it owed its 
origin to Louis Dane's fear o f Russian influence in the region. During the Younghusband 
Mission, Dane proposed combating Russian influence in Khotan by extending the Indian 
frontier across western Tibet to the Kuenlun range, a massive commitment which he must 
have known Whitehall would reject. But Dane appears to have been using what became a 
common 'forward school' policy-making tactic - advancing an extreme policy in order to 
obtain a lesser aim by compromise. When Viceroy A m pthill duly replied that ’HM 
Government would have a fit if  we proposed anything o f the kind', Dane promptly made a 
successful proposal for a trade mart in western Tibet. [10]
As I have discussed elsewhere, the Gartok Agency was created without adequate thought 
for its location and function, and it proved difficult to attract suitable candidates to the 
poorly paid post o f Trade Agent there. [11] The early Gartok Agents had neither personal 
knowledge of, nor influence on, policy and events in Central Tibet, and had no direct 
contact with the Political Officer Sikkim until after 1932. Thakur Jai Chand, the first Agent 
appointed there, was, however, given instructions as to his duties. He was to send 
government a weekly diary o f 'routes traversed...trade prospects and such political 
information as he may be able to gather'.[12]
But Dane's fears o f Russian influence in western Tibet never materialised, and no 
Chinese officials ever visited the region. As there was only local intelligence to be obtained 
in Gartok, it was o f little interest to the cadre; the Agency remained largely peripheral to the 
events with which we deal. The post mainly functioned as a Trade Agency, devoted to 
assisting Indian traders. Its comparative neglect is further evidence that the cadre's primary
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role in Tibet was political and diplomatic, and that they considered trade a low priority 
which could be dealt with by local employees.
The Trade Agents' duties were never defined. Bailey admitted in 1907 that 'I don't know 
whether I am cantonment magistrate or not', as 'everything is very unsettled'. This was not 
a situation unique to Tibet. As Gerald Morgan has observed, 'early Political Officers often 
suggested their own jobs '.[13] This absence of definition fitted the Politicals' belief that 
frontier officers needed the freedom to act on their own initiative, and that the right type of 
individual, once trained, could be relied upon to act correctly in the furtherance o f British 
interests. [14]
David Potter has shown that ICS officers, as 'trusted servants o f  the state, identifying 
themselves...with the values and interests o f those who em ployed them', fit Rener and 
Goldthorpe's models of'serv ice class' professional employees. They could be relied upon 
to act in accordance with 'the interests and values o f the organization' and, in return for the 
trust endowed in them, 'expected considerable independence and freedom...to...act as they 
thought best'. The model may be equally applied to the Tibet cadre. Cadre officers were 
relied upon to act consistently in the service o f their employer's values and interests, and, 
in return, expected 'proof that the Government o f India were prepared to support their 
officers when they necessarily incur responsibilities'.[15]
But how, in the absence o f orders, were the cadre to choose what was within their 
province, and how and why did they define their role as they did? In appointing O'Connor 
as Gyantse Trade Agent, Younghusband ensured that the foremost British position in Tibet 
was occupied by an officer whose views on Tibetan policy followed those o f Curzon and 
himself. O 'Connor's successor, Bailey, was trained to follow the same path, regularly 
receiving private advice from Younghusband and O'Connor. In Gangtok, Bell continued 
and refined these 'forward' policies.
Thus in the formative years o f the British presence in Tibet the officers there all 
represented the 'forward school' o f thinking on frontier policy. In creating a 'forward' role 
for themselves they were filling the role envisaged by their creators. The issues which the 
cadre identified as important were those left unresolved by the Younghusband Mission - in 
particular the question o f  British representation in Lhasa.
Different men, chosen from different backgrounds, might have identified other goals - 
perhaps Tibetan representation in India and abroad, or trade, or even unifying Tibet and 
China. The point o f such speculation is to show that British interests in Tibet by no means 
demanded the particular programmes promoted by the cadre; indeed their actions could be 
inconsistent with the policies o f Delhi and Whitehall.
The cadre's definition o f  their role reflected their mentality. Their upbringing, training
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and sense o f identity meant that they saw their role as Curzon and Younghusband intended; 
as diplomats representing the Government o f India, but also in the tradition o f frontier 
officials who were expected to advance British interests and position. Whitehall intended 
them to be overseers o f frontier trade, but as members o f  what was in effect India's 
diplomatic corps, the cadre defined their role within the identity and traditions o f that 
service. Information-gathering, which we examine in the next section, provides an example 
o f how this role developed.
SECTION 4.2: - ’INFORM ATION’ and INTELLIGENCE
Many aspects o f T ibetan politics were little-known to the British prior to the 
Younghusband Mission, and the systematic gathering o f political intelligence became a 
primary part o f the Tibet cadre's role, with paid informants used to gather information. I 
have previously examined how, during the period 1904-09, the Government o f India 
collected inform ation on Tibetan affairs from Tibet's neighbouring governm ents 
(particularly Nepal), and from missionaries on the Eastern Tibetan frontier. Other important 
news was obtained by the interception o f Chinese and Tibetan communications through the 
Indian telegraph system. In Tibet, cadre officers had informants at all levels o f society, and 
gathered news from European travellers and Indian traders. Intelligence gathering was thus 
recognised as an integral part o f  the Tibet cadre's duties.[16]
The National Archives o f India show that Trade Agents were provided with a regular 
Secret Service allowance to pay informants. In 1910, this allowance was greatly increased 
(from 200 to 1000 rupees per month in the case of Yatung), as 'the local people as well as 
passing travellers require to be bribed liberally in order to brave the risk o f being seen about 
this Agency by the Chinese'.[17]
Lists of the actual recipients o f these funds reveal the wide range o f informants used. 
Those listed naturally include those whose interests coincided with the British - the 
Nepalese representative in Gyantse (who received a regular monthly payment o f 50 
rupees). Indian traders, and Bhutanese officials. O'Connor, building on contacts he had 
established during the Younghusband M ission, extended this range o f  informants. 
Villagers were rewarded with one or two rupees, servants o f Lhasa officials and clerks at 
the Panchen Lama's monastery in Shigatse received 10-50 rupees. The Gyantse Jongpon’s 
clerk and a Gyantse monk were regular paid informants, and a number of other monks 
from leading monasteries throughout Lhasa and central Tibet also profited. Perhaps 
O'Connor's greatest success was in obtaining informants from the Chinese army, and there
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were also regular payments to a 'Chinese Agent from Lhasa'.[18]
Local agents who proved valuable were taken into regular cadre employment. For 
example, in 1912, A-chuk Tsering, who later accompanied Bell to Lhasa, was employed as 
a 'Secret Service Agent' at Ghoom under the District Commissioner Darjeeling, watching 
the movements o f two Japanese studying Tibetan language there. [19]
British travellers also received Secret Service payments. In 1914, the botanist Frank 
Kingdom-Ward received a token 50 rupee payment for his report on south-eastern Tibet, 
while new light is shed on the nature o f Bailey's travels by entries which reveal he received 
a substantial payment from Secret Service funds for his journey from Peking to Sadiya in 
1911.[20]
Hugh Richardson has claimed that information gathering in Tibet was 'done openly' and 
that 'there was no clandestine activity or the employment o f secret agents which are 
generally associated with the idea o f  spying'. But although there are no breakdowns of 
Secret Service expenditure in official records after 1909, there are private papers from later 
periods which show that Secret Service funds continued to be used to pay local informants. 
For example in 1944, Gyantse Trade Agent Mainprice refers to a 'Secret Service' payment 
o f 450 rupees. In addition, the Indian archive indexes confirm that what the Government of 
India themselves term ed 'Secret Agent(s)' were still used to report on Tibet in the 
1940s.[21]
Therefore, while British sources claim that, due to the open nature o f Tibetan aristocratic 
society, information was freely obtained in Lhasa, there was nevertheless an ongoing use 
o f 'secret agents' by the British throughout the period of their involvement in Tibet. Once 
the Tibet positions were established in an intelligence-gathering role there was no further 
need to articulate this role; the tradition had been established.
There was, however, a reorganisation o f intelligence gathering in the 1936-37 period, 
around the time when Gould and Richardson became respectively Political Officer Sikkim 
and Trade Agent Gyantse. The relevant archives remain classified, but it is possible to 
reconstruct the effect o f these changes from scattered references to intelligence on the north­
eastern frontier. [22] Much o f the responsibility for intelligence gathering in the region was 
apparently shifted from the Political Officer Sikkim to the Central Intelligence Officer in 
Shillong.
The Central Intelligence Bureau, which had been created by Curzon in April 1904, came 
under the Home Affairs Departm ent, although it liaised closely with the Political 
Department; after 1944 all telegrams concerning Tibetan affairs were copied to the Shillong 
office. This post was occupied during the 1940s by an Irish police officer, Eric Lambert, 
and after 1946 he was given an assistant based in Kalimpong with particular concern for
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Tibetan affairs. Lambert's chosen assistant was Lieutenant Lha Tsering, the son o f Bell's 
confidant, A-chuk Tsering. [23]
Lambert's office became an important influence on Tibetan policy in the '40s, but the 
close links between Lambert and the Political Officer Sikkim suggest they shared similar 
aims. For example, in September 1944, Lambert recommended an increase in government 
contributions to Tibetan monasteries, a policy which was enthusiastically followed by the 
cadre, as will be seen. [24]
The Government o f India may not have had a monopoly on clandestine British operations 
in Tibet. The foreign policy interests o f Whitehall and Delhi were not identical, and 
Whitehall may have used their own agents in Tibet. Certainly Whitehall took over the duty 
o f obtaining British intelligence in Tibet after 1947, with the British High Commission in 
Delhi suggesting likely avenues o f intelligence. [25]
SECTION 4.3: - CULTIVATING FRIENDSHIPS
The cadre's definition o f their duties followed Political Department guidelines, written 
and unwritten. The Department's 'Manual o f Instruction' stated that 'The first duty o f a 
Political Officer is to cultivate direct, friendly, personal relations with the Ruling Chiefs 
with whom he w orks.'[26] Through friendship, the cadre aimed to influence Tibet's 
leaders to follow policies favoured by the British. As Mrs W illiamson recalled, 'it was 
important that we get to know people, and...thereby be able to exert a positive influence on 
Tibet.'[27] The unwritten codes were those inculcated during officers' early training and 
service in Tibet, and these codes taught the cadre that their role was a 'forward' one, in 
which the establishment o f good relations with local rulers was an important means o f 
advancing British interests.
The withdrawal o f the Younghusband Mission from Tibet left a power vacuum which 
made it difficult for the Tibet cadre to identify suitable 'Ruling Chiefs' whom they might 
cultivate as supporters. Although the cadre had initially been prepared to work with the 
C hinese, as Y ounghusband had done, they found the C hinese 'unpleasant 
neighbours',[28] whose rule was neither effective, nor beneficial to British interests. China 
was nominally the suzerain power in Tibet, and was recognised as such by Whitehall, but 
the British positions in Tibet posed a threat to Chinese power and prestige in the region, 
and the Chinese, who considered Tibet part of their empire, sought to regain control there.
When China re-established a degree of control over Tibet in 1907-11, their presence 
threatened to destroy any effective British influence there, and, while Whitehall w;as
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prepared to sacrifice the Agencies in the interests o f wider international relations, the Tibet 
cadre sought to maintain and strengthen their position. As the Chinese were the main threat 
to the cadre, they became their enemy; there was no possibility o f  establishing close 
personal relations that might have assisted the tri-partite solution favoured by Whitehall. 
The result was that Tibet in the period 1904-47 was the setting for a struggle between 
British and Chinese agents for power and influence.
Having discounted the Chinese as suitable 'Ruling Chiefs' to befriend, the cadre were 
then faced with identifying suitable Tibetan leaders. This meant defining Tibet, an issue we 
deal with in Chapter Six, and identifying the rulers o f  this 'Tibet*. The one obvious 
candidate was the Dalai Lama, who was, theoretically at least, at the apex o f the Tibetan 
system o f theocratic government. But with the Dalai Lama in exile in Mongolia, Tibet was 
ruled by a Regent, the Abbot o f Ganden monastery.
The Regent, however, was an unsuitable ruler in British eyes. He was a religious leader, 
with neither knowledge of, nor interest in, worldly affairs. An alternative leader was 
needed, but the traditional Tibetan power structure was a complicated system o f 'checks 
and balances' which devolved the power o f the Dalai Lama among various monastic and 
aristocratic factions. The incarnation system also meant regular long periods o f rule by a 
Regent. The effects o f  this complex power structure were by no means immediately 
apparent to the British, and greatly complicated the search for leaders to cultivate. [29]
As Whitehall prevented their having any direct contact with Lhasa officials, the cadre's 
first choice as an alternative leader was the most powerful figure the cadre could contact, 
the Panchen Lama. He had an independent power structure at Shigatse, with his own court 
and officials, tax-paying territory, and even foreign policy. Significant numbers o f Tibetans 
regarded the Panchen, rather than the Dalai Lama, as their supreme sovereign in both the 
religious and secular realms. [30]
Soon after the opening o f the Gyantse Agency, O'Connor visited Shigatse where he (and 
subsequently Bailey), got on well with the Panchen Lama, a somewhat worldly figure of 
similar age to the Agents. The Lama was given various gifts, including modern rifles and a 
motor car, and in 1906 he was invited to India, where he was treated with great ceremony 
in (as was clearly stated) an attempt to impress him .[31]
In the immediate post-Younghusband period, before the Tibet cadre identified the 
Chinese as their enemy, Louis Dane had seen the Panchen Lama as a potential solution to 
the Tibetan problem. He considered that if  the Chinese replaced the Dalai Lama with the 
Panchen Lama, the British could then recognise Chinese authority in Tibet, as it would 
'effectively settle the unruly Tibetans and exclude Russian influence'. But while Dane 
sought details o f historical precedents concerning the Chinese deposition o f the 6th and 7th
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Dalai Lamas, he also considered the possibility that the Panchen Lam a 'may yet be an 
Indian Ruling Chief .[32]
Given Dane's close relationship with O'Connor, it was no surprise that the Gyantse 
Agent should promote a plan to centre British policy in Tibet around the Panchen Lama. In 
February 1907 O'Connor proposed that the Panchen Lama should be encouraged to declare 
his independence from Lhasa and create a separate state in southern Tibet, ruled from his 
Shigatse headquarters. Britain should then, O'Connor argued, recognise and support the 
new entity, which would act as a strong 'buffer state' for British India.[33]
Richardson states that this plan 'suggests that O'Connor was not fully in touch with the 
depths o f  Tibetan history and religious feeling'. Even at the tim e it aroused great 
opposition. Morley was 'horrified', White attempted to use it to engineer O 'Connor's 
dismissal, and the plan was never acted on.[34] But O'Connor's plan was consistent with 
'forward school' thinking. While Tibet was too large for Britain to protect militarily, a 
southern Tibetan state could have been supported, would have provided a forward position 
for British interests beyond the Himalayas, and had the potential to be drawn within the 
frontiers o f British India in due course.
O’Connor's perspective was limited, and wider geopolitical im plications (such as 
Russian and Chinese opposition) made it impossible for his government to support the 
plan. But O 'Connor acted before 'Tibet' was created by the British as a geographically 
determined state with fixed borders, and his relations with the Panchen Lama gave him a 
different perspective on Tibetan identity to that o f later cadre officers, who defined Tibet in 
accordance with the Dalai Lama's perspective.
The Panchen Lama certainly saw the advantages of a break-away. Bell, who met him in 
1906, wrote o f their meeting that, 'he opened his mind to me. He wanted to be independent 
o f Lhasa and to deal with the British Government as an independent State'.[35] The 
Panchen Lama's view o f Tibet as a state therefore, cannot be said to have coincided with 
that of the Dalai Lama, or of the cadre in later years.
Cadre support for the Panchen Lama was soon abandoned. They became preoccupied 
with holding their ground, and the Chinese prevented them from making personal contact 
with the Panchen Lama while they made their own efforts to court his favour. The Chinese 
offered the Lama the Regency in 1907, and persuaded him to stay in Lhasa for six months 
in 1911, and although ultimately he refused to accept secular power in Tibet, the 
unfortunate Panchen Lama lost the trust o f significant elements o f the Dalai Lama's 
supporters as a result o f these flirtations with foreign powers.
Although he corresponded with several cadre officers until the 1930s, the Panchen Lama 
also lost the trust o f the British as a result o f his dealings with the Chinese. In 1913 Bell
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rejected his request to be represented at the Simla Convention, noting that 'the sentiments 
o f the Tashi Lama and nearly all his court are o f pro-Chinese tendency', and it was to 
China that he went into exile in 1923.[36] His decline is an exam ple o f how contact 
between modern and traditional societies tended to bring about the collapse o f traditional 
structures because o f the modern societies' definition o f a state as ultimately ruled by a 
single entity, with whom they preferred to deal.
The Dalai Lama's flight to India in 1910 gave the cadre the chance to befriend the 
traditional Lhasa leadership. MacDonald earned the Dalai Lama's life-long trust by aiding 
his flight into exile, and once the Tibetan leader was in India, Bell successfully cultivated 
his friendship, becoming the Tibetans' most trusted foreign confidant. Bell encouraged the 
Dalai Lama to begin transforming Tibet into a modern nation-state, guided by British 
expertise in such matters as the development o f mining, improvement o f communications, 
and strengthening o f its armed forces.
As the British were forbidden by the 1907 Anglo-Russian convention from intervening in 
Tibetan internal affairs, Bell concealed the extent to which he guided these changes, but, 
while the Dalai Lama was open to other influences, there can be little doubt that Bell was 
the major influence on his thinking. Bell wrote that 'the Dalai Lama...has accepted all the 
opinions that I have given him, and has acted on them'.[37]
To avoid a charge o f  exceeding his instructions, Bell refers to giving advice in his 
'private capacity'; but it is doubtful the Tibetans recognised the difference. As with the 
'advice' given by Political Agents in Indian Princely States, it was clearly understood by 
the recipients as intended to be acted upon if  British support was to be obtained. In return 
for the Dalai Lama's acquiescence, Bell supported his rule, advancing policies based on 
support for the existing power structure in Tibet. In so doing he also created a powerful 
role for him self as the individual best able to deal with the Tibetan Government, a role his 
successors jealously guarded.[38]
SECTION 4.4: - A PERIOD OF DECLINE
After Bell's final retirement in 1921, a number o f problems arose in Anglo-Tibetan 
relations. Modernisation policies aroused conservative opposition within Tibetan monastic 
and aristocratic circles which proved too strong for the Dalai Lama to ignore. When Bailey 
took over as Political Officer Sikkim he had been out o f contact with central Tibetans for 
more than a decade, and had no close ties with their existing leaders; Bell having ignored 
the opportunity o f taking him to Lhasa.[39] As noted, Bailey also mistrusted Macdonald,
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and consequently was unable to make use of the then Gyantse and Yatung Trade Agent's 
experience in dealing with Tibetan opposition to modernisation. In addition, a number o f 
other incidents, such as McGovern's illicit visit to Lhasa, strained Anglo-Tibetan relations.
In the years since he had been at Gyantse, Bailey had made a name for himself. He had 
explored the eastern extremities o f the Brahmaputra, been shipwrecked off the China coast, 
and served at Gallipoli before being withdrawn from war service and sent on an intelligence 
mission to Tashkent to report on the situation as the Bolsheviks took control. Unlike Bell, 
Bailey's view o f a Political Officer's role was more orientated towards command than 
advice; M cGovern described how, in contrast to Bell, 'Bailey has followed the more 
ordinary lines o f British administrators, who believe it inconsistent with the maintenance o f 
dignity to pander too much to native ideas.'[40]
But Bailey was not lacking influential support. The appointment o f his former mentor, 
O'Connor, as British representative in Kathmandhu, and o f Lord Curzon as British 
Foreign Minister, strengthened his position. As Bailey lacked Bell's long friendship with 
the Dalai Lama, he attempted to cultivate his own contacts in Tibet's power structure and, 
given his military background, found natural allies in the newly emerging military forces in 
Tibet.
Tibet's growing military power was closely associated with Tsarong Shape, who rose 
from humble beginnings to became Commander-in-Chief o f the Tibetan Army in 1915. 
Tsarong had made his name commanding a small force which held o ff the Chinese army 
pursuing the Dalai Lama as he fled to exile in India in 1910, after which MacDonald had 
disguised him as a British mail-runner to enable him to escape to India. Tsarong was 
clearly an outstanding individual, a powerful figure in Lhasa politics who enjoyed a close 
relationship with the Dalai Lama. Tsarong was also exceptional in having a great interest in 
the world outside Tibet, and while British sources emphasise his ties with them, he was 
clearly equally interested in meeting other foreigners, for he befriended the Japanese 
travellers to Lhasa in the 1910-20 period, and in later years always met other foreign 
travellers to Lhasa. [41]
Bailey naturally identified Tsarong as a potential ally. Tsarong, however, lacked either a 
monastic or aristocratic power base, and his main supporters, army officers who had been 
trained by the Gyantse Escort Commander or at Quetta Military College, were suspected by 
conservative Tibetans of having adopted European values.
With his government still reluctant to allow its officers access to Lhasa, Bailey faced a 
problem in establishing close ties with Tsarong. In 1922 he managed, apparently without 
the support o f the Government o f India, to arrange for General George Pereira, a former 
military attache at the British Legation in Peking, to visit Lhasa en route from Peking to
India. Although officially described as a ’private traveller1, Pereira met Tsarong in Lhasa 
and sent Bailey detailed reports on Tibetan military forces, recommending that to organise 
their army 'it is absolutely necessary to send a military advisor to Tsarong'.[42]
In Lhasa, Pereira obviously exerted some influence on the Tibetan Government to follow 
Bell's earlier recommendation that a police force be established in Lhasa. The day after 
Pereira left Lhasa the Tibetans asked the Government o f India to lend them the services of 
Laden La to establish and train the Lhasa police.[43] This request gave Bailey the chance to 
develop ties with Tsarong.
Bailey certainly knew that Whitehall would not sanction posting a British military officer 
at Lhasa, but Laden La was an experienced police and intelligence officer. He was trusted 
by the Tibetans, and had recently been in Lhasa with Bell. Just as in 1903, when Curzon 
had recognised that the distinction between a 'political' and a 'trade' agent was not 
'mutually exclusive',[44] Bailey realised Laden La could fill a dual role. Bailey therefore 
persuaded his government that it was of'great political importance' that Laden La be sent to 
Lhasa. So keen were government to use Laden La that he was able to demand promotion to 
Superintendent as a condition o f acceptance, although there were no vacancies at that rank, 
and a special position had to be created for him. [45]
Laden La reached Lhasa in September 1923 and established a 200-man police force. He 
also established close ties with Tsarong and occupied a central role in subsequent events, 
the exact nature o f which remains unresolved. In May 1924, a fight between police and 
soldiers ended with Tsarong punishing two soldiers by mutilation, as a result o f which one 
died. M utilation had been forbidden by the Dalai Lama, and Tsarong’s monastic and 
aristocratic opponents sought to use this incident to engineer his dismissal. Tsarong’s 
supporters, including Laden La, sought to preserve his position.[46]
Laden La became involved in what was apparently a half-formed plot to transfer secular 
power from the Dalai Lama to Tsarong Shape. Had it succeeded, Bailey, who was setting 
out for Lhasa at this time, could have arrived in Lhasa to be greeted by a new Tibetan 
Government headed by Tsarong. But the plot was not carried through, and the full 
implications o f these events was not brought out by Bailey's reports at the time. It was 
several years before somewhat contradictory versions o f the story emerged in private 
correspondence.
Bailey visited Lhasa between 16 July and 16 August 1924. There he spent much o f  his 
time in discussions with Tsarong. Bailey's report reveals that he asked Tsarong what 
would happen if the Dalai Lama died, perhaps a rather curious question given that he was 
apparently in good health. Tsarong replied that if  the Government o f  India sent troops it 
would stop any trouble, but Bailey warned him that his government would not interfere in
Tibet's internal affairs. Bailey also advised Tsarong to deposit money in India in case he 
had to flee into exile. [47]
Bailey's departure from Lhasa was the signal for a series o f events which greatly reduced 
British prestige in Tibet. The struggle between the 'conservative' and 'modernising' 
tendencies in Tibetan society culminated in defeat for those favouring modernisation. Laden 
La left Lhasa on 9 October 1924 and the police force lost all power. Tsarong conveniently 
left Tibet on a pilgrimage to India around the same time, and was removed from his post as 
Army Commander on his return. In Tsarong's absence his young military supporters were 
down-graded, and a number o f other events in this period (such as the closure o f the 
Gyantse school), illustrated the decline in the British position. In the late 1920s there were 
indications that the Dalai Lama was again turning to China or Russia for support, as the 
concluding years o f Bailey's term in Sikkim saw Anglo-Tibetan relations at a low ebb. [48] 
The decline in Anglo-Tibetan relations at this time has been blamed on a number o f 
causes. Ira Klein has emphasised the wider decline in British power in the East at this time. 
Other observers have blamed the British failure to supply Tibet with further weaponry, or 
to obtain Chinese agreement to the Simla Convention. But, as the leading studies o f this 
period have all dismissed any suggestion o f British involvement in a plot to depose the 
Dalai Lama, the events involving Laden La have not been seen as significantly affecting 
Anglo-Tibetan relations, although that would have gone a long way towards explaining the 
British decline.[49]
Richardson does not refer to the incident at all, but, in connection with Chinese 
accusations o f British support for 'militaristic lay officials who wanted to substitute some 
form o f civil government for the Lama hierarchy' in the 1930s (allegations which may 
reflect their belated awareness of earlier events), he states that 'to suggest that the British 
Government would assist such a group-if it existed-[sic]...is...inept'.[50]
Lamb, while noting rumours of a conspiracy between Laden La and Tsarong Shape, is 
content to note that there is 'not a vestige o f evidence' for this in the India Office Library 
records. Goldstein, surveying these events, writes that ’Ladenla[sic] was an Indian official, 
and it would have been unreasonable to assume he acted without orders or at least official 
encouragement'; but footnotes this statement with the contradictory remark that 'This is. 
however, precisely what happened.'[51]
There is no doubt as to Laden La's involvement, although details o f his role took some 
time to emerge. The Gyantse Khenchung, apparently at the Dalai Lama's behest, informed 
Norbhu Dhondup in 1926 that Laden La had been involved in a plot against the Dalai 
Lama, allegations which Gyantse school-teacher Frank Ludlow accepted as true. Then 
when Bailey was on leave in 1927, the Khenchung  gave Trade Agent Williamson (who
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was acting as Political Officer Sikkim during Bailey's absence), a full account o f the 
incident. The Government o f India also accepted that Laden La was involved, judging from 
the National Archives o f India restricted file on this matter titled 'Indiscretion o f Laden La 
in associating with Tibetan officers attempting to overthrow the Dalai Lama.'[52]
The Government o f India's treatment o f Laden La after the incident is instructive. Far 
from censuring him, they promoted him to Trade Agent in Yatung, but the posting was 
cancelled after the Dalai Lama, who now deeply mistrusted Lade La, wrote to Norbhu 
Dhondup objecting to the appointment as 'he [Laden La] is not altogether a steady and 
straight-forward man and it is not known how he would serve to maintain Anglo-Tibetan 
am ity.'[53]
When Laden La left Lhasa, ostensibly suffering from a nervous breakdown, he took six 
months' leave, and then resumed his post, continuing to be regarded as a valuable Agent, 
sent to Lhasa 'on special duty' whenever the need arose. Bailey strongly supported Laden 
La. He originally argued that the Khenchung's account was 'inconceivable', and when he 
finally advised his government that Laden La had indeed 'certainly committed a serious 
indiscretion' stated that he hoped no action would be taken against him: none was.[54]
Has previous scholarship been correct in rejecting any British involvement in this plot? 
Bailey was one o f the outstanding intelligence agents o f his time. An illustration o f this is 
that his disguise in Tashkent had been so good that he was hired by the Cheka  (the 
forerunner o f the KGB) to find the British agent (Bailey himself), they knew was in the 
area. There must be considerable doubt that such an officer would be ignorant o f the 
activities o f his own key agent in a crucial post. [5 5]
Circumstantial evidence points to a 'plot'; we cannot necessarily expect empirical 
evidence. An experienced intelligence operator such as Bailey would naturally conceal 
evidence o f a failed coup attempt if  he could. The reporting o f events in Tibet was largely 
controlled by the Political Officer Sikkim, and Bailey apparently took full advantage o f his 
power to restrict government's knowledge o f the matter.
Viewed from the perspective we obtain from knowledge o f the cadre mentality, the events 
o f this period can be seen to follow' a logical sequence which provides a convincing 
hypothesis to explain the events o f the time and the subsequent decline in Anglo-Tibetan 
relations. Bailey had apparently come to the conclusion that the only way to modernise 
Tibet to the extent where it would provide a secure northern border for India was by 
establishing a secular government in Tibet under Tsarong Shape's leader-ship. Bailey was 
seriously concerned about the possibility o f Bolshevik subversion in Tibet, and the 
traditional Tibetan leadership cannot have seemed likely to be capable o f resisting 
determined Russian infiltration.[56]
Pereira's reports must have been a significant influence on Bailey; it is clear from the way 
in which Bailey arranged permission for him to travel freely in areas normally closed to 
travellers that he had an im portant role. M acDonald, who was not then in Bailey's 
confidence, makes the unusual comment on Pereira's travels that, 'Whether his last journey 
was inspired by motives other than exploration and the desire to be the first European to 
reach Lhasa from the Chinese side I do not know, nor did he tell m e.'[57]
In sending Laden La to encourage Tsarong, Bailey had an agent whose actions he could 
disown officially if  they failed, while rewarding him later for his efforts. There is o f 
course, the possibility that Laden La acted on his own initiative, in the tradition his 
'forward' thinking superiors had inculcated in him. But Laden La was not officially 
attached to the Political Department at this time, and had he been involved in a foreign 
conspiracy without significant support from higher British officers it is hard to believe he 
could have escaped dismissal from government service.
O'Connor, then in Kathmandhu, may also have been involved in this plan. Bailey was in 
close touch with him at that time, and hopes for Tsarong's leadership echo O'Connor's 
earlier plans for the Panchen Lama. Bailey’s plan, like O 'Connor's, was a typically 
'forward' manoeuvre, aimed at tying Tibet more closely to British India and excluding 
Russian influence, while also serving to place Bailey in the position Bell had obtained, o f 
being a close friend and advisor to a Tibetan ruler.
Bailey knew he could not expect his government to approve the overthrow of the Tibetan 
Government, but that if  it succeeded, with British involvement concealed, they would 
accept it. Under Tsarong, modernisation on the British model could then proceed, with 
British 'advisors' ensuring Russian influence was excluded. The subsequent attitude o f the 
Dalai Lama may also be consistent with the existence o f a plot. At first he would have had 
no real proof o f British involvement, but he may gradually have come to suspect its full 
extent. Certainly he later distanced him self from the British, and withdrew his support for 
British-sponsored modernisation, exploring alternative avenues o f  support for his regime 
along lines less liable to arouse monastic opposition or to create a secular alternative to his 
rule.
Bailey's plan, if such it was, failed for two reasons, both o f which also applied to 
O'Connor's earlier plans for the Panchen Lama. Firstly the policy and financial restrictions 
imposed by government meant Bailey was unable to offer real support to the 'modernising' 
faction in the form o f military assistance, which would have been decisive. Secondly. 
Tsarong, like the Panchen Lama, was apparently unwilling to take the decisive step o f 
declaring his claim for power. While this failure by the Panchen Lama has been blamed on 
the weakness o f his character, no such accusation can be leveled against Tsarong. Rather it
appears that his loyalty to the Dalai Lam a was too strong for him to turn against his 
benefactor, and Tsarong knew that even if  the Dalai Lama died he lacked sufficient support 
to take over Tibet without British military assistance. Tsarong consequently chose to go on 
a pilgrimage to India rather than challenge for power.[58]
The events of this period gave the Tibet cadre greater understanding of the Tibetans. They 
did not make the mistake again o f allying with a faction o f Tibetan society at the expense of 
others. As Richardson later wrote
descriptions o f this or that official...as "pro-British", "pro-Chinese"..
[are]..too facile. The only thing the Tibetans have been "pro" is the 
preservation o f their Religious State. [59]
Support for the Tibetan army was to be finally abandoned as a realistic option after a 
dam ning report by Brigadier-General Neame, after his visit to Lhasa in 1936. He 
concluded that
the Tibetans...are absolutely unmilitary, all their thoughts and energies are 
devoted to their religious life. The Tibetan Government have absolutely no 
idea o f military organisation, administration or training ....The troops are 
untrained, unreliable and unpopular. [60]
SECTION 4.5: - SEEKING NEW MEANS OF INFLUENCE
After the decline in relations with Tibet in the 1920s, an atmosphere o f  suspicion 
persisted when Weir visited Lhasa in 1930; Tsarong, who was still an influential figure in 
Lhasa, prudently kept his distance. However, Weir had a budget o f 15,000 rupees for 
presents to Tibetan officials, an increase o f  5,000 rupees from the allowance for the Bailey 
Mission. He diplomatically avoided raising several controversial issues (such as the Dalai 
Lama's recent contacts with China), and worked steadily at improving relations. He was 
assisted socially by the presence of his wife, and in discussions with the Kashag  by his 
government's agreement to allow Tibet supplies o f cheap silver. Weir was also careful, in 
the manner of Bell, to follow Tibetan etiquette.[61]
By the time Weir visited Lhasa again in 1932, Tibetan and Chinese forces had again 
clashed on the eastern border, and Tibet was now anxious to obtain British support. There 
were signs that they were reviving the stalled process o f modernisation and there was an
optimistic tone to the cadre's reports in this period. The more considered and sympathetic 
approach o f  Weir, and his successor Williamson, appeared to revive good relations with 
Lhasa's ruling elite.[62]
The Dalai Lama's death in December 1933 meant that relations with the Tibetan 
leadership required a new focus. This took some time to emerge. The British realised that 
'the time has gone by when the maintenance o f British interests in regard to Tibet depended 
mainly on contacts with a few individuals and pre-eminently with one'.[63]
In Lhasa, amidst an on-going struggle for power and influence, a young incarnate lama 
from Reting was appointed Regent. The Reting Regent appeared to view the British 
favourably, and invited Williamson to visit him, but British influence in Tibet at this crucial 
juncture was weakened when (as will be seen in Chapter Five) Williamson died in Lhasa.
When Basil Gould took over in Sikkim, a new era in Anglo-Tibetan relations began. He 
had firm support from Indian Foreign Secretary O laf Caroe for a more actively 
interventionist policy in response to the establishment o f a Chinese Mission in Lhasa, and 
an able assistant in Hugh Richardson, who quickly progressed from Trade Agent Gyantse 
to Head o f M ission Lhasa. He also promoted the experienced Norbhu Dhondup to the 
reactivated Yatung Agency, and Norbhu also headed the Lhasa M ission in Richardson’s 
absence.
The focus o f  British efforts in Tibet was now on Lhasa, where a body o f men 
experienced in Tibetan affairs had unrestricted access to all levels o f  Tibetan society. The 
Gyantse Agency was reduced to little more than a staging post for Lhasa, and the Agents 
there had little significant input in policy.[64] Only Captain Saker o f the later Gyantse 
Agents showed signs o f being suitable for promotion to the higher cadre posts.
With the establishment of the Lhasa Mission the cultivation of contacts among the Tibetan 
leadership proceeded unhindered. Richardson developed new contacts with Tibet's 
monastic power structure, and with religious functionaries, such as the State Oracle, who 
had an influential place in Tibetan society. Richardson proved an expert at those aspects o f 
his duty 'which are not exactly work, although they are apt to consume a good deal o f  
energy and patience', and as a result o f these contacts he and Gould developed a greater 
understanding o f Tibetan society7 than any officers since Bell and Macdonald. [65]
The purpose o f establishing good relations with 'Ruling Chiefs' was of course to 
persuade them to act in accordance with British aims. Meanwhile China's agents sought 
Tibetan support for Chinese aims. Both sides sought to exclude the other's influence (an 
aim which did not coincide with their status as World War Two allies), and thus there was 
a constant battle for ascendancy in Lhasa between the British and Chinese representatives. 
The British and Chinese in Lhasa did co-operate in 1942 to persuade the Regent to allow
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the Trans-Tibet Transport system to be established, but the norm al state o f relations 
between them was described by Robert Ford. He later recalled that when he reached Lhasa 
towards the end o f the war, he
was shocked at the mutual m istrust and hostility between British and 
Chinese...I had thought o f as gallant allies....I could hardly believe we had 
been waging a cold war with them in Lhasa all the time.[66]
Although the cadre succeeded in gaining the friendship o f many Tibetans, who did seek 
and follow British advice,[67] in the face o f  the Chinese threat a more powerful weapon 
was needed in the struggle for influence.
The British had always followed the local custom o f presenting gifts when visiting 
important Tibetans. The offering o f gifts to a host, or social superior, was part o f Tibetan 
tradition. This gift-giving was highly ritualised, objects retained gift status, being received 
and then passed on. The British quickly adapted to this system, offering gifts to their 
supporters. White was so generous in giving modern weapons to various Tibetan officials 
that he was censured for failing to consider the potential threat these weapons offered to the 
British. [6 8]
After the Younghusband Mission a street-song in Lhasa recorded that:
At first they speak o f "Foes o f  our True Faith";
And next the cry is "Foreign Devildom";
But when they see the foreign money bags,
We hear o f "Honourable Englishmen". [69]
Charles Bell, finding his efforts to persuade his government to supply arms to Tibet were 
unsuccessful, took 30,000 rupees with him to Lhasa to present to various influential 
Tibetans.[70] The extent to which Bell's generosity assisted his success is difficult to 
gauge; Bell naturally downplayed this aspect in his reports, but under Gould direct financial 
payment to influential individuals became an increasingly important aspect o f the cadre's 
efforts to influence the Tibetans.
Charles Bell's influence is clearly apparent in many o f Gould's policies at this time. 
Gould, who had been away from Tibet for more than twenty years when he was posted to 
Gangtok, went to considerable trouble to correspond with Bell without the knowledge o f 
the government by routing this correspondence through one o f Macdonald's daughters. 
Bell had recognised the possibilities o f buying support; in 1914 he described how arms
sales 'will give us a good hold over the Government o f Tibet'.[71]
The Chinese had also traditionally made cash payments to Tibetan monasteries as part of 
their religious policies (although the political implications were clear), but these cash 
payments or benefits to individuals, whether by the Chinese or the British, appear to have 
been outside the traditional ethical limits of this system of exchange.
The arrival o f the Chinese Mission in Lhasa in 1934 brought a new urgency to the cadre's 
efforts to cultivate supporters. There was an increasing emphasis on paying influential 
elements o f Tibetan society in return for their support. This policy was implicit rather than 
articulated, and, lacking financial support from their government, the cadre had to create 
their own source o f funds 'to keep the Tibetans happy'. [72]
In 1936-37, Gould gave cash paym ents to Lhasa monasteries and ’certain o f the 
officials'. By the 1940s, Lhasa Mission reports detail regular payments to Tibetan officials 
and institutions. These proved effective, at least in the short term. Sherriff found his 
reception at Sera monastery was 'markedly friendly' after he had given the Abbots 700 
rupees. When the Drepung Abbots called on the British Mission for the first time in 
N ovem ber 1942, Ludlow was in no doubt as to the reason for their visit, 'All this o f 
course' he wrote, 'is due to the sum o f money that has recently been placed at my disposal 
for distribution among monasteries.'[73]
The long term results were less certain. Richardson, in 1946, reported that 'Drepung is 
still aloof and that 'the monasteries...have always been comparatively inaccessible to 
social contacts and impervious to the small contacts that are possible'. But the M ission 
Reports o f  1947 indicate that 'Kogbo Khamtsen' college was their 'protecting college' at 
Drepung, while at Sera two colleges claimed the privilege, and both were given 'a special 
present’.[74]
It was clearly stated that the continuance o f these gifts 'depends on the maintenance o f a 
friendly attitude on the part of the Tibetan Government', and payments were withheld when 
this was in doubt. After the English school, established in Lhasa in 1944, was closed by 
conservative elements o f the Tibetan Government, Gould vetoed Sherriff s plan to donate 
20,000 rupees to the monasteries at the annual Monlam festival.[75]
In the absence o f any other effective policy weapon, payments to individual Tibetans 
became the central pillar of the cadre's policy towards Tibet. This was never officially 
articulated, and has passed largely unnoticed by historians. The policy was essentially 
reactive, following the Chinese use o f funds in much greater amounts for the same 
purpose, but its great weakness was that it brought no benefit to Tibet as a whole. 
Individuals profited, but the Tibetan state remained starved o f funds. It also acted to the 
detriment o f Tibet's moral climate, as will be seen. As Richardson later observed 'A good
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deal o f money flowed into Tibet during the war years, but it fell into individual hands and 
did not do any good to the country.'[76]
The use o f  British payments to the Tibetans is placed in a different perspective by the fact 
that the Chinese made similar, and larger payments; British sources record the Chinese 
giving the Lhasa monasteries 80,000 rupees in December 1943. But in the later war years 
the British were able to supply items like kerosene and sugar which neither Chinese nor 
Tibetans could obtain. They also offered customs exemptions on goods imported through 
India, a significant saving for Lhasa aristocrats, whose lifestyle relied on imports from 
China and India. [77]
In the 1940s, cadre officers also proved more adept at selecting gifts which would appeal 
to the young Dalai Lama. While Chinese representatives gave him traditional gifts o f 
carpets and silks, the British gave toys such as a pedal-car, picture books, and a bycycle, 
which naturally found greater favour with the boy, who was 'always excited and happy' 
when he heard that British officials were coming to visit him .[78]
Arthur Hopkinson found a means to finance increased payments following Lambert's 
1944 proposal to augment contributions to Tibetan monasteries. He formed a syndicate for 
the procurem ent o f cotton cloth in Bombay and sold it under licence to Tibetans in 
Kalimpong. Licences to procure cloth under this system were then allocated to Tibetans 'on 
account of.[their]..supposed position or supposed political usefulness past or future'.[79] 
The licences were transferable, which meant that the recipients could immediately sell 
them to established traders at a considerable profit. Richardson was 'constantly being 
besieged by people who wanted a quota'. He recalls that 'Hopkinson also quite unofficially 
took a proportion o f the profits somehow...and established a Tibetan "cess" fund,..and 
then we used that "cess" fund for keeping the Tibetans happy'. Apparently the only time 
this fund was referred to in official records was when it ended in 1947, with the balance of 
the 'cess' fund. 1 1,398 rupees, being deposited with the Tibetan Government in order that 
an annual payment o f one tvcmgka per monk could be made from the interest. [80] 
Hopkinson’s explanation of the purpose o f the quota system policy was that
through the system o f cloth procurement...we have deliberately set out to 
demonstrate to the Tibetans the economic and commercial advantages of the 
connection with India; in order that, when changes should come, the 
economic and commercial bonds should hold firm.[81]
Although the British were withdrawing from government in India, the aims o f 
H opkinson's policy were fundam entally consistent with the aim s o f Curzon and
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Younghusband - to draw Tibet into the Indian sphere. But, in this report, Hopkinson 
introduced a note o f moral caution. He observed that 'The Trans-Tibet Transport system 
(which we imposed on [an] at first unwilling Tibet at the instance o f China)... created a get- 
rich-quick atmosphere that tended to debauch and demoralise Tibetans'.[82]
This was not the only reference to a decline in the moral climate o f Tibet at that time. It 
may have been typical o f the Tibetan system that in the absence o f a ruling Dalai Lama there 
was a decline in the spiritual emphasis in society, but this was greatly accentuated by 
British and Chinese rivalry. The two Regents in the 1933-48 period were themselves open 
to bribery, and as R ichardson reported in the 1940s 'govt.[sic] here is rather 
uncouth...most o f them heavily involved in trade...under pressure o f  Chinese bribery'. 
British sources describing the colourful social life of the Tibetan aristocracy in the 1933-48 
period can be read as a discourse on spiritual decline and aristocratic decadence which 
offers a great contrast to the expected image o f a theocratic society. The British certainly 
contributed to this decline through their policy o f profiting individuals, as did the Chinese, 
to the ultimate benefit o f  the Chinese Communists. [83]
A decline was also apparent among the British. In 1946-47, the Chinese Communist 
threat had yet to emerge fully, and the cadre were primarily concerned to train their Indian 
successors for the usual struggle for influence vis-a-vis the Chinese in Lhasa. But it was 
now obvious that there was little future for the imperial presence in the East, and, while 
Richardson was young and energetic, older officers who had not had leave during the war 
were 'worn out'. Gould had remained at his post for too long, and suffered a mental and 
physical decline. Hopkinson wrote that 'Everything seems to held together by a bootlace, 
and all the people I should normally rely on are either going potty or taking to drink or 
opium or [are] otherwise incapacitated.'[84]
CO NCLU SIO NS
The British cadre officers were not given official instructions on their duties and aims in 
Tibet. They were free to define their own role, a freedom they considered appropriate; as 
Bell stated, 'We should not allow the administration of our Agencies in Tibet to become too 
rigid, too bureaucratic.'[85]
The cadre created a role based on models such as Sandeman, with his 'forward' policies 
in Baluchistan, and their 'founding fathers' Curzon and Y ounghusband. Following 
Political Department instructions and traditions, priority was given to cultivating the 
friendship of Tibet's rulers, in order to gain their support. The search for supporters
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continued throughout the 1904-47 period, as deeper levels o f authority were identified and 
befriended by cadre officers, who were also aware o f  the need to identify and maintain 
alternative supporters in case established allies proved unsuitable to British interests. The 
British accordingly kept contact with the Panchen Lama after establishing close ties with the 
Dalai Lama.
The identification o f suitable supporters implied related judgments about the traditional 
society, how it was constituted and over what area its authority extended. Thus in the 
period in which O'Connor cultivated the Panchen Lama's support, cadre definitions o f 
Tibetan territory and 'traditional’ authority differed from those in the period in which the 
Dalai Lama’s support was cultivated.
After potentially supportive elements o f local society were identified, they, or the interests 
they represented, were offered inducements for their support. In India, titles, salutes and 
other symbols o f  power were bestowed on British allies. Outside India, recognition o f a 
state's independent status, and diplomatic, financial and military support for that status, 
were the ultimate British gift, and implied personal rewards for British allies in the new 
state. Thus the cadre offered the D alai Lama support for T ibetan aspirations to 
independence from China. While their government prevented them from offering any 
significant practical support, the cadre were usually able to provide the Tibetans with just 
enough supplies o f weapons and diplomatic assistance in their struggle with China to retain 
the support o f significant elements o f the Dalai Lama's Government.
There was a tension in British India between the tendency to intervene in the affairs o f 
states to protect British interests, and the desire to protect the traditional ruling and social 
structures o f states, the collapse o f which might lead to further problems requiring British 
intervention. Both o f these tendencies ultimately depended on co-operation from local 
power elites; thus it is generally held that 'British policies were all in a sense variations on 
the theme o f control through collaboration.'[86]
Non-intervention in their internal affairs was one reward offered to co-operative Indian 
Princes. Intervention was in any case, as Copland has shown in regard to the western 
Indian states, overwhelmingly in support o f the existing rulers, whom the British saw as 
'natural' leaders, whose rule was most able to ensure social stability. Intervention within 
India's external frontiers actually became increasingly common as a result of the imperial 
process o f administrative centralisation, and the growth o f structures across India.[87] 
However, intervention became increasingly rare in the areas outside India's external 
frontiers.
We may apply to the Tibet cadre Fieldhouse's conclusion that
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It was an almost invariable rule that those Europeans sent to take control of 
new colonies felt that their own reputations and careers would be enhanced 
by success in expanding the effective authority o f their parent state. [88]
But while that was how they felt, the conclusions which Fieldhouse and others have 
reached concerning the 19th century - that the frontiersmen generated formal imperialism 
when 'collaboration' between the colonial power and the local elites collapsed - cannot be 
sustained in regard to Tibet in the 20th century.
The cadre did not live in an era when they could rely on government intervention to attain 
their aims. They had to rely on their cultivation o f local allies to ensure that Tibet followed 
their 'advice'. This policy failed in the 1905-10 and 1923-24 periods and the cadre did then 
attempt to promote policies directly aimed at expanding British authority. But they were 
unable to impose these policies in the face o f Delhi's reluctance, and Whitehall's refusal, to 
sanction any extension o f British involvement in Tibet. Thus the predominant strategy of 
the Tibet cadre was Bell's policy o f support for the Dalai Lama; although these occasions 
showed that, had they had government support, the cadre’s role might have veered from 
'advisor' to 'empire builder'.
Just as ruling structures o f  the Indian Princely States which had allied with the British 
survived almost intact when the imperial power withdrew in 1947, so too did much o f the 
traditional Tibetan power structure. This supports the conclusion that policies o f 
collaboration with traditional elites tended to prevent the political and social modernisation 
o f indigenous societies, whose structures prevented progress. [89]
So closely did the cadre identify with Tibet's traditional rulers that a threat to that system 
was seen as a threat to the cadre's own position. Modernising elements in Tibetan society 
in the 1940s were generally regarded by the British as Chinese sympathisers, and Tibetan 
dissidents in India were deported back to Tibet. It was Tibetan conservatives who were 
now seen as patriotic opponents of the Chinese. [90] Modernisation was only encouraged to 
the extent that it could be undertaken without threatening the position o f British supporters.
Direct financial payment to individuals was not a normal policy o f the Government o f 
India, although official subsidies were paid to ruling chiefs on the North-West Frontier and 
in the Persian Gulf. But the Tibet cadre were able to generate their own funds through the 
sale o f cloth quotas, and during the 1935-46 period, gifts o f cash, or privileges o f great 
cash value, became the principal reward to British supporters. Yet there was doubt as to 
value o f this policy. As one British observer noted 'If there's one thing you can't do it is 
bribe a Tibetan, you can give them as much gold and silver as you like, but they will look 
at you [as if to say] "You can't buy me".'[91]
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This view is supported by the lack o f evidence for these gifts actually influencing the 
Tibetans to change their policies in line with British interests. For example, they continued 
to object to British Indian control o f Tawang. But it would appear that the policy was 
continued due to the absence o f any effective alternative, although it may be that it was 
successful in assuring the flow o f information from Tibet, the importance o f which is 
largely implicit, rather than articulated, in the sources.
The policy o f direct cash payments to Tibetan institutions and individuals was a symbol 
o f  the cadre's impotence. Far from being the ’motor o f  imperial expansion’ that Yapp 
describes Political agents as being in the early part of the 19th century, the frontiersmen in 
mid 20th century Tibet were reduced to acting as a rather ineffectual brake on the imperial 
’retreat to the centre'. As Yapp notes, the Politicals’ ability to initiate policy decreased 
steadily in the late 19th century, as improved communications enabled government to 
increase its control over the periphery.[92]
By the 1930s, any possibility of British rule being extended into Tibet had ended, and the 
cadre were unable to obtain any significant support for their plans to strengthen Tibet. 
Despite their best efforts, Tibet was abandoned by Whitehall. 19th century models thus 
cannot be applied to India's north-east frontier after Curzon's departure, for the imperial 
high tide had passed.
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CHAPTER FIVE
'WE COULD RUN THE WHOLE SHOW ’: 
PROMOTING POLICY: THE LHASA M ISSION
INTR O D U CTIO N
Although stationing a British representative in Lhasa was a primary goal o f Curzon's 
Tibetan policy, Whitehall refused to sanction this on grounds o f cost and security. After the 
Younghusband Mission left Lhasa, cadre officers were prevented by their own government 
from visiting the Tibetan capital, but they considered that if  the cadre was to have any real 
influence in Tibet they needed access to Lhasa. The frequency with which the cadre raised 
the issue o f  access to Lhasa, and the emphasis they placed on it, indicates that they 
considered this the most important problem they faced.
In this chapter, I will examine how the cadre succeeded in establishing a permanent 
position in Lhasa, in order to demonstrate how they made successful use o f  the limited 
means at their disposal to promote a change in policy. I have also briefly examined two 
contrasting issues which demonstrate why the issue o f representation in Lhasa remained a 
priority, while other issues were neglected, or abandoned after a period o f emphasis.
The various models o f imperial expansion, proposed by Fieldhouse, Robinson and 
Gallagher and so on, have not been applied in regard to Tibet. Yet the cadre's promotion of 
access to Lhasa was a 'forward' policy, which created the potential for drawing Tibet into 
the British Empire. Efforts to establish representation in Lhasa may therefore be considered 
within the wider framework of imperial motives.
We have seen in the previous chapter that the cadre created a role which developed the 
policies initiated by Curzon and Younghusband. The issues which they identified as 
important were those left unresolved by, or arising from, the Younghusband Mission. The 
goals which the early cadre officers identified were passed on to their successors, and later 
cadre officers continued the effort to obtain access to, or preferably representation in, 
Lhasa; this became the main priority o f the 'men on the spot'. Their role in this issue can be
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followed through three stages: (1) attempts to gain access to Lhasa in the period 1904- 
1920, (2) regular missions to Lhasa during the period 1921-1936, and, (3) the permanent 
British Mission in Lhasa 1937-47, and ensuring its continuance.
SECTION 5.1: - CONTRASTING APPROACHES TO SIM ILAR ISSUES
Before dealing with our main theme o f representation in Lhasa, it is instructive to 
consider briefly two other issues, arms supplies to Tibet and improvements in Tibet's 
roads, which demonstrate contrasting approaches to policy formation by the cadre.
If  Tibet was to act as 'buffer state', it required a well trained and well equipped army. 
The cadre sought to ensure this by arranging weapons and training for the Tibetan army. 
After rifles supplied by the Government o f India in 1914 enabled the Tibetans to defeat 
Chinese forces in fighting along the Eastern Tibetan border in 1917-18, arms supplies to 
Tibet became a major issue.[l]
This issue was originally seen by the cadre as one in which they could obtain concrete 
assistance for Tibet, and improve Anglo-Tibetan ties while enhancing the ultimate goal of 
security for India's northern border. Thus they promoted arms sales to Tibet at every 
opportunity. [2] But it became increasingly apparent that there was no realistic prospect of 
the Tibetan army ever becoming a strong enough force to resist foreign intervention. While 
arms sales continued into the 1940s, the increased knowledge o f Tibet gained by the cadre 
resulted in a change o f policy; after Neame's report in 1936 they ceased to promote the 
prospect o f Tibet's army being made a significant force. [3]
One potentially significant issue which the cadre downplayed, was the question o f road- 
building. Historically, Tibet was isolated from India by the Himalayas, which provided a 
barrier to large scale trans-border traffic. British attempts to establish regular trade and 
com munications with Tibet, and to encourage its gradual modernisation through the 
introduction o f imported technology and expertise, required improving roads to. and 
within, Tibet.
Under Article Five o f the 1904 Anglo-Tibetan Convention, the Tibetans were to maintain 
roads leading to the trade marts.[4] But they saw little benefit in this, fearing that improved 
access would hasten the introduction o f foreign ideas, threatening the traditional fabric of 
Tibetan society. They also quoted a proverb describing the British as the 'road-builders of 
Tibet', with the implication that when the British had built these roads, others would use 
them to Tibet's detriment.[5]
The cadre tried to encourage the Tibetans to improve their roads, but with little success.
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While the Tibetans made occasional repairs on the two main passes from India to Yatung, 
the Nathu La and the Jelep La, no repairs to the trade route from Yatung to Gyantse were 
undertaken after minor repairs in 1933-34.[6]
Although their reports regularly noted Tibet's lack o f effort in this direction, the cadre, 
after some initial enthusiasm in the early years, downplayed the roads issue. There were 
three reasons for this. Firstly, having personal experience o f the route, they realised the 
immensity o f the undertaking required to render Himalayan roads suitable for modern 
traffic. Road-building would have involved the Government o f India in considerable 
expense, and the cadre were well aware they had little chance o f obtaining the necessary 
funding. [7]
Secondly, this issue was closely connected with trade, a field in which the cadre had little 
expertise, or even interest. It was not one where prestige was obviously involved, and 
there was little to be gained from making it an issue. Thirdly, we must consider the cadre's 
sympathy for the Tibetan desire for isolation, and their awareness o f the risks to the fabric 
o f Tibetan society (and hence ultimately the security o f the Indian border, which might in 
any case be better served by a lack o f roads) in attempting to hurry the modernisation of 
Tibet.
Consequently, while the road-building issue was of importance to the Yatung and Gartok 
Agents, who were more concerned with trade, and who could count on the support o f local 
traders who saw the financial advantages o f road improvement, wider considerations meant 
that the issue was a low priority for the senior cadre officers.[8]
In western Tibet, where roads in the modern sense were non-existent, the Trade Agents 
there had occasion to resort to dynamite to effect a passage up to the Tibetan border. This 
led to the bizarre suggestion that
the cheapest and most effective way of improving the route in Tibet itself is 
to authorize the Trade Agent to buy a good drill and to take with him a small 
supply o f dynam ite each year...N o political negotiations would be 
necessary...and ...1 cannot see that anything but good would ensue.[9]
This suggestion by a provincial official may be seen as symbolising the frustrations of 
those lesser officials who promoted Tibetan policies that did not coincide with those 
emphasised by the Political Officers.
The questions o f  arms supplies and road-building dem onstrate that there was a 
prioritorisation o f issues by the cadre, which was liable to change over time. Aims such as 
road-building, which were not seen as realistic, were put aside. The cadre's increasing
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understanding o f Tibetan society meant that issues such as arms supplies also came to be 
seen as less important, and were not therefore emphasised by the cadre to the same extent, 
while other matters (such as the control o f travellers, as we have seen) became o f higher 
priority. This is consistent with, and a part of, the finding that the cadre largely defined 
their own role in Tibet.
SECTION 5.2: - THE PROBLEM OF LOCATION
Curzon's desire to establish relations with Tibet was based on two obvious concerns: 
trade, and the security of India in the face of a perceived Russian threat. The latter was o f 
primary importance. Trade issues provided a cause which could be emphasised for public 
consum ption, but there is no doubt that within the Government o f  India, Russia's 
intentions were the greatest cause o f  concern. To exclude Russian influence in Tibet, 
Curzon and Younghusband agreed that 'the personal influence o f a British officer at the 
capital..[provided]..the best m eans o f  preventing serious trouble arising on the 
frontier'. [10]
The belief that a British representative in Lhasa would be able to ensure that the Tibetans 
would exclude Russian influence meant that representation in Lhasa became the principal 
policy promoted by the Tibet cadre; it was 'the one point necessary'.[11]
As there was no attempt to persuade the Tibetans to station a representative in India (an 
obvious compromise), it is clear that such an agent was not perceived merely as a channel 
o f communications between Delhi and Lhasa. This issue can therefore, be seen to involve 
w ider aims on the part o f the 'forw ard school'. These aims w ere expressed by 
Younghusband after he arrived in Lhasa. He found that
the Chinese know nothing o f what goes on here and are completely out o f 
touch. Nor do the Tibetans obey a single word they say. If  only we were 
going to keep a Resident here, we could run the whole show.[12]
Younghusband attempted to circumvent W hitehall's ban on a British agent being 
stationed in the Tibetan capital by making the separate agreement which allowed the 
Gyantse Trade Agent
to visit Lhasa, when it is necessary, to consult with high Chinese and 
Tibetan officials on such matters o f importance as he has found impossible
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to settle at Gyantse by correspondence or by personal conference with the 
Tibetan agent.[13]
Whitehall however, repudiated this special agreement, and O'Connor’s first official act 
on taking up the post o f Trade Agent Gyantse was to inform the Tibetan Government of 
this. The Government o f  India was thus left with its principal representative in Tibet 
stationed in Gyantse and forbidden to visit the Tibetan capital. To make matters worse, the 
cadre soon realised that all three trade marts were in unsuitable locations. First-hand 
experience showed that in terms o f both trade and politics, Shigatse was a much more 
important town than Gyantse, Phari than Yatung, and Taklakot than Gartok. The priority 
given to Lhasa meant that Trade Agencies had been established without sufficient thought 
for their most suitable location, and, once established under the 1904 Convention, political 
conditions within Tibet and changes in British policy in the post-Curzon period meant that 
there was little prospect o f relocating them. [14]
The decline in the British position in Tibet in the years following the Younghusband 
Mission was a natural consequence o f new Whitehall policies, which aimed at withdrawing 
from involvement in Tibet. Whitehall under Secretary o f  State John Morley saw the 
security o f India's northern frontier as best guaranteed by Chinese paramountcy there. The 
turning o f the tide o f British expansion in the Himalayas left the 'men on the spot' in a 
difficult position as Morley hoped to reverse 'Curzonism' by withdrawing British officials 
from Tibet entirely.[15]
The Tibet cadre, however, took a very different view from that o f  Whitehall. They saw 
the desired solution to the Tibetan problem in Curzonian terms, in that any potential threat 
to the security o f India emanating from the Tibetan border was seen as best solved by 
extending British influence over Tibet, to the exclusion o f the influence of any other foreign 
power, Asian or European. In attempting to overcome the problem of location, and gain 
influence in Tibet, the cadre were thus placed in the awkward position 
of promoting a policy at odds with that o f their Home Government.
Initially, under the Viceroyalty of the Earl o f Minto [1905-10], the cadre had little support 
at the highest levels of the Government of India, but circumstances changed after the arrival 
o f Charles Hardinge (Baron Hardinge o f Penshurst) as Viceroy. The cadre gained 
increasing support from Delhi as the Chinese came to be perceived as almost as great a 
threat to the security o f India's northern border as the Russians were.
Hardinge had previously served in the British Legation in Teheran, as Under-Secretary at 
the Foreign Office with responsibility for Central Asia, and as Ambassador to Russia. 
These posts had made him personally aware o f Russian encroachment on what the British
saw as their imperial interests. While Hardinge, unlike Curzon, does not appear to have 
formulated 'general analyses o f policy1, he was a key figure in the 1907 Anglo-Russian 
accord, by which Britain and Russia agreed to acknowledge China's suzerain power in 
Tibet, and to refrain from sending representatives to Lhasa. Yet Hardinge was determined 
to 'defend British imperial interests against Russian encroachm ents'. Thus he had 
supported the Younghusband Mission, and by 1913, he was convinced o f  the 'supreme 
im portance..[of being]..represented at Lhasa' in view  o f  the spread o f  Russian 
influence. [16]
SECTION 5.3: - 1904-1920: GAINING ACCESS TO LHASA
I have previously examined the Political Officers' attempts to gain access to Lhasa during 
the period 1910-20, when, after a change o f policy by Whitehall, their efforts culminated in 
Charles Bell being permitted to take up a long-standing invitation from the Dalai Lama to 
visit Lhasa. [17]
The genesis o f this invitation lay in the assistance given to the Dalai Lama by David 
Macdonald at Yatung in 1910. Macdonald had been specifically instructed that while he 
could shelter the Dalai Lama in the Trade Agency, he was to maintain neutrality in the 
Chinese-Tibetan conflict. But as the Tibetan leader fled south from the pursuing Chinese 
forces, Macdonald not only offered the Dalai Lama and his followers sanctuary in the Trade 
Agency, but deployed the Agency escort to protect him. [18]
Macdonald's interpretation of his orders attracted no censure from government. There can 
be little doubt that his actions were tacitly approved o f by his immediate superior, the 
Political Officer Charles Bell, who was soon to benefit from the goodwill gained by 
Macdonald's action. Bell later described MacDonald's assistance to the Dalai Lama as being 
'perhaps the chief reason why the British name stands high in Tibet.'[19]
During the Dalai Lama's period o f exile, Bell succeeded in cultivating the personal 
friendship o f the Tibetan leader and a number o f his court followers. In practice, Bell was 
able to give the Tibetans very little concrete assistance, for Whitehall, and even many in the 
Government of India, considered the Dalai Lama was no longer an important political 
force. The Secretary o f  State, Lord Morley, for example, described the Dalai Lama as 'a 
pestilent animal... [who] should be left to stew in his own ju ice '.[20]
Even when the Dalai Lama returned to rule Tibet in 1912, Whitehall objected to any 
gestures o f support being given to him. Bell and the Tibet cadre, however, offered what 
support they could. Bell instructed Basil Gould to escort the Dalai Lama as he passed
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Gyantse, and Macdonald played host to the Dalai Lama in Yatung for five days. Macdonald 
naturally gained great prestige from this with the local Tibetan community.[21]
Soon after the Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa, there was a new initiative by the 
Government o f India to overcome Whitehall's objection to a British officer visiting Lhasa. 
Following a Tibetan request for an officer to arrange the evacuation o f the defeated Chinese 
forces from Lhasa to India, they despatched Laden La to Lhasa .
After ordering Laden La to Gyantse on 24 May 1912, Viceroy Hardinge, apparently 
waited a week before informing the Secretary o f State that Laden La had been sent to 
Gyantse with orders to prepare to visit Lhasa. Given the slower communications and pace 
o f government at the time, it appears that by waiting until Laden La had reached Gyantse, 
and then despatching the telegram to London on a Friday, the Government o f India 
intended to present Laden La's arrival in Lhasa to Whitehall as a fa it accompli. On Tuesday 
June 4th, a telegram was sent ordering Laden La to Lhasa. He received the telegram at 9am 
on June 5th and departed later that day, accompanied by Norbhu Dhondup. But while the 
weekend's delay slowed their reaction, Whitehall eventually halted Laden La on June 9th, 
40 miles from Lhasa, following a 'clear the line' telegram ordering them to return to 
Gyantse. [22]
W hitehall continued to oppose every suggestion o f a Lhasa mission. Bell received 
numerous invitations from the Dalai Lama, all o f which he was forced to decline, while 
efforts after the 1913-14 Simla Conference to send a European China Consular Officer to 
China via Lhasa were also vetoed, as was a similar proposal by the British Legation in 
Peking in 1917. [23]
Despite these vetoes, there were a number o f changes taking place in the factors 
preventing a British Mission to Lhasa. Bell's influence at the Simla Convention can be 
clearly seen in Article Eight o f the final agreement between the Governments o f India and 
Tibet. This clause, allowing the Gyantse Trade Agent to visit Lhasa, was virtually identical 
to the agreement Younghusband had obtained, but Whitehall had repudiated, in 1904.[24] 
Although this clause appeared to contravene the 1907 Anglo-Russian treaty, the subsequent 
repudiation o f its international treaties by the new Russian revolutionary government made 
the 1907 agreement a dead letter.
The two principal British officers on the Tibetan frontier. Bell and Macdonald, were 
growing in prestige and experience, both with the Tibetans and their own government. 
Their personal relations with the Tibetans prospered, and their expertise in all things 
Tibetan enabled them to speak on questions o f policy with growing authority. Their 
arguments in favour of representation in Lhasa became the obvious alternative to turn to in 
the search for new approaches to the Tibetan question.[25]
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In 1919, the cadre's flow o f information was interrupted by the death o f the main sources 
o f information on events at Lhasa, the Tibetan Prime Minister, Lonchen Shatra, and the 
half-brother o f the Maharajah o f Sikkim, Lhase Kusho. This deprived the British o f Lhasa 
news at an important time, as a Chinese Mission, nominally from the Kansu Provincial 
Government, reached Lhasa that year, suggesting the possibility o f direct Chinese-Tibetan 
negotiations without British involvement. Whitehall now began to turn to the alternative 
policy long advocated by the 'men on the spot'. The British Legation at Peking were also 
reconsidering their policy o f opposition to a British mission to Lhasa, and the powerful 
Sinophile lobby in the British Foreign Office began to accept the need for alternative 
approaches. [26]
Finally, and perhaps conclusively, Lord Curzon became British Foreign Secretary in 
1919. As Viceroy o f India his Tibet policy had been aimed at establishing British 
representation in Lhasa. Fifteen years later Curzon was now in a position to achieve his 
original aim, and he had the perfect representative in Charles Bell, who provided a personal 
link to his own period o f involvement on this frontier.
The fact that the 1914 Agreement specified the Gyantse Trade Agent's right to visit 
Lhasa, rather than that o f the Political Officer in Sikkim, appears to have been quietly 
overlooked in the planning for a Lhasa Mission. While the then Gyantse Agent, David 
Macdonald, was certainly well qualified to deal with the Dalai Lama, Bell's superior status 
made him the obvious choice; he had been recalled in January 1920, after eighteen months' 
retirement, with just such a mission in view.
During the summer o f 1920 Bell had repeatedly requested Whitehall's permission to visit 
Lhasa, but he seems to have had some last minute doubts about the advisability o f the visit 
in view o f the lack o f tangible support he was permitted to offer the Tibetans. However 
after consultation with Macdonald, who had no such doubts. Bell lost his doubts, and, in 
October 1920, while on his annual inspection o f Gyantse, Bell was ordered to proceed to 
Lhasa. [27]
SECTION 5.4: - THE EFFECTS OF THE BELL MISSION
The Bell Mission to Lhasa in 1920-21 marked a major turning point in the history o f the 
British presence in Tibet. It had the effect o f opening the Tibetan capital to regular visits by 
British officials. Norbhu Dhondup and Laden La subsequently made regular visits to the 
Tibetan capital, and at least one representative o f the Government of India visited Lhasa 
annually.[28] Ultimately, the Bell Mission paved the way for permanent representation in
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Lhasa, thus fulfilling the original intention behind Curzon's Tibet policy.[29]
For Bell personally, the 1920-21 Mission was the culmination o f his career. He had 
worked for more than ten years to persuade his political masters in London and Delhi that 
he should be allowed to visit Lhasa. Once there he had to struggle against the caution o f the 
Government o f India which sought to shorten his visit, as well as against opposition from 
monastic elements within Tibet. [30]
Bell stayed in Lhasa from November 1920 until October 1921, being joined briefly by 
David Macdonald, his staunch supporter and assistant.[31] When Bell finally left, content 
that he had achieved his aims, he retired a second, and final time, and began writing the 
then definitive works on Tibetan civilisation. Before his departure however, he submitted a 
report which was accepted by Delhi and Whitehall as the basis for future policy in Tibet. In 
this report Bell made a number of proposals which were all later adopted in some form. He 
recommended that if  a Lhasa Mission was established, it should be under the control o f the 
Indian Political Department, and that the Yatung Agency then be abolished in all but name, 
with the Gyantse Agency greatly reduced. He also recommended that Europeans (although 
not shooting parties or missionaries) be allowed to visit Gyantse. [32]
Bell's major finding in this report was that Britain should not establish a permanent 
position in Lhasa - unless the Chinese first established a mission o f their own. Until that 
time only temporary missions, such as his own, should be sent. Bell argued that Lhasa's 
isolation, and the danger from 'unruly monks', made a permanent mission inappropriate. 
But the Politicals maintained at least one post, at Kashgar, which was far more inaccessible 
from India than Lhasa, and Kashgar and many other positions (particularly on the North- 
West Frontier) had similar, if not greater, security problems.
The Kashgar Consulate was usually staffed by the Indian Political Department. In the 
1920s, telegrams took between 11 and 19 days from Delhi to Kashgar, compared with one 
to two days to Gyantse, while the journey from Gilgit to Kashgar took up to 30 days, more 
than twice the time taken from Gangtok to Gyantse. An indication o f its security problem 
was that in 1934 the Consulate-General's wife was wounded by a stray bullet in local 
fighting, and in 1936 there was an apparent attempt to assassinate the Consul.[33]
Bell's real motives for advancing this Lhasa policy emerge in his first book Tibet Past 
and Present, published three years after his retirement. His time in Lhasa had brought 
home to him the extent to which the Tibetans desired to protect their religion by maintaining 
their isolation. Recalling the goodwill gained by Younghusband's withdrawal from Lhasa, 
Bell argued that this would be lost if a British official was stationed in Lhasa permanently. 
In addition, this would raise the prospect o f China demanding the right to station a 
representative in Lhasa, with all the attendant risks to Tibetan security that would entail.
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Finally, definitively, Bell quotes the Dalai Lama as saying
If  an Amban must come, I wish to have a British Representative also in 
Lhasa. But, until an Am ban com es, it is sufficient that a British 
representative should visit Lhasa occasionally, as necessity arises.[34]
Thus we can see that in this important area, Bell's identification o f British interests was 
identical to the Dalai Lama's wishes for his countiy. Bell clearly followed the Politicals' 
Manual o f Instructions, which stated that Political officers should 'assume an identity o f 
interest between the Imperial Government and the Durbar'.[35]
SECTION 5.5: - THE USE OF INTERMEDIARIES
Although a precedent had been established for British missions to Lhasa, future missions 
by British Political Officers still generated a great deal o f discussion in government. But 
local em ployees could now visit Lhasa freely, and the Government o f India did not, 
apparently, seek Whitehall's prior approval for these visits.
The two principal intermediaries used on missions to Lhasa were Laden La and Norbhu 
Dhondup. Laden La, as we have seen in the previous chapter, lost the trust o f the Tibetans 
after his actions in 1923-24, and although he was sent to Lhasa again in 1930 by Colonel 
Weir, the Tibetans remained suspicious of him. He was detained at Chushul ferry and told 
'no useful purpose could be served' by his visiting Lhasa. Laden La appealed to Tsarong 
Shape, who intervened on his behalf in Lhasa, and after two days he was allowed to 
proceed.[36]
Laden La claimed that his 1930 mission was a success, a claim apparently accepted by his 
superiors, for he accompanied Colonel Weir to Lhasa later that year and again in 1932.[37] 
Other sources however, suggest Laden La was still mistrusted by the Tibetans and that he 
achieved little in Lhasa. Apart from Norbhu Dhondup, whose critiques o f Laden La in his 
letters to Bailey could have been based on personal differences and professional 
jealousies,[38] there were also regular complaints about Laden La from the now retired 
David Macdonald.
MacDonald considered that both Laden La and Norbhu Dhondup were responsible for the 
downturn in Anglo-Tibetan relations, stating that they were working for their own ends, 
and giving political information to the Tibetans. In addition, M acdonald alleged that 
Tsarong had been demoted from Shape to Dzasci rank due to the assistance he had given
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Laden La in getting to Lhasa in 1930. M acDonald's negative view o f Norbhu Dhondup 
was supported by Mr Rosemeyer, the telegraph officer who supervised the Gangtok to 
Lhasa line, (and him self an Anglo-Indian). He informed Bell that Norbhu was 'not a patch 
on your former Chief Clerk A-chuk Tse-ring[sic], who was both shrewd and clever'. [39]
But the presence o f other foreign agents at Lhasa meant that an intermediaries' career was 
not without its dangers, Norbhu's life was, he reported, threatened on several occasions by 
Russian or Chinese agents; in response, he swore 'I...shall not die before I murder at least 
two, as I have my rifles and pistols...always loaded'.[40]
The extent to which the Sikkim Political Officers relied on the information obtained by 
these two intermediaries is difficult to assess. Their visits had the advantage that they could 
be arranged at short notice, while missions by Political Officers involved considerable 
preparation, and permission from Whitehall. The two men were thus o f great value to the 
British, despite their shortcomings, and considerable reliance was placed upon their 
knowledge o f the culture and people o f  Tibet. The Political Officers were aware o f the 
difficult position these men held, but exercised their own judgm ent in assessing the worth 
o f the reports they produced.[41]
SECTION 5.6: - 1921-36: POLITICAL OFFICERS1 LHASA MISSIONS
Although the Sikkim Political Officers could now despatch local intennediaries to Lhasa, 
they saw their own access to the Tibetan capital as o f paramount importance, both as a 
barometer o f the state o f Anglo-Tibetan relations, and as a matter o f prestige. [42] After 
Bell's Mission, there were five visits to Lhasa by the Political Officer Sikkim before the 
establishment o f a permanent mission there. Bailey visited Lhasa in 1924, Weir in 1930 
and 1932, and Williamson in 1933 and 1935.
When a Political Officer wanted to visit Lhasa, he faced the problem of persuading three 
governments, London, Delhi, and Lhasa, that such a visit was necessary. After the Bell 
Mission, Delhi’s support was virtually automatic, but examining how the agreement o f 
Lhasa and W hitehall was obtained provides a clear picture o f the cadre's command of 
internal politics, and o f their wider manoeuverings towards achieving the ultimate goal of 
permanent representation in Lhasa
Before a Political Officer could visit Lhasa he had to receive an invitation from the 
Tibetans. These were not always issued as 'spontaneously' as Delhi's reports to the India 
Office suggested.[43] First Laden La or Norbhu Dhondup were sent to Lhasa with verbal 
instructions to suggest to the Dalai Lama that he invite the Political Officer to visit Lhasa.
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Obviously they would also indicate that such an invitation would be accepted. Thus neither 
side risked the 'loss of face' that would follow an official refusal o f the invitation.
Although Bell had been forced to decline a number o f invitations to Lhasa prior to 1920, 
no invitation was subsequently declined by the British. Once, however, the Dalai Lama 
failed to respond to the British hints. In 1929, Weir's attempts to obtain an invitation 
through Norbhu Dhondup met with the request that his visit be postponed to avoid 
complications with China. Although the Dalai Lama wrote to Weir explaining 'it is not at all 
an attempt to slight you...I would request you not to get disappointed by misunderstanding 
things', the refusal was taken by the British as a rebuff, and a sign that the Tibetan 
government had become less partial to them. [44]
The simplest example o f the procedure the Political Officers went through to visit Lhasa 
concerns the 1933 mission. When Williamson wrote to inform the Dalai Lama that he had 
taken over from Weir as Political Officer Sikkim, the Dalai Lama replied with an invitation 
for Williamson to visit Lhasa. However, as Williamson had already discussed the matter 
informally with his government, some degree o f pre-arrangement seems likely. [45] 
Williamson assembled official arguments in favour o f his being permitted to take up the 
invitation. He stated that, if  Weir had remained as Political Officer Sikkim, a visit would 
not have been necessary, but he (W illiamson) had not met the Dalai Lama, and 'it is 
impossible to over-estimate the importance of personal contact', and therefore he should 
accept the invitation. [46]
The Government o f  India forwarded W illiamson's claims, recom mending to the 
Secretary o f State that he be allowed to visit Lhasa. They enhanced W illiamson's 
arguments by claiming that in Lhasa he could restrain Tibet from aggressive activity in the 
eastern borderlands. After the Foreign Office advised the India Office that they had no 
objections, the Secretary o f State approved the mission.[47]
Only the Dalai Lama had the unquestioned power to issue an invitation to Lhasa. After his 
death, the Regent wrote privately to Williamson suggesting he telegraph the Tibetan 
Government, asking if  it was convenient to visit Lhasa. The Regent did not 'feel 
sufficiently powerful to invite me in more definite terms on his own responsibility' but he 
advised Williamson that if  the request was received he could arrange its acceptance.[48] 
Getting an invitation from Lhasa was generally easier than ensuring Whitehall's approval 
for such missions. Hence the Political Officers sought to marshall every possible argument 
in their favour. The most popular argument was simply the benefit o f personal contact, but. 
in addition to the perennial prospect o f mediating between China and Tibet, and between 
the Dalai and Panchen Lamas, there were many others. Bailey's purpose was said to be the 
exclusion o f foreign influences. Japanese, Indian nationalist, and Bolshevik. [49]
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When there was no immediate response from Whitehall to Bailey's request, in an obvious 
attempt to speed a favourable response, Bailey reported that the Tibetans were anxious for a 
reply, and that the Tibetan Prime Minister was reported to be in 'very poor health'.[50]
In 1930, Weir used the argument that, as there had not been a British officer in Lhasa 
since 1924, the Tibetans would soon be able to refuse any further missions on the grounds 
that relations could obviously proceed without them. He then articulated the cadre's 
understanding o f the Younghusband M ission as having been a means to gain access to 
Lhasa. According to Weir, if  the British kept away from close contact with the Tibetans, 
'the entire value of the Tibet M ission o f 1904 will be nullified'. For good measure he 
suggested that the 13th Dalai Lama might soon die, and it was necessary to meet potential 
new leaders.[51]
If  the Political Officer was reticent in suggesting a Lhasa Mission, the initiative could 
come from the Government o f  India. In September 1934, the Indian Foreign Secretary, 
H .A.F.M etcalfe, asked W illiamson in Gangtok for a report on the Tibetan question. 
Metcalfe was concerned that Britain's commercial interests in China meant that they would
have great difficulty in persuading His Majesty's Government to take a 
strong line with the Chinese Government over the Tibetan question, unless 
we can produce m uch m ore cogent arguments than...hitherto... The 
maintenance o f the Government o f India's influence at Lhasa in some form 
is essential, and it would seem necessary to attempt to convince His 
Majesty's Government of this fact by all the arguments we can muster. [52]
Williamson duly filed a report recommending that he be permitted to visit Lhasa to 
counter Chinese moves there.[53]
There were now pressing reasons for a new stage in relations with Tibet. The death of the 
13th Dalai Lama on 17 December 1933 was followed by the arrival o f  a 'condolence 
mission' from the Nanking Government in April 1934. When the main body of the mission 
departed, they left behind the nucleus o f a permanent mission, including a radio operator 
with a transmitter. (Thus the Chinese were freed from reliance on the Government o f 
India's telegraph system, where their communications were routinely monitored.) While 
Bell’s 1921 report was not directly quoted, the British response was just as Bell had 
recommended; if  China stationed a permanent representative in Lhasa, India should follow 
suit.
In 1935, Williamson's main task was thus to ascertain whether the Chinese Mission was 
indeed to be a permanent one, and if  so, whether the Tibetans would accept a permanent
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British representative as a counter to the Chinese move. On the receipt o f this information 
Delhi and Whitehall were to consider the question of a permanent mission. [54]
British plans to counter the Chinese M ission then suffered an unexpected setback. 
Frederick Williamson had never enjoyed the best o f health in Tibet. On his first posting to 
Gyantse in 1926 he was suffering from a serious fever, and he did not commence duty for 
six weeks. On this 1935 mission, Williamson set out against medical advice, and again fell 
ill en route to Gyantse. His condition continued to decline, but although he was advised to 
leave Lhasa as early as September, he refused on the grounds that 'duty required his 
presence', and he died in Lhasa from chronic uraem ia on 17 Novem ber 1935. The 
accompanying Gyantse Trade Agent, Captain Keith Battye, 'kept his head' and took over 
the leadership o f  the mission. He escorted W illiamson's widow back to India after 
Williamson had been buried in Gyantse.[55]
Williamson's death not only delayed a response to the Chinese presence in Lhasa; the 
British feared it had damaged their prestige with the Tibetans. This fear may have been 
unfounded; the Tibetans apparently blamed his death on a more esoteric cause, considering 
it due to his photographing powerful images o f deities at a shrine in Lhasa. [56]
The British Government gave as little publicity as possible to these missions to Lhasa, in 
order to avoid international complications; but W illiamson's death gained unwelcome 
attention, with questions raised in the British parliament. In February 1936, Communist 
M.P. Mr Gallacher, asked what W illiamson had been doing in Lhasa, and whether the 
Government o f India was intending to appoint a permanent representative there. The British 
Government played down the visit as a routine one, and blithely denied that it was 
considering a permanent representative in Lhasa. [57] But the denial was some way from 
the truth, for the appointment was now being actively considered.
SECTION 5.7: - GOULD'S ESTABLISHM ENT OF A PERM ANENT MISSION
The final report on the Williamson Mission concluded that although the attitude o f the 
Kashag to a permanent British Mission in Lhasa was one of'distaste', they would give the 
question o f a British representative 'favourable consideration' if  they were forced to accept 
a Chinese representative.[58] In 1936, with the Chinese 'condolence mission' now firmly 
established as China's representation in Lhasa, W illiamson's successor, Basil Gould, 
began to plan his response following the guidelines Bell had established.
Each succeeding Political Officer's arguments for a Lhasa mission built on the arguments 
raised successfully by his predecessors. Thus in 1936 Gould was able to muster a number
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o f arguments in favour o f his visiting Lhasa. In April, Whitehall was informed that the 
primary purpose o f the intended mission was to arrange for the Panchen Lama's return to 
Tibet from exile in China. Whitehall approved, subject to an invitation, to obtain which 
Norbhu Dhondup was duly sent to Lhasa in June. After the invitation was received the 
mission was approved, and preparations were made on a far more elaborate scale than for 
previous missions.[59]
The subsequent news that the Tibetans considered British mediation in the Panchen Lama 
affair would be unwanted interference in Tibetan internal affairs, appeared to remove the 
basis for Gould's mission. But the Government o f India advised Whitehall that 'After 
discussion with Gould, we are satisfied that the invitation to visit Lhasa must be accepted in 
spite o f this...refusal to accept our intervention.' Whitehall accepted the need for Gould's 
mission to 'explore the general situation in Tibet', but Gould was to be instructed to 'be 
cautious in sounding Tibetan Government regarding permanent representation.'[60]
Gould duly arrived in Lhasa on 24 August 1936, with six British officers, the largest 
contingent since the Younghusband mission. Gould intended his mission to become 
permanent, and sought to bolster the party's popularity and prestige by calling David 
Macdonald out o f retirement to act as their Tibetan language instructor; but in the event 
illness prevented MacDonald from making the journey.[61]
Once he had arrived in Lhasa, Gould had little difficulty in finding arguments for the 
cadre remaining there. The Panchen Lama was threatening to return to Tibet with a Chinese 
military escort, and Gould claimed that his presence was strengthening the resolve o f the 
Tibetan Government to resist the Chinese force. In October 1936, Gould proposed that if 
the Panchen Lama did return with the escort, he should negotiate for a permanent British 
representative in Lhasa. [62]
The Government o f India reported to Whitehall that Gould was making progress towards 
securing permission for another Everest expedition, an achievement valued by London, and 
that while Gould had to return to his duties in Sikkim, Norbhu and Richardson could both 
remain in Lhasa. While noting the financial cost o f their remaining was 13,000 rupees a 
month, Delhi argued that 'The real solution for our difficulties would...appear to be some 
kind o f permanent representation at Lhasa'. Norbhu Dhondup's unofficial efforts to gain 
Tibetan agreement to this at the time may have been unsuccessful, to judge from Gould's 
statement that 'the time is not suitable' for discussing this with the Tibetans. Whitehall 
however agreed to the mission's extension, although it cautiously preferred that Norbhu 
remain in Lhasa, rather than the British officer.[63]
With this permission granted, Gould set out to create an impression o f permanence 
around his mission. Gould’s understanding o f the importance o f  symbolic gestures is
163
revealed in his use o f the mission football team’s regular matches as one means o f 
appearing ’permanent'.[64]
Gould further delayed his departure from Lhasa on the grounds that it would be a 'grave 
discourtesy' to leave before the Tibetan New Year celebrations, but he finally departed on 
17 February 1937. N orbhu Dhondup needed dental treatm ent in Calcutta, and so 
Richardson remained in Lhasa until Norbhu was fit to return. W hen Gould departed he 
sim ply inform ed the K ashag that R ichardson would rem ain to discuss m atters 
outstanding. [65]
The exact status o f  the Lhasa post was never defined, nor was it covered by any 
agreement. No official notification o f any intention to create a permanent position was 
given, then or later, to the Tibetan Government - or to W hitehall. The post o f Head of 
British Mission Lhasa always remained under the command o f the Political Officer Sikkim. 
The Mission remained in Lhasa until August 1947, when it became the Indian Mission, 
although Hugh Richardson continued to command the post until 1950. Theoretically it 
remained temporary, but the officers there were determined not to depart, at least while the 
Chinese remained in Lhasa. The Tibetans never asked the British M ission to leave, and 
made the most o f it as a channel o f contact with the outside world. [66]
Gould had thus achieved his primary aim by following the policy espoused by his former 
superior, Charles Bell, and 'brought about de facto permanent representation...at Lhasa 
under the name o f a "temporary" M ission'.[67] Gould took the realistic view that the 
'prime need is to admit to ourselves that our aims are not ALTRUISTIC'[Gould's 
emphasis]. British interests were best served by a 'friendly and sufficiently strong and 
independent Tibet' Thus he had
concentrated on one main objective viz. the establishment o f our mission at 
Lhasa. Round this one distinct forward move [my emphasis] I have 
endeavoured to throw a purdah o f conservatism and o f help in such matters 
as trade and medical work.[68]
There is little doubt that Gould's 'guru'. Charles Bell, approved o f his former pupil's 
sentiments and actions.[69]
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SECTION 5,8: - 1937-47: MAINTAINING A PRESENCE AT LHASA
As the Lhasa Mission remained theoretically temporary, Gould was called upon annually 
to justify its continuance. The death o f the Panchen Lama in December 1937 struck at much 
o f the supposed basis o f the British presence in Lhasa, and Gould was asked by his 
government (presumably pre-empting Whitehall's enquiry), if  there was now 'any reason 
why the Lhasa Mission should not be withdrawn entirely as soon as possible?'[70]
Gould duly responded with argum ents, old and new. Citing N orbhu Dhondup's 
pessimistic views o f the consequences o f withdrawal, he argued that Norbhu's presence 
had prevented the Chinese from establishing a stronger presence in Lhasa. The rising threat 
from Japan was also cited, while financial concerns were addressed by Gould's claim that 
the costs o f maintaining the post (now 5O,O0ORs. a month) could be met by savings in the 
Postal Department. He also pointed out that it might prove difficult to gain permission to 
return to Lhasa if  the mission was withdrawn, and that withdrawal would mean the loss of 
influence and reliable information. Gould even raised the prospect o f a British withdrawal 
being used as a bargaining chip if China agreed to negotiations over the status o f Tibet, a 
prospect Whitehall always hoped might eventuate. Gould recommended that the British 
remain until an unspecified time when 'we are able to estimate the present intentions o f the 
Chinese and also o f  the Japanese.' Gould's arguments were accepted, with the post 
sanctioned until September 1938.[71]
In August 1938, Gould sought further extension o f  the position, citing all the usual 
reasons, adding that the British should be present at the forthcoming installation o f  the new 
Dalai Lama. Sanction was duly given for the Lhasa M ission to continue for another 
year. [72]
Gould subsequently suggested that a Residency be built in Lhasa, capable o f conveying 
both British prestige and 'the impression o f stability and permanence which it would be 
politic to convey.' He added the rather bizarre suggestion, presumably for Whitehall's 
consumption, that with such a Residency there to symbolise the British presence, an actual 
representative would not be needed. But Whitehall would only sanction a new Residency if 
the Tibetans could be persuaded to pay for it.[73]
Gould was not alone in stressing the need to maintain the Lhasa Mission. There was a 
concerted effort by the various cadre officers to publicise its value. The reports of 
Richardson and Norbhu in Lhasa, and the Trade Agent in Gyantse, frequently referred to 
the advantages o f having a representative in the Tibetan capital. But Gyantse itself now 
became little more than a staging post for the Lhasa Mission. Now when important news 
came from Lhasa the Gyantse Agents found they could inform the local Tibetan officials
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before they had heard it through their own sources. [74]
After the 1930s, Gould continued an annual repetition o f  the arguments for the Lhasa 
Mission's continuance, but these requests, and consequent sanctions, became increasingly 
routine. Gould had succeeded in his 'major preoccupation' (and that o f his predecessors), 
by establishing a permanent representative in Lhasa.[75] During World War Two the Allies 
needed to consult the Tibetan Government on a number o f war related issues, which 
brought home to Whitehall the advantages o f a representative in Lhasa, and the closure o f 
the post ceased to be a consideration.
C O N CLU SIO N S
In this chapter we have observed how the early cadre officers, following the ’forward' 
policies initiated by Curzon and Younghusband, identified representation in Lhasa as 
essential to fulfilling their primary aims despite the policies o f  their Home Government, 
which sought to withdraw from further involvement in Tibet. They identified this aim as 
one which was achievable, unlike improved roads, and it was a policy that survived 
continued contact with the Tibetans, unlike the emphasis on arms supplies. To achieve this 
aim, the cadre found themselves forced to play what Lamb has called 'the great game o f 
bureaucratic survival and self-promotion'.[76]
That Bell was finally permitted to visit Lhasa was partly due to events in China, and the 
Chinese refusal to compromise over Simla, but it was also due to the prestige and expertise 
that Bell had acquired in his fifteen years on the frontier. This experience increasingly 
enabled him to function well both inside and outside the 'system'. He also benefited a great 
deal from the support and advice o f David MacDonald.
Bell's great achievement was to translate Curzon’s turn-of-the-century policies into 
contemporary idioms by adding the knowledge he had gained o f Tibet from his friendship 
with the Dalai Lama, to produce policies which suited the interests o f both British India and 
Tibet, such as those concerning the restriction o f European travellers' access to Tibet, noted 
in Chapter Two.
Bell identified a confluence o f British and Tibetan interests in one particular area. The 
Tibetans sought to exclude foreign influence from Tibet and maintain internal autonomy. 
The interests o f British India demanded that foreign influence be excluded from Tibet, 
while her internal autonomy was the best guarantee o f strength and stability there. Thus 
Bell sought to guarantee Tibet's continuing independence and safeguard her isolation, 
while ensuring that the British had access to Lhasa in order to influence Tibet's future; with
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the British replacing China as Tibet's 'patron1,
Clive Christie has argued that after the Montagu Declaration o f 1917, Bell saw Indian 
independence as inevitable, sooner, rather than later, and that he came to see Tibet's future 
in an accommodation with China, and, consequently, ceased to stress the need for a 
permanent representative in Lhasa. [77]
Christie did not have access to papers indicating that Bell relied a great deal at this time on 
the advice o f David Macdonald. In consequence, he has, I believe, underestimated Bell's 
understanding and manipulation o f internal politics as a means o f achieving his long-term 
aims. Bell did not abandon his 'forward' aims as Christie suggests. Rather he made more 
and more compromises to achieve his primary aim o f access to Lhasa. This can be most 
clearly seen in the issue o f arms supplies. In April 1920 Bell had argued that sending a 
representative to Lhasa without the right to offer arms supplies would render the mission 
pointless. But when it became apparent the Foreign Office would not agree to these arms 
sales, Bell, after consulting Macdonald, who recommended the visit go ahead, dropped this 
demand but went ahead with the mission. [78]
Bell's conditions should, therefore, be seen as 'bargaining chips' which could be 
sacrificed to the ultimate aim, just as Dane's proposal to extend the Indian border to the 
Kuenlun mountains was really aimed at gaining approval for a Trade Agency at Gartok. 
This method o f obtaining their principal demands was a typical cadre ploy. The Political 
Officers inflated their requests for personnel and presents required on visits to Lhasa, 
knowing that these would be reduced by government. Naturally this is not specified in 
official documentation, but the search for funds was not only carried out through official 
channels. For example, when Weir visited Simla for instructions prior to his visit to Lhasa 
in 1930 he wras invited to stay with the Indian Foreign Secretary. For Weir this was 'a 
chance o f saturating him so much with Tibet that I might be able to squeeze a little more 
money out o f Foreign for presents'.[79]
As Lamb notes, the M orley-Minto years had taught the cadre that they needed to be 
'somewhat devious' to advance their aims.[80] Thus they couched their appeals for support 
in often exaggerated terms of threats to the security of India, concealed their true motives 
for all manner o f actions, and often avoided consulting, or even deliberately misled, 
Whitehall. We cannot, therefore, necessarily accept any particular statement by Bell as 
indicating his true beliefs and aims, without seeing it in the context o f  his long term goals.
Once he had achieved the right o f  access to Lhasa, Bell did not abandon plans for a 
permanent representative there. Rather, on visiting Lhasa he realised that the interests of 
Britain and Tibet were reconcilable; a permanent British presence was neither wanted by the 
Tibetans, nor needed by the British, unless and until Chinese representation occurred. [81]
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The policy established by Bell shows his ability to isolate realistic policy goals which 
were consistent with Tibetan aims. He sought to protect the interests o f British India 
without committing India to protecting Tibet's independence from China by military means. 
It appears that he reluctantly accepted that China must eventually play a role in Tibet, 
although even this could be made to serve British interests if  it did lead to a British presence 
in Lhasa. [82] But Bell sought to postpone that eventuality, in the hope that Tibet would 
develop to the point where it could exist as a strong, independent nation.
An apparent weakness o f Bell's policy was that it produced a solution to the 
representation in Lhasa problem which was based on a reactive policy. But this reveals 
Bell's understanding o f policy formation. British policy towards Tibet after 1905 was 
essentially reactive in nature. Bell was only permitted to visit Lhasa following the Kansu 
Mission and the collapse o f hoped for talks with China, and a British Lhasa Mission was 
only permitted after the establishment o f a permanent Chinese Mission there.
Bell had come to realise that anything resembling a 'forward' move on the Tibetan 
frontier would only be permitted by Whitehall as a defensive counter to Chinese (or other 
foreign) 'forward' moves in the region, real or imagined. Malcolm Yapp has shown in his 
study o f 19th century British Indian strategy, that the idea o f a 'foreign threat' to India was 
commonly used by British frontiersmen as a means o f obtaining an additional allocation o f 
resources to their region by relating their problems to wider questions o f imperial strategy. 
Bell and his successors used this method, but it succeeded in this period only after specific, 
and verifiable, moves by foreign powers, such as the Kansu Mission.[83]
An alternative interpretation o f this process is that Whitehall only permitted 'forward' 
moves on the Tibetan frontier when the flow o f inform ation was disrupted. In this 
perspective, the Younghusband Mission was sanctioned when Tibet refused to respond to 
British efforts to establish communications with Lhasa, the Bell Mission when the principal 
British informants in Lhasa had died, and the Lhasa Mission was established when the 
British lost the ability to monitor Chinese communications from Tibet. Maintaining the flow 
o f information may well have been central to British reaction to events on the Tibetan 
frontier.
Implicit in the cadre's aim of representation in Lhasa was the potential for transforming a 
sphere o f  influence into a British protectorate. [84] This did not occur for two reasons; (1) 
economic restrictions on the Government o f India, and, (2) W hitehall's application o f  
policies based on a global perception. We may conclude therefore, that the cadre's Lhasa 
policies are further evidence that models o f imperialism which emphasise the role o f the 
'man on the spot’ in exploiting local crisis to persuade the central government to expand the 
empire, cannot be applied to Tibet after 1905.
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In this region, the 'frontiersmen' could, as we have seen, influence policy in the long­
term by emphasising a realistic goal. By pursuing consistent lines o f policy (such as the 
need for access to Lhasa) over a period o f time, they created alternative policies which were 
adopted when existing ones failed.[85] But the cadre succeeded in achieving access to 
Lhasa through internal political manoeuvers and the building up of a body of argument, not 
by creating 'external incidents', or exploiting 'local crisises'.
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CHAPTER STX
’WE WANT A UNITED TIBET’: 
CONSTRUCTING TIBET: POLICY AND IM AGE
IN TR O D UCTIO N
As the cadre were the first modern Europeans to reside in Tibet, they had a unique 
opportunity to increase European knowledge o f the region. This body o f knowledge was, 
prior to the Younghusband Mission, greatly restricted, particularly in regard to details o f 
Tibet's political structures.
The cadre became the primary interpreters o f  Tibet to the outside world, and the 
information they obtained and propagated became the basis for much o f  our modern 
knowledge o f Tibet. But the image which they produced strongly reflects the character and 
policy aims o f these individuals, and the interests and perspectives o f the imperial power 
and its allies within the Lhasa ruling class as they attempted to transform Tibet into a 
modern nation-state. As the image was advantageous to both power groups, they co­
operated in presenting and preserving it. By controlling access to both Tibet, and the body 
o f knowledge built up, the cadre and their Tibetan allies tried to prevent the emergence of 
opposing images.
That the British sought to produce an image o f Tibet was originally implicit in the search 
for contact and meaning. After Younghusband it became explicit, with the cadre specifically 
stating that they sought to propagate ideas and images for a political purpose. These ideas 
and images became part of a battle to establish a view of the country on the international 
stage, and were an important weapon in the cadre's attempts to transform Tibet into an 
entity associated with India. Thus Gould stated that 'One o f our main political 
aims..[was]., showing that Tibet had its own art etc and that in some ways...Tibet is more 
closely allied to India than to China’.[l]
The cadre's part in the creation o f an image o f  Tibet is a significant issue because, 
although there is also a 'mystical' image o f Tibet, the image resulting from the British
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perception was, and still is, the dominant one held in political and academic circles. This 
image was an important legacy of the British presence in Tibet, and continues to shape the 
European response to Tibet's status today.
In this chapter we will examine the concept o f 'Tibet' and 'Tibetan' as it existed before 
the encounter with the British, and describe how the imperial power engaged in a complex 
process o f defining what was 'Tibetan', and what was 'non-Tibetan' as they attempted to 
transform Tibet into what would have been, in effect, a modern nation-state according to 
the European understanding o f the term. Policies and image-creation were part o f the same 
political process, and we will examine how this process raised questions as to whether 
concepts o f Tibetan identity could survive the transition to modern statehood. In the 
following chapter we will demonstrate the means by which this image o f Tibet was 
produced, controlled, and 'sold'.
SECTION 6.1: - TIBETAN IDENTITY IN THE PRE-BRITISH PERIOD
In seeking ties with Lhasa's ruling elite, the British were implicitly identifying Lhasa as 
the administrative and political centre o f a Tibetan state. But Tibet was not then a nation­
state in the European definition. The model o f the nation-state was a relatively recent 
European phenomenon, which may be defined as consisting o f  a territorial entity, within 
defined borders, in which a single government was sovereign. Citizens o f a nation-state 
were assumed to be predominantly from a single ethnic group, Germans, Greeks, and so 
on, or composed of ethnic groups, such as English, Irish, Scots and Welsh, sharing certain 
aims and assumptions and coming together as a nation-state for mutual benefit. [2]
This European assumption that peoples o f a nation-state shared common interests and 
perceptions meant that in identifying a nation, its peoples were defined as characterised by 
certain shared qualities. The definition o f these qualities created categories of'insider' and 
'outsider' which were applied in defining the nation. (As will be seen, the Tibetans 
understood these 'insider/outsider' concepts primarily in a religious sense.) Thus certain 
distinct aspects o f  culture, geography, language and so on, were identified as definitive 
qualities o f'T ibe t' and 'Tibetanness'. When these definitions had been made, conformity 
to them became the measure o f whether something was Tibetan or non-Tibetan. 'Tibetans' 
for example, were defined by the British as wearing Tibetan clothing. If  they adopted 
European clothing, this was regarded as diminishing their Tibetan identity.[3]
Officers such as Bell and Gould, who wrote Tibetan dictionaries, helped define the 
Tibetan language in European understanding, just as the British defined the Tibetan border
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with India. They imposed a linguistic standard which complemented other contemporary 
definitions, o f Tibet's territory, leadership and so on, which were required if  Tibet was to 
be within European definitions o f a modern nation state. The Tibetans' separate language 
was, and is, an important part o f their claim to a separate identity, and hence separate state, 
from the Chinese. Thus the cadre's language studies helped to bring out Tibet's separate 
status; enhancing the political aims of the British and their Tibetan allies.
The effect o f this classification o f identity was to impose conformity to European 
definitions as a pre-condition for acceptance o f elements as 'Tibetan'. The power of 
definition was appropriated by European authority. For example, Tibetans were seen by the 
British as reliant on astrological calculations as to the most auspicious date on which to 
carry out significant activities. Yet when the Dalai Lama was to visit Calcutta, Bell noted 
that 'not until I reminded them o f the necessity o f doing so did the Dalai Lama and party 
remember to enquire as to auspicious dates’.[4]
As a result o f the European definition o f Tibet, the required characteristics o f Tibetan 
identity were fixed in (or beyond) time. Thus a British travel writer in the 1930s observed 
that 'once trains or motors have been introduced... Tibet...will be Tibet no longer'. The 
effect has lasted; a Tibetan historian today, long-resident in Britain, observes that a friend 
'can't get used to the idea o f a Tibetan driving a car'. [5]
These characteristics were not constructed without basis. That Tibetans were a distinct 
ethnic group, more akin to M ongols than to Chinese or Indians, was undisputed; the 
Chinese defined them as one o f the five races forming the Chinese nation. As an ethnic 
group, Tibetans were clearly distinct from their neighbours. They maintained a unique 
social system, free o f the religiously-sanctioned divisions o f Hindu India, with aspects 
such as fraternal polyandry, which were absent from Han Chinese society. Similarly, 
Tibetan language and landscape, art, architecture, dress, and diet, as well as their economic 
and gender relations, were all clearly distinguished from those o f neighbouring cultures. 
These socio-cultural elements o f Tibetan identity can be traced back to the earliest recorded 
periods of Tibetan history around the 7th century AD., and some are clearly earlier.[6]
What was imposed by European classification was a definition which failed to allow for 
variations such as those occurring in the regions of cultural interface on the periphery o f the 
defined culture. What the British defined as Tibetan was the 'core culture', that o f the 
centre, as represented by their contact with, and allies in, central Tibet. For example, the 
British expressed their understanding o f Tibetan religion in terms which privileged the 
Gelugpa sect, which predominated in Lhasa and Shigatse, at the expense o f sects such as 
the B on , whose realms o f authority lay in the Tibetan periphery. To the cadre, the area 
centred on Lhasa, Shigatse and Gyantse was 'Tibet proper, the seat o f  the Dalai Lama and
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his Government'. [7]
Since 1947, it has become increasingly clear that, historically, Tibet included a variety of 
political and administrative formations, and that a single central administration did not 
consistently maintain authority there.[8] Tibetan territory included enclaves under the 
jurisdiction o f Bhutan and Sikkim, and, at various times in its history, power centres such 
as Shigatse conducted dealings with foreign powers without reference to Lhasa. [9]
The principalities which made up Eastern Tibet were particularly reluctant to allow Lhasa 
to exercise secular authority in their domain, and Lhasa was often, in the Eastern Tibetan 
perspective, a remote and largely nominal authority. Even the religious authority of Lhasa 
vested in the leading Gelugpa sect was not necessarily accepted in these areas, where the 
prevailing sectarian orientation was towards the Nyingma or Bon sects. [10]
The established models o f  the traditional Tibetan state formation are those hierarchal 
structures culminating in the office of the Dalai Lama, as propounded by historians such as 
Hugh Richardson. But Geoffrey Samuel has lately proposed a new model o f Tibet's power 
structure in the pre-British period. He describes it in terms o f a 'galactic polity', a 'structure 
based on a center, and regional administrations that replicated the structure o f the center'. 
The administrations within this system may fluctuate in prominence, and the primary 
central power focus may shift from one centre to another without significantly changing the 
overall identity o f the system. Samuel's model appears to provide a more realistic, and less 
Lhasa-centric explanation o f  the pre-British Tibetan pow er structure, capable o f 
incorporating extra-territorial elements such as foreign enclaves, and it may be extended 
into both religious and secular power centres, which were not always synonymous, and are 
difficult to represent hierarchically, even at a fixed point in time.[l 1]
Just as Tibet was not a modern nation-state in the sense o f  having a centralised 
administration controlled by a single government, it also failed to satisfy the demand that a 
modern nation-state should have fixed borders. The geographers, Davis and Prescott, have 
presented evidence suggesting that the concept o f boundaries was almost universal in 
traditional societies (among which, in this sense, we may include Tibet), but that formal 
delimitation of these borders was not necessarily made unless they became subject to 
dispute. The case o f Tibet's borders would appear to support this conclusion. [12]
Historically, the principal external threat to Tibet had come from China, and the Sino- 
Tibetan border was defined in a Treaty between Tibet and China as early as 821-22AD. 
Disputes in western Tibet led to the fixing of the Tibetan border with Ladakh in 1683, and 
the Tibet-Nepal border was also clearly established, as can be seen from the 1856 Treaty 
which followed war between Tibet and Nepal.[13] But as there had been no major disputes 
with India, or with Tibet's northern neighbours, neither the Indo-Tibetan border nor
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Tibet's borders with M ongolia and Sinkiang had been formally defined by the 20th 
century, although in each case their location was apparently clearly understood by both 
parties.
British definitions o f 'Tibetan1 privileged certain aspects o f culture and nation in line with 
the European understanding o f the necessary components o f a state and a people. Thus 
geographical boundaries were created, as the European definition o f a state required fixed 
boundaries. Peoples within that boundary were defined as Tibetan, and assumed to share 
the characteristics o f the core culture (although the cadre recognised that the drawing of 
India’s borders had left Tibetan' peoples within India).
The peoples o f the Tibetan region did share socio-cultural values which contributed to a 
strong sense o f collective identity, and this persisted despite changing institutional 
loyalties. [14] The key element o f this sense o f collective identity was the Tibetan Buddhist 
faith, which was an integral part o f their social and political systems. The Tibetans 
described their own identity by the term nang pa, meaning a Buddhist, or an 'insider'. 
Non-Buddhists, even those o f Tibetan race such as the minority Muslim community, were 
termed 'phyi p a ' or 'outsiders'.[15] The indigenous construction o f Tibetan identity was, 
therefore, prim arily religious, and it was this religious orientation w hich gave a 
fundamental historical unity to the Tibetan community, particularly in the face o f outside 
threats to their religion, when this unity largely submerged regional and factional divisions 
within their society.
The Tibetan conception o f themselves as a political entity was o f Tibet as a religious 
territory, the ideal home o f Buddhism. As the primary focus o f the Tibetan peoples' sense 
o f identity was their religion, it was the claim to religious authority which legitimised 
Lhasa's rule, for the Tibetans at least. Thus the Tibetan Government described Tibet in 
such term s as 'a purely religious country' and 'dedicated to the w ell-being o f 
humanity...the religious land o f Tibet'. They demonstrated that this was not purely rhetoric 
by such actions as banning, on moral grounds, the export o f live animals for slaughter in 
India.[16]
Studies examining Tibetan national identity are in their infancy, but. in a recent ground­
breaking paper, George Dreyfus concluded that the Tibetans' definition of themselves in 
relation to Buddhism dates to the period from the 12th to the 14th centuries. There was then 
a deliberate effort by Tibet's rulers to establish a sense o f Buddhist heritage in the country, 
which was aimed at recreating the strong, united Tibetan empire o f the 7th to 8th centuries. 
The 'invention o f tradition' in this period attributed the period o f  Tibetan greatness, which 
remained in their collective memory, to the Buddhist kings o f the empire period.[17]
Dreyfus's paper is an attempt to resolve the paradoxes inherent in those works which
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have portrayed nationalism as a modern construct.[18] Dreyfus recognises that while 
loyalty to a nation-state may be modern, loyalty to a national community is clearly an older 
phenomenon. He takes from Eric Hobsbawm the term 'proto-nationalism', to describe the 
Tibetan sense o f  historical continuity, whereby 'certain memories act as a focus for the 
formation o f a sense o f community', a community in which loyalties were to local, 
regional, ethnic and religious entities, rather than to the 'nation1.[19]
The Tibet which the British encountered was, therefore, a more decentralised polity than 
was immediately apparent from contact with central Tibet. It was made up o f distinct 
communities o f fluctuating importance, with a sense o f  shared identity based on socio­
cultural ties, o f which the most important was religious. But the Tibetans were largely 
devoid o f loyalty to the super-personal entities o f European statehood. [20] If  Tibet was to 
serve as an effective 'buffer state' for British India, it was necessary to develop the political 
and administrative structures within Tibet, thereby encouraging the processes which created 
a 'nation'.
SECTION 6.2: - KNOW LEDGE: THE CADRE'S PERSPECTIVE
Cadre officers passed through a process o f training and selection which produced 
individuals with a particular character and perspective. This perception was naturally liable 
to change with time, and there were also wide variations in the way individual officers 
viewed Tibet. For example, when the Gyantse Trade Agency opened, O'Connor hired a 
local religious practitioner, who 'kindly expelled all the devils and spirits from the new 
stables', in a ceremony O'Connor found 'very interesting'. In contrast, Sherriff thought 
Tibetan religious rites were 'dreadful examples o f the backwardness o f Tibet..[a]..waste o f 
m oney'.[21] Despite these variations, however, the cadre's background and training gave 
them a collective view which included belief in the superiority o f European systems o f 
knowledge, which gave priority to empirical evidence, and, implicitly, supported the 
superiority o f European cultural and political systems.
Cadre officers were interested in Tibet; they sought to learn as much as they could about 
the country and its people because it attracted them. If  it did not, they did not continue to 
serve there. But there was an overlap between political and personal motives for the cadre's 
information- gathering. When officers such as Bailey collected and classified specimens of 
Tibetan flora and fauna, or climbed unknown peaks, they considered this as a personal 
(although often profitable) pastime. Yet there was a wider significance to their actions, in 
that the collection o f scientific data in this era had significant implications for national
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prestige. The discoveries o f individuals were seen by nations as 'an important source o f 
national pride'. They also, while adding to the body o f European knowledge, helped to 
define states such as Tibet, by establishing a distinct landscape, with distinct flora and 
fauna associated with the country. In addition, for the Tibet cadre officers, these 
discoveries assisted in building personal prestige within the system. Bailey, for example, 
was widely renowned as the discoverer o f the Blue Poppy. [22]
There was another factor involved in this process, what was considered, in the ethos o f 
the time, as a higher purpose. The gathering o f positivist knowledge was seen as having a 
moral function, in enabling 'higher' (European) civilisation to 'know' the world. 
Increasing the body o f knowledge was considered to be part o f the 'civilising mission' o f 
the imperial nations. The cadre's 'founding father’, Lord Curzon, was in no doubt that this 
was part o f the wider function o f an Indian official. 'It is', he proclaimed, 'equally our duty 
to dig and discover, to classify, reproduce and describe, to copy and decipher, and to 
cherish and conserve.'[23]
The collection o f knowledge by Europeans, however, involved its conversion into 
ordered systems in English-language forms, which were considered to be based on 
scientifically verifiable data. The resulting categories were privileged by the authority o f 
European positivist science above the 'unscientific' knowledge o f local sources, which had 
originally been perceived largely as 'aged metaphysics and infantile legends'.[24]
Local informants did provide specialist data regarded as authentic by the British, but the 
European ordering o f knowledge in distinct categories o f specialist information was 
imposed on this data. Thus the British in Tibet chose to emphasise knowledge obtained 
from their Lhasa allies (rather than, for example, knowledge obtained from the Eastern 
Tibet region), and the fact that they could quote Tibetans in support o f this knowledge 
strengthened its authority in the positivist understanding.
The effect o f that categorisation o f  particular local knowledge was to confirm the 
European understanding o f T ibetans’ as a race sharing particular perceptions, and to 
institutionalise European system s o f knowledge as 'true'. Local know ledge was 
subordinated by this European appropriation o f the power to classify and define elements 
o f the local culture. The imperial systems of knowledge then acted as sources of power, for 
identifying local elites, defining ’insider’ and ’outsider’ elem ents o f a society, or 
determining 'natural1 frontiers.[25]
The knowledge o f Tibet which the cadre developed was, therefore, part o f a wider 
European movement to collate inform ation and classify it w ithin certain established 
parameters, and the cadre's collection and presentation of information was affected by this 
European perspective on the purpose and use o f knowledge.
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SECTION 6.3: - CREATING AN IMAGE
In the period leading up to the Younghusband Mission, and in accounts o f the Mission, 
British descriptions o f  Tibet and its people were predominantly negative. Percival Landon, 
the London Tim es correspondent officially attached to the Younghusband M ission, 
described the Tibetans as a 'stunted and dirty little people', a comment typical o f the time. 
British troops had recently fought Tibet, and contemporary descriptions of Tibetans were 
typical o f the discourse o f war. Frontier officers who were later to write laudatory 
descriptions o f the Tibetans commonly described them in such pejorative terms. Even Bell 
was associated with a report which described Tibetans as 'untruthful and faithless, deceitful 
and insincere', and Tibetan Buddhism  as having becom e 'a disastrous parasitic 
disease'.[26]
The Younghusband Mission created an increased demand for information concerning 
Tibet, not only by the government, but also by the British public, a demand which was 
filled by a num ber o f  works concerning the mission. These works, by officers or 
journalists accompanying Younghusband, produced a great deal o f information concerning 
Tibet, which was presented in a form designed to legitimise British actions. Thus the 
Tibetan Government and the religious system surrounding it were presented in a negative 
light, the use o f modern weapons by trained troops against primitively-armed irregular 
forces was justified, and so on. [27]
The initial British concern in Tibet was to gather information o f strategic value, a concern 
which was never entirely absent. The earliest studies by Bell, O 'Connor and their 
contemporaries, were internal government reports concerned with transport routes into 
Tibet and other information with an obvious military value. These reports firstly built up 
knowledge within the system, meaning that Secretariat officials, such as Foreign Secretary 
Dane, acquired an expertise in Tibetan matters based on the knowledge gathered by the 
cadre.
In 1909-11. the publication o f books by White and Younghusband, and Bailey's 
'Blackwoods' article, signaled the replacem ent o f the discourse o f war by a more 
sym pathetic approach, which became pronounced in the later works o f Bell and 
M acdonald.[28] Tibet was no longer portrayed as hostile; indeed in Bailey's article it was 
simply an exotic location for shikar. As will be seen. Bell and MacDonald explained Tibet 
and its culture in sympathetic and comparative terms designed to portray it as 'familiar', 
and in later years Richardson and Tucci adopted a more scholarly approach, which 
assumed the reader’s understanding o f this transformation.
Comparing two descriptions o f the 13th Dalai Lama's early period o f rule, both by cadre
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officers whom the Tibetans remember as sympathetic to them, clearly demonstrates the 
change in approach. In 1905, O'Connor described how the young Dalai Lama had acted
in accordance with the dictates o f his own untrammeled will. No person or 
party o f the State dared for a moment to oppose him. His b rief rule was 
signalised by numerous proscriptions, banishments, im prisonings and 
torturings. Neither life nor property was safe for a moment...[29]
Forty years later, Charles Bell described how the Tibetan leader in that period had had
a strong will....His courage and energy were inexhaustible; he recoiled 
from nothing..[B y]., skill, tinged with hum our...he surm ounted the 
obstacles....He was young and strong, and he worked continuously.[30]
This change in perspective was initially due to the cessation o f  hostilities with Tibet, and 
became pronounced in the new era o f Anglo-Tibetan relations w hich followed Bell's 
establishment o f friendship with the Dalai Lama. It became apparent to the cadre that, 
historically, the Dalai Lama was the only leader acceptable to all factions o f Tibetan society. 
While there may have been opposition to the application o f the Dalai Lama's policies, his 
personal status was apparently unchallenged, and there is a remarkable lack o f evidence o f 
opposition to the system itself. This made the 13th Dalai Lama the ideal figure for the 
British to befriend; by influencing him, they influenced Tibet. [31]
The cadre thus turned to the Dalai Lama as the 'natural' leader o f  Tibet. In return for 
following Bell's 'advice', the Dalai Lama received British support for his regime. Apart 
from the material aspect o f support - arms supplies, the provision o f European technical 
expertise, and so on - this took the form o f the production o f an image o f Tibet which was 
designed to serve the interests of the British, and their allies in Tibet.
British interests, from the perspective o f the Tibet cadre, required that Tibet be a strong, 
unified state, capable o f excluding foreign influence, and that it follow the 'advice' o f a 
British representative in Lhasa. While the cadre's policies, such as establishing a 
representative in Lhasa, were aimed at creating this ideal Tibet, they also attempted at the 
same time to create an image o f  Tibet which matched the ideal. Thus the image o f Tibet 
which the cadre constructed portrayed the ideal Tibet which their policies were designed to 
create. While Whitehall refused to recognise Tibet as an independent state, the cadre sought 
to make Tibetan independence a fa it accompli.
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SECTION 6.4: - ’LOCATING* TIBET
The cadre's efforts to create a Tibetan nation-state may be seen to follow the precedent of 
British influence upon the creation o f Indian identity and nationhood. In a recent paper, 
Peter Robb dem onstrates how the process by which the British gradually expanded 
sovereignty over India contributed to the creation o f Indian national structures (those 
aspects o f  centralised authority such as government, law, and boundaries), and the 
development o f new processes (those aspects o f society with a shared consciousness o f 
unified or related identity, such as traditions, values, and belief systems). [32]
Through establishing India's boundaries and claiming sovereignty within them, and by 
taking responsibility for the welfare o f the peoples therein, the British helped to create India 
as a single, defined entity, peopled by ’Indians'. They then devised strategies o f 
'improvement' designed to appeal to various social groups in order to persuade them to 
support, and identify with, the new state.[33]
The Tibet cadre similarly contributed to the development o f a Tibetan state, and a sense of 
identification and loyalty to that state, by their development of, and support for, Tibetan 
structures and processes. As Tibet lacked many o f the preconditions o f statehood, the 
British had to influence the Tibetans to create or develop the structures which made up a 
state in the European model, and encourage the growth o f the processes which would 
establish a Tibetan identity in the modem understanding, as will be seen. Again they did 
this by strategies designed to appeal to local allies, although imperial concerns remained 
paramount to the British.
We have seen that defined borders were the fundamental indicator o f a state in the 
European model, whereas pre-modern states 'were defined by centres, borders were 
porous and indistinct, and sovereignties faded imperceptibly into one another'.[34] The 
primary political requisite o f the Tibetan border for the British was to secure India against 
foreign invasion. This concern with security meant that the Government o f India sought a 
border serving her interests, rather than a border based on mutual agreement between 
neighbouring states. The British therefore imposed a border, which included elements 
which were to bring continual problems between India, and its northern neighbour, 
whether Tibet or China.[35]
The political boundaries imposed by the British, which defined India as a geographical 
state, were drawn as lines o f defence, not to define India along racial, linguistic or religious 
lines. The state o f India was created by these borders; the borders were not marking o ff a 
pre-existing 'India'.[36]
The parallel effect o f this creation o f India on Tibet, was to define it as outside India. This
was symbolised administratively by the posting o f Foreign Department Politicals, rather 
than ICS administrators, to represent the Government o f India's interests there. This did 
not immediately preclude attempts by frontiersmen in Tibet, and elsewhere, to expand these 
frontiers, but, with time, the boundaries acquired a definitive character despite the absence 
o f formal demarcation in some areas.
In fixing boundaries o f defence for India, the British twice attempted to define areas o f 
Tibetan territory as 'Indian'. As we have seen, Younghusband tried to make the Chumbi 
Valley part o f  India, but Whitehall prevented this, in a significant step towards imposing 
central control over frontier policy. In the previous century such m easures as 
Younghusband's were almost invariably the prelude for the extension o f the frontiers o f the 
British Empire, but now Whitehall had called a halt to expansion, and the frontiersmen 
were forced to accept W hitehall's authority. Instead o f  being absorbed into India, and 
subjected to a process of'Indianisation ', the British defined the Chumbi as Tibetan, and 
encouraged Lhasa to exert its authority there.[37]
The cadre did not, however, abandon their efforts to secure a border which served 
India's strategic interests by securing possible invasion routes from, or to, Tibet. Having 
failed to gain control o f the Chumbi, they turned their attention to Tawang, which, as Lamb 
states, Bell sought to bring inside India 'as a potential replacem ent for the Chumbi 
Valley...as a British outpost on the Tibetan plateau: from thence would radiate British 
political, cultural and economic influence'.[38]
Bell used the Simla Convention to annex Tawang and several smaller areas. In addition to 
the Convention itself, negotiated between Britain, China and Tibet, there were two separate 
agreements made then between the British and the Tibetans. These were formalised through 
an exchange o f notes, which were attached to the Convention. One note placed the British 
Trade Agencies on a firmer footing, the other made Tawang part o f India.[39] Tawang was 
unquestionably part o f Tibet prior to 1914, and accepted as such by both Bell and the 
Government o f India. But as Bell advised his government, the Simla Convention meant 
'the cession by Tibet to us o f the Tawang district....Also...other tracts o f  Tibetan territory 
on...the north-east frontier’.[40]
There is no record of how Bell, the guiding hand in M acM ahon’s Simla negotiations, 
persuaded Lonchen Shatra, the Tibetan Chief Minister and representative at the Simla 
Convention, to agree to cede Tawang. Certainly it was not with the Dalai Lama’s approval. 
As Bell himself described, the Tibetan leader publicly demonstrated his dissatisfaction with 
the results o f his Minister's negotiations by summoning Lonchen Shatra for an interview at 
6 a.m. and then making him wait until 5 p.m. for the audience.[41] But it appears that, in 
this instance, the dictates o f the cadre's primary purpose, ensuring the security o f India,
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meant their allies' claims, however well-founded, were disregarded.
Lonchen Shatra may simply have been naive. The newly independent Tibetan 
Government were grateful to Bell and his government for sheltering them during their 
exile, and were concerned with the threat from China, not India. Bell's notes record his 
plan to absorb Tawang into India, while avoiding direct payment, which would 'make us a 
party to interference with the integrity o f Tibet'. Bell suggested that money should be given 
later, 'for some supposedly unconnected purpose'. In the event, a different currency was 
used. A month after Tibet signed the Treaty, and ceded Tawang, the Government o f India 
supplied it with five thousand rifles and half a million rounds o f ammunition. [42]
An incidental consequence o f the annexation o f Tawang may have been Drepung 
monasteries’s opposition to the British; Tawang monastery paid annual tribute to Loseling 
College o f Drepung, which ceased when the British took over. Loseling was at the centre 
o f opposition to Bell's Lhasa visit. [43]
It is doubtful that Whitehall understood the significance o f the annexation, or even knew 
that Tibetan territory had been taken; within a month o f the conclusion o f the Simla 
Conference, Britain was at war with Germany, and events on the periphery of empire were 
given little attention. But the consequences were far-reaching. The loss o f Tawang was 
never accepted by the Tibetans and, as Tibet legally could cede territory only if it was a 
sovereign state, which China did not accept, the Chinese also refused to recognise its loss. 
Tawang was to be an important issue in the 1962 Indo-China war.[44]
The British role in defining the Tibetan frontier was obscured until it was brought out by 
the works o f Alastair Lamb. Officers such as Bell and MacDonald made no mention of 
Tawang in their memoirs; Richardson refers to the situation there as having aroused ’some 
resentment from the Tibetan Government' but he does not mention its former status.[45] 
The British preferred to refer to Tibet's 'natural' or 'traditional' borders, concepts which 
reinforced the image o f Tibet as a state with clearly defined, rather than constructed, 
frontiers. But the attem pted annexation o f the Chumbi V alley, the successful 
commandeering o f Tawang, and O'Connor's plan to divide Tibet, are all evidence that the 
British did not originally perceive Tibet as a single, geographically defined state. Rather 
they sought to create a Tibet which served the interests o f the Government o f India. Thus 
Tibet's southern borders were created, not determined.
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SECTION 6.5: - DEVELOPING NATIONALISM
Although they had defined Tibet geographically, the cadre were well aware that,
W hile...there is a definite area within which Tibetan culture and religious 
ideas are predominant, this area does not necessarily coincide with the 
effective limits o f Chinese and Tibetan administration at any particular 
time. [46]
As part o f their effort to transform Tibet into a modem nation-state, the British therefore 
encouraged the Tibetan Government to undertake the processes o f asserting sovereignty 
and state responsibility for its citizens.
Lhasa was encouraged to demonstrate its authority over Tibet's outlying areas. For 
example, Bell gave the Dalai Lama 'constant advice' that he should improve the quality o f 
his administration in Eastern Tibet in order to prevent the local people from favouring 
Chinese adm inistration. This, Bell stated in an implicit acknowledgement o f  Tibet's 
previous lack o f unity, would mean that 'eastern Tibetans add their wide territories to the 
rule o f Lhasa and work for a united Tibet'.[47]
Unity was regarded by the British as an essential element o f  a strong state. It had been 
one o f the advantages which O 'Connor had seen in creating a state in southern Tibet 
centred around the Panchen Lama. After the Dalai Lama's return to Tibet in 1912, 
however, Bell was concerned to ensure that future cadre officers should, in their dealings 
with the Panchen Lama, avoid 'encouraging... any aspirations towards independence of 
Lhasa'. Bell clearly stated that 'We want a united Tibet'; abetting the Dalai Lama to 
centralise his administration was one means towards this. [48]
While encouraging the development o f national structures, the cadre simultaneously 
sought to reinforce the processes which linked 'Tibet' and 'Tibetans', and to create a sense 
o f nationalism there. They pursued a variety of schemes which, as Gould clearly stated, 
were aimed at 'developing the...national consciousness o f Tibet'.[49]
One example o f this was the stimulus given by Ludlow's school, and the Gould Mission, 
to the creation o f a Tibetan football team. Ludlow's school team adopted 'Tibetan colours' 
o f yellow and maroon. Gould's M ission created a 'Tibetan' team, which played, under 
British auspices, against other defined races in Lhasa; the Nepalese, the British, the 
Ladakhis and so on. Similarly, Ludlow and his successors encouraged Tibetan pupils at 
British schools to wear their national dress, and Ludlow chose to give photos o f the Dalai 
Lama as school prizes, rather than cash. Other policy initiatives, such as donations to
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monasteries, were designed to give 'the right background to the ideas we seek to 
propagate'. [50]
There is insufficient evidence to judge the extent to which the British contributed to the 
Tibetans' adoption o f many external symbols o f nationality, such as stamps, currency and a 
flag, but certainly the Tibetans' choice o f the tune 'God Save the King' as their national 
anthem suggests British influence! There were few areas where the cadre could not see (or 
claim to see) means o f developing Tibetan nationalism. Gould, for example, claimed that: 
'There are distinct signs that the grant o f free transit [for Tibetan goods on Indian railways] 
tends to foster amongst Tibetans the development o f a feeling o f nationality.'[51]
The cadre intended these policies to strengthen Tibet, and the position o f British allies 
there, and policies such as supporting the concentration o f power in the hands o f the Dalai 
Lama and his administration were designed to appeal to these allies. But this upset the 
delicate power-balance in Tibet, and without active British intervention there, which was 
not a realistic option, British allies were unable to complete the processes initiated by the 
British.
Ultimately, the British were largely unsuccessful in their efforts to foster Tibetan 
nationalism. The American journalist, Archie Steele, who visited Lhasa in 1944, observed 
'few stirrings o f nationalism as yet in Buddhist Tibef.[52] Richardson, asked in 1951 
whether Tibet's monks were loyal to their religion or their government, answered that the 
monks were
madly loyal to their religion and to the Dalai Lama, but [that] they are not 
very fond o f the executive....It is religion and the head o f the religion that 
commands their loyalty.[53]
Thus it appears that British efforts to foster Tibetan nationalism had had little effect, and 
that the Tibetans continued to regard themselves as a religious, rather than a nation, state. 
But the British had built on Tibetan proto-nationalism, and established many o f the 
necessary foundations for the development o f nationalism. It appears that, even though the 
structures o f Tibet were destroyed or radically altered by the Chinese invasion, the 
necessary processes had been started, and that Tibetan nationalism then took its current 
powerful form in response to the assertion o f Chinese imperial control o f Tibet. [54] That 
situation has parallels with the emergence o f Indian nationalism in response to the British 
imperial presence.
187
SECTION 6.6: - M ODERNISATION
As Tibet increasingly came into contact with the outside world, it inevitably faced 
pressures to modernise its institutions. As the Chinese were themselves modernising on the 
European model, British and Chinese efforts to modernise Tibet emphasised the same 
means and objectives. The only question was which country would control the process. 
Modernisation became part o f the cadre's attempts to establish a strong Tibetan identity and 
locate it in the modern world.
A number o f factors are involved in the process o f a state's transition from pre-modern to 
modern, and there is no precise definition of'm odernisation1. I use the term in the sense 
defined by Stephen Becker in regard to Russian Central Asia. Becker defines four areas in 
which the transformation o f structures and processes takes place. There is an intellectual 
acceptance o f secular and rational ideas, an economic revolution as a result o f the adoption 
of'post-Newtonian scientific technology', a social transformation involving the growth of 
literacy, social mobility, and the formation o f a new professional class, and a political 
change towards centralised administration, increased social activity by government, and an 
increase in public participation in political activity. To this might be added the adoption of 
symbols o f modernity, such as flags, stamps, and national organisations. [55]
Bell used his friendship with the Dalai Lama to ensure that the British guided Tibet's 
modernisation. During the period 1913-21, he encouraged the Dalai Lama to bring Tibetan 
structures and processes in line with European models o f modern states. Foreign experts 
were brought to Tibet to assist the development o f communications and modern mining 
techniques; Tibet's m ilitary forces were reorganised, and plans were made for the 
introduction o f western-style education. The Dalai Lama was encouraged to reform the 
economic basis o f the country in order to develop the financial resources necessary for 
modernisation in the absence o f foreign financial aid, which Bell could not offer.
These developments were all features o f modern states; they also, as Bell recognised, 
functioned as aspects o f  imperial power, making the Tibetans 'economically and militarily 
dependent on us to just that extent that is desirable’.[56] Aspects such as the introduction of 
western education were designed to ensure that 'the future administrators o f  Tibet...gain 
their ideas...from England rather than...any other country.'[57]
Modernisation was to have far-reaching consequences for Tibet. The process raised 
questions o f  social values, and threatened to produce rivalries and passions outside 
accepted and acceptable channels. The required breakdown o f  existing social structures, 
and the streamlining o f power sources, began to threaten Tibet's fragile national unity, and
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even the secular position o f the Dalai Lama himself. The growth o f military power, and 
social changes, were particularly threatening to the monastic power structure. Bell was 
made personally aware o f  these problems during his visit to Lhasa in 1920-21, when his 
own safety was threatened by monastic elements opposed to modernisation policies.[58]
These threats to Tibetan social stability, not least the events surrounding Laden La in 
1923-24, caused the Dalai Lama to abandon the modernisation process in the mid-1920s. 
M odernisation continued, but at a more gradual pace, and on a piecemeal basis largely 
outside government control. The cadre became more cautious in promoting changes in 
Tibet. Only aspects likely to be o f obvious and im m ediate value, such as radio 
communications and modem medical aid, were now introduced. The result was that at the 
time o f the Chinese invasion Tibetan society had not undergone rapid changes. The cadre 
had failed to create Tibet as a modern state in the European definition. This sequence o f 
events appears to support W.J.Mommsen's conclusion, that colonial policies o f support for 
established local elites 'often had a decisive effect in preventing the political and social 
modernization o f  the indigenous societies'. [59]
The traditional Tibetan power structure under the Dalai Lama was an extremely 
conservative force, strongly resistant to change. [60] By allying themselves with this elite, 
the British did aid its survival. They helped prevent the emergence o f any alternative ruling 
structures, and, by acquiescing in Tibet's rejection o f modernisation, which might have 
broken down the traditional structures which were preventing change, they allowed the 
system to continue largely unaltered. The cadre, in the absence o f any significant support 
from their government for policies which would have produced change, continued to 
support their local allies, and to regard any elements opposing these allies as being 
motivated by pro-Chinese (republican or communist) sympathies, with possible Russian 
connections always considered.[61]
SECTION 6.7: - IMAGES. CORE AND SECONDARY.
The image o f Tibet which the British created was multi-faceted, with secondary images 
(those which support, or have other purposes), around a 'core' image (that which 'gathers 
and organizes imagery'). [62] The core image was the political one; Tibet becoming a 
modern nation-state, united under a single government sovereign within its borders, and 
existing as a friendly neighbour to British India.
This core image was most clearly articulated by Bell, who wove the key ingredients 
together. Thus he described how 'M odern Tibet... rejects the Chinese suzerainty and
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claims the status o f an independent nation', a nation in which 'national sentiment...is now a 
growing force'. The Dalai Lama was 'determined to free Tibet as far as possible from 
Chinese rule.' In th is he had the support o f  the 'the m ajority o f the T ibetan 
race..[who]..see in him...the only means o f attaining their goal.' In support o f this, Bell 
quoted a Tibetan noble as stating that 'All [Tibetans] like his [the Dalai Lama's] having 
supreme power'. The attitude to Britain o f this 'self-governing country', was 'one o f 
cordial friendship’ and the Dalai Lama was quoted as saying that as British and Tibetans 
were 'both religious peoples', they could 'live in amity together', whereas the Chinese 
were not religious, and were thus incompatible with the Tibetans. Tibet would, Bell 
predicted, ’at length secure[s] recognition o f  the integrity and autonomy o f her 
territory'. [63]
The core image which Bell articulated was the basis for the British construction o f an 
image o f Tibet. Later cadre officers followed his definitions and assumed their readers' 
familiarity with his works. For example, Spencer-Chapman suggested that readers might 
compare an illustration in his book with the same scene in an earlier work o f Bell's, and 
Hopkinson could state in 1950 that 'I do not wish to waste your time by repeating facts o f 
ancient history with which you are already familiar from books and articles, such as Sir 
Charles Bell's.'[64]
The cadre constantly reinforced this core image. Thus typically we read in these works 
that the 'Dalai Lama is, o f course, absolute ruler in all things spiritual as well as temporal.' 
Cadre officers describe their 'friendly personal discussion[s]' with Tibetan officials, and 
state that 'Ever since 1912 the T ibetans have, in fact, been unquestionably 
independent.'[65]
Around this core image were secondary images, designed to reinforce the core image. 
These could consist o f aspects o f the core image which were inconsistent with European 
understanding being presented in positive forms; for example, the Dalai Lama's supreme 
authority, extreme, and certainly undem ocratic by British standards, was defended; 
'Naturally there will always be some who from jealousy or other motives criticize one who 
has the strength o f character to assume such autocratic power.'[66]
Other secondary images were subjective judgments whose authority rested on that of their 
author's empirical observation. Thus, the aristocrats surrounding the Dalai Lama had 'the 
distinguished bearing and perfect natural manners o f an ancient and proud civilization'. 
Further down the social scale were the 'common people', 'extraordinarily friendly...always 
cheery', who 'unwashed as they may be... are always laughing'. Certainly, as Richardson 
notes, with little exaggeration, visitors o f different nationalities 'all agree in describing the 
Tibetans as kind, gentle, honest, open and cheerful': this was one o f the attractions o f
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service there. But this portrayal o f Tibet in positive and sympathetic terms also served cadre 
interests by creating the impression o f Tibet as a worthy ally, [67]
There were few aspects o f the British knowledge of Tibet which could not be used as 
supporting elements o f  the core image they sought to project. Evidence o f Chinese misrule, 
or contempt for Tibet, such as their A m bans ' failure to learn Tibetan, bolstered Tibet's 
claim to independence, or contrasted unfavourably with British assistance, and respect for 
Tibetan culture. Descriptions o f the Dalai Lama and his court brought out the well-ordered 
nature o f the society, and the validity o f his traditional authority. Phrases such 'The 
Tibetans believe...'[68] enhanced the image o f Tibetans as a unified people.
By emphasising the validity o f Tibetan institutions, and the cultural unity o f its people, 
the cadre presented Tibet as a viable and friendly neighbouring state to India, with a 
historical culture which was o f particular value. As we have seen, the cadre were keen to 
support travellers such as Tucci, who brought out these aspects o f Tibet's historical 
culture. This judgm ent o f Tibetan culture as being of value went beyond the definition of 
Tibetans by their culture, and clearly implied the possession o f qualities which were o f 
'rare value to the rich diversity o f the w orld '.[69] Tibet was promoted as possessing 
qualities which the West had lost, as will be seen in Section 6.10.
The reliance on a particular class o f allies within Tibet, the Lhasa ruling elite, meant that 
the British constructed this image in line with the perspective o f that elite; it was a Lhasa- 
centric image, which reflected a delicate balance between the requirements o f the British 
and their Lhasa allies. The British understanding of states as defined by their centre, and 
their alliance with elements o f the Lhasa ruling class, meant that the Lhasa perspective was 
privileged, and regional perspectives (including those o f  British observers such as 
W.H.King referred to in Chapter Two) were submerged.
This perspective was by no means a distortion, but regional and sectarian differences may 
have been subsumed by this image of unity under the unquestioned religious and secular 
authority of the Dalai Lama. The information obtained from the Lhasa ruling class did not. 
for example, articulate the interests o f Eastern Tibetan principalities which sometimes 
aspired to closer ties with China. The need to define Tibetan structures in terms of 
European political formations may have prevented a fuller understanding of Tibet's power 
structures, relations with its neighbours, and aspirations.
The image o f Tibet created by the British became the dominant political image held in the 
West, and. as it reflected their perspective, it has been largely accepted as accurate by the 
Tibetan Government-in-exile. Those aspects in which scholarship might question its 
accuracy are those where alternative voices are revealed, albeit without emphasis, in the 
available British sources. Thus questions should be asked concerning the social harmony.
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and sense o f national and religious identity, o f various communities outside Tibet's central 
provinces o f U and Tsang, and o f groups such as the Ragyaba , disposers o f the dead, 
whose status virtually equated to India's 'untouchables'.
Such work as has been done in this area does not, however, suggest it is liable to lead to 
any major revisions o f the received image o f Tibet beyond a more balanced view o f the 
aspirations o f marginalised groups in Tibetan society. Tibet does appear to have been a 
relatively homogeneous society, with little opposition to the Dalai Lama's rule, and, as the 
British image reflects the perspective o f the Dalai Lama's Government, it is a close 
reflection o f the self-image o f the Lhasa Tibetan ruling class, which remains the dominant 
Tibetan voice today.[70]
SECTION 6.8: - THE M YSTICAL TMAGE
The principal competition to the image o f  Tibet produced by the cadre was, and is, the 
'mystical' image, Tibet as a sacred land in which the paranormal was commonplace. This 
image has co-existed with a political image since the earliest European encounters with the 
region. [71] The mystic image was created by a different process from that o f the political 
image, a process which has recently been examined in a seminal study by Peter Bishop. 
Bishop examines the writings of European travellers in and around Tibet during the period 
1773-1959 to show how these works influenced the development o f the idea o f Tibet as a 
sacred site, ultimately producing an image, or series o f images, which separated the 
concept of Tibet as a sacred site from that o f Tibet as a geographical place. [72]
Although Bishop is not concerned with the historical antecedents o f this ’sacred Tibet', 
he might be criticised for neglecting the historical basis for the European construct. 
Himalayan Tibet, in particular the Mount Kailas-Lake Manasarovar region, has held sacred 
associations for Indian religions since the pre-Christian era. There are references to the 
Himalayas in the earliest known Indian text, the Rg Veda, and by the period of'C lassical 
Hinduism' (c600 BC to c200AD) the Kailas-Manasarovar region was firmly located in the 
sacred geography o f the sub-continent. [73] In addition to numerous references to the 
Himalayas as sacred sites in both o f the classical Indian epics, the Ram ayana  and the 
Mahabharata, we have the Skanda Parana text which asserts that 'As the dew is dried up 
by the morning sun, so are the sins o f men blotted out at the sight o f the Himalayas'. [74] 
Tibet's image as a sacred land in the Indian imagination therefore predates the encounter 
with the West.
European mystical discourse on Tibet was aimed at other Europeans, and was expressed
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in the language o f myth, not reality. Hence it contrasted with the more prosaic views o f 
those in regular contact with the Tibetans. But as the cadre also appealed to a European 
audience they were forced to confront this alternative image, and they found it could serve 
as a useful secondary image with which to promote the idea of Tibet as a separate state. The 
two images were separate, and my concern is not with the construction or content o f  this 
mystical image, but the means by which the cadre dealt with it demonstrates their ability to 
use images for a political purpose.
The mystical image was part o f  the attraction o f  service in Tibet. Younghusband in 
particular understood Lhasa as having a wider, symbolic significance, and underwent 
powerful spiritual experiences there which led him to pursue this path at the expense o f his 
career in government service. Significantly, this in no way damaged his prestige within the 
Tibet cadre, and the last British Political Officer Sikkim, Arthur Hopkinson, also retired to 
a spiritual life (albeit in more conventional form as an Anglican clergyman). Tibetan 
religion was o f  genuine interest to most cadre officers, and while, as Mark Cocker has 
observed, the Younghusband Mission failed to confirm 'the mystic image o f Tibet in some 
empirically verifiable form', it remained part o f the allure of service there. [75]
The cadre found that this pre-existing image could serve British interests and reach a 
wider audience than their own. There was 110 inherent conflict between the two images. It 
was not a political issue in the sense that neither the Chinese, nor the Russians, sought 
political benefit by emphasising Tibet's mystical aura. The mystic image reinforced Tibet's 
separate identity, and was a positive moral image, both factors which the cadre sought to 
emphasise; it could, therefore, assist British aims. Consequently, as long as travellers 
avoided referring to political matters, and maintained British prestige, the cadre had no 
particular objection to the Tibetan journeys o f those sincerely interested in Tibet's spiritual 
culture. [76] They took a benign view o f even the most eccentric of these visitors if  they 
steered clear o f political matters, but sought to exclude even renowned scholars whom they 
considered politically unreliable.[77]
Alexandra David-Neel trod a fine line here. While the British objected to her ignoring 
their frontier travel regulations, and com menting on the British policy o f  excluding 
travellers from Tibet, her works were immensely popular, and enhanced Tibet's separate 
identity, thus furthering British Indian interests. There was also a personal factor in that 
David-Neel studied Tibetan mysticism while generally remaining within the Western 
academic tradition, a synthesis the cadre could admire. By presenting herself as a pro- 
British European with a similar class background and attitudes to the cadre's own, she 
gained their acceptance as a harmless, even admirable, traveller from within the tradition o f 
aristocratic European 'eccentrics'.[78]
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Thus mysticism added to the attraction o f Tibet, and the mystical image was implicitly 
encouraged by the cadre through their writings. While these inherently contradicted many 
aspects o f the mystical image through positivist analysis, and because the authors had not 
observed any scientifically inexplicable events there, these works simultaneously enhanced 
the image by their use o f metaphors and symbols o f  rem ote space, isolation, and 
timelessness. For example, the introduction to Younghusband's account o f his mission to 
Lhasa describes Tibet as 'a mysterious, secluded country in the remote hinterland of the 
Himalayas'.[79] That they did not observe any scientifically inexplicable events was even a 
matter o f regret to the British in Tibet. Spencer-Chapman, Secretary on the Gould Mission 
to Lhasa in 1936-37, observed that the Tibetans 'may believe implicitly in various psychic 
phenomena' but that 'I was never fortunate enough to witness these m yself .[80]
There were limits to the cadre's endorsement of Tibetan mysticism. In practice the cadre 
were reluctant to accept incidents which the Tibetans regarded as miraculous. MacDonald 
described seeing the corpse o f a Chumbi Valley monastery oracle, only for the 'corpse' to 
revive four days later. 'I suppose' wrote M acDonald 'this m ust have been a case o f 
suspended animation, for no other explanation would fit the circumstances.' On the other 
hand, Bell, in an unpublished manuscript, observed without comment that the Gangtok 
Residency had ghosts. There was an 'apparition o f an old women, also a boy and girl' 
which were harmless, but there was also a ghost described as having 'the body o f a red 
mule and the head o f tiger'. Bell wrote that 'whenever one of my police orderlies saw it he 
fired a shot at it immediately’.[81]
It appears that such tales partly reflected a sense o f  Tibet's distinctive 'Otherness'. 
Photographs in the officers' books must also have reinforced this sense. For however 
familiarising the text, there was little or nothing familiar in the photographs, and much that 
was strange to the European mind, such as frozen waterfalls and 'A Priest..[with]..cup 
made from a skull, and drum made from two skulls'. This latter image o f 'Otherness' 
proved a particularly strong one; Bell, MacDonald, and Spencer-Chapman all included a 
similar illustration.[82] Ultimately the cadre were content to support the mystical image 
because of its political value in demonstrating that Tibet had a valuable, unique culture, and 
a distinct identity.
SECTION 6.9: - 'FAMILIAR' OR ’OTHER1
The need to present Tibet as both a worthy ally o f the British and a separate and distinct 
entity from China meant that the image which the British constructed contained elements in
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which Tibet was rendered as ’Other'. It also had elements in which it was portrayed as 
'familiar'. This paradox was never fully resolved. As Peter Bishop states, 'Tibet...always 
sustained an independent Otherness', it was 'imbued with a mixture o f both the romance of 
the unknown and the defence o f the known.'[83]
Despite their partial endorsement o f  Tibet's 'strangeness', the cadre did attempt to define 
and describe Tibet in terms which would transform it from 'Other' to 'familiar' in the 
European consciousness. This was part o f a wider effort aimed at enabling Europeans to 
'know' and understand the world, but it also had distinct political implications. Tibet was 
not a British colony, but a buffer against Chinese and Russian intrusion into India. This 
meant that Tibet was not placed in opposition to British interests and was partly removed 
from colonial discourse. As an 'ally' o f British India, Tibet had to be portrayed in a 
positive, 'familiar', light.
The works o f officers such as Bell and MacDonald played an important part in bringing 
Tibet into the realm o f the 'familiar'. One method they used was a common journalistic 
device, applying comparisons to translate Tibetan institutions and personalities into familiar 
images. Lhasa was compared with Rome, the Dalai Lama with the Pope, and Sera and 
Drepung monasteries with Oxford and Cambridge. Bell even translated Tibetan personal 
names in an effort to make them more 'familiar'; thus he refers to Tsarong (Shape) as 
'Clear Eye'.[84]
Spencer-Chapman was a strong exponent o f this technique. He noted, for example, that 
'As Salisbury Cathedral towers above the city and plain at its feet, so the Potala completely 
dominates the vale of Lhasa.' He described how Nayapso la 'looks more like a Scottish 
loch every day except there is no heather on the hills', and, in common with many other 
observers, found that Tibetan Buddhist 'ritual and chanting recalls a Roman Catholic High 
Mass'. This effort to present aspects o f Tibet in terms familiar to Europeans was made in 
the language o f the dominant culture with which these authors identified, whether they 
were British or otherwise. Thus MacDonald described how, 'The climate o f the Chumbi 
Valley is ideal, not unlike that o f England', although at the time he wrote this he had never 
been to England![85]
We have previously noted indications that the production o f an image o f Tibet was 
principally aimed at readers o f the cadre's own social class, and that the earliest emphasis in 
the building up of a body of knowledge o f Tibet was upon items likely to be o f military or 
strategic value against foreign pow ers.[86] In that this knowledge was shaped by a 
hierarchal power relationship, as it was produced by the Government o f India as a part o f 
their concern with the security of India's northern border, it can be seen to have been 
produced as an element of colonial domination. Yet knowledge which was of military value
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had restricted circulation. The image of Tibet ’produced’ by the British (after the early 
period o f conflict with Tibet) was predominantly a positive image. It reinforced, and to an 
extent created, Tibetan identity, and was thus useful as much to the Tibetan Government as 
to the Government o f India.
Colonial discourses o f control were designed to reinforce an image o f the subject peoples 
as requiring, or even desiring, European rule, and were expressed in terms of'O therness'. 
While the cadre certainly promoted such images, particularly in the early years o f the 
Tibetan encounter, once it had become apparent that W hitehall would not perm it an 
extension o f British Indian authority across the Tibetan frontier, there was a concerted 
effort to portray Tibet as a country whose people shared British aspirations towards 
freedom and independence.
The predominant mode o f expression in British Tibetan discourse appears more akin to 
what Lionel Caplan, in discussing the image o f  the Gurkhas, has called 'a pastoral mode', 
than to that o f 'Orientalism'. As Caplan notes, scholars such as Ronald Inden have argued 
that Orientalist writing on South Asia 'places exclusive stress on difference'. Caplan has 
shown the Gurkha as represented in the writings o f British military officers, as 'having 
become an honorary European, assuming the latter's characteristics and sharing his 
attitudes to and distance from the Oriental "other",' The cadre attempted to portray Tibetans 
similarly as 'familiar'.[87]
The 'pastoral' mode, a term originally used by Kenneth Burke, describes a discourse in 
which subordinate peoples in the imperial process are represented in approving terms, 
enabling unequal relationships to be portrayed as characterised by 'immense courtesy, 
respect and affection'. While maintaining the dominant aspect o f the relationship, this 
discourse is not primarily concerned with power, in the sense usually associated with 
'Orientalism'. The subjects are not exoticised, rather the shared inherent qualities o f  both 
parties are emphasised, and the paternal relationship is portrayed as based on mutual 
respect. [88]
While this pastoral mode is, Caplan concludes. Orientalist in the sense that it is 
knowledge which speaks for others, and in that it 'functions as an element o f (colonial or 
neo-colonial) dom ination', it is principally an attempt to bring the subjects into the 
'familiar'. Caplan describes a discourse of'self-reflection', produced by authors who were 
primarily ex-Gurkha officers, with 'a vested interest in the subject'. Their production of 
this perspective can be seen against the background o f the authors' desire to protect their 
interests at a time o f change, and was aimed primarily at the dominant class, 'whatever its 
effect on the subordinate classes'.[89] In the Tibetan context this is characterised by the 
writings o f Bell and Macdonald.
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Caplan's conclusion that the 'pastoral' mode represents an attempt to transform its 
subjects into the 'familiar' equates with that o f Bishop, who uses term s which imply 
transformation o f Tibet into a sacred place for the British, 'Such a fundamental reference 
point must belong ...to a culture, to its sense o f itself, to its quest for meaning.'[90] 
Certainly the spiritual aspect was a crucial factor in transforming Tibet into a 'familiar' 
place; the mystic image itself was a great attraction. It was also so obviously a means by 
which Tibet could be presented in a positive light, that it was neither desirable nor possible 
to eliminate it entirely. Tibet's concern with religion demanded a positive response; the 
British were not unaffected by adm iration for this priority. Thus the discourse was 
uniquely brought, by Tibet's spiritual ethos, into areas o f meaning not normally associated 
with the definition o f region, territory and state. Could a state define itself by religion, and 
exist with only a token military force?
That Caplan's conclusions may be applied in the Tibetan context becomes apparent in the 
later writings o f officers such as Hopkinson, which contain soliloquies very far removed 
from 'Orientalism*. Thus Hopkinson described how the Tibetans 'value their independence 
as much as you or I do'.[91] As noted in more detail in the next section, Hopkinson 
questioned the value o f the Anglo-Tibetan encounter. Observing its effects, he asked 'What 
benefit will it be to a man or a country if  he gain the whole world and lose his own 
soul?'[92]
This is very far removed from the discourse o f control that is the basis o f the Orientalist 
argument. It also goes beyond the perception o f a dichotom y whereby the spiritual 
superiority o f the 'East' meant a consequent inability to construct effective political 
structures. Hopkinson implied that Tibet's political structures were in some ways superior, 
and that this was because o f their more spiritual basis. In this discourse, Tibet became not 
only 'familiar', but even superior.
The image o f Tibet, however, was never brought fully into the realm o f the 'familiar'. 
The need to emphasise Tibet's social and cultural differences with China meant that the 
British presented memorable images o f Tibetan uniqueness, and these images, such as 
descriptions o f 'sky burials' reinforced concepts of Tibet as 'Other'. The restrictions 
imposed by W hitehall meant the cadre failed to establish Tibet's precise identity and 
location, and, in addition, the attraction o f the mystical image o f Tibet meant that it retained 
a spiritual location outside geographical place.
The failure to establish Tibet as fully 'familiar' also reflected the fact that for most o f the 
British who served there, Tibet retained at least some degree of'O therness'. Most British 
officers expected service in Tibet to be an encounter with the ’Other', and were content that 
it should be. While they created a discourse of the 'familiar', even those officers with the
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greatest understanding confronted those aspects o f Tibet, such as the Tibetan's disregard 
for western scientific 'truths', w hich while not necessarily significant, rem ained 
fundamentally incompatible with European knowledge and understanding.
SECTION 6.10: - ISSUES OF MORALITY
The process o f defining Tibet as a nation, and transforming structures and processes 
there to create a Tibetan national identity, raised the issue o f how, or if, the qualities 
defined as essential aspects o f 'Tibet' and 'Tibetan' could be maintained when Tibet was 
modernised. Later cadre officers, such as Richardson and Hopkinson, saw in the social 
structure they encountered, a system with genuine merits, which deeply challenged their 
view of the value of their own society. They considered that modernisation was corrupting 
the Tibetan values they admired.
These values were not just those created by the processes which the British had initiated; 
they were those the British and their allies saw as inherent in Tibetan identity. The religious 
identity of Tibetan proto-nationalism implied and articulated the privileging of certain ethical 
and humanitarian qualities. For example, the 13th Dalai Lama, on his accession to power in 
1895. proclaim ed that the Tibetans' Buddhist character gave them  such virtues as 
'compassionate hospitality'.[93] These values were seen as threatened by the increasing 
Tibetan contact with Western culture.
Arthur Hopkinson. the last British Political Officer Sikkim, was particularly concerned 
that the encounter with modern culture had brought 'the worst aspects o f capitalism' to 
Tibet. [94] In addition to his concern with the political implications o f this issue. Hopkinson 
also began to question the accepted ideas o f cultural values which underlay the imperial 
process. Noting 'the happiness, contentment, self-sufficiency, and liberty' o f the Tibetans, 
he concluded that 'the modern world has more to learn from Tibet than to teach [it]'.[95]
Hopkinson realised that changes in Tibet had had consequences very different from those 
intended. Some o f these results directly threatened British aims there. For example, when 
the cadre encouraged education in Tibet, they intended it to strengthen Tibetan identity. 
Gyantse school headmaster Frank Ludlow had been determined to ensure that pupils at his 
school 'adhere to their own customs, and wear their national dress'. While British-style 
schools in Tibet failed to survive conservative opposition, some Tibetans saw benefits in 
western education, and began sending their children to schools in India. But there they 
received ideas from schools 'founded on the underlying idea o f [the] racial, religious or 
cultural superiority of the Vatican or Salt Lake City to the Potala'. Hopkinson considered
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these schools 'set out, with the kindliest o f motives, ultimately to demoralise them... [and to 
teach them] to despise their own country'.[96]
Although the Tibet cadre generally tried to restrict foreigners travelling to Tibet to those of 
their own 'type', there were always imperial elements which believed that contact with 
Western civilisation was beneficial to Tibet. White had argued that 'the more Tibetans come 
into contact with Europeans the better', and in the late 1940s, Hopkinson noted how 'One 
important diplomatic lady in Delhi said to me "Of course I'm going [to Tibet]; it is good for 
them."' But, as Hopkinson concluded, 'The Tibetans take a different view.'[97] 
Hopkinson's comments, on the eve o f the British departure from Tibet, reflect his own 
values, as well as the characteristic identification o f imperial officials with the peoples 
among whom they lived and worked. But his conclusion was a significant development, 
representing a view diametrically opposed to that of the prevailing ethos at the time o f the 
foundation o f the Trade Agencies. The British encounter with Tibet, begun in hostility, had 
ended in respect and even esteem for the 'Other' culture.
The cadre had been influenced by the concept o f British imperial power as a 'civilising 
mission'. They had a genuine desire to see Tibet advance. In the 1920s, Ludlow (whose 
wages from the Tibetan Government did not cover his expenses there) personally paid the 
fees o f Tibetan boys studying telegraphy in Kalimpong. After his departure, Williamson, 
and later Bailey, continued to meet these costs from their own pocket. [98]
Later cadre officers did not oppose change in Tibet per se, but, seeing the Tibetans as 
conservative and resistant to change, they deliberately 'adopted a conservative policy o f 
making haste slow ly'.[99] Through policies such as the exclusion o f missionaries and 
other agents o f change, the cadre sought to preserve the stability o f Tibet, and through their 
opposition to the introduction o f European dress and modes o f thinking, they attempted to 
preserve the existing Tibetan identity. But the rapid changes resulting from Tibet’s 
exposure to the modern world increasingly threatened this policy.
The cadre's concern partly reflects a similar attitude within Tibetan society. The alliance 
o f interests between the cadre and their Tibetan supporters naturally meant that threats to 
one group were regarded with concern by the other.[100] But the British, unlike the 
Tibetans, were qualified by their familiarity with both societies to compare them, and judge 
the benefits of the encounter. Consequently they supported the status quo not only because 
o f their political need to maintain a close association with Tibet's ruling class, but in order 
to preserve a society they admired. This factor should be considered in applying 
Mommsen's conclusion that alliances with local allies prevented the modernisation of pre­
modern societies.[101]
Tibet was subject to the production o f knowledge for purposes o f political control, albeit
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in India, as much as in Tibet. But the cadre's growing understanding of, and sympathy for, 
Tibet, lead to a discourse o f self-reflection, in which Tibet could be seen as representing all 
that was best in society in general.[102] The official British encounter with Tibet led 
individuals personally involved in the encounter to question whether the 'Other' was not 
superior to the 'familiar'. Their enthusiasm was not for the mystical elements which 
attracted so many private travellers, but rather for the society which produced the personal 
characteristics o f Tibetans which they admired.
In the wider sense, the cadre's development o f admiration for Tibetan values is evidence 
for the influence o f  the indigenous society on the imperial power, which appears 
characteristic o f encounters on the frontier, as will be seen in Chapter Eight. But it may also 
suggest that as the power o f policy-making was removed from the 'men on the spot' by the 
increased control exercised by central government, the frontiersmen identified less closely 
with the goals o f their government, and were increasingly drawn to question its policies 
and their results.
The concerns which the cadre felt over Tibet's moral status were not expressed publicly 
until after the British had left Tibet, because it did not support the image o f Tibet which the 
British were trying to project, nor did it reflect well on British influence there. When a 
concern for morality did emerge into the public sphere, it was for a political purpose: a 
concern to gain the moral high ground vis-a-vis Communist China,
This was a deliberate strategy. After the Communists took power in China, Richardson 
was aware that 'It is merely a question o f when the Communists choose to come....The 
only possible line I can recommend for the government to pursue is to arouse moral 
feelings for Tibet.' China's subsequent military invasion enabled the Tibetan Government- 
in-exile to appeal to morality and justice, a claim which it has never relinquished, and 
which has become the primary weapon o f the Tibetan independence movement. [103]
Their sympathy for Tibetan aspirations left the cadre 'unspeakably sad' when it became 
obvious that Tibet was unlikely to be accepted as an independent nation-state in the post­
war community o f  nations.[104] That this concern was genuine can be seen by the 
continuing efforts on behalf o f the Tibetan cause today, by surviving officers such as Hugh 
Richardson and Radio Officer Robert Ford, both o f whom remain active in the Tibetan 
cause.
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SECTION 6.11: - LACK OF DEFINITION: INDEPENDENCE AND IMAGE
The image o f Tibet produced by the British left a number o f aspects undefined, and the 
greatest divergence between the 'produced' image, and the Tibetan's self-image, is in the 
significant area o f Tibet's political status. This divergence also provides the clearest 
example o f the way in which the 'produced' image o f Tibet failed, due to the political 
requirements o f wider British policy, to reflect the views o f the 'men on the spot'.
Today, the exiled Tibetan Government regard the image which the British created as 
being 'incomplete', particularly in the crucial area o f Tibet's political status. The present 
Dalai Lama maintains that the British failure to represent Tibet as an independent nation was 
a historical distortion o f Tibet's status, arising from the British preference for Chinese, 
rather than Russian influence in Tibet.[105]
The evidence suggests this is correct. Whitehall was prepared to accept Chinese control 
over o f Tibet as a solution to the perceived threat from Russia. But while Tibet had been 
under Chinese rule in the past, this had been due to force o f Chinese arms. Elements o f 
Tibetan society had accomodated themselves to the Chinese, and the Tibetan leadership had 
accepted a nominal Chinese overlordship, but, historically, they had resisted any efforts by 
China to enforce administrative control.
The Tibetan Government had seen Tibet's relations with China in terms o f a 'patron- 
priesf relationship, a concept based on a cosmological understanding o f the Emperor o f 
China as protector o f the Buddhist faith, and o f the Dalai Lama as the primary religious 
advisor to the Emperor. Thus the Tibetans maintained that this relationship ended with the 
overthrow o f the last Em peror in 1911. The concept reflected the Tibetan view o f 
themselves as a religious state, and had no legal status in the European sense.[106]
A full consideration o f the issue o f Tibetan independence is outside the scope o f this 
work, but the view that Tibet was entitled to independence was held by most of the British 
officers who served there. It.was W hitehall's refusal to recognise an independent Tibet 
which led to the image's being 'incomplete'. As Richardson recently stated, 'In all practical 
matters the Tibetans were independent....The British Government...sold the Tibetans 
down the river....I was profoundly ashamed o f the government.'[107]
As precise definition o f Tibet's political status was not essential to Anglo-Tibetan 
relations, it was generally left undefined, and related issues involving Tibet's status were 
also avoided when possible. Thus when India became aware o f the 1913 Treaty between 
Tibet and Mongolia, which represented a statement by both countries that they considered 
each other independent, the Government o f India concluded that 'it might be o f advantage 
to HM.'s[sic] Government to be without authoritative information on this point'.[108]
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Certain aspects o f Tibet's undefined status suited India, Concern for frontier security 
meant that the Government o f India did not want a Tibetan state which was 'a power o f any 
significance in its own right'. They even considered the possibility that an independent 
Tibet, following its own foreign policy, might pose a threat to India. Delhi was thus 'by no 
means satisfied that it is in India’s interests to have a well trained, well armed and highly 
organised army in Tibet'.[109]
However, by any practical definition, Tibet functioned as an independent state in the 
period 1913-1950. It bought (and sold) arms and am m unition directly from other 
neighbouring governments, and remained neutral in World War Two, a war in which 
China was deeply involved. It controlled its own territory, and adopted many o f the 
symbols o f modem statehood; it had its own currency, stamps, capital city and flag. Cadre 
officers dealt with its government on a day-to-day basis. They believed that 'Tibet is just as 
much entitled to her freedom as India'.[110] But wider political considerations required that 
this fact be concealed, and lip-service paid to Chinese suzerainty. The cadre therefore 
generally had to represent Tibetan aspirations for an independent identity and control o f 
their own destiny, in terms o f the euphemism 'internal autonomy under the lightest possible 
Chinese suzerainty'.[111]
The failure to establish an image o f Tibet fully consistent with the Tibetan's self-image 
was, therefore, largely the result o f Whitehall policy (which the Government o f India 
followed), not o f the failure o f the 'man on the spot' to understand Tibet's status. As 
serving government officials, cadre officers ultimately had to follow orders, and clear 
statements o f support for Tibetan independence were usually given only after an officer had 
retired, and was able to speak as an individual, rather than an official.
The deliberate distortion o f an image was not the monopoly o f European imperial 
powers. In the 19th century, the Chinese Ambcrns often filed false reports from Lhasa 
knowing that their central government was unlikely to question the accuracy o f reports by 
their 'men on the spot'.[112] Official Tibetan correspondence was similarly liable to 
present a false picture. It was common practice to send a written communication, but to 
entrust the messenger with a verbal message amending the 'official' order. [113]
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CHAPTER SEVEN
'NOTHING LEFT TO W HICH OBJECTION COULD BE TAKEN’: 
CONTRO LLING INFORM ATION.
INTRO DUCTIO N
The cadre's greatest influence on the image o f Tibet came from their published writings; 
these reached the widest audience, and had the deepest influence on European thinking. 
A lthough the im age they projected strongly reflected the Tibetan G overnm ent's 
understanding, it was primarily designed to reflect British interests. Thus it ignored the 
Tibetan perspective when necessary, just as British policies ignored the perspective o f their 
Tibetan allies when necessary (for example, in regard to Tawang).
To ensure that its agent's writings reflected British interests, government censored them. 
Thus, the knowledge which the cadre gained from first-hand experience o f Tibet passed 
through levels o f selection and o f censorship before being released, levels where the 
presentation o f information was shaped by both the personal perspectives o f the authors, 
and government's actual political needs.
In this chapter we will examine how knowledge was selected by the cadre, and how it 
was censored by government and its supporting structures, in order to present it in the form 
best serving British interests. In addition, we will examine how this process dealt with 
alternative images which existed, or might have been constructed.
SECTION 7.1: - USING INFORMATION: THE CADRE
The information which the cadre presented to their government was not only affected by 
the perspectives involved in gathering and selecting information, but also presented in a 
form which advanced the interests that the cadre sought to promote. This took the form of 
praise for fellow cadre officers - 'Mr MacDonald has as usual managed his work tactfully
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and efficiently' - and even self-praise: 'by tact and influence I kept them in bounds'.[1]. 
More significantly it involved the presentation o f information in a form designed to promote 
particular policies and actions by Delhi and Whitehall.
Cadre officers could, by stating opinion as 'truth', and using these 'truths' selectively, 
use their status as the government's experts 'on the spot' to advance particular policies. 
This was something central government was aware of, however, and they could often read 
the hidden codes o f meaning in this discourse. Thus when Bell, arguing in favour o f 
British annexation o f the Chumbi Valley, claimed the support o f the Chumbi people for this 
policy, a Secretariat official commented 'was there ever a pioneer o f the forward policy 
who did not find the trans-border people dying to be annexed?'[2]
Before Bell established his alliance with the Dalai Lama, he used a similar approach in an 
unsuccessful attempt to persuade his government to take formal control o f Tibet's foreign 
relations. He claimed that the Tibetans' character, 'though in many ways admirable is 
permeated by a vein o f impracticability, which prevents them from coming to a final 
decision', and that this meant Tibet would not be capable o f conducting its own foreign 
relations. That the Tibetan Government were 'naive' became an article o f faith among the 
cadre, and, while this description was appropriate in some instances, after the British 
departed they admitted that, while the Tibetans 'played at being a very simple people..., 
they were shrewd diplomatic operators'.[3]
Bell's statements were an example o f how knowledge could be both 'true', and 'useful'. 
Information could be true but o f interest only to positivist science; other information could 
be true and politically useful. Bell's transparent attempt to promote the idea that the British 
should take over control o f Tibet's foreign relations, as they had done with Bhutan, offered 
a justification o f British rule or guidance by presenting the newly encountered culture as 
inferior; which has been shown to be a common imperial tactic.[4]
The knowledge accumulated by cadre officers took time to emerge into the public 
domain, and when it did. their character and training meant that government could to a large 
extent trust their judgm ent as to what to present to the public. An example o f the way in 
which the cadre censored themselves can be seen in M ainprice's private papers. These 
reveal that he had grave doubts as to the wisdom of British Tibetan policies (as will be 
seen). But in the writing that he intended for publication, Mainprice did not mention these 
doubts. While the possibility exists that Mainprice had simply changed his opinion, this 
reticence was typical o f a wider British Indian ethos, which ensured that other British 
officers accom panying the cadre were similarly discreet. General N eam e's dam ning 
criticism s o f the Tibetan army, previously noted, were not repeated in his published 
account o f his journey, where his only explicit criticism was o f 'p o o r marksmanship' by
209
one section o f the troops. [5]
The promotion o f a particular image for political purposes meant, as will be seen, that 
alternative 'voices' were censored or marginalised. Evidence which supported other 
political images o f Tibet was refuted, explained away, or ignored. This was particularly the 
case with the opposing image promoted by the Chinese, which was o f Tibet as an integral 
part o f China.
SECTION 7.2: - USING INFORMATION: GOVERNM ENT
While government expected to be able to trust the judgem ent o f  its officers as to what 
information to present to the public, officials were required, by both civil and military 
regulations additional to the Official Secrets Act, to submit their writings for censorship. 
Some officers actively supported this system. For example the India Office noted that 
M acdonald was 'anxious that we should strike out anything that is considered 
objectionable’.[6] Other officers (and their publishers) were sometimes unaware o f  this 
requirement, and were censured if  their writings contained information the government 
wished to restrict.
The Government o f India even claimed the power to restrict its officers' private 
conversations. For example they did not wish to publicise the existence of goldfields in 
western Tibet, to avoid encouraging prospectors. Captain Rawling, who travelled through 
western Tibet at the conclusion o f the Younghusband Mission, was instructed 'to avoid all 
reference in conversation to information...regarding the goldfields'.[7]
Arms supplies to Tibet from India were an issue o f particular sensitivity, in that they 
could have been seen as implying recognition o f Tibet as an independent state. Hence both 
Bell and Macdonald's references to these supplies were censored. Where Bell commented 
on Tibetan troops being 'armed with the new rifles', mention o f the source of these rifles 
(the Government o f India) was removed. M acdonald's claim in his manuscript that 
demands for payment for weapons were a factor in the Panchen Lama's flight was also 
censored, along with a large section o f suggestions on future policy, including support for 
Tibetan independence. Macdonald was told that it was 'most important that nothing should 
be said which could tend to damage relations with Tibet or any other foreign power'.[8]
Whitehall was primarily concerned with avoiding any references to British actions or 
policies liable to arouse international opposition. This meant that they opposed any 
reference to British influence in Tibet; the image they wanted to portray was of British India 
having normal neighbourly relations with Tibet, the two countries respecting each other's
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territorial integrity, and refraining from interference in each other's internal affairs.
The Government o f India followed Whitehall's wishes in this matter, but their concern to 
use Tibet as a 'buffer-state', and to protect the security of their frontiers by separating India 
from China, meant that they were prepared to allow the cadre great latitude in their 
references to Tibet's status. They would even to allow them to support its independence, as 
long as they appeased Whitehall by not mentioning that they were trying to help the 
Tibetans achieve it.
The production o f an image o f Tibet was thus greatly affected by the need to appease 
other world powers. This concern for foreign reaction meant that the image o f  Tibet which 
the Government o f India allowed to be promoted did not fully reflect the knowledge of the 
cadre. Most significantly it did not state unequivocally that Tibet was an independent state, 
which was to be o f crucial importance to Tibet's future.
Government's attitude to works which had not been subm itted for censorship was 
inconsistent. W hen W hite published Sikkim  and B hutan , he forwarded a copy to 
government to solicit sales. They considered White 'guilty o f a grave act o f insubordination 
and even impertinence' for remarks in his book which they saw as 'vindictive to the 
Government he served'. (For example, he wrote that 'It is neither a pleasant nor an easy 
task to have to deliberately deceive people who trusted you, as I had to do'.) Despite this, 
no action was taken against White. Somewhat surprisingly (given that White criticised the 
government's policy o f withdrawing from involvement in Tibet in the post-Younghusband 
period, and admitted that the British had, in the case of Sikkim, 'deprived the weaker State 
o f valuable territory'), Viceroy Minto concluded that 'The publication o f a few home truths 
is not altogether disagreeable reading'.[9]
In practice, government could do little to prevent retired officers from writing what they 
wished. Bell reluctantly agreed to submit his first book for censorship, apparently after 
being threatened with action under the Official Secrets Act. When government heard he was 
writing another book they asked to see the proofs, but Bell found he was no longer bound 
by the Act. having been out o f service for more than six years, and refused to submit the 
proofs. Government considered threatening his pension, but this was legally impossible, 
and they were forced to 'acquiesce gracefully' to Bell’s uncensored publications. All that 
could be done was for the India Office to press the Government o f India to emphasise to 
the Political Officers in Sikkim and Nepal that, as these posts were 'closely connected with 
the affairs o f foreign countries, the...Regulations governing publication apply with 
particular force'.[10]
Although official censorship was both inconsistent and ultimately unenforceable, it did 
affect the information flow from Tibet. On the other hand, those aspects o f White and
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Bell's writings which escaped censorship were ultimately absorbed into the acceptable 
body o f opinion. This process occurred in Bell's case both because o f his personal prestige 
within the Tibet cadre, which meant his ideas were supported by his successors, and 
because the passages government objected to were principally indications o f British support 
for Tibet, which they eventually found useful to show to the Tibetan Government. White's 
'self-laudatory' work appears to have been subject to a positive reinterpretation as the 
passage o f time removed memory o f his failures, and mythologised the early Tibetan 
frontiersmen.
SECTION 7.3: - CENSORSHIP: SUPPORTING STRUCTURES
The Government o f India had considerable power to control the flow o f information from 
Tibet into the public sphere. We have seen how they exercised control over access to Tibet, 
favouring travellers of similar background and outlook to their officials, on the assumption 
that their discretion could then be relied upon. Following McGovern's journey to Lhasa, 
government tightened this informal process by adding a further rule to the frontier pass 
visitors had to sign. Travellers had to agree
not to publish, without the previous consent o f the Government o f India, 
any statement, whether in the press or otherwise, regarding his visit to Tibet 
or based on material obtained during the visit. [11]
W hen 'knowledge' was released by government, organisations such as the Royal 
Geographical Society (hereafter referred to as the RGS), and the London Times, functioned 
unofficially as imperial support structures, by adding a further level o f censorship. These 
bodies acted in close association with the Government o f India, in return for which their 
leaders could expect to be given privileged access to information, events and places. 
Government even gave direct 'subsidies' to the Reuters news agency in India.[12]
Arthur Hinks, the long-serving Secretary of the RGS, had close links with many of the 
Tibet cadre, and played an important role in this process; we have noted how he assisted 
Bailey's attack on McGovern's reputation. Hinks censored information both before, and 
after, it was officially censored. When F.Spencer Chapman submitted a paper to the RGS. 
Hinks forwarded it to the India Office for censorship after 'cutting out a number o f things 
which I am sure you would not like'. There was, he hoped, 'nothing left to which 
objection could be taken'. When the India Office made further changes. Hinks agreed these
212
were 'very properly rem oved'.[13]
Government maintained a close relationship with these knowledge-disseminating bodies 
because articles they published carried great authority, and formed part o f the body o f 
'dominant knowledge'. Although the intended audience for the reception o f knowledge 
produced by the cadre was never clearly specified, it certainly included the sort o f audience 
which would read the Tim es , and join the RGS. The information they published was 
understood by its readers to be 'true', because it was based on empirical evidence, and 
written by persons o f similar outlook and class. It represented the 'official' knowledge of 
their readers' society.
Some officers actively solicited orders for their books from the Government o f India, 
whose orders for works they approved o f acted as a means o f subsidising publication 
costs. Charles Sherring, for example, who had inspected the Gartok Trade Agency in 
1905, hoped government would take at least 600 copies o f his book, although in the event, 
after a lengthy process o f soliciting orders from every departm ent and Provincial 
Government, they took only 58 copies.[14] This suggests that the intended readership at 
which they aimed their works were their fellow colonial officials.
Mark Cocker notes that Bailey 'expected his readers to understand and share' his 
attitudes, which 'to a larger extent...they probably would have done. His most likely 
audience would have been from the officer classes w ith experience o f colonial 
administration.' Cadre officers naturally recommended particular books to those interested, 
and these were invariably those written by other officially approved visitors. Mainprice, for 
example, recommended Spencer-Chapman's book 'for a good picture o f Tibet'.[15]
Control o f information from Tibet was also extended over the Tibetans. The British 
controlled the telegraph line which was Tibet's most rapid contact with the outside world. 
When (probably following Bell's advice) the Tibetans asked the British to extend the line 
from Gyantse to Lhasa, there was strong support for this within government. The 
Secretary o f State was told that 'there are great advantages in any improvement of 
communications in countries contiguous to our borders, provided these communications 
are under our control'. The Military7 Department agreed it 'might...become o f great military 
value to us', while Bell saw it as an opportunity to 'put the Tibetan Government under an 
obligation by helping them'. [16]
Information control was a two-way process. In addition to controlling information to and 
from Tibet, the British sought to control the image of the outside world which the Tibetans 
received. Bell began supplying the exiled Dalai Lama with translated extracts from Indian 
newspapers and Bailey continued this policy, and also forwarded suitable cuttings from the 
Times - for example, reports o f religious persecution in Russia. [17]
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The British were able, to a great extent, to restrict Tibet's knowledge o f the outside 
world. The Tibetans were given selected images o f the West, images designed to reinforce 
the 'advice* given by the Politicals. By preventing the entry o f  other external influences, 
which might have acted as agents for change, the cadre may have reduced pressure for 
change within Tibet. But even the selected changes which the British introduced were 
strongly opposed by the powerful conservative forces within Tibet; the policy, therefore, 
contained elements o f benefit to both British and Tibetan ruling structures.
SECTION 7.4: - IMAGES: DOM INANT AND MARGINAL
There are alternative sources for an image o f Tibet, voices largely silenced by the 
dominant image. In a study o f Japanese travellers to Tibet, Scott Berry concluded that the 
four Japanese who visited Lhasa during the period 1912-24, failed to establish a significant 
image o f Tibet due, not only to language difficulties, but to their undistinguished class 
background, and their lack o f political connections and patronage from the Japanese 
Government.[18] This conclusion can also be applied to a neglected British voice.
The longest-serving Europeans in Tibet left almost no historical trace. They were the two 
Telegraph Sergeants, H.M artin and W .H.Luff, and Radio Officer Reginald Fox, who 
spent the longest period in Lhasa. None o f  these three Londoners published any work, or 
left personal papers. Just as the British imperial process m arginalised indigenous 
'subaltern' voices, British ’subaltern' voices were similarly neglected. The careers o f these 
individuals demonstrate how the 'class voices' which expressed the British view o f Tibet 
dominated frontier history at the expense o f other 'voices'.
Sergeant Henry Martin was a former labourer, who served with Younghusband and 
remained in Gyantse as a Telegraphist, and later Head Clerk, from 1904 until he retired in 
1931. He died soon after retiring, having found that despite 'his record o f long faithful 
service...hard to beat in the annals o f  a Government office', his government were 
unwilling to correct an anomaly w hich reduced his pension by a third. Luff, who 
personally escorted the Dalai Lama into exile in India in 1910, also remained in Tibet from 
the Younghusband Mission until he retired in the late 1920s. After a brief, unsuccessful 
career as a gardener in Weir's Gangtok Residency, he died at Darjeeling in 1942. Reginald 
Fox served as Lhasa Mission Radio Officer from March 1937 until 1950, and similarly 
died soon after retiring. W hile he and his Tibetan wife are frequently mentioned in 
travellers' accounts, there is almost no trace o f him in surviving British records.[19]
The absence o f  these 'subaltern voices' is significant in emphasising that the image the
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cadre produced was created by a particular class o f officials, those who had passed through 
public schools, universities or military colleges, Indian civil or military service, and the 
filtering process o f the Tibet cadre. With its essential class base, the Tibet cadre did not 
admit British 'lower ranks', no matter how experienced or knowledgeable, to the ranks of 
opinion makers. Support personnel had no influence on policy, and were thus excluded 
from the image creation process, just as they were in India.
As Fox, Luff, and Martin all sought to remain in Tibet after retirement, their involvement 
in the country must have been as committed as any cadre officer, but the understanding 
they gained from this involvement was not utilised, or at least not acknowledged, by the 
cadre. They were not normally included in meetings with the Tibetan ruling class, and 
neither were the perspectives which they gained from their social contacts with lower levels 
o f Tibetan society, reflected in the dominant image created. The result was an image o f 
Tibet based on a very narrow class perception.
SECTION 7.5: - IMAGE - THE MISSING PIECES
We have seen that issues which might reflect badly on the cadre, such as cash payments 
to influential Tibetans, did not emerge into the public knowledge. There was also a gap 
between what the cadre themselves knew or believed, and what they divulged, as we have 
seen with Neame's article, which avoided mentioning both the purpose and the results o f 
his mission. This can also be seen clearly in two cases where Politicals posted to Gyantse 
formed views which differed significantly from the usual cadre perception. It is significant 
that neither officer remained in Tibet for more than a few months. They were not therefore, 
by my definition, accepted members o f the Tibet cadre.
The recorded memories o f 1933 Gyantse Agent Meredith Worth, suggest an image o f 
Tibet closer to that presented by Communist Chinese sources than to that offered in British 
sources. Interviewed in 1980. Worth recalled that
My memories are o f many cheerful parties in the Fort and in the homes of 
wealthy families, the dominance and brutality o f the Lamas and officials 
towards the serf population and the prevalence o f venereal diseases....It 
was, therefore, for me a relief to read recently in Han Suyin's book "Lhasa, 
the Open City" [which promotes a polemically positive view o f Communist 
rule in Tibet] that those conditions no longer exist.[20]
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Paul M ainprice confided to his 1944 diary that
I have serious doubts whether Tibet is at all fit for independence and 
whether the present system of Government should be bolstered up. Would 
China in control o f Tibet really be a very serious menace to India? As we 
don't seem to do much developing o f Tibet, I question whether the Chinese 
would not be able to do it to our own mutual advantage. O f course the 
Tibetan aristocracy and officials would not like it, but the peasants preferred 
the Chinese regime in Eastern Tibet in the early years o f this century. [21]
Neither Worth nor Mainprice appear to have expressed these views publicly during their 
imperial service. They were doubtless aware that views diametrically opposed to those of 
their superiors would be censored, and were unlikely to advance their careers. This must 
have acted as an incentive to self-censorship. As a result, the dominant image o f Tibet was 
not affected by alternative views, even those o f members o f the Political Department.
The doubts which Mainprice expressed over British policy in Tibet do reflect a different 
perspective from that o f  other cadre officers. Mainprice 'was always concerned for the 
underdog'. He was one o f the few imperial officers to gain good relations with the 
Mishmis during service in Assam, and his diaries record his later sympathy and support for 
the Muslim populace o f Kashmir, which led to his being detained and expelled by the new 
Indian government.[22]
Mainprice's perspective indicates how the emphasis on relations with Tibet's ruling class 
resulted in a marginalisation of the voice o f the majority o f Tibetans, those outside ruling 
circles. Bell was aware that the peasants were often treated 'abominably' and even admitted 
in his first book that 'There is no doubt some foundation for the Amban's claim that the 
poorer classes in Tibet were in favour o f China.' But Bell's policy o f support for the 
existing Tibetan leadership meant that this perspective was not represented by the British. 
The condition o f the lower classes was heavily criticised on occasion, Macdonald being 
particularly critical. But a positive image was maintained by attributing misrule to the era of 
Chinese domination, and describing how conditions were improving under the Dalai 
Lama's rule. This positive note was enhanced by the constant stress on the overall 
happiness and contentment o f the peasant class, which is a recurrent theme in British 
accounts o f Tibet, where even 'the slavery was o f  a very mild type'. [23]
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SECTION 7.6: - PUBLICITY
Government control over the supply o f information to the press became increasingly 
more sophisticated in Tibet, as it did elsewhere. Michael Edwardes has noted how the 
expansion o f the Western powers was matched by an increasing 'need to explain and 
justify the motives behind...expansion...to attract and inspire those sections o f public 
opinion whose support was necessary to the activities o f  government'. As early as 1910, 
Younghusband, speaking in London, argued that 'our line o f action in Tibet is entirely 
dependent on the state o f opinion in this country'. [24]
The cadre's early press releases deliberately avoided com menting on policy, and 
contained little o f popular interest. When the Dalai Lama came to India, Bell was instructed 
'to assist the Press Correspondent with news while o f  course saying nothing as to the 
policy', and he detailed Laden La to supply 'such items o f news, as are likely to soon 
afterwards in any case becom e known to the public'. A lthough Bell's first book 
recommended that 'We should do more than is done at present towards putting before the 
public the Tibetan side o f incidents that arise', press communiques continued to be given in 
the officially approved 'vague and general terms'.[25]
Gould was again responsible for fully implementing Bell's policy suggestions. He 
recognised the public 'demand for "copy" which always appears to exist in regard to 
Tibet'. Where previous missions to Lhasa had sought anonymity, Gould arranged for 
generous publicity prior to his visit to Lhasa in 1936. Sections o f  the Mission Diaries were 
released to the press and these 'somewhat bald and colourless' excerpts were supplemented 
by descriptive articles written by Gould or Spencer-Chapman.[26]
Comparison of the original reports with those released to the press illustrates aspects of 
the image o f Tibet which Gould sought to project. Reference to the 'bizarre' appearance o f 
the Tibetan army was tactfully deleted, as was the description o f the 'in some cases 
imbecile faces' o f the villagers. The original phrase 'The old world courtesy, politeness, 
bowing and compliments o f the Tibetans, officials as well as servants, is charming’, was 
reduced to avoid reference to politeness, bowing and compliments, perhaps due to their 
implicit association with Chinese forms of diplomacy.[27]
In the 1940s. Gould increased the means by which Tibet received publicity. He arranged 
subsidies for a Tibetan language newspaper, published in Kalimpong by the Reverend 
Tharchin, a Ladakhi convert to Christianity who maintained close links with the British. 
Foreign newspaper correspondents with influence in America were invited to Tibet 'in the 
hope that the U.S. public will be led to appreciate the Tibetan position vis-a-vis China'. 
Archie Steele was the first journalist invited, and his visit was followed by others in the late
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1940s, but their writings had little apparent effect.[28]
Gould emphasised the need for Tibet to publicise its cause, and, in line with cadre 
traditions, ensured that this process was controlled by his own government. The India 
Office were informed that
the thing should be kept in the Government o f India's hands and...the 
Ministry o f Information should be largely frozen out....I think it would be 
unfortunate if the Ministry's Far Eastern Bureau in Delhi were enabled to 
get a foot in the Tibetan door. [29]
Part o f Gould's publicity campaign involved ensuring that British publications reflected 
the desired view o f Tibet. In the 1920s Bailey had unsuccessfully tried to get the British 
film censor to remove parts o f the official film o f an Everest expedition which the Tibetans 
found offensive (in particular a sequence in which a Tibetan was shown removing lice from 
his clothing). Gould was more successful in obtaining the co-operation o f the editor of 
Whitaker's Almanack, who agreed to send the proofs o f an article on Tibet to the India 
Office for 'correction'. Richardson revised the article, although the India Office cautiously 
noted that 'we must be careful not to appear to be telling Whitakers what to publish'.[30]
In response to the Chinese establishment o f a library in Lhasa in the 1940s, the Lhasa 
Mission built up a collection o f books on Tibet, which were used to impress the Tibetans. 
Their leaders were also given books written by Bell, Tucci and others, which demonstrated 
European interest in, and concern for, Tibet. Bell clearly expressed his intent when he told 
the Dalai Lama that he hoped his first book would 'do good for Tibet by causing British 
and Americans to understand Tibet better’. Gould and Richardson's dictionary was another 
work seen in this context. It was observed that 'Perhaps its greatest propaganda value will 
be the fact that the Political Officer is sufficiently interested in Tibetan to write a book about 
if. The supply o f information to Tibet was, therefore, part o f  a process o f image 
production which reinforced the projection of British prestige outlined in Chapter Two. [31] 
An important addition to this process came in the early 1930s when the cadre found that 
film shows were extremely popular with the Tibetans. They concluded that 'the cinema 
...can be made into the most powerful o f all our propaganda weapons'. The Lhasa Mission 
put on regular shows which were attended by both lay officials and monks. The films were 
carefully chosen with advice from intermediaries such as Norbhu Dhondup, to project 
British power and to appeal to Tibetan sensibilities. Thus one film was adjudged suitable as 
it gave 'the right im pression o f British power and purpose'. Another, on St Paul's 
cathedral, was considered particularly suitable for Tibet due to its 'religious flavour'.[32]
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The Tibetans gradually became aware o f  the importance o f  outside opinion. One 
indication o f this came in 1937, when, after allegations by an American journalist that the 
Panchen Lama had been involved in commercial schemes in China, the exiled Lama wrote 
to the Journal o f  the Royal Central Asian Society denying the allegations. [33]
In the late '40s, the Tibetans hesitantly began actively to seek publicity. J.E.Reid, an 
electrical engineer who was the last British Indian official to be invited to Lhasa, reported in 
January 1950 that 'The Tibetan Government had suddenly awoken to the reality o f the 
dangers which threatened it and is now regretting its past policy o f keeping aloof from 
outside contact.' The Tibetans, he reported, 'were now anxious that full world publicity 
should be given to their plight and to the country itself. This 'awakening' came too late to 
assist the Tibetan cause against the Chinese, but the Tibetan Government-in-exile have 
endeavoured to obtain as much publicity as possible for their cause. [34]
CONCLUSION: A SALEABLE IMAGE
Competing power structures produce images, the ascendancy o f  which depends upon 
subsequent political and social events. We cannot assum e that the records o f the 
subordinate powers involved in producing competing images represent images which are 
'true', and in opposition to dominant 'false' images. Rather we must examine each image 
for the truths which it contains, or represents. There was no one, true, image to be 
understood or 'discovered'. Each encounter produced different results, and different 
constructions by the powers involved.
Creating an image o f Tibet was part o f British policy there. Whitehall was advised that 
there was 'in the case o f T ibet..[little or no]..difference between propaganda and 
policy'.[35] Although Whitehall prevented Tibet's being recognised as independent, the 
cadre were at least partly successful in promoting its separate identity. The fusion o f policy 
and image-construction meant that there were few areas of the British-constructed image 
that did not reflect both the political process in which they were engaged, and the 
perspective o f their Lhasa allies.
But while cadre officers did generally tailor their knowledge to fit within the limits of 
Government o f India policy, their writings were censored by government and by its 
supporting structures. The final image produced therefore differed from the 'truth' as 
discovered by the cadre. Nevertheless, the status which the cadre derived from their 
presence 'on the spot' gave their books a great authority in political and academic circles - 
that is, among readers o f the cadre officers' social class and background - and they have
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therefore been influential at that level. As the image reflected the perspective of the cadre's 
Lhasa allies, the image promoted in these works was largely accepted by the Tibetans, and 
has thus remained unchallenged in the West until recent years.
While the Government o f India could control the flow o f information from Tibet, there 
was one factor in the promotion o f this image into democratic European society which 
could not be controlled. That was the public's interest in particular aspects o f Tibet. Human 
nature meant that sensational and colourful aspects were favoured over the 'bland and 
colourless'. During the 1920s, the travels o f both General Pereira and Alexandra David- 
Neel were described in books. Younghusband's edition o f Pereira's diaries was a positivist 
account o f Tibet, the journey legitimised by its catalogue o f dates, places, and scientific 
observations. David-Neel's account, in contrast, provided few such details, but gave a 
colourful description o f Tibet's people and culture. Pereira's book was o f specialist interest 
only, and was never reprinted. In contrast, David-Neel's book has remained in print for 
nearly seventy years.[36]
The mystical image of Tibet was the one with the widest popular appeal. While the 
general public may be aware o f the main aspects of the hegemonic texts - Tibet's separate 
status and the position o f the Dalai Lama - it is the mystical image which 'sells'.
This commercial factor has been largely ignored in the debate over 'Orientalism'. It is a 
great weakness o f the 'Orientalist' argument that it ascribes political motives to the human 
attraction to, and desire for, 'exotic' images. In the popular imagination, Tibet, as Peter 
Bishop observes, retains its attraction because it is ’located at the periphery o f the social 
world...entangled in..[the]..frontier imagination...outside the demands and stresses of the 
modern world, outside space and time.' The general public have been more attracted by this 
image than by the positivist one. The cadre understood this, and used it to enhance the 
image they had constructed.[37]
As the cadre officer's books were published by commercial publishers, and it became 
increasingly difficult to publish a purely positivist work, the officers needed to take account 
o f  public taste. Thus, when Bailey submitted draft chapters o f his autobiography, his 
reader returned it with suggestions on how to make it more interesting for the general 
public. Bailey was advised that while his treatment was
all right for the Journal o f the R.G.S....the general reader wants something 
more human - a hint occasionally o f the authors[sic] physical and spiritual 
reaction to his disappointments and to his successes ....A little description 
too o f the peoples...the scenery also - which must be colourful. That 
mountain ...for instance...must have been a thrilling sight, but there is no
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thrill in the telling.[38]
The result o f this commercial demand was to ensure that cadre officers' books contained 
the necessary emphasis on the 'colourful' and the 'thrilling'. While Bell and Richardson's 
books, aimed at an academic audience, contain the minimum o f  such matter, the memoirs 
o f  other cadre officers and official visitors to Tibet contain descriptions of sky burials, 
religious dances, aristocratic pageantry, oracles' trances, hermits' retreats, and the lengthy 
and (in European eyes) peculiar menus at banquets - themes which recur in virtually ever}' 
book.
The need for authors to express their personal reactions to their encounter with Tibet 
makes this discourse the repository for perpetuating images o f 'Otherness' which are 
challenged by the array o f other material which they present which is designed to render 
Tibet 'familiar'. Thus M acDonald - despite an intimate knowledge o f monastic life - 
described his reaction to the Potala as, 'One wondered what was going on behind the 
walls, and imagined the lamas invoking all... their magic.' Similarly Spencer-Chapman 
described Lhasa's holiest shrine as 'repellent and sinister ...as if  one might come upon 
priests performing barbaric rites and offering sacrifices o f human blood before their 
sardonic idols.' The need for 'colour' meant that these w riters adopted a European 
outsiders perspective, even when, as in the case o f MacDonald, their background gave 
them a much deeper understanding o f their subject. [39]
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CHAPTER EIGHT
T BECAM E...TIBETANISED’: 
UNDERSTANDING AND THE FRONTIER
INTRO DU CTIO N
En route to Lhasa in 1936, the Gould Mission visited a monastery where the Abbot 
predicted rain, as
"the holy pig was just due to rise out of Manasarovar Lake and...three days 
rain usually fell on it, as this rain water was necessary to consecrate the 
Pig"-
Two published accounts o f  the journey by members o f  the m ission refer to this 
prediction, but neither comments on it.[l] For minds trained in the tradition o f scientific 
enquiry, this forecast was noteworthy because it was beyond logical comprehension and 
explanation; it was inexorably 'Other'.
India’s northern frontier in the 1904-47 period was a realm o f  interaction between two 
very different cultures, which raises the question o f whether this encounter was a dialogue. 
Did either culture understand the other? To answer this question, we must examine what 
measures o f understanding may be used, and consider the extent to which individual cadre 
officers can be said to have understood Tibet. We have seen how and why the cadre 
constructed an image o f Tibet, and that this obscured certain aspects o f the situation there. 
We can, therefore, separate the understanding gained by individual cadre officers from the 
image which the cadre sought to construct, and ask whether individual members o f  the 
Tibet cadre were able to understand, and engage in a dialogue with, the Tibetans.
We shall, in this chapter, also consider the effect o f the cadre's frontier location 011 the 
officers' understanding. It will be seen that an absence o f precise definition is characteristic 
o f frontiers in general, and the Tibetan frontier in particular. This was not only due to
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political factors, but because the Tibetan frontier was what may be called a 'liminal' zone, 
where precise definitions could be inappropriate.
SECTION 8.1: - UNDERSTANDING
In 1926, the officer inspecting the Gartok Trade Agency reported that, as the local people 
were still 'medieval', British and Tibetan officials there had 'almost no basis on which to 
approach each other'. This lack o f understanding is apparent in many aspects o f Anglo- 
Tibetan relations, as we have seen with the cadre's presentation o f British prestige to the 
Tibetans, which used forms and symbols which were not received by the Tibetans in the 
m anner intended. The cadre, however, were aware o f the difficulty o f understanding 
another culture; they knew that 'Asia does not think along European lines.'[2]
We can, therefore, ask whether the British ever understood the Tibetans, a question 
which is located within the wider academic debate concerning whether the encounter 
between imperial and indigenous societies resulted in mutual understanding. Although 
Tibet was never a British colony, it is appropriate to raise these issues within this wider 
context, both because the encounter was imposed in the interests o f the colonial power, and 
because an image o f Tibet was produced by the dominant imperial power for a political 
purpose.
Recent scholarship has tended to conclude that the British did not understand, and could 
not have understood, the cultures they encountered in South Asia. M argaret Ewing, for 
example, concluded that 'Whatever the civilians may have believed...the Indian context in 
which they worked was beyond their understanding', and, specifically in the Tibetan 
context, Heather Spence concluded that 'It seems almost impossible that Westerners...and 
Tibetans should have understood each other.'[3]
These conclusions are based on the premise that because knowledge o f indigenous 
societies was appropriated and reconstructed by the imperial nations in a form determined 
by their power structures, there could not be an objective understanding o f one society by 
the other. Nor could there be a shared perception and understanding even between 
individuals, as each worked from the basis o f different, and incom patible, sets o f 
knowledge.
The Government o f India's implicit assumption was that its officers gained understanding 
from empirical observation, and thus that the cadre's location enabled them to discover the 
'truth' about their host culture, a truth which could not otherwise be obtained. Hence, 
although the Tibetans had protested before the Younghusband M ission that they sought
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isolation in order to protect their religion, this was only accepted as 'true' by the British 
after Bell had been to Lhasa, and 'discovered' it. As Younghusband stated, T h is  is the 
discovery made by Sir Charles Bell during his year o f almost daily intercourse with the 
Dalai Lama at Lhasa. It is a discovery o f greatest importance.'[4]
The cadre promoted the value o f their presence 'on the spot', claiming that Tibet's 
'atmosphere must be almost impenetrable to one who has not been there'. Younghusband 
expressed this when he claimed that personal experience had given him understanding of 
the Tibetans. After visiting the Jokhang (Lhasa's main temple), he wrote 'Here it was that I 
found the true inner spirit o f the people.'[5]
Understanding was thus seen as gained principally through empirical observation, which 
was considered to increase with time 'on the spot'. This meant that those officers with the 
longest terms o f service, Bell, MacDonald, Richardson, and Norbhu, were thought to have 
gained the deepest insight into Tibet; Bell described MacDonald's 'long residence in Tibet' 
as a factor in his good performance. [6]
The Tibetans shared the belief that insight increased with time. The Dalai Lama told 
Bailey that 'it took the Tibetans a long time to get to know a new man and it took a British 
officer a long time to get to know Tibetans and their language'. Thus the Tibetans preferred 
that cadre officers serve long terms in Tibet, a principle they expressed with their proverb 
that 'Old devils are better than new Gods'.[7]
Our definition o f understanding today, however, implies a perception o f meaning in an 
object beyond that obtained by em pirical observation. U nderstanding also involves 
sympathy for, and agreement or harmony with, that object. In the case o f a complex object 
such as an individual or a culture, there is no single point in time, or degree o f knowledge, 
at which understanding o f the object is reached: rather there are degrees o f understanding, 
and a failure to comprehend some aspects o f a culture does not preclude an overall 
understanding o f it. Aspects o f Tibetan culture always remained 'Other', even to Bell, 
M acDonald and Richardson. But culture and society are in a constant state of flux, and 
different cultures may exist within one society. Even within societies, individuals may fail 
to understand aspects o f their 'own' culture.
Understanding develops, and, as 'Outsiders' increase their understanding o f a culture, 
they progress through stages of'O utsiderness', to 'Insiderness', culminating at a level in 
which the individual is accepted as 'belonging' to the 'Other' culture. These levels of 
understanding may be categorised, as for example Peter Bishop has done in the case o f 
European travellers to Tibet. [8]
The criteria required to reach the highest level o f understanding, that of'belonging' to the 
'Other' culture, necessarily vary with the subject culture. But certain requisite attributes
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common to cultural understanding appear obvious. Fluency in the host language, the basis 
o f understanding, is essential. So too is a significant time-span spent among the 'Other' 
society. The individual must also be sympathetic to, and identify with, that (subject) 
culture. Norbhu, Bell, MacDonald and Richardson all fulfilled these criteria.
The trust which the Tibetans placed in individuals such as Bell (for example, allowing 
him to represent them at the Simla Convention on one occasion), indicates that they did 
recognise certain cadre officers as 'understanding', and even 'belonging' to, their society. 
Both societies thus acknowledged these officers' insight, a very significant, if  not 
conclusive, measure o f understanding.
There is one further indication o f understanding which is important in this imperial 
context: the individual's ability to produce an account o f the 'Other' culture which makes 
sense to both com munities. As we have seen in the case o f Laden La, it was then 
considered o f great importance that in coming to 'belong' to the 'Other' culture, individuals 
did not cease to be accepted as 'belonging' to their own. In British India, an individual who 
was considered to have 'gone native', to a large extent placed him self outside his own 
society. His insights ceased to be trusted, or accepted as ’true', by knowledge-making 
bodies such as the Royal Geographical Society, which only processed knowledge 
expressed in forms and using conventions it deemed appropriate. An individual's ability to 
produce an account o f the 'Other' culture which was accepted by both communities, 
indicates that, while 'belonging' to the 'Other' culture', he had not ceased to be accepted as 
'belonging' to his own.
It appears that becoming an 'Insider' meant a 'crossing over' from one culture to another, 
but the production o f a mutually acceptable account o f the host society indicated the ability 
both to 'cross over’, and to return to, the original culture. Bell, as will be seen, 'crossed 
over', but he did not cease to 'belong' to his own culture. He returned to express his 
understanding o f Tibetan culture in European forms, in works accepted as adequately 
representing their culture by the Tibetan Government-in-exile, who continue to recommend 
Bell's work.[9]
British officers naturally began their Tibetan career as 'Outsiders'. They had an 
'awareness o f meaning withheld and o f the inability to participate in those meanings'. [10] 
Depending on their degree o f interest in Tibet, and their perspective o f it as a career 
posting, they could then develop the necessary interest in Tibet, command of its language, 
and friendly ties with its people, that were required for continued service there, and 
acceptance as what I have termed a 'Tibet cadre' officer. Officers such as Worth and 
Mainprice failed to progress from this 'Outsider' status.
Long service, and close ties with the Tibetans, gave officers such as W eir and
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W illiamson a deeper level o f understanding o f Tibetan society, and some sense o f 
'belonging' there. Thus W illiamson 'never felt so happy as when he was among them 
[Tibetans]'.[11] But these officers did not become 'Insiders' in Tibetan culture. This was 
partly due to their lack o f fluency in language, without which it was believed that 'no one 
can get INSIDE the Tibetans’[12] and, at least in the case o f Weir, whose ultimate ambition 
was a first-class Indian Residency, an unwillingness to dedicate his career entirely to Tibet.
But something more was required to become an 'Insider': individual perception. 
Becoming accepted as 'belonging' to Tibetan culture required an intuitive, as well as 
empirical, understanding o f Tibetan society. Ideal frontier officers, such as Sandeman, 
were considered to possess 'an intuitive perception...from an Oriental as well as an English 
point o f view'.[13] This was seen as giving insight unavailable to others, however learned. 
Thus his fellow-officers noted how Norbhu Dondup 'has such an intuitive knowledge o f 
Tibetan affairs and people that his conclusions, however fantastic they may appear, are 
practically always right'. Despite fulfilling most o f the criteria required o f 'Insiders', 
officers such as Bailey did not reach the ultimate state of'com plete belonging' or 'complete 
identity with a place' because they lacked that intuitive understanding which made the 
'Other' appear 'familiar*.[14]
Whereas military officers were closely associated with frontiers such as the North-West 
Frontier Province, on the Tibetan frontier those officers with a strong military background 
appear to have had greatest difficulty in gaining this intuitive understanding. It would 
appear that the practical focus o f their training precluded sym pathetic insight into a 
contemplative society. George Sherriff, for example, failed to understand Tibetan concepts 
o f good behaviour. Sherriff held gun classes in Lhasa, which commenced at 10 a.m. - TO 
a.m. sharp in the military mind'. When the Tibetan trainees arrived at least an hour late, 
Sherriff was not impressed; but in Tibetan custom it was considered good behaviour to 
arrive late, so as not to appear 'too keen'. To Sherriff, this perspective remained 
'O ther'.[l 5]
O f the British (or Anglo-Indian) cadre officers, three civilians. Bell, MacDonald and 
Richardson, proved best able intuitively to understand Tibet. Bell devoted his life to Tibet. 
He immersed him self so deeply into Tibetan culture, and placed such emphasis on 
adherence to Tibetan ceremonial and ritual traditions, that he considered that 'I became in a 
large measure Tibetanised'.[16]
Bell was considered by his own society as having understood the Tibetans, and 
considered himself to have a place in Tibetan society. He was equipped with the language 
skill, experience, and personal empathy and interest to attain an intuitive understanding of 
Tibetan culture. But did he gain acceptance by Tibetan society as 'belonging' to their
culture?
There are few sources from which to answer this. The only Tibetan source in English 
which refers to Bell's understanding is, as far as I am aware, a work by a former Tibetan 
Government Minister, W.D.Shakabpa, the nearest we have to an official Tibetan history in 
the English language. It refers to Bell as 'a very close friend o f the Dalai Lama1. [17]
Our other source is Bell himself, but familiarity with Bell's despatches suggests that in 
personal matters he may be relied upon. Bell was not overly given to self-praise for purely 
personal, as opposed to policy, reasons and the Tibetan tributes which Bell records are not 
the flattering platitudes routinely given by local rulers to retiring imperial officers, some of 
whom took them seriously enough to repeat them in their memoirs. The Tibetans whom 
Bell quotes refer not to his abilities and achievements, but to his affinity with the Tibetans. 
The Dalai Lama him self is quoted as telling Bell 'I have complete confidence in you, for we 
two are men o f like mind', while a leading monastic official is quoted as having written to 
the Dalai Lama that
’When a European is with us Tibetans I feel that he is a European and we 
are Tibetans; but when L onchen Bell is with us, I feel that we are all 
Tibetans together.'[18]
The Tibetans indicated their acceptance o f Bell as an 'Insider1 by what Bishop calls 'an 
honorary kinship designation in a religious framework'.[19] The Tibetans (again Bell is the 
source for this), explained Bell's involvement in Tibet as deriving from his having been a 
Tibetan in a previous incarnation, who had prayed to be reborn in a powerful country in 
order to help Tibet. If  we accept this account, which is consistent with Tibetan beliefs, and 
other Europeans have claimed this status was also endowed on them ,[20] it would appear 
to place Bell firmly as an 'Insider' who was accepted by the Tibetans as having intuitively 
understood them. Therefore we can, in this case, state that Bell understood the Tibetans, 
that they accepted him as understanding them, and that his writings indicated his ability to 
produce an account o f Tibet satisfying both parties. [21]
Bell was not unique in 'crossing over' and becoming accepted as an 'insider' by the 
Tibetans themselves. MacDonald and Richardson also gained this highest possible level of 
understanding, while several other officers, such as O'Connor, approached this level, but 
were prevented by circum stance from gaining a com plete understanding. Norbhu 
Dhondup, as we have seen in Chapter Three, was widely seen as having made the journey 
in the opposite direction. MacDonald, with his local background, perhaps found it easiest, 
and o f Richardson it was noted in the Secretariat as early as 1939 that 'he has identified
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him self more closely with Tibetans and Tibetan affairs, and...gained more insight and 
respect, than any Englishmen since the time o f Charles Bell'. Richardson, like Bell, has 
devoted his life to the study of Tibet. The present Dalai Lama maintains regular contact with 
him, considering his life 'very precious to us'. [22]
The principal objection to claiming that these three officers were considered by Tibetans 
as 'belonging' to their culture must be that none o f them became Buddhists. While a deep 
study o f  an indigenous religion such as Buddhism was considered a perfectly proper 
imperial pursuit, to have adopted that religion would have removed an officer from the 
acceptable param eters o f  behaviour for a British official. Yet, as we have seen, the 
Tibetans' own identification o f them selves was based on a shared sense o f  religious 
identity; Tibetans considered them selves devout followers o f a particular type o f 
Buddhism. Could therefore, a non-Buddhist British official be considered by Tibetans as 
an 'Insider'?
The answer to this may lie in the Tibetan's conception o f  the world. Few Tibetans had 
any understanding o f Christianity, and a leading Tibetan academic notes that as a child 'I 
had never heard o f the world outside Tibet and I was convinced that no other race apart 
from the Tibetans existed '.[23] The boundaries of Tibetan Buddhism were not firmly 
fixed. Outside the core ruling sect, the Gelugpa , were the other major Tibetan Buddhist 
sects, and the Bon  sect, whose historical foundations predated Buddhism, but which had 
become a systemised religion under Buddhist influence. There were also Tibetan Muslims, 
whose status was peripheral, culturally Tibetan, but in religion 'outsiders'. In Tibet there 
was, therefore, both an ignorance o f (or lack o f interest in) other religions, even races, and 
an absence of defined religious boundaries. [24]
The British were aware that the Tibetans had seen them as a threat to their religion. 
Knowing the great importance of religion to the Tibetans, the cadre went to great lengths to 
avoid the appearance o f offering any threat to Buddhism. When officers such as O'Connor 
hired Tibetan religious practitioners to carry out ceremonies, and displayed interest and 
respect for Tibetan religious traditions, this must have been contrasted favourably with the 
actions o f the Chinese, who in the 1907-11 period had caused great damage to Tibetan 
religious institutions. Officers such as Bell gathered an extensive knowledge of Tibetan 
Buddhism, and displayed a respect for its outer forms; they did not emphasise their 
Christian beliefs in Tibet.[25]
By allying with the Buddhist leadership o f the Dalai Lama the British effectively 
marginalised any religious opposition to their presence. Through such devices as allocating 
these cadre officers a Tibetan heritage from a previous incarnation, they could be given 
'honorary Buddhist' status within the broad parameters o f the Tibetan religious system. It
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would appear therefore, that the British came to be seen by the Tibetans as protectors o f 
Tibetan Buddhism (a role previously filled by the Chinese). Officers such as Bell were seen 
as having incarnated as Christians (or in MacDonald's case, adopted Christianity), in order 
to protect Buddhism; their Christianity was considered a necessary device used by 
Buddhists (in a previous existence) to protect Buddhism. Thus while not becoming 
Buddhists, these officers were given a place within the Tibetan Buddhist system, and this 
was essential to their being accepted as 'Insiders'.
Therefore, while previous scholarship has doubted the ability o f one culture to 
understand another, it was possible for individuals to gain an understanding o f the 'Other' 
society which was accepted by both parties, and this relationship was a dialogue. 
However, it is important to note that most Tibet cadre officers, did not 'cross over' and 
come to 'belong* to Tibetan society; they did not expect to. While they established good 
personal relations with Tibetans, and developed a love o f the country, to them it remained 
'Other'. This was an important part o f its attraction; they wanted to serve on the frontier, 
with all that symbolised. They did not seek the familiar.
This is not to suggest that these officers were either ineffective, or unpopular with 
Tibetans or their fellow cadre officers. Within the Tibet cadre there was always both a 
tendency to command, and another tendency to understand, the Tibetans; a dichotomy 
which can be equated to tendencies in British India described by Dewey in terms o f a "Cult 
o f Friendship" and a "Gospel of U plift".[26] Neither tendency predominated overall, or 
even in a single officer. But the Government o f India did not need its frontiersmen to 
become 'Insiders' in Tibet; its interests were well-enough served by a lower level of 
understanding.
The expertise in Tibetan affairs which came from becoming an 'Insider' in Tibetan 
society did enhance the status o f a cadre officer with his government, and implied that he 
was better equipped to serve their interests. As an interest in Tibet was essential to 
continued employment in Tibet, deepening understanding was a logical consequence o f the 
Tibet cadre's presence in the region. But only a few individuals with a particular personal 
interest and commitment to service in Tibet sought the highest level o f understanding, and it 
was not an essential requirement for the functioning o f imperial government.
To conclude that colonial encounter in itself cannot allow understanding, ignores the 
insight gained by the 'men on the spot'. The understanding which officers such as Bell 
gained was not dependent on the imperial context o f their encounter. Imperial and career 
factors provided the opportunity for, and affected the transmission of, understanding, but 
Bell, M acDonald and Richardson showed that individuals 'crossed over' from personal 
desire to do so, rather than as an exercise in power. A distinction should, therefore, be
drawn between the understanding gained by these individuals, and that reflected in the 
image they constructed. This question o f  individual understanding in imperial encounter 
has been largely overlooked in previous debate, which has centred on power relationships, 
rather than personal relationships.
SECTION 8.2: - UNDERSTANDING: PERSPECTIVES
It is now recognised that imperial encounter had an important effect on both the European 
and the indigenous powers engaged in the process. That influence affected individuals, as 
well as societies, and was particularly clear in the realm o f understanding. For example, 
Charles Bell's understanding o f Tibet was greatly influenced by his personal contacts with 
the 13th Dalai Lama, which gave him a Lhasa-centric perspective.
Bell's earliest understanding o f  Tibet came from Palhese, a central Tibetan aristocrat, 
albeit a disaffected one, and he continued to emphasise contacts with Lhasa and central 
Tibetan ruling figures. As a result, the policies which Bell initiated generally reflected an 
understanding o f Tibet strongly influenced by the perspective o f the Dalai Lama and his 
government - for example, as seen in Chapter Five, Bell's adoption o f  the Dalai Lama's 
policy in regard to a British representative in Lhasa.
Bell could not impose policies which the Tibetans strongly opposed without alienating his 
allies, or creating civil disturbances which would potentially threaten the security o f  the 
Indian border, the protection o f which, it must be remembered, was the cadre’s primary 
purpose. Bell therefore adopted a policy o f support for the traditional Lhasa leadership (at 
the expense of power structures elsewhere in Tibet), and took the aspirations and cultural 
traditions o f the Tibetan ruling structure into account in framing his policies.
The British understanding o f  Tibet may also have been affected by a Sikkimese 
perspective. This aspect o f their understanding is difficult to gauge, for it is not brought out 
in the sources, but many o f the intermediaries who assisted the British in learning about 
Tibet, such as Sonam Tobden, Yatung Trade Agent in the 1940s, were Sikkimese.
The Sikkimese did not consider themselves Tibetans. While Sikkimese religion and 
culture were closely related to those o f Tibet, there were significant differences; for 
example the leading Buddhist sect there were the Kargyu , rather than the Gelugpci sect 
which ruled at Lhasa, a separate code o f law was used, and supreme authority was vested 
in a monarch, in contrast to the Tibetan form o f theocracy. This separate identity was 
recognised by both the British and the Tibetan Governments, who dealt with Sikkim as a 
separate state. This meant that the Sikkimese employed by the British also had to interpret
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Tibet; among the private papers o f Sikkimese intermediaries are notes on Tibetan language 
and culture which indicate that they, like the British, set out to acquire knowledge o f 
Tibet. [27]
Sikkimese interests did not necessarily coalesce with those o f Britain or Tibet. Their 
archives record that in the 18th and 19th centuries they had lost territory to
Powerful hordes of elephants from the south,[i.e. India]
Active hordes o f monkeys from the west,[i.e. Nepal]
Cunning hordes o f foxes from the north.[i.e. Tibet][28]
Service with the British offered the Sikkimese a 'voice', and while there are no obvious 
cases where intermediaries were able to influence the British in Sikkim's favour, it is 
necessary to consider that the intermediaries' identity and interests may have affected 
British understanding o f Tibet in ways which reflected Sikkimese perspectives and 
aspirations. It may, for example, have given them a greater understanding o f the Kargyu  
sect than other (geographically) peripheral sects.
SECTION 8.3: - THE LIM INAL FRONTIER
In the sphere o f encounter there is no abrupt change from 'familiar' to 'Other'; rather 
there is a zone o f transition between the two - the frontier. The transitional nature o f this 
zone tends to defy precise definition.[29] This lack o f definition is so apparent in many 
areas o f  the British encounter with Tibet as to be a defining characteristic. As Bishop 
comments, 'Tibet seemed always to have the ability slightly to elude the total embrace of 
Western Orientalism'.[30]
Even the term used by Whitehall to describe China's status in Tibet, 'suzerainty', was 
vague and imprecise, with no definition o f what level o f Chinese control it implied was 
acceptable. 'Suzerainty' has acquired a specific usage in the Tibetan context, and yet it has 
no agreed meaning in practice. It certainly implied that Tibet had internal autonomy, but the 
cadre were prepared to accept suzerainty only in its narrowest possible definition, as a 
purely ceremonial form, which excluded any Chinese control of Tibet. [31]
This linguistic im precision extended into other areas, which, while not obviously 
significant in themselves, were symbolic o f the wider lack o f definition. Even the terms 
'Trade A genf and 'Head of British Mission Lhasa' were specific terms lacking a defined 
identity and administrative place outside the Tibetan context. Defining a language too can be
seen part o f the European process o f defining a state. Choices are made as to the 'correct' 
language, and variations marginalised as dialects. But despite the expertise the cadre 
acquired in the Tibetan language, they failed to establish one accepted method o f 
transcribing Tibetan into English. The transcription forms they used varied, and several 
different systems are still used today. The cadre's reports contain different spellings for 
people, places and positions in Tibetan society, which often confused the Secretariat 
officials. This lack o f definition was a characteristic of the location.
The cadre's location on the Indian frontier placed them in constant confrontation with the 
paradoxes o f social structures and systems alternative to their own, and this was a factor in 
generating a 'heroic mythology', which located the frontiersmen in imperial legends.[32] 
The Tibet cadre became an integral part o f British frontier mythology, a status o f which 
they were not unaware. In seeking to describe the many-faceted implications o f  this 
transitional location, in both historical time and imperial legend, it is appropriate to adopt 
Victor Turner's term 'liminal' from the field of religious studies.[33]
This term is appropriate to apply to the Tibetan frontier as it implies both the geographical 
and mythological aspects o f this zone; the latter aspect being difficult otherwise to quantify 
in historical terms. Turner developed Arnold van Gennep's work on rites o f  passage, 
emphasising the central phase o f 'liminality' (from the Latin lim en , a threshold) as an 
ambiguous state 'betwixt and between' customary social categories. Turner's studies o f 
pilgrimage stressed those aspects o f freedom and ambiguity at the interface o f cultural 
change, and he used the term 'liminal' to emphasise a zone outside normal social structures 
and location, but entered by choice. [34]
Victor Turner's emphasis on freedom and ambiguity in the liminal zone is shared by the 
seminal frontier thesis o f the 19th century historian o f America's West, Frederick Jackson 
Tumer.[35] He argued that the freedom and potential of the frontier had a decisive effect on 
the character o f frontiersmen, bringing out an independence and resourcefulness reflecting 
the frontier experience. This experience subsequently passed into national folklore, 
transforming experience into legend, with its attendant symbols and language, and became 
a formative influence on national identity. F.J. Turner's findings may be applied to the 
experience o f the Tibetan frontier, in identifying this zone as a place where a conditions of 
freedom and am biguity affected character and action, and were transform ed into 
legend. [36]
The geographical studies o f J.R.V.Prescott provide more evidence that we may locate the 
history o f  the Tibet cadre within the wider area o f frontier studies. Prescott, following 
C.B.Fawcett, identifies the predominant characteristic o f a frontier as its distinct transitional 
nature. In addition, the absence o f fully-developed legal and administrative systems is
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characteristic, with a consequent effect on the frontiersmens' behaviour. This results in 
those conditions F.J.Turner identified on the American frontier, which encouraged 'those 
who were self-reliant, and capable o f improvisation'.
Prescott draws two conclusions relevant to the Tibetan frontier. He found that, for the 
state, the frontier principally involves considerations o f security. W hereas in traditional 
societies, defined by their centre, frontiers merged imperceptibly, modern states, being 
defined by their borders, sought to establish boundaries, rather than frontiers between 
states. On the individual level, Prescott concluded that 'no one can doubt that 
"frontiersman" denotes a particular kind o f philosophy and character'; one whose 
behaviour has been 'influenced by both government regulations and their perception o f the 
possibilities offered by the frontier'.[37]
The studies o f Prescott, and Victor and F.J.Tumer, indicate that we may regard a frontier 
as a liminal zone o f  transition, where the absence o f defined place and identity produced 
new responses by individuals, whose character was affected by the freedom and ambiguity 
o f  their location. Being outside the limits o f a society's place, identity and codes o f 
meaning, this liminal zone becomes the setting for experience to be expressed as myth and 
legend.
The liminal status o f  the frontier implied a place which transformed the character o f 
individuals encountering the zone. This was an essential part o f the wider belief in frontiers 
as zones o f transformation. The effect o f the frontier on the individual was generally 
portrayed in wholly positive terms; this was certainly the case in British India.[38] Lord 
Curzon considered that character was 'moulded' on the frontier by 'responsibility 
and...self-reliance'. Those with 'courage...patience and...initiative' found the frontier 
'ennobling and invigorating'.[39]
Similarly Melody Webb, in a recent study o f the Alaskan frontier based on F.J.Turner's 
methodology, quotes an Alaskan pioneer as claiming 'nothing will test out men as to their 
real character, resourcefulness, courage, endurance... and readiness to do their...duties 
as...that hard frontier country'. Curzon claimed to admire the frontier officer who took 'the 
bit between his teeth', and implicitly he supported the right o f frontier officials to act on 
their own initiative without reliance on regulations. This parallels the view o f a 
contemporary pioneer officer in Alaska, Lieutenant (later Brigadier-General) 'Billy' 
Mitchell, who claimed that 'An officer who always follows the letter o f the Books o f 
Regulations instead o f the spirit seldom gets anywhere', a very similar message to that 
presented in Sandem an's biography (as seen in Chapter One), and promoted by the 
cadre. [40]
Thus, while the British sought to bring India's north-east frontier under increasing
administrative control, the individuals chosen to serve on the frontier were those who 
valued initiative above regulations; a situation with parallels elsewhere in British India, the 
Punjab and the North-W est Frontier for example. The frontiersmen themselves regarded 
their own paternal m ethods o f government as more suited to local conditions than 
government based on codes o f law and regulation, although, in practice, the two methods 
constantly overlapped.
The paradox that frontiersmen with little regard for rules and regulations were seen as 
best suited to bringing settled administration to the frontier may have reflected a wider 
sense o f understanding amongst the British in India that they served in a zone which both 
required, and produced, special traits of character among the successful. The Tibet cadre 
therefore, reflect a particular manifestation o f a wider issue, which demonstrates the 
differing trends in British India in dealing with policies of control.
CO NCLUSIO N
Officers such as Bell, M acDonald and Richardson did gain a deep understanding o f 
Tibet, beyond that regarded as necessary for the perform ance o f their duties. The 
understanding they gained reflected the perspective of the Lhasa ruling class, and it was 
with this section o f Tibetan society that cadre officers came to identify with, and ’belong' 
to.
Cadre officers did seek to 'discover' the truth about Tibet. Their own sense o f identity 
and personal prestige was closely associated with the level o f knowledge they gained. They 
believed that through personal contact with the Tibetans they gained an understanding 
which enabled them to 'discover', and subsequently represent, the 'truth' about Tibet. 
There was more to obtaining understanding, including an intuitive perception, but several 
officers did 'cross over' and gain a deeper understanding o f  Tibet than any other 
Europeans, and their understanding was recognised by the Tibetans.
The cadre's location on the frontier was an important factor in their identity. The frontier 
was a liminal zone o f transition, in which aspects o f myth and legend are o f a part o f the 
regions' identity, and the positive value o f this aspect o f Tibetan identity, and the traditions 
o f British frontier service, both contributed to a lack of precise definition o f Tibet.
It appears that parallels with the essential features of the Tibetan frontier experience, and 
the British understanding o f this encounter, may be found wherever European expansion 
led to an encounter in zones o f transition outside o f major civilisations. It would also 
appear that while individuals were chosen for service on the frontier because they
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possessed particular character traits, service on the frontier was believed to bring out those 
desired characteristics. The lack of definition characteristic of the frontier gave it a freedom 
from fixed identity and place which made it a potential location for the transformation of 
experience into legend, a process which parallels the frontier experience elsewhere.
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CO NCLUSION
’W E ARE NO LONGER MASTERS OF THE RESIDENCY’:
CHARACTER AND POLTCY,
The Tibet cadre were the product of an imperial age. Their mentality reflected the era - 
which effectively ended in India with Curzon's departure - when the boundaries o f empire 
could be extended by the application o f ’forward’ policies by imperial frontiersmen. The 
original cadre officers were all associated with the Younghusband Mission, a classic 
example o f ’forward’ policy in action, and supported the policy it represented. Despite 
changing personnel and circumstances, the cadre's primary aims and policies remained 
'forward' throughout the 1904-47 period.
As noted, cadre officers had many characteristics known to be common to imperial 
officers, such as education at British public schools. Previous studies have questioned 
which factor was most influential in forming their character, and the evidence in this case 
suggests that public school influence was greater than initial service training. But it also 
appears that their outlook was greatly affected by the books which they read, particularly 
during their Political training. When we read Thornton's biography o f Sandeman, we read 
a blueprint for the Tibet cadre's behaviour and ethos.
Despite their sharing o f certain characteristics, cadre officers were recognised as distinct 
from other imperial officers. The primary element in this distinct collective identity was 
their empathy with Tibet and the Tibetans. A deep personal involvement was required to 
gain this empathy, and thus the most successful officers were those who chose to serve 
there, even at the expense o f  family, health and career. A w illingness to make such 
sacrifices may be associated with another defining element o f cadre officers; they had a 
'touch o f the recluse', which predisposed them to service on the frontier. The cadre's high 
degree o f specialisation was in contrast to the 'generalist' traditions o f the British Indian 
sendees in the 19th century, although indicative o f their increasing specialisation in the 20th 
century.
The cadre were also characterised by scholarship. They embraced the qualities o f both 
'men o f action' and intellectuals. The need for men who would build-up a body o f
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knowledge of the region, combined with the requirement that they be fit enough to survive 
Tibet's harsh climatic conditions, meant that successful cadre officers blended intellect and 
action.
The cadre's distinct institutional identity was deliberately maintained by a twofold 
process. Firstly, serving cadre officers exercised a significant level o f influence on cadre 
appointments by an unofficial system o f patronage, selecting officers whose mentality and 
approach to policy matched that o f their own. Thus Bell supported MacDonald, and in turn 
they both assisted Gould, who recommended Richardson.
Secondly, cadre traditions were passed down from serving officers to newcomers. These 
traditions were based on existing service traditions, such as those o f the ICS and the Indian 
Army, and on the regional traditions o f imperial frontiers. This process supports Shils's 
conclusion that 'Particular elements in one...tradition...may...be diffused into families or 
branches o f  traditions o f  another sphere', and is consistent with Potter's findings 
concerning the establishment and maintenance of Indian administrative traditions. [1]
The type of officer considered best-suited for frontier service was synonymous with the 
image o f the ideal officer portrayed in imperial literature and Political Department training 
texts. Recruits were selected and trained to match that ideal, and were instilled with an 
intuitive understanding o f the boundaries o f behaviour necessary to that ideal. The 
definition o f these boundaries may be seen as a process, whereby the ideal was continually 
negotiated within certain established parameters. Thus the cadre raised such issues as 
whether an Indian officer could uphold British prestige. This discussion was located within 
a wider debate between those who felt that the predominant tendency o f the British should 
be to 'command', and those who felt that it should be to 'advise'. In Tibet, those, such as 
Bell and M acDonald, who favoured 'advice' (albeit advice which often implied a 
command), were most successful in gaining the Tibetans' trust.
However, the difference between 'command' and 'advice' was not necessarily apparent 
to the Tibetans, and the cadre's actions were fundamentally concerned with the application 
o f power. U ltim ately, despite the cadre's empathy with Tibetan aspirations, they 
represented British Indian interests, and when these clashed with those of Tibet, as they did 
in the case of Tawang for example, the cadre clearly acted in accordance with their duty to 
their employer, although they did not necessarily feel bound by this loyalty after they 
retired.
We have seen in Chapter Two that prestige was an important aspect o f the cadre's power; 
through creating an aura o f unchallengeable authority, the British tried to avoid the need 
actually to enforce their influence by costly military means. The cadre were greatly 
concerned with the maintenance o f British prestige, this was a part o f their duties, a
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deliberate strategy o f imperial rule designed to uphold the impression o f power. [2] On the 
other hand, the evidence suggests that the Tibetans did not understand many aspects of 
prestige in the form in which the British projected it.
The cadre's prestige was strengthened by their role as the sole channel o f communication 
between Lhasa and the British and Indian Governments. By maintaining a monopoly over 
the flow o f information from Tibet, the cadre prevented the emergence o f other ’voices1 
which might contradict their own. Thus they opposed the presence in Tibet o f persons 
outside Governm ent o f India control, such as the China Customs officers (whose 
expulsion was also part o f  the wider struggle for influence at W hitehall between the 
G overnm ent o f India, and the British Foreign Office, which the cadre regarded as 
supporting Chinese interests). This process was also concerned with preventing the 
Tibetans from coming into contact with Europeans who did not represent the image o f 
European civilisation which the cadre sought to project.
The intermediaries , who acted as go-betweens in British dealings with the Tibetan 
Government, were trained to represent the British to the Tibetans; the most successful o f 
them were promoted to cadre posts. They were selected from the Buddhist hill-peoples in 
the frontier regions, and formed close ties with British officers. As there was no policy o f 
introducing Hindus or Muslims from the mainstream of Indian society into cadre service, 
when the British departed, there were no officers in the new Indian External Affairs 
Department who had any personal knowledge o f Tibet, or with the empathy towards the 
Tibetans which the British officers had developed. Whether, given the loss o f policy­
making power on the periphery, more experienced officers could have had any significant 
influence on events in Tibet in the 1950s is open to question. But certainly there was a lack 
o f expertise available within the Indian Government during this crucial period as a 
consequence of cadre recruitment policies.
The interm ediaries fell into two types, rather as British officials represented two 
tendencies, to command and to advise. One type was represented by Laden La. who 
adopted British forms of behaviour and ultimately lost the trust o f the Tibetans. The other 
type, represented by Norbhu Dhondup, maintained their own cultural identity, while 
successfully learning British codes o f behaviour, written and unwritten. The intermediaries 
who ultimately gained promotion to cadre posts were those who followed the Norbhu 
tendency, just as the British officers who were most successful in gaining the trust o f the 
Tibetans w?ere those who followed Bell’s tendency to advise rather than to command.
In the early years o f the British presence in Tibet, the intermediaries were those such as 
Palhese, whose primary loy alty was to a particular British officer. This pattern o f sendee 
was gradually replaced by that o f groups with close family connections, such as the
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Tserings, who established a tradition (however tenuous) o f  family service under the 
British. These groups could be in competition for British patronage - there was competition 
between Laden La and Norbhu Dhondup - and this competition continues to affect the 
perspectives o f oral sources in the Himalayas today.
We have seen that the cadre's primary influence on policy was 'forward'. Probably their 
most successful campaign was to establish a British Mission in Lhasa, clearly a 'forward' 
move, both geographically and symbolically. But in the 20th century, the promotion o f 
'forward' policies by the imperial frontiersmen did not lead to any major expansion o f the 
British frontier. Although Tawang was annexed to British India, this was done without the 
specific approval, or at least full understanding, o f Whitehall.
In the post-Younghusband era, Whitehall, by such actions as insisting on the return o f 
the Chumbi Valley, demonstrated that it would not allow 'forward' policies which led to 
the expansion o f the empire. There had been a change in the climate o f opinion on imperial 
expansion, at least in Britain, and the establishment o f rapid communications between 
Whitehall and the periphery of empire restricted the possibility of independent action on the 
frontier. The cadre were unable to gain government support for either military intervention 
in Tibet, or significant economic involvement. Thus we may conclude that the process by 
which British government increasingly extended its authority over the periphery o f empire 
resulted in a critical shift in the power source. In this period and place, while the 
frontiersmen remained a force promoting imperial expansion, the power to advance or 
withdraw had passed from the periphery to the centre.
One consequence of the loss of power on the periphery, not previously emphasised, was 
the frontiersmen's increasing disenchantment with their government's policies. While they 
were at the centre o f policy-making, frontiersmen such as Younghusband identified with 
the policies o f their government. When the power moved from the periphery to the centre, 
as it did sharply after Curzon’s departure, the frontiersmen were isolated from policy 
formation, and increasingly opposed to government policies.
While the personal contact which every Political officer had with the Viceroy at the time 
of his selection may have strengthened his sense o f  identification with the 'system', this 
was diminished by his loss o f any real power to create policy. Cadre officers could still 
exert an influence, including a 'behind the scenes' influence as we have seen in Chapter 
Five in the case o f Weir seeking additional funds for Tibet while staying with the Indian 
Foreign Secretary. They were able to gain minor, locally significant points, such as 
assisting Tibet to recruit Radio Officer Robert Ford. But, overall, the cadre were 
increasingly isolated from the 'system'.
The cadre's 'forward' policies were transformed as a result o f this power shift. After
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World War One, the extension o f the Indian frontier over Tibet was clearly a political and 
financial impossibility. But the cadre continued to promote policies designed to increase 
British involvement in Tibet, and advance British interests, in opposition to the now 
prevailing policy o f a 'retreat to the centre'. But post-Younghusband British Tibetan policy 
was essentially reactive; the centre would only respond, not initiate. Thus Whitehall was 
prepared to allow the establishment o f a British Mission in Lhasa as a response to the 
establishment o f a Chinese Mission there, but it would not allow Tibet any significant 
economic support.
Despite this lack o f support at Whitehall, the cadre were largely free to create their own 
role, which they did within the wider traditions of British imperial frontiersmen, and the 
methods o f  the Political Department. Two elements were central to this; information 
gathering, and the cultivation o f local supporters.
Post-1950 imperial historiography has argued against any suggestion that the British 
spied on T ibet.[3] But the argument can only be over semantics. The sources clearly 
demonstrate that throughout the 1904-47 period the British clandestinely monitored 
Chinese and Tibetan communications and employed 'Secret Service Agents' to obtain 
information concerning Tibet. This information flow was o f  critical importance to the 
British. As noted, we may read much o f the history o f the British encounter with Tibet as 
inspired by this need for intelligence. Ensuring the security o f India, which was the cadre's 
primary purpose, required constantly updated information as to the efforts o f other powers 
to influence events in Tibet. Reliable information was most easily obtained at Lhasa; hence 
the cadre made access to Lhasa their main priority. When events in Tibet threatened the 
flow of information - when major informants died, or the Chinese established a presence at 
Lhasa - this demanded a response to secure a continuing information-flow.
Spying was not always necessary. Tibet was a comparatively open society where 
information was freely given by Tibetans whom the cadre had befriended. Obtaining such 
contacts was a recognised part o f a Political officer's duty, for by allying with local 'Ruling 
Chiefs', officers could influence them to follow policies favourable to British interests, in 
return for which they were given various forms of support. Although the British preferred 
to deal with existing leaders, they would support alternatives if existing leaders failed to 
follow British 'advice'. Thus in 1907 the British considered the Panchen Lama as a 
potential Tibetan leader, and in the early 1920s Tsarong Shape was seen in this role.
Although the cadre lacked the power to alter the Tibetan leadership, Bell was able to 
transform Anglo-Tibetan relations through his friendship with the Dalai Lama, who 
enjoyed the greatest authority, and overwhelming popular support, in Tibet. Bell's policy 
o f support for the Dalai Lama became the predominant feature o f cadre policies, and Bell
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him self was, arguably, the most influential cadre officer, both with his own government 
and with the Tibetans. But Tibet was not a dictatorship. The Dalai Lama took aristocratic 
and monastic opinion into account in formulating policy, and their conservative opposition 
restricted his ability to follow Bell's 'advice1.
As suggested, the decline in British influence in Tibet in the 1920s may have been a 
consequence o f an attempted coup initiated by Bailey in 1923-24. Such a 'forward' move 
was certainly within Bailey's capabilities, and consistent with his attitudes to both Tibet and 
Russia. But when the nascent military faction in Tibet lost power after this period, the 
British, under Weir and W illiamson, broadened their range o f contacts in an effort to 
befriend the powerful monastic faction.
In the absence o f any alternative means o f gaining influence, the cadre increasingly relied 
on cash payments to leading Tibetan individuals and institutions. This policy was never 
openly articulated (presumably due to doubts over its morality, although the cadre appear to 
have perceived it as a necessary evil), and has largely escaped historical notice, but it 
emerged clearly in interviews with former British officers in Tibet. They recalled that the 
cadre helped the Tibetan rulers to 'keep the Chinese at a safe distance through gifts o f 
money and weapons'.[4]
British sources seek to locate their actions in Tibet within certain ethical parameters. Thus 
Richardson notes that in the early 1920s, 'There was no suggestion o f  [the cadre] 
persuading the Tibetans to undertake anything they did not want’.[5] Issues which threaten 
the ethical image, such as spying, Tawang, and O'Connor's and Bailey's apparent attempts 
to create an alternative to the Dalai Lama's leadership, were passed-over, or suppressed, as 
part of the British attempt to maintain the moral high-ground in the struggle against Chinese 
imperialism.
Post-1947 events in Tibet have meant that any evidence casting the British in a poor 
moral light, or demonstrating the full implications o f their efforts to influence Tibet, assists 
the Chinese claim that they were freeing Tibet from British imperialism. But the truths 
which the cadre’s works represent must be placed in the context o f the interests they 
represent. The moral case for Tibetan independence rests on clearly established factors such 
as the Tibetan's separate identity, desire for independence, and China's oppression and 
exploitation of Tibet since the 1950s, none of which is seriously in doubt. Their claim is 
not dependent on the perceived morality o f British actions, and may indeed be strengthened 
by being removed from this context.
The imperial encounter with traditional Asian societies was, in the wider perspective, an 
issue o f power. China. Russia, Britain, India and, to a lesser degree, Japan and other 
regional powers, all sought to promote their own interests in Tibet. The issue was not
245
simply one o f European imperialism; the aims of every state involved were imperial. What 
was at stake was power over Tibet. There is, in today's understanding, no real moral high- 
ground for any state which sought to control the Tibetans, whose desire was for self- 
determination and isolation from neighbouring powers in order to maintain conditions 
conducive to their religious priorities.
Where there is evidence to support British claims to the moral high-ground is in regard to 
the cadre officers themselves. The British were in Tibet to protect and advance their own 
interests. In private the cadre admitted that their aims were not altruistic, and that they 
placed British interests above those o f the Tibetans; Gould's mission to Lhasa in 1936-37 
for exam ple, gave the Tibetans 'assurances o f continued diplomatic support without 
committing ourselves to writing'.[6]
But, except in issues related to the security o f India (the annexation o f Tawang being the 
most obvious example o f this), there was clearly a genuine desire by the cadre that the 
encounter should benefit the Tibetans. Thus Gould told Ford that 'Your job is to help the 
Tibetans'. [7] This altruistic aspect was part o f a complex cadre motivation, which included 
more selfish elements along with those o f duty and service. But the prevailing trend in the 
cadre was to empathise with Tibet and Tibetans, and this trend prevailed both during and 
after their Tibetan service.
This was in great contrast to the Chinese. The Ambcms' office was, according to British 
and Tibetan sources, characterised by corruption, internal dispute, and opium addiction, 
and the Ambans neither learned Tibetan nor identified with Tibetan aspirations.[8] A British 
officer, however, was, with few exceptions, 'always aware that I was a guest in their 
country [Tibet], and if they didn’t like it, that was the end o f the matter’.[9]
There were, therefore, genuine elements to the cadre's friendship with Tibetans, as when 
Richardson found that the 'Nechung Ta Lama' was 'Quite apart from the political value of 
his friendship...one o f the best o f m en'.[10] These personal ties affected the cadre's 
perceptions o f Tibet, and led to officers such as Richardson, for example, developing what 
the Dalai Lama described as 'a very, very strong sense o f  devotion to Tibetan 
independence'.[11 ]
CHARACTER AND IMAGE
As we have seen in Chapter Six, prior to their encounter with the British, Tibetans had a 
sense o f distinct collective identity, or 'proto-nationalism ', based on a historical 
understanding o f Tibet as a religious community. But their loyalties were to local, regional.
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ethnic and religious entities, rather than to a Tibetan nation. Although their primary 
authority was the Dalai Lama, his power, like that o f India's Viceroy, was restrained by a 
series o f 'checks and balances'. Tibet's then status appears to fit models o f a 'galactic 
polity', a political structure o f fluctuating authority centres, as proposed by Samuel. [12]
British Indian strategic policy required that Tibet serve as a British-influenced 'buffer 
state' against foreign influence in the Himalayas. Creating this 'buffer state' meant 
transforming Tibet into a nation-state, a process replicating many features o f the extension 
o f British sovereignty in India. The British stimulated this process, and to an extent 
therefore, they 'constructed' a Tibetan state, but Whitehall refused to recognise this state as 
independent to avoid jeopardising Anglo-Chinese relations.
Despite Whitehall, however, the British did contribute to the creation o f structures which 
encouraged the growth o f Tibetan nationalism, and helped the Tibetans to learn the 
importance o f symbols o f nationalism. Thus the concern o f  Ludlow in the 1920s, and 
Hopkinson in the 1940s, that Tibetans should continue to wear Tibetan clothing in order to 
preserve their identity, emerges again in the 1990s as a Tibetan nationalist statement: one 
Dorje Wangdu was jailed by the Chinese in 1991 on charges which included 'advocating 
that Tibetans wear Tibetan national clothes during Chinese National Day celebrations'.[13]
British Indian interests did not necessarily require specific or final definition o f Tibet's 
status, which remained ambiguous. But the cadre dealt with Tibet as an independent state. 
In conjunction with their efforts to transform Tibet into a modern nation-state, they sought 
to construct an image which portrayed the Tibet which their policies aimed at creating. This 
image-construction had a political purpose; it was part o f  a battle o f ideas, aimed at 
establishing an independent Tibet in the minds at least o f that class o f educated Europeans, 
particularly imperial officers, who were the target for these images.
The cadre created an image o f Tibet through various media, but most significantly their 
published works. The European appropriation o f authority for the production o f 
knowledge, and the weight given to empirical evidence, gave these works great authority in 
government and academic circles. But the cadre's use of local informants and their attempts 
to ally with the existing central Tibetan leadership, meant that wrhile the image they 
constructed reflected both European perceptions inherent in the cadre's mentality, and the 
interests o f British India, it also reflected their local informants and Tibetan allies. As this 
image represented the interests o f both powers, they co-operated in maintaining and 
supporting it, a process which has continued to this day.
This image was not, however, constructed without a rational basis; cadre officers did 
generally seek to present empirical evidence designed to produce what they perceived as a 
'true' picture o f Tibet. While marginalising the aspirations o f some peripheral social
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groups, the image did reflect the perspective o f the 'core' culture o f central Tibet. It was 
(after 1910) also generally expressed in positive terms, designed to render Tibet 'familiar' 
to the readers, in contrast to 'Orientalist' images which stress 'Otherness'.
There was, and is, a definitively Orientalist image o f Tibet - the mystical image - which 
existed alongside the image created by the cadre. Historically, fantastic images were often 
constructed around unknown lands, such as pre-colonial Australia, but regular contact with 
these places saw more empirically-based images replace the fantastic. In Tibet, however, 
the two images co-existed, because the mystical image served both the British and Tibetan 
governments’ interests by em phasising Tibet's separate identity and uniquely valuable 
culture; both were ’core’ elements in the cadre's construction o f an image o f Tibet. There 
was also a personal factor in this. Their exotic location (as they perceived it) was a part o f 
the cadre's identity; many cadre officers were genuinely interested in the mystical aspect of 
Tibet, albeit within scientific parameters.
The image constructed by the cadre did not, however, fully reflect their knowledge of 
Tibet. It was shaped by self-censorship, and government censorship, as well as by the 
individual and class perceptions previously referred to. This has meant that negative 
elements o f the British presence have remained largely hidden; for example, the decline in 
the country's moral climate, which was partly due to the influx o f wealth into the hands of 
a few individuals, as a result o f the rivalry between British and Chinese representatives 
who attempted to buy influence in Tibet.
One additional factor affected the cadre's presentation o f information on Tibet: the need to 
sell their books in a commercial market. This led to an emphasis on the colourful and the 
dramatic - repetitive recitations o f images o f 'Otherness' - at the expense o f material 
designed to render Tibet familiar, as authors sought colourful images to appeal to the book- 
buying public.
Tibet did become fully familiar to a few cadre officers. Bell. MacDonald, and Richardson 
all appear to have been accepted by the Tibetans as 'belonging' to Tibetan culture. They 
were fluent in Tibetan, lived among Tibetans for a long period o f time, empathised with 
them, and had an intuitive understanding o f the culture which they demonstrated by the 
production o f works accepted by both Tibetans and Europeans as accurately representing 
their subject. It appears that these officers did understand the Tibetans, and that, in the 
wider sense, individual understanding is therefore possible in colonial encounter.
Charles Bell was generally accepted by both nations as having gained the greatest 
understanding o f Tibet. But his level o f understanding was not essential to the satisfactory 
performance o f an officer's duties; while it was a great advantage to an officer's work, it 
was an involvement beyond the requirements of duty. Officers, such as Sherriff and Weir
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were efficient and effective despite being content to view Tibet as 'Other'.
Officers who came to 'belong1 to Tibetan society identified with the interests of the Lhasa 
ruling-class to w hich they 'belonged'. Their understanding o f Tibet reflected the 
perspective o f that class, just as it reflected the perspective they gained from their class in 
British society. Paradoxically, this alliance between the cadre and the Lhasa leadership, 
which as Goldstein has shown was an extremely conservative force opposed to any 
modernisation process,[14] tended to preserve this elite and the existing structures o f 
Tibetan society from change, despite modernisation being part o f British aims. Elements 
within Tibet which opposed these ruling forces were perceived by the British and their 
allies as pro-Chinese, and their voices were suppressed.
But Tibet's failure to establish an identity in the sense required by modern political 
models o f  independent states was not solely the responsibility o f the British. The 
conservative elem ents dom inating Tibet's governm ent resisted those aspects o f 
modernisation which might have established Tibet’s independent status on the world 
stage. [15] Once the possibility of the British establishing a formal protectorate over Tibet 
had vanished, there was a common awareness that an eventual accommodation with China 
was inevitable. But although it was obvious by the 1920s that the policy was unrealistic, 
Britain and Tibet continued to hope that the Chinese would eventually accept an agreement 
along the lines o f the Simla Convention, and both the cadre and the Tibetans followed 
policies on the basis o f the Simla Convention, which even the Government o f India 
acknow ledged, after it ended, was 'invalid ' w ithout Chinese acceptance o f  its 
conditions. [16]
The lack o f definition characteristic of the British encounter with Tibet was typical o f the 
liminal frontier zone in which the encounter was located. In this zone o f freedom and 
ambiguity, the absence o f fixed identity and place provided conditions affecting character 
and action, and producing responses the British considered desirable among their frontier 
officers. The character and actions o f the cadre were therefore, affected by and 
characteristic of, their liminal location.
The liminal nature o f this zone, outside customary understandings of time and place, 
made it a location for the transformation o f  action into legend, and both indigenous and 
imperial myths flourished there. The Indian frontier was the setting for a powerful 
mythology o f empire, and cadre officers were aware o f taking their place in such myths as 
the "Great Game". This imperial mythology provides a valuable source for understanding 
the self-image o f the frontiersman, a factor otherwise difficult to quantify in historical 
terms.
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THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ANGLO-TIBETAN ENCOUNTER
The Anglo-Tibetan encounter had significant and lasting consequences in two related 
areas; (a) the political status o f  Tibet, and (b) our understanding o f Tibetan history and 
culture, and the context in which these are studied. While both are complex issues, they are 
clearly shaped by the implications o f British actions in the region.
On 15 August 1947, when responsibility for Indo-Tibetan relations passed into the hands 
o f  the newly independent Indian Government, the British ceased to be represented in Tibet. 
The U.K. High Commission in Delhi did propose establishing a British medical dispensary 
in Lhasa, to represent British interests, and Major Guthrie, the Lhasa Mission doctor and 
'an enthusiast about Tibet' offered to remain there. But the Foreign Office decreed 
otherwise, and formal Anglo-Tibetan ties ended. [17]
Anglo-Tibetan relations were o f such low priority within Whitehall that Tibet was not 
officially notified that India was being given independence until less than three weeks 
before the event. They were informed that the Indian Government would inherit the rights 
and obligations o f existing treaties previously held by the Government o f India in regard to 
Tibet. [18]
Although the new Indian flag flew in place o f the Union Jack, there were no immediate 
changes in the cadre posts, not least because there were no trained Indians to replace them. 
But while Richardson remained in Lhasa until 1950, an Indian took control o f the Tibet 
posts on 1 September 1948, when Arthur Hopkinson handed over to the new Political 
Officer Sikkim, Harish Dayal ICS, and Mrs Hopkinson wrote in her diary that, 'Today we 
are no longer masters o f the Residency'. [19]
When Hopkinson departed, the cadre were optimistic that India would follow the Tibetan 
policies established by the British. Harish Dayal was considered sympathetic to the 
Tibetans, and in December 1949 Hopkinson wrote to Bailey that, 'At first the Congress 
were showing signs o f completely selling out the Tibs[sic]. but we persistently combated 
this'. Indeed Hopkinson was more impressed with the new Indian officials than with their 
British predecessors in their last year, whom he described as 'moribund...intent on their 
next jobs '.[20]
But the cadre's hopes were soon disappointed. Tibet was to be an exception to the 
general continuity o f foreign policy after the transfer o f power. In January 1950, India 
recognised the new Communist Government in China, which in August o f that year 
officially advised India o f their intention to 'liberate' Tibet. On 7 October 1950, Chinese 
forces invaded Tibet from the east and the west. The last Europeans left Tibet around that 
time, although a missionary, Geoffrey Bull, and former Lhasa Radio Officer Robert Ford,
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then employed by the Tibetan Government in Quamdo, were captured by the invading 
forces in eastern Tibet. Marking the decline o f British power and influence in the region, 
they were not released until 1953 and 1955 respectively.[21]
The Chinese take-over was in two phases. The first, which involved attempts to absorb 
Tibet peacefully, lasted until 1959, when the situation deteriorated, and the 14th Dalai Lama 
fled to India as Chinese forces shelled Lhasa. Three years later, the Sino-Indian conflict 
broke out, and the Lhasa Mission and the Trade Agencies were closed. The official Indian 
presence in Tibet was ended.[22]
In April 1954, the Indian Government concluded an Agreement with China in which it 
recognised Tibet as part o f China. This agreement allowed the 'establishment' (i.e. 
continuance) o f three Indian Trade Agencies in Tibet. By an exchange of notes following 
the Agreement, however, India agreed to withdraw the Agency military escort, and to give 
control o f the telegraph and communication systems, and the dak bungalows along the 
trade route, to China. [23]
There were other significant events in 1954. On 17 July, floods, which killed several 
hundred people in the area, destroyed the Gyantse Trade Agency, killing Trade Agent 
Pemba Tsering and his wife, and washing away the graves o f W illiamson and other 
Europeans who had died in Tibet. Then, on 25 December, the first motor convoy reached 
Lhasa from Chengdu. [24]
Independent India's policy towards Tibet differed from that o f British India for a number 
o f reasons, not all o f them the result o f British actions. For example, the idealism o f 
Jawaharlal Nehru clearly led him to a naive view o f Communist Chinese intentions and 
policies.[25] But Whitehall's refusal to recognise Tibet as an independent state had left it 
with an ambiguous status in international law. Tibet claimed, and demonstrated that it was 
independent in status, but no other state now recognised it as such,
India also had to face the legacy o f British India's annexation o f Tawang. As the Simla 
Convention was the legal basis o f this, and the legal status o f that Convention was 'at best 
questionable, at worst null and void ',[26] due to China's refusal to recognise it, British 
Tibetan policy had left India in an awkward position. It appears she hoped to extricate 
herself by recognising Chinese authority over Tibet in the hope that China would accept 
Indian rule over Tawang.
Newly independent India was not, for reasons o f  prestige, nation-building, and domestic 
politics, prepared to give up areas which it had inherited from the British as Indian 
territory. But Tawang was undoubtedly a 'skeleton' which India wished to keep in the 
cupboard; even today files relating to the area remain classified. The British annexation of 
Tawang has overshadowed India's Tibetan policy ever since.
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The political status o f  Tibet today retains much o f the ambivalence which characterised 
the British period. The governments o f the world officially accept Tibet as part of China, 
but, through such actions as the American President's receiving the Dalai Lama, imply a 
recognition that Tibet has a legitimate claim to independence. Tibet has taken its place 
among a group o f what we might call 'unrecognised' nations - such as Kurdistan - which 
are paradoxically seeking to become recognised independent nation-states while threatening 
the whole nation-state system as a model for world order. The British failure to recognise 
T ibetan independence was largely responsible for T ibet being an 'unrecognised' 
nation. [27]
Despite their battle against the Chinese, the Tibet cadre, in the tradition o f their "Great 
Game" heritage, had always tended to regard Russia as the greatest threat to the security o f 
Tibet and India. Even in 1948, Hopkinson reported that 'in spite o f changes within India, 
the same dangers threaten without, only more intensified, with increased Russian 
expansion'. M ajor Saker also submitted a report to the new Government o f Pakistan 
around that time, in which he concluded that western Tibet 'was liable to be taken over by 
the Russians, possibly for the sake o f its mineral wealth'.[28]
Not until early 1949 was it obvious that the Communists would gain the victory which 
was formally signified by the inauguration o f the Peoples Republic o f China on 1 October 
1949.[29] It is difficult to criticise the Tibet cadre for failing to foresee the Communist 
victory. They, and the Tibetans, were aware that China, whatever her government, would 
attempt to control Tibet, and that Tibet could not resist a full-scale military attack by China. 
But 'no one had seriously thought that the Chinese would take military action in Tibet. The 
milieu was shattered by the Chinese invasion.'[30]
The cadre existed to protect the security o f British India's northern border; in August 
1947 they could look back and claim to have succeeded in this aim. The cadre were not 
posted to Tibet to protect or advance the interests o f the Tibetans, while W hitehall's 
primary concern there was to avoid damaging British relations with other major powers, 
and. in particular, the China trade. But because o f their empathy with the Tibetans, cadre 
officers identified strongly with Tibetan interests, and they did not leave Tibet in its 
virtually helpless state without deep personal regrets. Therefore, just as we must separate 
the knowledge o f Tibet which individual cadre officers gained, from the image o f Tibet 
which was constructed as a result o f this knowledge, so we must separate the British 
Government's willingness to abandon Tibet from the cadre's aims for Tibet's future.
The frontiersmen on the Tibetan periphery o f the British empire had. by the 1940s. lost 
all power to influence Tibet's future in the direction which they thought best; the power 
was held by the central government, which was totally indifferent to Tibetan interests. In
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retrospect, we may see that had Curzon and Younghusband's 'forward' policies been 
carried though to their logical conclusion, Tibet would have been taken into close 
association with India, perhaps with a status similar to that of Bhutan. We may now judge 
that this could have prevented the cultural genocide that followed the Chinese take-over, 
and saved more than a million Tibetan lives, and that therefore the policies advanced by the 
cadre were correct, and the policies o f the British Government were tragically wrong. But 
as was recognised by Bell, such a commitment was impractical,[31] and in 1947 there was 
no longer the means or the will to protect what was only ever a peripheral consideration in 
empire. Britain left many unresolved questions in abandoning her empire in India, both as a 
consequence o f the construction o f identities and political constituencies and of the failure 
to do so, as in the case of Tibet.
It may be that the encounter on the Tibetan frontier, beyond the stresses o f direct imperial 
control and consequent indigenous resistance, did result in an experience o f which it could 
be truthfully said by the cadre, as the encounter ended, that 'on balance we had done more 
good than harm....W e could look back without shame, and with some pride.'[32] But the 
cadre's duty to promote the interests o f the Government o f India, and Whitehall's refusal to 
permit the fulfillment o f Tibetan aspirations to independence, meant that that judgment must 
be applied to the relationship o f individual British officers (including the medical and 
technical staff) with the Tibetans, rather than to the encounter as a whole.
THE BRITISH AND MODERN TIBETAN HISTORIOGRAPHY
The Chinese take-over o f Tibet polarised the emerging field o f Tibetan studies, with 
issues being seen in a political context where information either supports the perspective of 
the Chinese Governm ent or o f the Tibetan Government-in-exile. Attempts to remove 
Tibetan studies from this context have failed; even Buddhist studies suggest support for the 
Tibetan position by implying that Tibetan culture is of value, and because the Tibetans use 
Buddhism as a political weapon against the Chinese.[33]
We have seen that the cadre constructed an image of Tibet in works which acquired a 
great authority among British officialdom. The Tibetans have found these works extremely 
valuable in support o f their cause. The basic premise articulated by the Tibetan Government 
today is that Tibetans are a separate race and culture from the Chinese, and, until they were 
invaded, formed a state historically independent of China, with such religio-political ties as 
existed for mutual convenience between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese Emperor having 
ended when China became a republic. The works o f cadre officers such as Bell and
Richardson support this position because they promoted virtually the same premise, both in 
British interests, and in the interests o f their Tibetan allies.
In the 1950s and '60s, former cadre officers offered the Tibetan cause a 'voice'. Hugh 
Richardson, for example, was a leading figure in the founding o f the U.K. Tibet Society, 
which began to campaign on behalf of the Tibetans. Thus the alliance o f interests between 
the cadre officers and their allies in Tibet in the pre-1947 period continued into the modern 
period. It is clearly in Tibet's interest that the leading European work on Tibetan history has 
been written by Hugh Richardson, for it specifically counters Chinese claims in regard to 
Tibet. [34]
The need to avoid offering any support for Chinese activity in Tibet, the fact that the most 
authoritative texts in Tibetan studies were by cadre officers (or by those like Tucci who co­
operated closely with the cadre), combined with the impossibility o f further independent 
research in Tibet (until the late 1980s), have all had a great effect on Tibetan studies. The 
field continues to be dominated by works following the traditions and relying on the 
authority o f the image o f Tibet constructed by the Tibet cadre, with most o f the principal 
works by cadre officers themselves having been reprinted in the last decade. [3 5]
The position is, however, changing. In the last decade western, and Tibetan, scholarship 
has begun to question accepted images o f Tibet, with revisionist work on religious and 
regional minority traditions, and the traditional Tibetan power structure and sense of 
identity, although, as noted, this does not appear to lead to radically different interpretations 
o f Tibetan history and culture.[36] Both modern and historical Tibet are now subject to 
investigation, and will be assisted by an understanding o f the British perspective and 
activities which led to their construction o f an image of Tibet.
Understanding the influence o f the Tibet cadre enables us to see its continuing effects. 
Thus the Dalai Lama continues to be the focus o f western support for the Tibetan cause, 
just as he was the focus o f British efforts to cultivate Tibetan allies. We may see that that 
the cadre's efforts to create a modern Tibetan-nation state, and an image o f Tibet as such a 
state, has resulted in the question o f  Tibetan independence being located in a legal 
framework of debate over Tibet's status in two periods, 1913-50, and pre-1904. The legal 
uncertainty surrounding aspects o f this case in the British period, such as the Simla 
Convention, weakens the Tibetan position.
The Tibetan claim to independence may be better located in a moral framework, and in the 
still-evolving context o f separate racial, cultural and religious identity as a basis for self- 
determination, rather than in quasi-historical claims based on cadre constructions and 
British imperial treaties. The award o f the Nobel Peace Prize to the Dalai Lama, and recent 
protests in Tibet which have specifically linked Tibetan religious identity and Buddhist
254
ethics with the Tibetan’s aspirations for independence,[37] appear more appropriate to 
Tibet's fundamentally religious identity.
N either em phasis is liable to greatly effect the policies o f the present Chinese 
Government. But establishing in the eyes o f the international community the Tibetan's 
claim to the right to self-determination on both moral and identity grounds offers the 
possibility that if China wishes to be accepted in international arenas such as trade, sports 
and academic and scientific forum, she will be put under increasing pressure to satisfy 
Tibetan aspirations; as South Africa was put under similar pressure in regard to her 
apartheid policies.
With this political backdrop, modem Tibetan studies continue to have significant political 
implications; pro-Tibetan or pro-Chinese. But the Dalai Lama noted how the massive 
increase in western studies o f Tibetan Buddhism helped to dispel negative images o f their 
religion, and how the distortion o f the political image o f Tibet by the British desire to 
exclude Russian influence from Tibet was partly due to the fact that 'there was very little 
contact, only officials, no independent individuals who spent time in Tibet or were able to 
study [Tibet]'. [38] Increasingly, there are numbers o f independent scholars able to visit 
and study Tibet, which can only benefit the field o f study, and our understanding o f Tibet 
and the Tibetans.
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APPENDIX ONE
THE TIBET CADRE:- Officers who served for more than nine months as Political 
Officer Sikkim, Head of British Mission Lhasa, or British Trade Agent Gyantse.
The information concerning each officer is given in the following format:- final rank, 
name, decorations, dates, Indian department prior to Political service; and then as per the 
following abbreviations.
b. - Place o f birth.
f  - Father's occupation (if in India this is indicated
in subsequent brackets when not obvious). 
educ. - Education, public school or otherwise.
u/mc. - University or military college attended.
jp. - Initial Indian service posting(s).
Lt-Colonel Frederick Marsham BAILEY CIE. (1882-1967) Indian Army. 
b. I n d ia . /  Indian Army. educ. W ellington, Edinburgh Academy, u/mc. Sandhurst./? . 
Sikkim and Tibet. Active sendee in World War One. Later Resident in Kashmir and Nepal. 
Noted explorer and naturalist.
Major Richmond Keith Molesworth BATTYE (1905-1958) Indian Army.
b. Persia. /  IMS. educ. Marlborough, u/mc. RMA. W oolich ./? . North-W est Frontier
Province. Later Colonial Administrative Service, Tangyanika.
Sir Charles Bell KCIE. CMG. CIE. (1870-1945) ICS.
b. I n d ia ./  Indian Provincial Services, educ. Winchester, u/mc. Oxford./?. Bengal. Retired 
to Canada.
Major William Lachlan CAMPBELL CIE. (1880-1937) Indian Army.
b. Scotland. /  Gentleman (close relatives served in India), educ. Edinburgh Academy.
u/mc. RMA. W oolich./?. Peking.
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Rai Bahadur Norbhu Dhondup OBE. CBE. (1889-1944).
b. India (D arjeeling )./ Trader (India), educ. Government High School Darjeeling. u/??ic. 
N o n e ./;. Sikkim & Tibet.
Lt-Colonel Edward W alter FLETCHER CBE. (1899-1958) Indian Army. 
b. S co tlan d ./ Military, educ. Malborough. u/mc. RMA. W oolich ./;. North West Frontier 
Province. Active service in World War Two.
Sir Basil GOULD CMG. CIE. (1883-1956) ICS.
b. E n g lan d ./ Law. educ. Winchester, u/mc. Oxford.fp. Punjab, Afghanistan.
M ajor Philip Coates HAILEY (1903-1980) Indian Army.
b. In d ia . /  ICS. educ. Clifton College, u/mc. Sandhurst./;. Baluchistan. Nephew of Sir 
(later Lord) Malcolm Hailey (Governor of the Punjab 1924-28).
Arthur John HOPKINSON (1894-1953) ICS.
b. England. /  Church, educ. Marlborough, u/mc. O x fo rd ./;. United Provinces. Active 
service in World War One. Later became the Reverend Hopkinson.
Frank LUDLOW (1885-1972) Indian Education Department.
b. England. /  Cambridge University Lecturer in Botany, educ. Chelsea, u/mc. Cambridge. 
fp. Punjab. Reknowned naturalist. Employed by the Tibetan Government as Headmaster of 
Gyantse school, 1923-1926.
DAVID MACDONALD (1870-1962) Provincial service.
b. India. /  Tea-planter (India), educ. Bhotia School. Darjeeling, u/mc. N o n e ./;. Assam 
and Bengal. Later owner of the Himalaya Hotel, Kalimpong.
Lt-Colonel Sir William Frederick Travers O ’CONNOR CSI. CIE., CVO. (1870-1943) 
Indian Army.
b. Ireland. /  Irish land-owning family, educ. Charterhouse, u/mc. RMA. W o o lich ./;. 
Darjeeling. Later Resident in Nepal.
Hugh RICHARDSON OBE. CIE. (1905-) ICS.
b. S co tland ./ unknown (India; grandfather in ICS), educ. Glenalmond. u/mc. O xford ./;. 
Bengal. Later Visiting Professor at Seattle.
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Lt-Colonel Herbert Gordon RIVETT-CARNAC (1892-1962) Indian Army. 
b. In d ia ./  Indian Police, educ. Bradfield College, u/mc. Sandhurst./?. Mesopotamia.
Major Alexander Alfred RUSSELL MC. (1898-1967) Indian Army.
b. England. /  ICS. educ. Gordon Watson's Public School, Edinburgh, u/mc. Quetta Cadet
College./?. Persia.
Major Richard Kenneth Maitland SAKER CBE. (1908-1979) Indian Army. 
b. England. /  M ilitary, educ. Aldenham. u/mc. Sandhurst./? . Baroda. Later Pakistan 
Government and Foreign and Commonwealth Office employee.
Major George SHERRIFF (1898-1967) Indian Army.
b. Scotland. /  Distiller, educ. Sedbergh. u/mc. RMA. W oolich,/?. Unknown. Served at 
Kashgar Consulate, 1927-31. Active service in World War One. Reknowned naturalist.
Lt-Colonel Malcolm Cecil SINCLAIR OBE. (1899-1955) Indian Army.
b. Ire lan d ./ Indian Army. educ. Marlborough, u/mc. Quetta Cadet College./?. Unknown.
Rai Bahadur Pemba Tsering (1905-1954) Provincial Service.
b. India (Ghoom). /  Trader (India) family, educ. Government High School Darjeeling. 
u/mc. N one./?. Sikkim & Tibet.
Lt-Colonel James Leslie Rose W EIR CIE. (1883-1950) Indian army.
b. India. /  IMS. educ. Wellingborough, u/mc. RMA. W oolich./?. Gwalior. Punjab. Later
Resident in Baroda.
John Claude W HITE CIE. (1853-1918) Indian Public Works Department.
b. India. /  Unknown (in India), educ. Bonn (Germany), u/mc. None - Coopers Hill
College o f Engineering./?. Bengal.
Frederick W ILLIAMSON (1891-1935) ICS.
b. England. /  Technical, educ. Bedford Modern School, u/mc. Cambridge. /? . Orissa. 
Active service in World War One. Consulate-General in Kashgar 1927-30.
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APPENDIX - TWO
Officers who served in the Government 
of India’s principal positions in Tibet.
The encounter between pre-1947 Tibet and the outside world was heavily documented. 
There are archives which record virtually every European visitor to Tibet; the annual reports 
of the Trade Agencies in the India Office Library, for example, which contain the names of 
every European visitor from India in the 1904-47 period. This appendix lists those officials 
who served in the principal Indian Political Department posts concerned with Tibet. The 
Political Officer Sikkim was stationed in Gangtok (Sikkim), while the other positions listed 
were inside Tibet.[l]
The purpose o f this appendix is, in addition to providing a source for future research in 
this area, twofold. Firstly the sheer number o f these officials - over one hundred - provides 
a counterweight to the generally projected image of Tibet as an isolated land. In this sense it 
adds to Percival Landon's list o f officers on the Y ounghusband M ission and James 
Cooper's list o f European visitors to Lhasa. [2] Secondly, it can be used to trace the careers 
o f the principal officials in Tibet, as they followed a career path culminating in the positions 
in Gangtok or Lhasa.
The positions with which we are concerned are:-
(1) The Political Officer Sikkim
(2) The Head of the British Mission Lhasa
(3) The British Trade Agent Gyantse
(4) The British Trade Agent Yatung
(5) The British Trade Agent Gartok
(6) The Officer Commanding Trade Agent's Escort Gyantse
(7) The Medical Officer Gyantse
(8) The Civil Surgeon Bhutan and Tibet
In order to indicate the actual dates o f service in a particular position, the dates given are.
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with one exception which will be noted, those o f the actual hand-over, rather than the 
official posting date. Due to transport difficulties, leave requirements, and personal 
arrangements between officers, the official date o f posting often varies widely from the 
actual hand-over date.
Due to the complexity o f events involving the Gyantse Trade Agents in the earlier years, 
such as the flight and return o f the 13th Dalai Lama, I have given the actual day of hand­
over for this position as an aid to other scholars in this area, in all other cases the month is 
given.
In a number o f cases, officers were relieved temporarily during their absence on leave, or 
on other duties elsewhere in Tibet or India. In these cases I have indicated that the officer 
officiating 'relieves'.
There is no single source for this data. The lists have been compiled by a comparative 
review o f all available primary sources (as shown in the bibliography), particularly the 
records o f the India Office Library. These sources often conflict; in such cases reliance has 
been placed on the record compiled nearest to the date o f the event.
m  THE POLITICAL OFFICER SIKKIM. BHUTAN AND TIBET[3]
J.C. White takes up newly created post
C. Bell relieves 
White resumes 
Bell relieves 
White resumes
Bell relieves (White on leave prior to his retirement in
May 1889 
May 1904 
Nov. 1904 
Sept. 1906 
Jan. 1907
October 1908, when Bell was appointed permanently) 
Capt. J.L.R. W eir relieves 
Bell resumes 
B. Gould relieves 
Bell resumes
Major W.L. Campbell relieves (Bell on leave
Mar. 1908 
Aug. 1911 
Oct. 1911 
Oct. 1913 
Sept. 1914
prior to his retirement in March 1919 when Campbell was
appointed permanently)
Bell reappointed for one year after Campbell resigns 
Lt-Colone! W.F. O ’Connor takes up post (Bell in
Apr. 1918 
Jan. 1920
Lhasa until October 1921) Jan. 1921
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D. MacDonald relieves Mar. 1921
Major F.M. Bailey takes up post June 1921
F. Williamson relieves May 1927
Bailey resumes Dec. 1927
Major J.L.R. Weir takes up post Oct. 1928
F. Williamson relieves Apr. 1931
Weir resumes Aug. 1931
F. Williamson takes up post Jan. 1933
Capt. R.K.M. Battye relieves (after death of
Williamson in Lhasa.) Nov. 1935
B. Gould takes up post Dec. 1935
H. Richardson relieves May 1937
B. Gould resumes Nov. 1937
A.J. Hopkinson takes up post J u n .1945
(2) THE HEAD OF BRITISH MISSION I/HASA[4]
H. Richardson remained in Lhasa after the
departure o f the Gould Mission Feb. 1937
Norbhu Dhondup assumes post July 1937
H. Richardson resumes Oct. 1938
Norbhu Dhondup resumes Oct. 1939
F. Ludlow assumes post Apr. 1942
G. Sherriff assumes post Apr. 1943
H. Richardson relieves Jun. 1944
G. Sherriff resumes Sept. 1944
Pemba Tsering assumes post Apr. 1945
H. Richardson resumes Apr. 1946
Pemba Tsering relieves Sept. 1947
H. Richardson resumes Dec. 1947
(3) THE BRITISH TRADE AGENT GYANTSE [5]
Capt. W.F. O ’Connor takes up newly created post 01.10.1904
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Lt. F.M . Bailey relieves,
O'Connor resumes (Hand-over at Gangtok) 
Bailey relieves,
O'Connor resumes 
Bailey takes up post
Capt. R.S. Kennedy {IMS} relieves (at Yatung) 
Capt. J.L.R. Weir takes up post
D. Macdonald relieves (at Yatung)
Weir resumes 
Macdonald relieves 
Weir resumes 
Macdonald relieves 
B. Gould takes up post 
Macdonald relieves
Major W.L. Campbell takes up post (at Yatung)
Macdonald takes up post
F. Williamson takes up post
Capt. R.L. Vance {IMS} relieves
A.J. Hopkinson takes up post
Major H.G. Rivett-Carnac takes up post
Lt. W.J.L. Neal {IA} relieves
Rivett-Carnac resumes
Capt. D.R. Smith takes up post
Capt. E.W. Fletcher takes up post
Capt. A.A. Russell takes up post
M. Worth takes up post
Capt. P.C. Hailey takes up post
Capt. R.K.M. Battye takes up post
H. Richardson takes up post
Capt. D.G. Thornburgh takes up post
Major M.C. Sinclair takes up post (at Gangtok)
Capt. R.K .M . Saker takes up post
Major R.W.D. Gloyne {1A} relieves
Saker resumes
Gould reappointed, stationed at Gangtok,
Capt. J.H. Da  ^is  {IA} relieves (at Gyantse)
23.12.1905
15.12.1906
18.07.1907
27.07.1907
01.08.1907
05.06.1909
13.12.1909
23.01.1911
01.04.1911
10.08.1911
30.12.1911
15.02.1912
04.05.1912
31.03.1913 
24.02.1916  
31.03.1918 
20.06.1924
31.05.1926
03.01.1927
30.04.1928
01.03.1929
18.05.1929
18.09.1929
19.11.1929 
19.11.1931
18.04.1933
01.12.1933
20.06.1935
20.07.1936
03.02.1940
20.07.1940
15.06.1941
12.05.1942
15.01.1943
28.09.1943
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F.H. Mainprice takes up post 19.05.1944
Gould reappointed, stationed at Gangtok, the
following act in Gyantse:- 12.08.1944
Capt. C. Finch {IA}
Capt. A.G.H. Robins {IA}
Lt. R. Grist {IA}
Lt. T.R.W. Dark {IA}
Richardson reappointed 12.02.1946
(41 THE BRITISH TRADE AGENT YATUNGffi]
Jan. 1908 
July 1908 
June 1909 
July 1909
Capt. W.L. Campbell takes up post 
Lt. F.M. Bailey relieves 
Lt. R.S. Kennedy {IMS} relieves 
D. Macdonald takes up post
(Macdonald then served at Yatung, without official leave, 
until his retirement in October 1924. The post then combined 
with that o f the British Trade Agent Gyantse until 1936, for details see 
separate listing for Gyantse.)
Rai Bahadur Norbhu Dhondup takes up post 
(position combined with Head o f British 
Mission Lhasa when Norbhu Dhondup stationed
in Lhasa) July 1936
Rai Bahadur Sonam Tobdcn Kazi took up post Sept. 1942
Rai Sahib Pemba Tsering relieved Aug. 1943
R.B.Sonam Tobden Kazi resumes Mar. 1944
(51 THE BRITISH TRADE AGENT GARTOKfTl
Thakur Jai Chand took up newly created post Nov. 1904
Lala Devi Das took up post Jan. 1912
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Cha. Pala Ram took up post Mar, 1925
Thakur Hayat Singh took up post 1928
Dr Kanshi Ram took up post 1929
Pemba Tsering took up post 1941
Lakshman Singh took up post 1946
(61 OFFICER COMMANDING TRADE AGENT'S ESCORT GYANTSE[8]
Lt. W.L. Hogg, 3rd Brahmins relieved Nov. 1905
Lt. C.J. Auchinleck, 62nd Punjabis relieved Sept. 1906
Major W.R. W alker took command o f the 62nd July 1907
Lt. M.H.L. Morgan took command o f the 62nd Dec. 1907
Lt. R.B. Langrishe took command o f the 62nd Feb. 1908
Lt. W. Macready, 120th Rajputs relieved Sept. 1908
Lt. A.O. Creagh took command o f the 120th Sept. 1909
Lt. J. Turner, 114th Maharattas, relieved May. 1911
Lt. H.R. Wilson took command o f the 114th June 1913
Capt. L.S. Fenton, 113th Infantry, relieved Sept. 1913
Capt. L.F. Bodkin 2nd in command from Sept. 1914
Capt Bodkin took command o f the 113th Sept. 1915
Lt. W. de la Passy 2-i-c from Sept. 1915
(Departed May 1916, not replaced)
Lt. M.R. Roberts took command o f the 113th Aug. 1916
Capt. F. Perry, 2/10th Jats, relieved Apr. 1918
Lt. G.N. Chatterjee took command o f the 113th July 1920
Lt. J.A. Andrews took command of the 113th July 1921
Capt. E. Parker, 90th Punjabis, relieved Oct. 1921
Capt. G.B. Williams, 4/8th Rajputs, relieved Sept. 1922
Capt. J.E. Cobbett took command o f the 4/7th Sept. 1923
Capt. E.A. Evanson. 3/17th Dogras, relieved Sept. 1924
Lt. R.P. Taylor 2-i-c from Nov. 1925
Lt. H.M. de V. Moss, 3/12th Sikhs, relieved Sept. 1926
Lt. R.A.K. Sangster 2-i-c from Sept. 1926
Capt. W.E. Dean took command o f the 3/12th Sept. 1927
Capt. H.W. Mulligan took command o f the 3/12th Sept. 1928
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Capt. J.A. Blood took command o f the 3/12th Dec. 1929
Lt. A.J.W. Macleod 2-i-c from Dec. 1929
Capt. H.R. Officer took command o f the 3/12th Mar. 1930
Capt. F.C. Goddard, 1 /5th Maharatta Light Infantry
relieved Sept. 1930
Capt. A.J. Crozier 2-i-c from Sept. 1930
Capt. N.M. Anderson took command o f the 1 /5th June 1931
Capt. W.D. Marshall 2-i-c from June 1931
Capt Marshall took command of the the 1 /5th Sept. 1931
(no 2-i-c)
Capt. E.S.E. Rennie took command o f the 1 /5th Sept. 1932
Capt. H.W. Huelin, 2/7th Rajputs, relieved Sept. 1933
Lt. G.E.P. Cable 2-i-c from Sept. 1933
Major A.C. Bronham took command o f the 2/7th Sept. 1934
Lt. J.W. Pease 2-i-c from Sept. 1934
Capt. J.A. Salomons took command o f the 2/7 th Sept. 1935
(no 2-i-c)
Major P.W. Finch took command o f the 2/7th Nov. 1936
Cable (now Capt.) took command o f the 2/7th Mar. 1937
Major W.A. Colbourne, 1/15th Punjabis relieved Sept. 1937
Lt. H.B. Hudson 2-i-c from Sept. 1937
Lt. Hudson took command of the 1/15th (no 2-i-c) Jun. 1938
Major F. M ackenzie took command o f the 1/15th Sept. 1938
Capt. C.V. Clifford 2-i-c from Sept. 1938
Major J.G. Innes-Keys took command o f the 1/15th Sept. 1939
(no 2-i-c)
Major J.L. W iddicombe, 20th Garrison Company.
relieved June 1940
Lt. D.A. Walters 2-i-c from June 1940
Walters (now Capt.) took command o f the 20th
(no 2-i-c) Oct. 1940
Lt. E.F. Croyle 2-i-c from Feb. 1941
Major R.W.D. Gloyne takes command o f the 20th May 1941
Lt. C. Finch 2-i-c from Feb. 1943
Capt. J.H. Davies takes command o f the 20th Mar. 1943
Finch (now Capt.) took command o f the 20th July 1944
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Capt A.G.H. Robins Rajput Regiment, relieved July. 1944
(originally acting Trade Agent, took command) Oct. 1944
Lt. R.F. Grist 2-i-c from Oct. 1944
Grist (now Capt.) took command o f the 20th Oct. 1945
Lt. T.W.R. Dark 2-i-c from Nov. 1945
Major D.H. Pailthorpe, 1/lst Punjabis, relieved Oct. 1946
Lt N.J. Campbell 2-i-c from Oct. 1946
(Campbell left Feb. 1947 and not replaced)
Major Pearson took command o f the 1/lst May. 1947
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Lt. R. Steen takes up newly created post Oct. 1904
Lt. F.H. Stewart takes up post Oct. 1906
Lt. R.S. Kennedy takes up post Oct. 1907
Capt. D.M.C. Church takes up post Mar. 1910
Lt. R.F.D. M acGregor takes up post Jun. 1911
Capt. G.B. Harland takes up post Oct. 1912
Captain Harland departed in December 1915, the
position was then vacant, with Sub-Assistant
Surgeon Bo Tsering in charge o f the Gyantse
dispensary until September 1922.
Capt. R. Lee takes up post Sept. 1922
Major J.H. Hislop takes up post July 1923
Capt. R.L. Vance takes up post Sept. 1924
Capt. D.N. Bhaduri relieves Jan. 1926
Vance resumes Apr. 1926
Capt. H.W. Mulligan takes up post Sept. 1927
Lt. W.J.L. Neal takes up post Apr. 1928
Lt. M.R. Sinclair takes up post May. 1931
Lieutenant Sinclair accompanied the Political 
Officer to Lhasa in August 1932 towards the
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end o f his term o f service; Bo Tsering relieved 
until Captain Tennant arrived.
Capt. D. Tennant takes up post Sept. 1932
Capt. J. Guthrie takes up post Sept. 1934
Capt. W.S. Morgan takes up post Nov. 1936
Captain Morgan took over the post while in Lhasa 
with the Gould Mission. Sub-Assistant Surgeon 
Rai Sahib Tonyot Tsering relieved at Gyantse 
until Morgan arrived in February 1937.
Capt. A.H.O. O’Malley takes up post July 1938
Capt. C.W.A. Searle takes up post July 1940
Dr. G.F. Humphreys takes up post Oct. 1940
Capt. M.V. Kurian takes up post Mar. 1944
Captain Kurian was in Lhasa from November 1944 
until September 1945 with Bo Tsering relieving 
at Gyantse.
Capt. S.B. Bhattacharjee takes up post Nov. 1945
Capt. S. Sanyal relieves Sept. 1946
Bhattacharjee resumes Oct. 1946
Lt. B.B. Patnaik takes up post Oct. 1947
THE CIVIL SURGEON BHUTAN AND TIBETHOI
Aug. 1940 
Jan. 1942 
Jun. 1944 
Mar. 1945
Capt. W.H.D. Staunton takes up newly created post 
Lt-Col. J.H. Hislop takes up post 
Dr G.S. Terry takes up post 
Major J. Guthrie takes up post
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FOOTNOTES
[1] British personnel also served in other subordinate positions in Tibet. The early Gyantse and 
Yatung Head Clerks were European, and the telegraph, and supply posts, were occupied by 
British non-commissioned officers. After 1936 a British Radio Officer served at Lhasa. These 
positions are however, outside the scope of this study.
[2] Landon (1988, pp.364-67.); Cooper, J., 'Western Visitors to Lhasa: A Chronological List', 
undated, unpublished document available from The Tibet Society U.K.
[3] With the exception of White, whose post predated the creation of the positions in Tibet, all of 
these officers had previously served as British Trade Agent Gyantse. The three temporary officers 
were all serving at the Gyantse post at the time of their appointment.
[4] A British Mission under the command of the Political Officer Sikkim, B.J. Gould, arrived in 
Lhasa in August 1936. Gould departed with most of the members of the Mission in February 
1937, leaving H.Richardson in charge of what became the permanent British Mission in Lhasa. 
The position always remained subordinate to the Political Officer Sikkim, and Gould and 
Hopkinson effectively headed the Lhasa Mission during their visits there, in February to June 
1940, and August to December 1944 (Gould), and September 1945 to January 1946 
(Hopkinson). Other British officials were present during Pemba Tsering's period as Head of 
Mission. Of the five officers who occupied this post, only George Sherriff, a wartime appointee, 
had not previously served in Tibet, although Ludlow had been employed by the Tibetan 
Government, not the Government of India.
[5] At intervals in 1907-09, and from October 1924 to July 1936, this post was combined with that 
of the British Trade Agent Yatung. After 1944 the post was nominally held by an officer stationed 
in Gangtok (Gould), or Lhasa (Richardson). The Escort Commanding Officer in Gyantse then acted 
as Trade Agent in addition to his military post, except during visits by the appointed Trade Agent. 
Two Medical Officers and three Escort Commanding Officers relieved in the absence of the Trade 
Agent and four E.C.O.'s acted in Gyantse for appointees who were stationed elsewhere.
F.Mainprice was appointed to the post while in Gangtok, 15 October 1943 - 26 October 1943, but 
was then transferred and did not take up the position until May 1944.
[6] Although provision was made for this post to open on 1 May 1894 in the Anglo-Chinese 
Convention signed on 5 December 1893, the post was not occupied. In November 1903
E.C.H. Walsh was posted to the Chumbi Valley as Assistant Political Officer attached to the Tibetan 
Frontier Commission (which became the Younghusband Mission). C.Bell took up the post in May 
1904 until he was replaced by Captain W.L.Campbell in November 1905. Campbell was relieved 
by Lieutenant F.M.Bailey between December 1906 and January 1908, when the Chumbi Valley 
was returned to Tibetan control, and Campbell took up the post which was now renamed that of 
British Trade Agent Yatung. For more details see McKay (1992a, p.420).
[7] The post was originally full-time, but from 1928 onwards the Gartok Agent visited the Agency 
during the summer months only. The posting is thus shown on an annual basis from 1928. This 
post was never occupied by a European.
[8] The original Escort posted in Gyantse in October 1904 consisted of fifty men of the 40th 
Pathan Regiment, under the command of an Indian officer. At intervals after 1916 a second,
junior, officer was posted at Gyantse as Second-in-command. This officer often succeeded to the 
position of Escort Commander, but ten officers served only in the junior position. Major Pearson's 
dates are uncertain. The officer(s) being relieved returned to India within a few days of handing 
over, except in the case of Captain Marshall, who remained for a month in 1932 to assist in training 
Tibetan troops. The officers of the Escort were all members of the Indian Army, and, as far as can 
be ascertained, were all Europeans except for Lieutenant G.N.Chatterjee (who died at Gyantse in 
1921).
[9] After the establishment, in August 1940, of the senior post of Civil Surgeon Bhutan and Tibet, 
the position was, for administrative purposes, officialy referred to as the Officer in Charge Indian 
Military Hospital Gyantse. Aside from war-time appointee Dr Humphreys, the 23 officers who 
served in Gyantse were all members of the Indian Medical Service. Following the appointment of 
the Anglo-Indian, Dr Humphreys, the position was occupied by Indian officers.
[10] This position was created in August 1940 to oversee medical arrangements in Bhutan and 
Tibet. Although the official headquarters of the post was at Gyantse, the post became, in effect, 
that of Medical Officer to the British Mission Lhasa, with the officers concerned increasingly 
spending much of their time in Lhasa. In this instance, due to the varied locations involved, the 
dates given are those of appointment to the post. Two of the four officers appointed to this post, 
Lt-Colonel Hislop and Major Guthrie, had previously served as Medical Officer Gyantse.
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